This volume is a verbatim transcription of American Jurisprudence, Volume 12 (1938), Constitutional Law continuation, produced from high-resolution PDF page-spread photographs using Anthropic Claude optical-character recognition. Every effort has been made to reproduce the text exactly as printed, including all footnote citations. Characters that were genuinely illegible in the source images are marked [?].

The original work was published in 1938 and is in the public domain in the United States. This transcription edition is presented for educational and research purposes.

1.Table of Contents

2.Constitutional Law 24

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 29

§ 383. Terms and Scope of Constitutional Guaranties.— 29

§ 384. Obligation Defined and Scope of Rule.— 31

§ 385. Principles as Affected by War.— 33

§ 388. Rule as to Invalid or Illegal Contracts.— 37

B. IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION 40

§ 391. Degree of Impairment.— 42

§ 392. Diminution of Value of Contract.— 43

§ 393. Diminishing Means of Enforcement.— 44

§ 394. Generally.— 45

C. MEANS OF IMPAIRMENT 47

§ 395. Federal Laws.— 47

§ 396. State Laws, Constitutions, and Agencies.— 48

§ 397. Municipal Ordinances and Agencies.— 50

D. STATE CONTRACTS 57

§ 399. Generally.— 57

E. MATTERS CONSTITUTING CONTRACTS 64

§ 407. Corporate Charters; Statutory Liability of Stockholders.— 70

§ 408. Grants of Franchises by Municipal Corporations.— 71

§ 409. — 74

§ 410. Ultra Vires Grants as Exception to Rule.— 74

§ 411. Effect of Reserved Power to Amend or Repeal.— 75

§ 412. Rate Fixing by Municipality.— 75

§ 413. Privileges and Their Recall.— 77

§ 414. Privilege of Using Streets and Highways.— 77

§ 415. Judgments.— 79

§ 416. Marriage.— 80

F. LAWS AFFECTING POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS 82

§ 417. General Rule.— 82

§ 418. Taxing Power as Inherent Part of Contract.— 84

§ 419. Reorganized Municipal Corporations.— 87

§ 420. Matters Affecting Public Officers and Employees.— 89

G. POLICE POWER AS AFFECTING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS 90

§ 421. Generally.— 90

§ 422. Contracts Restricting Police Power.— 94

§ 423. Emergency Legislation.— 96

§ 424. Generally.— 97

§ 425. Labor Legislation.— 99

§ 426. Banks.— 100

H. INTEREST AND MONEY 103

§ 427. Generally.— 103

§ 428. Changes in Usury Laws.— 105

I. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS AS AFFECTED BY TAXING POWER 107

J. STATE CONTROL OVER REMEDIES 108

U. S. 677, 67 L. ed. 456, 43 S. Ct. 238; Etor 115

S. Ct. 428; Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U. S. 115

U. S. 219, 39 L. ed. 679, 15 S. Ct. 581; 115

N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dis- 116

S. Ct. 47; Brearley School v. Ward, 201 116

N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 116

C. L.; E. J. Lander & Co. v. Deemy, 46 117

N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922, citing R. C. L.; 117

S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836. 118

U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 118

N. W. 695, citing R. C. L.; Graves v. How- 119

§ 434. Tests and Operation of Rule.— 119

§ 435. Stipulated Remedies.— 121

§ 436. Curative Legislation.— 122

K. MODIFICATION OF PARTICULAR REMEDIES 124

§ 437. Generally.— 124

§ 438. State Insolvency Laws.— 126

§ 439. Preferences in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Distribution.— 128

§ 440. Mortgages.— 129

§ 441. Redemption.— 133

§ 442. Exemptions.— 135

§ 443. Liens.— 138

§ 444. Insurance.— 139

§ 445. Statutes of Limitation.— 141

§ 446. Generally.— 143

§ 447. Article 4, § 2, of Federal Constitution.— 144

§ 450. State Citizenship and Its Privileges.— 153

B. WHO ARE CITIZENS ENTITLED TO PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 155

§ 451. Generally.— 155

§ 452. Negroes, Mongolians, Indians, and Aliens.— 157

§ 453. Corporations, Business Trusts, Municipal Corporations, and State Agencies.— 158

§ 454. Residents and Nonresidents of a State.— 159

C. WHO ARE INHIBITED FROM IMPAIRING PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 161

§ 455. Generally.— 161

D. WHAT ARE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 162

§ 456. History and Definition.— 163

§ 457. General Illustrations.— 165

§ 458. Distinction between Fundamental Rights of Persons and Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship.— 168

§ 459. Removal from One State to Another.— 169

§ 460. Acquisition of Property.— 170

§ 461. Pursuit of Occupations.— 172

§ 462. Freedom from Discriminatory Taxation.— 174

§ 463. Freedom from Discriminatory License Laws.11— 175

§ 464. Access to Courts.— 181

E. WHAT ARE NOT PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 186

§ 465. Generally.— 186

§ 466. Right to Suffrage.— 192

§ 467. Rights Pertaining to Intoxicating Liquors.— 193

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMAND OF EQUALITY 195

§ 468. Generally.— 195

§ 469. Definition and Nature.— 196

U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287; Ann. 199

U. S. 57, 67 L. ed. 707; State v. State, Boyce, 200

U. S. 283, 61 L. ed. 302, 37 S. Ct. 124; Ham- 200

S. Ct. 1122; Richmond v. Dudley (Ind.) 26 200

N. E. 184, 10 L.R.A. 137. 200

N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; Vigeant v. Postal 201

R. C. L. 202

S. E. 516, 47 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. 202

S. Ct. 1031. 203

L. R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364, 37 203

L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. 203

U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Bar- 203

§ 470. Equality of Right.— 205

§ 471. Effect of Fourteenth Amendment.— 207

§ 472. — 208

§ 474. Persons Protected.— 213

§ 475. — 215

B. CLASSIFICATION 216

§ 476. Generally.— 216

§ 478. Application of Law to All Members.— 222

R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A. 223

S. Ct. 32; Arkadelphia Mill. Co. v. St. 225

S. Ct. 630; Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash- 225

O. R. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513, 57 L. ed. 225

R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 226

S. Ct. 1028; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 226

§ 479. Completeness of Inclusion of Members.— 228

§ 480. Reasonableness.— 229

§ 481. Substantial Differences; Proper Relationship to Object.— 236

§ 484. Completeness of Regulation of Evils.— 248

§ 485. Generally.— 253

§ 487. Capacity and Equipment.— 257

§ 488. Location and Territory.— 258

§ 489. Population.— 261

§ 490. Size and Amount.— 264

§ 494. Discretion of Officials.— 268

§ 495. Generally.— 272

§ 502. Labor Unions.— 282

§ 503. Employers.— 282

§ 504. Generally.— 284

§ 505. Equality of Right.— 286

§ 506. Particular Classes.— 286

§ 507. — 290

§ 508. Methods of Selling.— 293

§ 509. Articles Sold.— 294

§ 510. Agriculturists.— 295

§ 511. Milk Dealers.— 298

§ 512. Classification among Corporations.— 300

§ 513. Classification among Corporations and Individuals.— 303

§ 514. Classification among Individuals and Partnerships.— 305

§ 515. Horse Racing and Pool Selling.— 306

§ 516. Vehicles.— 308

§ 517. Buildings.— 311

§ 518. Taxation.— 313

S. Ct. 604; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 317

H. Hunt, 132 La. 1073, 162 So. 777, 103 318

S. Ct. 556, 87 A.L.R. 374. 319

U. S. 550, 79 L. ed. 1054, 55 S. Ct. 525, re- 319

S. Ct. 830, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 319

U. S. 517, 77; Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 319

S. Ct. 423; Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Harding 320

U. S. 421, 65 L. ed. 1029, 41 S. Ct. 571; F. S. 320

R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 320

S. W. (2d) 620, 106 A.L.R. 647; Hardwick v. 321

§ 519. Generally.— 322

§ 520. Discretion of Legislature.— 324

§ 521. Presumptions and Burden of Proof.— 326

§ 522. Matters Considered by Courts.— 332

§ 523. Technique of Judicial Investigation.— 333

§ 524. Construction of State Statutes.— 335

C. SPECIAL BURDENS AND PRIVILEGES 335

§ 525. Generally.— 335

§ 526. Generally.— 336

§ 527. Special Burdens or Liabilities.— 339

§ 528. Generally.— 341

§ 529. Prohibitive State Constitutional Provisions.— 341

§ 530. Classification Creating Special Privileges.— 345

§ 531. Illustrations of Valid Special Privileges and Immunities.— 345

§ 532. Illustrations of Invalid Special Privileges and Immunities.— 347

§ 535. Generally.— 352

D. DISCRIMINATIONS BASED ON RESIDENCE 352

§ 536. Against Nonresidents.— 352

§ 537. Against Residents.— 356

E. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AS TO SPECIAL AND LOCAL LEGISLATION 359

F. EQUALITY IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 365

§ 543. Generally.— 365

§ 544. Jurisdiction.— 367

§ 545. Venue.— 367

§ 546. — 368

§ 547. — 370

§ 548. Removal of Causes.— 370

§ 549. Conditions Precedent to Suit.— 371

§ 550. Procedure.— 371

§ 551. — 373

§ 552. Evidence; Witnesses.— 374

§ 553. Trial.— 375

§ 554. Appeal.— 376

§ 555. Decisions.— 377

§ 556. Penalties.— 377

§ 557. Generally.— 378

§ 558. Preliminary Examination.— 380

G. DISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS 387

§ 566. Generally.— 387

A. IN GENERAL 389

§ 567. Generally.— 389

§ 568. Origin of Guaranty.— 393

§ 569. General Nature of Guaranty.— 394

§ 570. Difficulty of Definition.— 396

§ 571. Attempted Definitions.— 398

§ 572. Definition of "Law of the Land."— 399

§ 573. Essential Elements.— 402

§ 574. Requirement of Equality of Operation.— 406

§ 575. Protection from Arbitrary Action.— 407

§ 576. Vesting Discretion as Arbitrary Denial.— 409

§ 577. Effect of Party Being Unsuccessful before Tribunal; Errors of Tri- 411

§ 578. Military Law as Due Process.— 414

§ 579. Police Regulation.— 415

B. MODIFICATION OF COMMON-LAW RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 417

§ 580. Generally.— 417

§ 581. By States.— 418

§ 582. Remedies and Procedure.— 420

§ 583. — 421

§ 584. — 424

§ 585. Definiteness of Statutes and Orders.— 424

C. PERSONS AFFECTED BY GUARANTY 425

§ 586. Generally.— 425

§ 587. Private Persons.— 428

§ 588. Generally.— 428

§ 589. Aliens.— 429

§ 590. Corporations.— 429

§ 591. Insane Persons.10— 429

§ 592. Children.20— 430

D. NOTICE 433

§ 595. Actions in Personam.— 434

§ 596. — 435

§ 597. Actions in Rem.— 436

§ 598. Character.5— 438

§ 599. To Foreign Corporations.5— 440

§ 600. Time.— 442

§ 601. Persons Entitled.4— 443

§ 602. Of Subsequent Steps.— 444

§ 603. As Dependent on Pleading.— 444

§ 604. When Not Required.— 445

§ 605. Representative Actions.— 447

§ 606. Appearance as Dispensing with Notice.— 448

E. HEARING 448

§ 607. Generally.— 448

§ 609. Raising Issues.— 453

§ 610. Time.— 453

§ 611. Time in Relation to Judgment or Order.— 453

§ 612. — 455

§ 613. Presence of Person.— 456

§ 614. Conditions and Restrictions.— 457

§ 615. Requiring Certain Pleadings.— 458

§ 616. Rulings of Trial Court.— 458

§ 617. Imposition of Severe Penalties.— 459

§ 618. Proceedings in Which Hearing Not Required.— 460

§ 619. Necessity of Jury Trial.6— 461

§ 620. Generally.— 464

§ 621. Right to Introduce Evidence.— 464

§ 622. Right to Prove and Recover Damages.— 466

§ 623. Changes in Rules of Evidence.— 467

§ 624. Creation of Presumptions.— 468

§ 631. Compulsory Process upon Witnesses.— 479

§ 632. Fixing Burden of Proof.— 479

§ 633. Generally.— 480

§ 634. Necessity of Judicial Tribunal.— 481

§ 635. Requirement of Impartiality.— 484

§ 636. Generally.— 486

§ 637. Rehearings.— 486

§ 638. Appeal or Review.— 486

§ 640. Generally.— 489

§ 642. Changes in Valuation; Reassessment.— 495

§ 643. Collection.— 496

§ 644. Forfeiture or Sale.— 497

§ 645. Imposition of Lien.— 499

§ 646. Proceedings against Collectors.— 500

§ 647. Generally.— 500

F. PROTECTION OF LIBERTY 500

§ 648. Generally.17— 500

G. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 502

§ 649. Generally.— 502

§ 650. What Is Property.— 503

§ 652. Relation to Police Power.— 508

§ 653. Generally.— 509

§ 654. Attachment and Garnishment.— 509

§ 655. Business.— 509

§ 656. Rights in Children.— 510

§ 657. Contracts.20— 510

§ 658. Taking under Eminent Domain.9— 511

§ 659. Franchises.— 513

§ 660. Rights under Judgment.— 514

§ 661. Jural Rights.— 514

§ 669. Right to Labor.— 521

§ 670. Labor Relations.— 522

§ 671. Liens.— 522

§ 672. Limitation of Actions.— 522

§ 673. Rights in Property.— 523

§ 674. — 524

§ 675. Statutory Rights.— 525

H. DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY 525

§ 676. Generally.— 525

§ 679. Property Constituting Nuisance.7— 530

§ 680. Foodstuffs.— 532

§ 681. Intoxicating Liquors.— 533

§ 682. Trees.— 534

§ 683. Animals.— 535

I. REGULATIONS 537

§ 684. Generally.— 537

§ 685. Animals.— 539

§ 636. Attorneys' Fees.— 539

§ 687. Automobiles.— 539

§ 688. Banks.— 540

§ 689. Business and Trade Practices.— 542

§ 690. Contracts.— 542

§ 691. Flag.— 545

§ 692. Garbage.— 545

§ 693. Moratorium.— 546

§ 694. Occupations.2— 547

§ 695. Privacy.— 547

§ 696. Property.— 547

§ 697. Public Printing.— 550

§ 698. Public Utilities.— 550

§ 699. Secret Societies.— 555

§ 700. Time.— 555

§ 701. Waste.— 556

§ 702. Generally.— 556

§ 703. History.— 558

§ 704. Interpretation.— 559

§ 705. Operation and Effect.— 559

§ 706. — 561

§ 707. Exceptions to Operation.— 561

§ 708. Policy of Forum; Conflicting Interests.— 564

§ 709. Necessity that Validity of Foreign Laws Be Involved.— 566

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2.Constitutional Law

| 6R.C.L. 11&12Am.Jur. | 6R.C.L. 11&12Am.Jur. | §§ | | §§ | | 6R.C.L. 11&12Am.Jur. | §§ |

| ¹ | ............ | ³⁶⁰ | DIVORCE | ³⁶⁰ | ............ | ⁴⁶⁹ | ⁴²⁵ | ... INHERITANCE, |

| ² | ............ | ³⁰⁹ | ²⁹⁹ | ............ | ³⁶¹ | ............ | | ⁴²⁷ | ESTATE, SUCCESSION, |

| ³ | ............ | ³¹¹ | | ............ | ³⁶² | ............ | | ⁴²⁸ | AND GIFT TAXES |

| ⁴ | ............ | ³¹² | ³⁰⁰ | ... DOWER; CUR- | ³⁶³ | ............ | | ⁴²⁹ | ... 547-⁵⁵⁶ |

| ⁵ | ............ | ³¹³ | | TESY; COMMU- | ³⁶⁴ | ............ | ⁴⁷¹ | ⁴³⁰ | ............ 557-⁵⁶⁵ |

| ⁶ | ............ | ³¹⁵ | | NITY PROPERTY | ³⁶⁵ | ............ | ⁴⁷² | ⁴³¹ | ............ ⁴⁸⁴ |

| ⁷ | ............ | ³¹⁶ | ³⁰¹ | ... DESCENT AND | ³⁶⁶ | ............ | ⁴⁷³ | ⁴³² | ............ ⁵⁶⁴ |

| ⁸ | ............ | ³¹⁷ | | DISTRIBUTION | ³⁶⁷ | ............ | ⁴⁷³ | ⁴³³ | ............ ⁵⁶⁷ |

| ⁹ | ............ | ³¹⁹ | | WILLS | ³⁶⁸ | ............ | ⁴⁷⁶ | ⁴³⁴ | ............ ⁵⁷¹ |

| ¹⁰ | ............ | ³²⁰ | ³⁰² | ... LIFE ESTATES, | ³⁶⁹ | ............ | ⁴⁷⁷, ⁴⁷⁸ | ⁴³⁵ | ............ ⁵⁶⁹ |

| ¹¹ | ............ | ³²¹ | ³⁰³ | REMAINDERS, AND | ³⁷⁰ | ............ | ⁴⁷⁹ | ⁴³⁶ | ............ ⁵⁶⁸ |

| ¹² | ............ | ³²³ | | REVERSIONS | ³⁷¹ | ............ | ⁴⁸⁰ | ⁴³⁷ | ............ ⁵⁷² |

| ¹³ | ............ | ³²⁴ | ³⁰⁴ | ... FORFEITURES | ³⁷² | ............ | ⁴⁸³ | ⁴³⁸ | ............ ⁵⁶³ |

| 242a | ............ | ³²⁵ | ³⁰⁵ | AND PENALTIES | ³⁷³ | ............ | ⁴⁸¹ | ⁴³⁹ | ............ ⁵⁷⁴ |

| ²³ | ............ | ³²⁶ | | ³⁷⁸ | ³⁷⁴ | ............ | ⁴⁸² | ⁴⁴⁰ | ............ ⁵⁷⁵ |

| ²⁴ | ............ | ³²⁷ | ³⁰⁶ | ... JUDGMENTS | ³⁷⁵ | ............ | ⁵¹⁹, ⁵²⁰ | ⁴⁴¹ | ............ ⁵⁸⁶, ⁵⁸⁷ |

| ²⁵ | ............ | ³³⁰ | ³⁰⁷ | ... LIMITATION OF | ³⁷⁶ | ............ | ⁵¹⁹, ⁵²¹, ⁵²² | ⁴⁴² | ............ ⁵⁷⁷ |

| ²⁴⁶ | ............ | ³³¹ | ³⁰⁸ | ACTIONS | ³⁷⁷ | ............ | ⁴⁸⁶ | ⁴⁴³ | ... ⁵⁷³, ⁵⁹⁴ et seq. |

| ²⁴⁷ | ............ | ³³² | | ³⁷⁹ | ³⁷⁸ | ............ | ⁴⁸⁷ | | ⁶⁰⁷ et seq. |

| ²⁴⁸ | ............ | ³³³ | ³⁰⁹ | ............ | ³⁸² | ³⁷⁹ | ............ | ⁴⁸⁸, ⁴⁸⁹ | ⁴⁴⁴ | ............ ⁶⁰¹, ⁶⁰⁴ |

| ²⁴⁹ | ............ | ³³⁶ | ³¹⁰ | ............ ³⁸³ | ³⁸⁰ | ............ | ⁴⁹⁰, ⁴⁹¹ | ⁴⁴⁵ | ... ⁵⁹⁵ et seq. |

| ²⁵⁰ | ............ | ³³⁷ | ³¹¹ | ............ ³⁸⁴ | ³⁸¹ | ............ | ⁴⁹² | ⁴⁴⁶ | ............ ⁵⁹¹ |

| ²⁵¹ | ............ | ³³⁸, ³⁴⁴ | ³¹² | ............ ³⁸⁵ | ³⁸⁶ | ³⁸² | ............ | ⁴⁹³ | ⁴⁴⁷ | ... ⁵⁷³, ⁶⁰⁷ et seq. |

| ²⁵² | ............ | | ³⁴⁴, ³⁴⁵ | ³¹³ | ............ ³⁸⁶ | ³⁸⁷ | ³⁸³ | ............ | ⁴⁹⁴ | ⁴⁴⁸ | ............ ⁶⁰⁸ |

| ²⁵³ | ............ | | | ³¹⁴ | ............ ³⁸⁸ | ³⁸⁴ | ............ | ⁴⁹⁶ | ⁴⁴⁹ | ............ ⁶¹⁸ |

| ²⁵⁴ | ............ | ³⁴² | ³¹⁵ | ............ ³⁸⁹ | ³⁸⁵ | ............ | ⁴⁹⁷ | ⁴⁵⁰ | ... ⁶²⁰ et seq. |

| ²⁵⁵ | ............ | ³⁴³ | ³¹⁶ | ............ ³⁹⁰ | ³⁸⁶ | ............ | ⁴⁹⁸ | ⁴⁵¹ | ............ ⁶²¹ |

| ²⁵⁶ | ............ | ³⁴⁷ | ³¹⁷ | ............ ³⁹¹ | ³⁸⁷ | ............ | ⁴⁹⁹ | ⁴⁵² | ............ ⁶³⁷, ⁶³⁸ |

| ²⁵⁷ | ............ | ⁴⁵⁶, ⁴⁵⁷ | ³¹⁸ | ............ ³⁹² | ³⁸⁸ | ............ | ⁵⁰⁰ | ⁴⁵³ | ............ ⁶⁰⁸ |

| ²⁵⁸ | ............ | ⁴⁴⁸ | ³¹⁹ | ............ ³⁹³ | ³⁸⁹ | ............ | ⁵⁰¹ | ⁴⁵⁴ | ............ ⁶¹⁹ |

| ²⁵⁹ | ............ | ⁴⁴⁸ | ³²⁰ | ............ ³⁹⁴ | ³⁹⁰ | ............ | ⁵⁰² | ⁴⁵⁵ | ............ ⁶³⁴ |

| ²⁶⁰ | ............ | ⁴⁵² | ³²¹ | ............ ³⁹⁶, ³⁹⁷ | ³⁹¹ | ............ | ⁴⁸⁶ | ⁴⁵⁶ | ... ⁵⁸⁰ et seq. |

| ²⁶¹ | ............ | ⁴⁵³ | ³²² | ............ | ³⁹⁸ | ³⁹² | ............ | ⁵⁰⁴ | ⁴⁵⁷ | PUBLIC OFFICERS |

| ²⁶² | ............ | ⁴⁵⁵ | ³²³ | ............ | ³⁹⁹ | ³⁹³ | ............ | ⁵⁰⁵ | ⁴⁵⁸ | ............ ⁶²⁴ |

| ²⁶³ | ............ | ⁴⁵⁰ | ³²⁴ | ............ ⁴⁰⁰ | ³⁹⁴ | ............ | 506-⁵⁰⁸ | ⁴⁵⁹ | ............ ⁶²⁶ |

| ²⁶⁶ | ............ | ⁴⁵⁶, ⁴⁵⁷ | ³²⁵ | ............ ⁴⁰¹ | ³⁹⁵ | ............ | ⁵¹⁰ | ⁴⁶⁰ | ............ ⁶²⁷ |

| ²⁶⁷ | ............ | ⁴⁵⁹ | ³²⁶ | ............ ⁴⁰² | ³⁹⁶ | ............ | ⁵⁰⁹ | ⁴⁶¹ | ............ ⁶²⁸ |

| ²⁶⁸ | ............ | ⁴⁶⁰, ⁴⁶² | ³²⁷ | ............ ⁴⁰⁴ | ³⁹⁷ | ............ | ⁵²⁵, ⁵²⁶ | ⁴⁶² | ............ ⁶²⁹ |

| ²⁶⁹ | ............ | ⁴⁶¹, ⁴⁶³ | ³²⁸ | ............ ⁴⁰⁵ | ³⁹⁸ | ............ | ⁵²⁷ | ⁴⁶³ | ............ ⁶³⁰ |

| ²⁷⁰ | ............ | ⁴⁶⁷ | ³²⁹ | ............ ⁴⁰⁶ | ³⁹⁹ | ............ | ⁵²⁸, ⁵²⁹ | ⁴⁶⁴ | GRAND JURY |

| ²⁷¹ | ............ | ⁴⁶⁶ | ³³⁰ | ............ ⁴⁰⁷ | ⁴⁰⁰ | ............ | ⁵³⁰ | ⁴⁶⁵ | .. CRIMINAL LAW; |

| ²⁷² | ............ | ⁴⁵⁴ | ³³¹ | ............ 408-⁴¹⁰ | ⁴⁰¹ | ............ | ⁵³¹ | | JURY |

| ²⁷³ | ............ | ⁴⁶⁵ | ³³² | ............ ⁴¹³ | ⁴⁰² | ............ | ⁵³² | ⁴⁶⁶ | ..... CRIMINAL |

| ²⁷⁴ | ............ | ³⁴⁸ | ³³³ | ............ ⁴¹⁴ | ⁴⁰³ | ............ | ⁵³¹ | | LAW |

| ²⁷⁵ | ............ | ³⁵¹ | ³³⁴ | ............ ⁴¹⁵ | ⁴⁰⁴ | ............ | ⁵³¹ | ⁴⁶⁷ | .... CONTEMPT |

| ²⁷⁶ | ............ | ³⁵² | ³³⁵ | ............ ⁴¹⁶ | ⁴⁰⁵ | ............ | ⁵³³ | ⁴⁶⁸ | ............ ⁵⁸⁸, ⁵⁹⁰ |

| ²⁷⁷ | ............ | ³⁵³ | ³³⁶ | ............ | ⁴⁰⁶ | ............ | ⁵³⁴ | ⁴⁶⁹ | ............ ⁵⁹¹ |

| ²⁷⁸ | ............ | ³⁵⁴ | ³³⁷ | ............ | ⁴⁰⁷ | ............ | ⁵³⁵ | ⁴⁷⁰ | ... CRIMINAL LAW |

| ²⁸⁰ | ............ | ³⁵⁷ | ³³⁸ | COUNTIES | ⁴⁰⁸ | ............ | ⁵¹², ⁵¹³; Also | ⁴⁷¹ | ............ ⁵⁹² |

| ²⁸¹ | ............ | ³⁶¹ | ³³⁹ | ............ ⁴²² | | | CORPORATIONS | ⁴⁷² | ............ ⁶⁵¹ |

| ²⁸² | ............ | | ³⁴⁰ | ............ ⁴²⁴ | ⁴⁰⁹ | ............ | CORPORATIONS | ⁴⁷³ | ............ ⁶⁵¹ |

| ²⁸³ | ............ JURIES | ³⁵⁹, ³⁵⁰ | ³⁴¹ | ............ | ⁴¹⁰ | ............ | FOREIGN COR- | ⁴⁷⁴ | ............ ⁶⁴⁹ |

| ²⁸⁴ | ............ | ³⁵⁵, ³⁵⁶ | ³⁴² | RAILROADS | | | PORATIONS | ⁴⁷⁵ | ............ ⁶⁵⁰ |

| ²⁸⁵ | .. SECOND AND | ³⁴⁵ | ³⁴³ | .. STREET RAIL- | ⁴¹¹ | ............ | ⁵³⁶ | ⁴⁷⁶ | ............ ⁶⁷⁶ |

| ²⁸⁶ | SUBSEQUENT | | | WAYS | ⁴¹² | ............ | ⁵³⁸ | ⁴⁷⁷ | ...... ⁶⁷⁶, ⁶⁷⁷ |

| | OFFENDERS | ³⁶³ | ³⁴⁶ | ............ ⁴²⁵ | ⁴¹³ | ............ | ⁵³⁹ | ⁴⁷⁸ | ............ ⁶⁷⁸ |

| ²⁸⁷ | ............ | ³⁶⁴ | ³⁴⁷ | ............ ⁴²⁷ | ⁴¹⁴ | ............ | ⁵⁴⁰, ⁵⁴¹ | ⁴⁷⁹ | ............ ⁶⁷⁹ |

| ²⁸⁸ | ............ | ³⁶² | ³⁴⁸ | ............ ⁴²⁸ | ⁴¹⁵ | ............ | ⁵⁴² | ⁴⁸⁰ | ............ ⁶⁸⁰ |

| ²⁸⁹ | ............ | ³⁶⁵, ³⁶⁶ | ³⁴⁹ | ............ ⁴²⁹ | ⁴¹⁶ | ............ | | ⁴⁸¹ | ............ ⁶⁸¹ |

| ²⁹⁰ | ............ | ³⁶⁷ | ³⁵⁰ | ............ ⁴³⁰ | ⁴¹⁷ | ............ | | ⁴⁸² | ............ ⁶⁹⁴ |

| ²⁹¹ | ............ | ³⁶⁸ | ³⁵¹ | ............ ⁴³¹ | ⁴¹⁸ | ............ | COSTS | ⁴⁸³ | ............ HEALTH |

| ²⁹² | ............ | ³⁶⁹ | ³⁵² | ............ ⁴³² | ⁴¹⁹ | ............ | | ⁴⁸⁴ | .. PUBLIC UTIL- |

| ²⁹³ | ............ | ³⁷⁰ | ³⁵³ | ............ | ⁴²⁰ | ............ | | ⁴⁸⁵ | ITIES & SERVICES |

| ²⁹⁴ | ............ | ³⁷¹ | ³⁵⁴ | ............ ⁴³⁴ | ⁴²¹ | ............ | ⁵¹⁵ | | .. MUNICIPAL |

| ²⁹⁵ | ............ | ³⁷² | ³⁵⁵ | ............ ⁴³⁵ | ⁴²² | ............ | ⁵¹⁶ | | CORPORATIONS |

| ²⁹⁶ | ............ | ³⁷⁵ | ³⁵⁶ | ............ ⁴³⁶ | ⁴²³ | ............ | ⁵¹⁷ | | ............ ⁶⁶³ |

| ²⁹⁷ | ............ | ³⁷⁶ | ³⁵⁷ | ............ ⁴³⁷ | ⁴²⁴ | ............ | ⁵¹⁸ | | |

| ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. |

| ⁹ | ............ | ⁸ | ²⁰ | ............ | ³¹, ³⁹ | ³² | ............ | ⁴⁴ | ⁴⁴ | ............ | ⁶⁸ |

| ¹⁰ | ............ | ¹⁴, ¹⁵ | ²¹ | ............ | | ³¹ | ³³ | ............ | ⁴⁸ | ⁴⁵ | ............ | ⁶⁹, ⁷⁰ |

| ¹¹ | ............ | ¹⁹ | ²² | ............ | ³², ³³ | ³⁴ | ............ | 57-⁶⁰ | ⁴⁶ | ............ | ⁷⁴ |

| ¹² | ............ | ²⁰ | ²³ | ............ | | ³⁵ | ............ | ⁶¹ | ⁴⁷ | ............ | ⁷³ |

| ¹³ | ............ | ²¹ | ²⁴ | ............ | | ³⁴ | ³⁶ | ............ | ⁶² | ⁴⁸ | ............ | ⁷⁷ |

| ¹⁴ | ............ | ²² | ²⁵ | ............ | | ²⁶ | ³⁷ | ............ | ⁶¹ | ⁴⁹ | ............ | ⁷⁸ |

| ¹⁵ | ............ | ²⁴, ²⁶ | ²⁶ | ............ | | ³⁷ | ³⁸ | ............ | ⁶³ | ⁵⁰ | ............ | ⁷⁹ |

| ¹⁶ | ............ | ²⁴, ²⁷ | ²⁷ | ............ | | ³⁸ | ³⁹ | ............ | ⁷¹ | ⁵¹ | .. APPEAL AND ER- |

| ¹⁷ | ............ | ²⁴, ²⁶ | ²⁸ | ............ | | ⁴⁹ | ⁴⁰ | ............ | ⁶⁴ | | ROR, VOLS. ² & ³; |

| ¹⁸ | ............ | ²⁹; INJUNC- | ²⁹ | ............ | 42-⁴⁶ | ⁴¹ | ............ | ⁶⁵ | | PARDON, REPRIEVE, |

| ¹⁹ | ............ | TION; LABOR | ³⁰ | ............ | | ⁴⁷ | ⁴² | ............ | ⁶⁶ | | AND AMNESTY |

| | ............ | ²⁸ | ³¹ | ............ | 50-⁵² | ⁴³ | ............ | ⁶⁷ | ⁵² | ... HABEAS CORPUS |

| ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. |

| ¹ | ............ | ¹, ² | ¹⁰ | ............ | | ¹⁸ | ¹⁹ | ............ | ²⁵ | ²⁷ | ............ | ³⁹, ⁴⁰ |

| ² | ............ | 3-⁵ | ¹¹ | ............ | | ¹⁹ | ²⁰ | ............ | ²⁹, ³⁶, ³⁷ | ²⁸ | ............ | ⁴¹ |

| ³ | ............ | 6-⁸ | ¹² | ............ | ²⁰, ²¹ | ²¹ | ............ | ³⁰, ³¹ | ²⁹ | ............ | 42-⁴⁴ |

| ⁴ | ............ | ⁹ | ¹³ | ............ | | ²² | ............ | ³² | ³⁰ | ............ | ⁴⁶ |

| ⁵ | ............ | ¹⁰ | ¹⁴ | ............ | | ²³ | ............ | ³³ | ³¹ | ............ | ⁴⁷ |

| ⁶ | ............ | ¹¹, ¹² | ¹⁵ | ............ | | ²⁴ | ²⁴ | ............ | ³⁴ | ³² | ............ | ⁴⁸ |

| ⁷ | ............ | ¹³ | ¹⁶ | ............ | | ²⁵ | ²⁵ | ............ | ³⁵ | ³³ | ............ | ⁴⁹ |

| ⁸ | ............ | ¹⁴, ¹⁵ | ¹⁷ | ............ | | ²⁶ | ²⁶ | ............ | ³⁸ | ³⁴ | ............ | ⁵⁰ |

| ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. | ⁶ R.C.L. | ¹² Am. Jur. |

| ¹ | ............ | ¹ | ⁴³ | ............ | ¹³⁷ | ⁸⁵ | ............ | ¹²² | ¹²⁴ | ............ | ¹⁷⁵ |

| ² | ............ | ² | ⁴⁴ | ............ | ¹⁴⁵ | ⁸⁶ | ............ | ¹²² | ¹²⁵ | ............ | ¹⁷⁶ |

| ³ | ............ | ² | ⁴⁵ | ............ | ¹³⁷ | ⁸⁷ | .. MONOPOLIES, | ¹²⁶ | ............ | ¹⁷⁹ |

| ⁴ | ............ | ¹² | ⁴⁶ | ............ | ¹⁴⁰, ¹⁴² | | COMBINATIONS, AND | ¹²⁷ | ............ | ¹⁷⁸ |

| ⁵ | ............ | ⁴, ⁵ | ⁴⁷ | ............ | ¹⁴⁰ | | RESTRAINTS OF | ¹²⁸ | ............ | ¹⁸⁴ |

| ⁶ | ............ | ⁴, ⁵ | ⁴⁸ | ............ | ¹⁴¹ | | TRADE | ¹²⁹ | ... ¹⁸⁴, ⁴³⁵, ⁴³⁶ |

| ⁷ | ............ | ⁶ | ⁴⁹ | ............ | ¹⁴³ | ⁸⁸ | ............ | ¹²³ | ¹³⁰ | ............ | ¹⁷⁷ |

| ⁸ | ............ | ⁷ | ⁵⁰ | ............ | ¹⁴⁴ | ⁸⁹ | ............ | ¹⁵¹ | ¹³¹ | ............ | ¹⁷⁷ |

| ⁹ | ............ | ⁹ | ⁵¹ | ............ | ¹⁴⁵ | ⁹⁰ | ............ | ²²¹ | ¹³² | ............ | ¹⁸³ |

| ¹⁰ | ............ | ¹⁰ | ⁵² | ............ | ¹⁴⁶ | ⁹¹ | ............ | ³⁵⁹ | ¹³³ | .. CARRIERS, VOLS. |

| ¹¹ | ............ | ¹⁶ | ⁵³ | ............ | ¹⁴⁸ | ⁹² | ............ | ³⁶⁰ | | ⁹ & ¹⁰ |

| ¹² | ............ | ¹⁷ | ⁵⁴ | ............ | ¹⁴⁷ | ⁹³ | ............ | ¹³ | ¹³⁴ | .. MASTER AND |

| ¹³ | ............ | ¹⁸ | ⁵⁵ | ............ | ⁶⁰ | ⁹⁴ | ............ | ¹⁴ | | SERVANT |

| ¹⁴ | ............ | ¹⁸ | ⁵⁶ | ............ | ⁶¹ | ⁹⁵ | ............ | ¹³, ²², ¹¹⁴, ¹¹⁶ | ¹³⁵ | .... INSURANCE |

| ¹⁵ | ............ | | ⁵⁷ | ............ | ⁶² | ⁹⁶ | ............ | ¹¹⁴ | ¹³⁶ | ............ | ²⁰² |

| ¹⁶ | .. INSANE AND | ⁵⁸ | ............ | ⁶³ | ⁹⁷ | ............ | ¹⁵ | ¹³⁷ | ............ | 203-²⁰⁵ |

| ¹⁷ | OTHER IN- | ⁵⁹ | ............ | 64-⁶⁷ | ⁹⁸ | ............ | ¹⁴⁹ | ¹³⁸ | ............ | ²⁰⁴ |

| ¹⁸ | COMPETENT | ⁶⁰ | ............ | ⁶⁸ | ⁹⁹ | ............ | ¹⁵⁰ | ¹³⁹ | ............ | ²⁰³ |

| ¹⁹ | PERSONS | ⁶¹ | ............ | ⁶⁹ | ¹⁰⁰ | ............ | ¹⁵³ | ¹⁴⁰ | ............ | ²⁰⁵ |

| ²⁰ | | ⁶² | ............ | ⁷⁰, ⁷¹ | ¹⁰¹ | ............ | ¹⁵⁴ | ¹⁴¹ | ............ | |

| ²¹ | ............ | ¹⁹ | ⁶³ | ............ | ⁷² | ¹⁰² | ............ | ¹⁵⁵ | ¹⁴² | ............ | |

| ²² | ............ | ¹⁹, ²² | ⁶⁴ | ............ | ⁷³ | ¹⁰³ | ............ | ¹⁵⁶ | ¹⁴³ | ............ | PUBLIC |

| ²³ | ...... ²⁶, ²⁸, ²⁹, ⁶⁴ | ⁶⁵ | ............ | ⁷⁴ | ¹⁰⁴ | ............ | ¹⁵² | ¹⁴⁴ | ............ | OFFICERS |

| ²⁴ | ......... ²², ¹³⁹ | ⁶⁶ | ............ | ⁷⁵, ⁷⁶, ⁷⁸, ¹¹² | ¹⁰⁵ | ............ | ¹⁵⁸ | ¹⁴⁵ | ............ | |

| ²⁵ | ............ | ²⁷ | ⁶⁷ | ............ | ⁷⁹ | ¹⁰⁶ | ............ | ¹⁵⁹ | ¹⁴⁶ | ............ | ²⁰⁶ |

| ²⁶ | ............ | 31-³⁴ | ⁶⁸ | ............ | ⁸⁰ | ¹⁰⁷ | ............ | ¹⁶⁰ | ¹⁴⁷ | ............ | ²⁰⁷ |

| ²⁷ | ......... ³⁷, ⁴²⁷ | ⁶⁹ | ............ | ⁸¹ | ¹⁰⁸ | ............ | ¹⁶¹ | ¹⁴⁸ | .. PUBLIC OFFICERS |

| ²⁸ | ......... ³⁹, ⁴⁰ | ⁷⁰ | ............ | 84-⁸⁷ | ¹⁰⁹ | ............ | ¹⁶² | ¹⁴⁹ | ............ | |

| ²⁹ | ............ | ⁴¹ | ⁷¹ | ............ | ⁸², ⁸³ | ¹¹⁰ | ............ | | ¹⁵⁰ | ............ | |

| ³⁰ | ............ | ⁴³ | ⁷² | ............ | ⁸², ⁸³ | ¹¹¹ | ............ | ¹⁶⁴ | ¹⁵¹ | .. PUBLIC WORKS |

| ³¹ | ......... 53-⁵⁵ | ⁷³ | ............ | ⁸⁸, ⁹¹ | ¹¹² | ............ | ¹⁶⁵ | ¹⁵² | AND CONTRACTS |

| ³² | ............ | ⁵⁶ | ⁷⁴ | ............ | ⁸⁹ | ¹¹³ | ............ | ¹⁶⁶ | ¹⁵³ | ............ | |

| ³³ | ...... 46-⁵⁰, ⁵⁷ | ⁷⁵ | ............ | ⁹² | ¹¹⁴ | ............ | ¹⁶⁷ | ¹⁵⁴ | ............ | PUBLIC |

| ³⁴ | ......... ⁴⁷, ⁴⁸ | ⁷⁶ | ............ | 96-¹⁰⁰ | ¹¹⁵ | ............ | ¹⁶⁹ | ¹⁵⁵ | ............ | UTILITIES |

| ³⁵ | ......... ⁵¹, ⁵⁸ | ⁷⁷ | ............ | ¹⁰¹ | ¹¹⁶ | ............ | ¹⁷⁰ | ¹⁵⁶ | ............ | ²⁰⁸ |

| ³⁶ | ............ | ⁵² | ⁷⁸ | ............ | ⁹⁹, ¹⁰¹ | ¹¹⁷ | ............ | ¹⁷¹ | ¹⁵⁷ | ............ | ¹⁸⁶ |

| ³⁷ | ............ | ²³ | ⁷⁹ | ............ | 102-¹⁰⁶ | ¹¹⁸ | ............ | ²²⁵ | ¹⁵⁸ | ............ | ¹⁸⁷ |

| ³⁸ | ............ | ²⁴ | ⁸⁰ | ............ | ⁹³, ⁹⁷, ¹⁰⁷ | ¹¹⁹ | ............ | ¹⁷² | ¹⁵⁹ | ... ARBITRATION |

| ³⁹ | ............ | ²⁵ | ⁸¹ | ............ | ⁹⁴ | ¹²⁰ | ............ | ¹⁶⁸ | | AND AWARD; |

| ⁴⁰ | ...... 124-¹³⁵ | ⁸² | ............ | ⁹⁵ | ¹²¹ | ............ | WAR | | COURTS |

| ⁴¹ | .... 125-¹³⁶, ¹³⁸ | ⁸³ | ............ | ⁹³ | ¹²² | ............ | WAR | ¹⁶⁰ | ............ | |

| ⁴² | .......... ¹³³ | ⁸⁴ | ............ | 113-¹¹⁶ | ¹²³ | ............ | ¹⁷⁴ | ¹⁶¹ | ............ | COURTS |

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

§ 383. Terms and Scope of Constitutional Guaranties.—

The Federal Constitution provides particularly for the protection of the citizen in respect of his contractual rights by stating that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.1 This clause of the Constitution is, in terms, a limitation on the powers of the states only, and neither it nor any other clause forbids the Congress of the United States, when acting within the scope of its powers, to enact laws which may operate to impair the obligation of contracts.2

Not only the original thirteen states, but all the states, are bound by the prohibition as to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.³

Speaking generally, it may be said that Congress, while without power to impair the obligation of contracts by laws acting directly and independently to that end, undeniably has authority to pass legislation pertinent to any of its powers conferred by the Constitution however such legislation may operate collaterally or incidentally to impair or destroy the obligation of private contracts.⁴ Hence, the obligation of contract is not impaired by an act of

²Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 294 U. S. 648, 79 L. ed. 1110, 55 S. Ct. 595; Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352; W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426, 78 L. ed. 1344, 54 S. Ct. 816, 93 A.L.R. 173; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 78 L. ed. 342, 54 S. Ct. 140; Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co. 290 U. S. 163, 78 L. ed. 243, 54 S. Ct. 134, affirming 261 N. Y. 140, 639, 184 N. E. 737, 185 N. E. 772, 87 A.L.R. 459; Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 75 L. ed. 562, 51 S. Ct. 306; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 68 L. ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197; Superior Water, Light & P. Co. v. Superior, 263 U. S. 125, 68 L. ed. 204, 44 S. Ct. 82; Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214; Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U. S. 409, 61 L. ed. 395, 37 S. Ct. 158; Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 28 L. ed. 279, 4 S. Ct. 170, 312; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. ed. 496; Re Inland Dredging Corp. (C. C. A. 2d) 61 F. (2d) 765, 88 A.L.R. 254, writ of certiorari denied in 288 U. S. 611, 77 L. ed. 985, 53 S. Ct. 403; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Franklin-American Trust Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 52 F. (2d) 431, 87 A.L.R. 386, writ of certiorari dismissed in 286 U. S. 533, 76 L. ed. 1274, 52 S. Ct. 642; Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McFadden (C. C. A. 8th) 105 F. 293, 52 L.R.A. 900, affirmed in 185 U. S. 505, 46 L. ed. 1012, 22 S. Ct. 753; Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, 86 A.L.R. 1493; Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Filmer, 217 Cal. 754, 21 P. (2d) 112, 91 A.L.R. 1; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Federal Land Bank v. W., 218 Iowa, 339, 252 N. W. 507, 94 A.L.R. 1338; Nagel v. Ghlinger, 166 Md. 231, 171 A. 65, 92 A.L.R. 1391; Harsha v. Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N. W. 849, 90 A.L.R. 853; Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Lovely Co. 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227, 88 A.L.R. 1263; Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co. 111 N. J. L. 596, 169 A. 177, 89 A.L.R. 1080; Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297; State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523; Haberlach v. Tillamook County Bank, 134 Or. 279, 293 P. 927, 72 A.L.R. 1245; Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1063; Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S. W. (2d) 1007, 96 A.L.R. 802; Filipkowski v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. 206 Wis. 39, 238 N. W. 828, 78 A.L.R. 613; Re Cranberry Creek Drainage Dist. 202 Wis. 64, 231 N. W. 538, 85 A.L.R. 242. See also Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 457, 20 L. ed. 287. Neither Congress nor the United States is in terms restricted by the provisions of the U. S. Const. Art. I, § 10, that no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract. New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591, 66 L. ed. 385, 42 S. Ct. 239. Contracts, however express, dealing with a subject matter which lies within the control of the constitutional authority of Congress cannot fetter such authority. Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352, affirming 265 N. Y. 37, 191 N. E. 726, 92 A.L.R. 1523.

⁴Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 294 U. S. 648, 79 L. ed. 1110, 55 S. Ct. 595 (power to enact bankruptcy legislation); Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352 (power over money). "Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with subject matter which lies within the control of Congress they have a congenital infirmity." Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Ameri- 10

Congress passed pursuant to, and in accord with, the interstate commerce clause.⁵ Furthermore, it is on this principle that Congress has the power to enact a bankruptcy law under which debtors may be discharged from debts existing at the time of the enactment of the law, while the power of the states in this respect is limited to the discharge of subsequent debts.⁶

The validity of the legislation of a foreign state cannot be tested by the Constitution of the United States, even if such foreign state subsequently becomes incorporated into the Union as one of the states, as was the case with Texas.⁷ Hence, the extent to which the people of the State of Texas are bound to acknowledge contracts or titles repudiated by the former Republic of Texas is a question to be decided by their own tribunals and with which the Federal courts have no right to interfere.⁸ The same conclusion was reached with respect to the original thirteen colonies. The Federal Constitution commenced its operation on the first Wednesday in March, 1789,⁹ and it was early decided that the provision that no state should make any law impairing the obligation of contracts did not extend to a law enacted by a colony or state before that day, and operating upon rights of property vested before that time.¹⁰ The clause as to the impairment of the obligation of contracts seems to be peculiar to the American system of constitutional government.¹¹ For example, there is no constitutional prohibition in Canada against the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts.¹²

§ 384. Obligation Defined and Scope of Rule.—

As between contracts, a subject elsewhere fully considered,13 and the obligation of a contract, protected against impairment by constitutional provisions, a distinction has been repeatedly drawn. The obligation of a contract is defined as the law or duty which binds the parties to perform their agreement.14 It is coeval with the

can Writing Paper Co. 299 U. S. 526, 81 L. ed. 387, 57 S. Ct. 24. The Constitution does not prohibit Congress from taking any action which may indirectly have the effect of impairing the obligation of contracts. Contracts must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of government; and no obligation of a contract can stand in the way of the exercise of legitimate government authority. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 457, 20 L. ed. 287.

⁶Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed. 1593, 55 S. Ct. 854, 97 A.L.R. 1106, rehearing denied in 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 46 L. ed. 1113, 22 S. Ct. 857.

⁸Herman v. Phalen, 14 How. (U. S.) 79, 14 L. ed. 334; League v. De Young, 11 How. (U. S.) 185, 13 L. ed. 657.

¹⁰Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 420, 5 L. ed. 124. The provision in the Constitution that no state shall make any law impairing the obligation of contracts does not extend to a state law enacted before the Constitution commenced its operation. Ibid.

¹¹Except for the provision that laws impairing the obligation of contracts are forbidden, the obligation of contracts is subject to legislative control, and is not secured by any general principles of jurisprudence outside the constitutional guaranty. Canada S. R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 27 L. ed. 1020, 3 S. Ct. 363.

¹⁴Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 65 L. ed. 857, 41 S. Ct. 408; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Selover, B. & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112, 57 L. ed. 146, 33 S. Ct. 69; Bedford v. Eastern Bldg. & L. Asso. 181 U. S. 227, 45 L. ed. 834, 21 S. Ct. 597; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; Louisiana ex rel. Nelson v. Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 648; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 26 L. ed. 132; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 304, 14 L. ed. 705; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. S.) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C.) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171; Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, 86 A.L.R. 1493; Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. (Del.) 455, 81 Am. Dec. 185; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 11

creation of the contract, the law affords for its enforcement,¹⁶ or, as other-

to perform,¹⁹ and it is a legal, not a mere moral, obligation.²⁰ The Constitution

tion all that are valid of every description,¹ whether executed or executory.²

Am. Dec. 447; Larrabee v. Talbott, 5 Gill (Md.) 426, 46 Am. Dec. 637, overruled on another point in Pinckney v. Lanahan, 62 Md. 447, 80 Am. Dec. 311; Bailey v. Gentry, Miss. 164, 13 Am. Dec. 484; J. B. Preston

¹Mo. 164, 13 Am. Dec. 484; J. B. Preston & Co. v. Funkhouser, 261 N. Y. 140, 639, 184 N. E. 737, 18 N. Y. 163, 78 L. ed. 243, affirmed 290 U. S. 163, 78 L. ed. 243,

⁵⁴S. Ct. 134; Boswell v. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. 193 N. Y. 465, 86 N. E. 532, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 948; Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 233, 8 Am. Dec. 313; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 565; Goggans v. Turnipseed, 1 S. C. 80, 98 Am. Dec. 397, 7 Am. Rep. 23; State v. Carew, 47 S. C. L. (13 Rich.) 498; Howard v. Ross, 38 Wash. 67, 80 P. 318, 3 Ann. Cas. 1140; Bettman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 P. 53, 40 L.R.A. 815; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569. It is to the laws, whether part of the common law or found in the statutes of the state, that we look for the validity and extent of a contract between persons. They constitute its obligation. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. 218 U. S. 406,

⁵⁴L. ed. 1088, 31 S. Ct. 59, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 220, 21 Ann. Cas. 815. "Obligation" is defined to be 'the act of obliging or binding, that which obligates; the binding power of a vow, promise, oath or contract.'" Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793.

¹⁵National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co. 226 U. S. 276, 57 L. ed. 221, 33 S. Ct. 17; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4, 97 A.L.R. 431; Green v. Asheville, 199 N. C. 516, 154 S. E. 852, citing R. C. L.

¹⁶Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 S. Ct. 164; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284,

³⁰L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 648; Louisiana v. New Or- leans, 102 U. S. 203, 26 L. ed. 132; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314, writ of certiorari denied in 199 U. S. 607,

⁵⁰L. ed. 331, 26 S. Ct. 747; Board of Rev- enue v. Farson, 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881; Welsh v. Cross, 146 Cal. 621, 81 P. 229, 106 Am. St. Rep. 63, 2 Ann. Cas. 796; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450,

¹⁷A. 405; Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 265, 94 N. E. 1001, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1215,

²⁰¹N. C. 59, 159 S. E. 14, citing R. C. L.; Green v. Asheville, 199 N. C. 516, 154 S. E. 852, citing R. C. L.; Blakemore v. Coop- er, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1074, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574; Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 426, 22 Am. Rep. 321; Swinburne v. Mills, 17 Wash. 611, 50 P. 489, 61 Am. St. Rep. 932. Annotation: 1 L.R.A. 356. The obligation of a contract, within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts, includes everything within its obligatory scope. Ed- wards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793. The obligation of a contract consists in what the obligor has undertaken to per- form, as measured by the standard of the laws in force at the time it was entered into. State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676,

¹⁵⁷So. 4, 97 A.L.R. 431. The obligation of a contract, including everything within its obligatory scope, em- braces the means provided for its enforce- ment. Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569.

¹⁷Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. (Del.) 455, 81 Am. Dec. 185; State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4, 97 A.L.R. 431.

¹⁸Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 A. 405, 4 L.R.A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266.

¹⁹Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253, 8 Am. Dec. 183; State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4, 97 A.L.R. 431.

²⁰Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124, 92 Am. Dec. 56; Larrabee v. Talbott, 5 Gill (Md.) 426, 46 Am. Dec. 637, overruled on another point in Pinckney v. Lanahan,

⁶²Md. 447; Goggans v. Turnipseed, 1 S. C. 80, 98 Am. Dec. 397, 7 Am. Rep. 23; State v. Carew, 47 S. C. L. (13 Rich.) 498, 91 Am. Dec. 245.

¹Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brook- lyn, 166 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165, 17 S. Ct. 718; Stephens v. Southern P. Co. 109 Cal. 86, 41 P. 783, 29 L.R.A. 751, 50 Am. St. Rep. 17; Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. (Del.) 455, 81 Am. Dec. 185; Lewis v. Brockenridge, 1 12

contract the remedy may be modified at the discretion of the legislative body.⁴

property necessarily implies a right to process of law to protect it.⁵ While it

§ 385. Principles as Affected by War.—

Blackf. (Ind.) 220, 12 Am. Dec. 228; Home Teleph. Co. v. Sarcoxie Light & Teleph. Co. 236 Mo. 114, 139 S. W. 108, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 124. It has long been settled by decisions of the United States Supreme Court that the word "contracts" in U. S. Const. Art. I, § 10, forbidding a state to impair the ob- ligation of contracts, is used in its usual or popular sense as signifying an agree- ment of two or more minds, upon suf- ficient consideration, to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent, express or implied, to its terms is of its very essence. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214. A contract valid when made is within the constitutional protection precluding the legislature from impairing contract obliga- tions. Filipkowski v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. 206 Wis. 39, 238 N. W. 828, 78 A.L.R. 613.

²⁴L. ed. 558; Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447. An executory contract within the mean- ing of the constitutional provision as to impairment of contracts is one in which a party binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162. It may be noted, however, that in a sub- sequent case it was said by Mr. Justice McLean that if it had not been otherwise laid down in the case of Fletcher v. Peck,

⁶Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162, he would have doubted whether the inhibition against impairment of the obligations of contracts did not apply exclusively to ex- ecutory contracts. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420, 9 L. ed. 773.

³Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54; Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Or. 266, 55 P. 967, 43 L.R.A. 634, 75 Am. St. Rep. 641. The constitutional provision against the impairment of contracts is not limited to express contracts and specific agreements but includes all cases where the law com- pletes the contract by implying an obliga- tion upon the part of one of the parties thereto to make compensation. Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Or. 266, 55 P. 967, 43 L.R.A. 634,

⁴Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 S. Ct. 755; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529. As to the modification of remedies, see infra, § 432.

⁵Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. (Del.) 455, 81 Am. Dec. 185; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Wil- liams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 96 Am. Dec. 613.

⁷Harsha v. Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N. W. 849, 90 A.L.R. 853 (control by state over its subdivisions).

²Jones v. Crittenden, 4 N. C. (1 Car. Law Repos. 385) 6 Am. Dec. 531; State v. Carew, 47 S. C. L. (13 Rich.) 498, 91 Am. Dec. 245; Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 688, 98 Am. Dec. 494. Annotation: 9 A.L.R. 7. As to moratorium legislation, see infra, § 423.

³Barry v. Iseman, 48 S. C. L. (14 Rich.) 129, 91 Am. Dec. 262. Annotation: 9 A.L.R. 7. 13

the Confederate States and the United States were held to violate the impairment clause of the Federal Constitution.⁴

As a general rule, a moratory law which stays all actions against persons in the military or naval service for a definite and reasonable time does not impair the obligation of a contract, since the application of the statute is solely to the remedy.⁵

**§ ³⁸⁶. Existing Laws as Establishing Obligations.**—Conformably to the well-established rule that the laws which subsist at the time and place of making a contract enter into, and form a part of, it as if they were expressly referred to, or incorporated in, its terms,⁶ the obligation of a contract is measured by the standard of the laws in force at the time it was entered into, and its performance is to be regulated by the terms and rules which they prescribe.⁷ There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent

4Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 688, 98 Am. Dec. 494. Annotation: 9 A.L.R. 8. 5McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127, 83 Am. Dec. 401; Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313, 84 Am. Dec. 442. Annotation: 9 A.L.R. 11. For a detailed discussion of war moratory statutes, see WAR [Also 27 R. C. L. Perm. Supp. p. 6021]. 6W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905; Farmers & M. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 67 L. ed. 1157, 43 S. Ct. 651, 30 A.L.R. 635; Oshkosh Waterworks v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 249, 23 S. Ct. 234; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 S. Ct. 903, 962; Louisiana ex rel. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 65; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 463, 2 S. Ct. 91; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Head v. University of Mississippi, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 526, 22 L. ed. 160; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Gantley v. Ewing, 3 How. (U. S.) 707, 11 L. ed. 794; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. S.) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C.) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171; State ex rel. Sherrill v. Milam, 113 Fla. 491, 153 So. 100, 125, 136, citing R. C. L.; Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 79, 11 So. 97, 16 L.R.A. 308, 30 Am. St. Rep. 95; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 731; County Bd. of Edu. v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W. 465, citing R. C. L.; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 A. 405, 4 L.R.A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266; Hubbard v. Hubbard (Mo. App.) 264 S. W. 422, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Public Serv. Commission v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202, 67 A.L.R. 1020; Gagnon v. Butte, 75 Mont. 279, 243 P. 1085, 51 A.L.R. 966; Sovereign Camp, W. W. v. Lenoir, 208 N. C. 433, 181 S. E. 339, citing R. C. L.; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1074, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574; Nelson v. Pitts, 126 Okla. 191, 259 P. 533, 53 A.L.R. 1187; Schramm v. Done, 135 Or. 16, 293 P. 931, citing R. C. L.; Haberlach v. Tillamook County Bank, 124 Or. 279, 293 P. 927, 72 A.L.R. 1245; Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Or. 133, 117 P. 814, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1257; Barry v. Iseman, 43 S. C. L. (14 Rich.) 129, 91 Am. Dec. 262; Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.) 263 S. W. 255, citing R. C. L.; Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1043, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 6 Am. Dec. 540. To know the obligation of a contract, regard must be had to the laws in force at its making. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905. 7W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234, 56 L. ed. 419, 32 S. Ct. 220, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 57; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 107, 22 L. ed. 72; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. ed. 179; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. S.) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Faxon v. All Persons, 166 Cal. 707, 137 P. 919, L.R.A.1916B, 1209; Folks v. Marion County, 121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 298, 102 A.L.R. 659; State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4, 97 A.L.R. 431; State ex rel. Sherrill v. Milam, 113 Fla. 491, 153 So. 100, 125, 136, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Buckwalter v. Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 90 A.L.R. 704; Morris v. Interstate Bond Co. 180 Ga. 689, 180 S. E. 819, 100 A.L.R. 415; Hubbard v. Hubbard (Mo. App.) 264 S. W. 422, citing R. C. L.; Gagnon v. Butte, 75 Mont. 279, 243 P. 1085, 51 A.L.R. 966, citing R. C. L.; Schramm v. Done, 135 Or. 16, 293 P. 931, citing R. C. L.; Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Or. 133, 117 P. 814, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1257; Goggans v. Turnipseed, 1 S. C. 80, 98 Am. Dec. 397, 7 Am. Rep. 23; Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.) 263 S. W. 255; Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1043, citing R. C. L.; Bettman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 P. 53, 40 L.R.A. 815. The term "obligation of contracts" as used in the provision of the Federal Constitution that no state shall pass any law 14

of the obligation than that which the terms of the contract indicate according to their settled legal meaning; when it becomes consummated, the existing law defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then in force.⁸ The law which thus establishes the obligation of a contract is not general or universal law, but the law of the jurisdiction in reference to which the contract is made.⁹

If the parties assent to being bound by any subsequent amendments of an existing statute which may be pertinent and applicable to their contract, then the passage of such an amendment does not impair the obligation of their contract.¹⁰

**§ ³⁸⁷. Laws as Operating on Future Contracts.**—The provision of the Constitution which declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts does not apply to a law enacted prior to the making of the contract, the obligation of which is claimed to be impaired,¹¹ but only to a statute of a state enacted after the making of the contract.¹² The obligation

impairing the obligation of contracts denotes the legal obligation of the parties to adhere to the agreement which at the time of contracting the law recognized and made enforceable. Preston Co. v. Funkhouser, ²⁶¹ N. Y. ¹⁴⁰, ¹⁸⁴ N. E. ⁷³⁷, ¹⁸⁵ N. E. ⁷⁷², ⁸⁷ A.L.R. ⁴⁵⁹.

Statutes in force at the time a contract is made by a municipality enter into, and become part of, the contract. Its obligation is to be measured, and performance is to be regulated, by the terms and rules which they prescribe. Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, ⁹⁸ Ohio St. ³²⁰, ¹²¹ N. E. ⁶⁸⁸, ³ A.L.R. ⁷⁰⁵, overruled on another point in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, ¹⁰⁷ Ohio St. ¹⁷³, ¹⁴⁰ N. E. ⁸⁸⁴, ²⁹ A.L.R. ³⁴².

8Hendrickson v. Apperson, ²⁴⁵ U. S. ¹⁰⁵, ⁶² L. ed. ¹⁷⁸, ³⁸ S. Ct. ⁴⁴; State v. Citrus County, ¹¹⁶ Fla. ⁶⁷⁶, ¹⁵⁷ So. ⁴, ⁹⁷ A.L.R. ⁴³¹; State ex rel. Sherrill v. Milam, ¹¹³ Fla. ⁴⁹¹, ¹⁵³ So. ¹⁰⁰, ¹²⁵, ¹³⁶, citing R. C. L.; Hull v. State, ²⁹ Fla. ⁷⁹, ¹¹ So. ⁹⁷, ¹⁶ L.R.A. ³⁰⁸, ³⁰ Am. St. Rep. ⁹⁵; Cattle Raisers Loan Co. v. Doan (Tex. Civ. App.) ⁸⁶ S. W. (2d) ²⁵², writ of error refused in ¹²⁷ Tex. ¹, ⁸⁶ S. W. (2d) 1082; Salter v. Nelson, ⁸⁵ Utah, ⁴⁶⁰, ³⁹ P. (2d) 1061, citing R. C. L.; Bettman v. Cowley, ¹⁹ Wash. ²⁰⁷, ⁵³ P. ⁵³, ⁴⁰ L.R.A. ⁸¹⁵.

9Selover, B. & Co. v. Walsh, ²²⁶ U. S. ¹¹², ⁵⁷ L. ed. ¹⁴⁶, ³³ S. Ct. ⁶⁹; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) ¹²² U. S. ²⁸⁴, ³⁰ L. ed. 1161, ⁷ S. Ct. 1190; Ogden v. Saunders, ¹² Wheat. (U. S.) ²¹³, ⁶ L. ed. ⁶⁰⁶; Boston Ice Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co. ⁷⁷ N. H. ⁶, ⁸⁶ A. ³⁵⁶, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1090; State v. Carew, ⁴⁷ S. C. L. (¹³ Rich.) ⁴⁹⁸, ⁹¹ Am. Dec. ²⁴⁵. See also Edwards v. Kearzey, ⁹⁶ U. S. ⁵⁹⁵, ²⁴ L. ed. ⁷⁹³.

10The obligation of a mortgage in which the mortgagor, conformably to a statute providing that where a mortgagor shall have assented thereto, a decree of foreclosure and sale may be passed upon the application of the mortgagee, assented to the passing of a decree in accordance with such statute "or any amendments or additions thereto" is not unconstitutionally impaired by a statute enacted subsequently to the mortgage, which provides that during the period of emergency therein declared such remedy shall not be available to the holder or holders of less than ²⁵ per cent of the entire unpaid mortgage debt, where prior to the mortgage there has been no amendment or addition to which the words "or any amendments or additions thereto" could apply. United States Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, ²⁹³ U. S. ²³², ⁷⁹ L. ed. ²⁹⁹, ⁵⁵ S. Ct. ¹⁶⁸.

11Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cram, ²²⁸ U. S. ⁷⁰, ⁵⁷ L. ed. ⁷³⁴, ³³ S. Ct. ⁴³⁷; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, ¹²¹ U. S. ³⁸⁸, ³⁰ L. ed. 1059, ⁷ S. Ct. ⁹¹⁶; Schewe v. Glenn, ³⁰² Ill. ⁴⁶², ¹³⁴ N. E. ⁸⁰⁹, citing R. C. L.; Anders v. Nicholson, ¹¹¹ Fla. ⁸⁴⁹, ¹⁵⁰ So. ⁶³⁹, citing R. C. L.; Dunseath v. Nevada Industrial Commission, ⁵² Nev. ¹⁰⁴, ²⁸² P. ⁸⁷⁹, ²⁹⁶ P. 1112, citing R. C. L.; Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) ¹⁸⁷ S. W. 1043, citing R. C. L.

A lease made subsequent to the enactment of a statute cannot be impaired by it. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, ²⁵⁸ U. S. ²⁴², ⁶⁶ L. ed. ⁵⁹⁵, ⁴² S. Ct. ²⁸⁹.

The contract clause applies only to legislation subsequent in time to the contract alleged to have been impaired. Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co. ²⁵² U. S. ⁴⁹⁹, ⁶⁴ L. ed. ⁶⁸⁴, ⁴⁰ S. Ct. ³⁶⁵.

**The inhibition of the Constitution** against impairing the obligation of contracts is wholly prospective; the states may legislate as to contracts thereafter made as they see fit. It is only those in existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect. Brown v. Smart, ¹⁴⁵ U. S. ⁴⁵⁴, ³⁶ L. ed. ⁷⁷³, ¹² S. Ct. ⁹⁵⁸; Denny v. Bennett, ¹²⁸ U. S. ⁴⁸⁹, ³² L. ed. ⁴⁹¹, ⁹ S. Ct. ¹³⁴.

12Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co. ²⁵² U. S. ⁴⁹⁹, ⁶⁴ L. ed. ⁶⁸⁴, ⁴⁰ S. Ct. ³⁶⁵; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, ¹⁸⁷ U. S. ⁴³⁷, ⁴⁷ L. ed. ²⁴⁹, ²³ S. Ct. ²³⁴; Schewe v. Glenn, ³⁰² Ill. ⁴⁶², ¹³⁴ N. E. ⁸⁰⁹, citing R. C. L.; Dunseath v. Nevada Industrial Commission, ⁵² Nev. ¹⁰⁴, ²⁸² P. ⁸⁷⁹, ²⁹⁶ P. 1112, citing R. C. L.; Bedard v. Mahoney, ³⁰ R. I. ⁴⁶⁹, ⁷⁶ A. ¹¹³, ¹³⁶ Am. St. Rep. ⁹⁶⁵; Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co.

of a contract cannot properly be said to be impaired by a statute in force when the contract was made,¹³ for in such cases it is presumed that it was made in contemplation of the existing law.¹⁴ Hence, a lease made subsequent to the enactment of a statute cannot be unconstitutionally impaired by such statute.¹⁵ The state, therefore, may legislate as to future contracts as it may see fit.¹⁶ and, accordingly, if a law is prospective only, it is valid.¹⁷ Although a statute tending to impair the obligation of a contract is inoperative as to contracts existing at the time of its passage, it may nevertheless be valid and operative as to future contracts.¹⁸ Thus, a statute imposing additional license fees on merchants offering prizes or premiums with merchandise sold does not impair the obligation of contracts unless it is made applicable to sales already made.¹⁹

§ 388. Rule as to Invalid or Illegal Contracts.—

Since the obligations which the Constitution of the United States protects from impairment are such as exist by reason of contract, it follows that as a basis for invoking the rule, there must be a valid contract20 possessing the essential element of assent.1

(Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1043, citing R. C. L. The law of the state to which the Federal Constitution refers when forbidding the impairment of the obligation of a contract must be one enacted after the making of the contract, the obligation of which is claimed to be impaired. Pinney v. Nelson, 133 U. S. 144, 46 L. ed. 125, 22 S. Ct. 52.

¹³Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Kyle, 228 U. S. 85, 57 L. ed. 741, 33 S. Ct. 440; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cram, 228 U. S. 70, 57 L. ed. 734, 33 S. Ct. 437; Abilene Nat. Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. ed. 439, 23 S. Ct. 277; Ouachita County v. Wolcott, 103 U. S. 559, 26 L. ed. 505; Schewe v. Glenn, 302 Ill. 462, 134 N. E. 809, citing R. C. L.; Corbin v. Houlehan, 100 Me. 246, 61 A. 131, 70 L.R.A. 568; Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co. 136 Mo. 382, 38 S. W. 85, 35 L.R.A. 227, 58 Am. St. Rep. 638, affirmed in 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; State ex rel. Public Serv. Commission v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202, 67 A.L.R. 1020; Dunseath v. Nevada Industrial Commission, 52 Nev. 104, 282 P. 879, 296 P. 1112, citing R. C. L.; Barry v. Iseman, 48 S. C. L. (14 Rich.) 129, 91 Am. Dec. 262; Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1043, citing R. C. L. A law imposing upon the head of the department of chemistry of the state university the duty of analyzing and testing samples of gasoline and kerosene does not violate the contract between such head and the state, where he assumed the position after the law came into effect. State ex rel. Public Serv. Commission v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202, 67 A.L.R. 1020. A state insolvency act cannot impair the obligations of a contract made after its enactment. Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 1, 82 A. 265, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 945.

¹⁴Abilene Nat. Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; Schewe v. Glenn, 302 Ill. 462, 134 N. E. 809, citing R. C. L.; Dunseath v. Nevada Industrial Commission, 52 Nev. 104, 282 P. 879, 296 P. 1112, citing R. C. L.; Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1043, citing R. C. L.; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. F. Asso. 112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1016. See supra, § 386.

¹⁵Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 66 L. ed. 595, 42 S. Ct. 289.

¹⁶Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Schewe v. Glenn, 302 Ill. 462, 134 N. E. 809, citing R. C. L. See also Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858. Annotation: 10 L.R.A. 405.

¹⁷United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284, 24 L. ed. 947; Schewe v. Glenn, 302 Ill. 462, 134 N. E. 809, citing R. C. L.

¹⁸Schewe v. Glenn, 302 Ill. 462, 134 N. E. 809, citing R. C. L.; Burdick v. People, 149 Ill. 600, 36 N. E. 948, 24 L.R.A. 152, 41 Am. St. Rep. 329; Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552, 30 Am. Rep. 238; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 320, 121 N. E. 638, 3 A.L.R. 705, overruled on another point in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio St. 173, 140 N. E. 884, 29 A.L.R. 342. Annotation: 61 Am. St. Rep. 940. A statute does not impair the obligation of contracts when it applies only to those contracts which are made subsequently. Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co. 136 Mo. 382, 38 S. W. 85, 35 L.R.A. 227, 58 Am. St. Rep. 638, affirmed in 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281.

¹⁹Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 60 L. ed. 691, 36 S. Ct. 379; Rast v. Van Demann & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455. See TRADING STAMPS [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 920, § 8].

²⁰Dunne v. Rock Island County, 233 Ill. 628, 119 N. E. 591 (writ of error dismissed in 248 U. S. 532, 63 L. ed. 405, 39 S. Ct. 10) citing R. C. L.; Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Mussette, 86 Tex. 708, 26 S. W. 1075, 24 L.R.A. 642. Annotation: L.R.A.1915C, 262. The constitutional prohibition against impairment of contract obligations com- 16

That class of obligations styled "quasi contracts" is not embraced within the constitutional guaranty against the passage of a law violating the obligation of a contract.²

Furthermore, the impairment of a contract cannot exist where the alleged contract is based on a proviso contained in a void statute.³ Likewise, a contract based on an unconstitutional statute granting lands is not within the purview of the impairment of obligation clause;⁴ and the protection of this clause does not extend to bonds of a municipal corporation which have been illegally issued.⁵ It is apparent that the Federal Constitution does not protect contracts which are invalid6 or illegal,⁷ as, for example, a grant of privileges in excess of a city's powers,⁸ an ultra vires contract of a corporation,⁹ or a nudum pactum.¹⁰

Criminal statutes leveled against acts that would be frauds without such criminal enactments, and intended for the protection of the rights of citizens, cannot have the effect of impairing the obligation of contracts or of depriving any person of his property without due process of law.¹¹ Not every contract relating to a particular subject matter is rendered illegal by reason of a change in the attitude of the law whereby such matter comes under the ban of illegality. Thus, after the abolition of slavery in a state, existing contracts relating thereto were not necessarily rendered illegal and, accordingly, they were still deemed to be capable of enforcement so that no question of the impairment of their obligation was thereby raised.¹²

prehends only those contracts which are founded on a good consideration. Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co. 161 U. S. 646, 40 L. ed. 838, 16 S. Ct. 705.

¹Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 395, 21 S. Ct. 240; Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 S. Ct. 329; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211.

²Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 33 L. ed. 193, 9 S. Ct. 763; Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211; Anders v. Nicholson, 111 Fla. 849, 150 So. 639, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Newgass v. New Orleans, 38 La. Ann. 119, 58 Am. Rep. 168; Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Mussette, 86 Tex. 708, 26 S. W. 1075, 24 L.R.A. 642. The provision of the Constitution relating to the impairment of the obligation of contracts does not apply to a case where there is no assent given to a transaction, because where no assent is given, there can be no faith pledged in respect of it. Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 196, 22 L. ed. 612.

⁴Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U. S. 272, 61 L. ed. 294, 37 S. Ct. 79. See also Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. ed. 1018, 13 S. Ct. 110.

⁵Zane v. Hamilton County, 189 U. S. 370, 47 L. ed. 858, 23 S. Ct. 538. See PUBLIC SECURITIES AND OBLIGATIONS.

⁶Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 395, 21 S. Ct. 240; Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Asso. 155 Ill. 166, 39 N. E. 651, 27 L.R.A. 298; Westminster Water Co. v. Westminster, 98 Md. 551, 56 A. 990, 64 L.R.A. 630, 103 Am. St. Rep. 424. In so far as the contracts of public service corporations conflict with public duties imposed upon them by law, they are not within the protection of the constitutional provision inhibiting impairment of the obligations of contracts. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Public Serv. Commission, 81 W. Va. 457, 94 S. E. 545, L.R.A.1918D, 268.

⁷Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132; Dunne v. Rock Island County, 233 Ill. 623, 119 N. E. 591 (writ of error dismissed in 248 U. S. 532, 63 L. ed. 405, 39 S. Ct. 10) citing R. C. L.; State v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78. Forbidding the enforcement of contracts made in violation of a statute prohibiting the exacting of more than 15 per cent interest on loans or accepting a note for a greater amount than that actually loaned, with intent to evade this provision, does not impair the obligation of such contracts when made by those not within the exempted classes. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132.

⁹New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142.

¹⁰Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co. 161 U. S. 646, 40 L. ed. 838, 16 S. Ct. 705; Christ Church v. Philadelphia County, 20 How. (U. S.) 26, 15 L. ed. 802.

¹¹State ex rel. Early v. Missouri Guarantee Sav. & Bldg. Asso. 167 Mo. 489, 67 S. W. 215, 90 Am. St. Rep. 426.

¹²Roundtree v. Baker, 52 Ill. 241, 4 Am. Rep. 597. Contracts relating to slaves, valid when made, were not impaired by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 546, 21 L. ed. 757. A provision in the Constitution of one of the reconstructed states annulling contracts for the purchase and sale of slaves is in- 17

B. IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION

**§ ³⁸⁹. Generally.**—It is a fundamental rule that a state by the act of its legislature cannot alter the nature and legal effect of an existing contract, to the prejudice of either party, or give to such contract a judicial construction binding on the parties or the courts,¹³ nor can the legislature make a law for a particular case, between two contracting parties, contrary to existing law, and order the court to enforce it.¹⁴ This rule is founded on two distinct principles of constitutional law: (1) That prohibiting the assumption of judicial power by the legislative department of government, and (2) that inhibiting the impairment by a state of the obligation of contracts. The first is based on the doctrine of the separation of the powers of government and is elsewhere considered in detail.¹⁵ It is to the second of these principles that the present discussion has reference. The importance of protecting the obligation of contracts from all legislative action tending to its impairment has been emphasized by the Supreme Court of the United States. This high tribunal has stated that the inviolability of contracts and the duty of performing them, as made, are at the foundation of all well-ordered society, that to prevent the removal or disturbance of these foundations was one of the great objects for which the Constitution was framed, and that it is one of the highest duties of this court to take care that the prohibition should neither be evaded nor frittered away.¹⁶

A state prohibited by the Federal Constitution from passing any laws impairing the obligation of contracts may not accomplish the same end by granting any permission necessary to enable Congress so to do.¹⁷

Since legislation of a state impairing the obligation of contracts made under its authority is void,¹⁸ the courts in enforcing the contracts will pursue the same course and apply the same remedies as though such invalid legislation had never existed.¹⁹ A person, however, may not complain that a statute impairs the obligation of contract unless he is a party to that contract or has a beneficial interest therein.²⁰

A workmen's compensation act is contractual in its nature,¹ and therefore any legislation which purports to change a substantial term of a contract operative at the time of the plaintiff's injury would impair the obligation of such contract and fall within the ban of the Constitution.²

**§ ³⁹⁰. Generally.**—The provision of the Federal Constitution prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts is intended to prohibit every mode or device having such purpose. The prohibition is universal and there-

valid as to existing contracts as violating the provision of the Federal Constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts. Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 654, 20 L. ed. 689.

¹³King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447, 8 Am. Dec. 112. Annotation: 3 L. ed. 162.

¹⁷Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improv. Dist. 298 U. S. 513, 80 L. ed. 1309, 56 S. Ct. 892, rehearing denied in 299 U. S. 619, 81 L. ed. 457, 57 S. Ct. 5.

¹⁹Louisiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090.

²Preveslin v. Derby & A. Developing Co. 112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 518, 70 A.L.R. 1426. 18

fore no attempt is made in that instrument to enumerate the modes by which contracts may be impaired.³ The courts from time to time, however, have announced certain tests and principles serving as guides in determining the validity of statutes attacked as impairing the obligation of contracts, such as the fact that a party is deprived of the benefits of his contract4 or that the statute takes from the party his whole contract and all the rights which it was intended to confer.⁵ A statute to be within the scope of this clause, however, must act on the contract itself as distinguished from the property which is the subject of the contract.⁶ The repeal of a law which constitutes a contract is an impairment of its obligation.⁷ The obligation of a contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms by imposing new conditions8 or dispensing with conditions,⁹ or which adds new duties,¹⁰ releases or lessens any part of the contract obligation,¹¹ or substantially defeats its end.¹² A law may be within the constitutional inhibition against impairment of contract obligations by implication, as well as by expression.¹³ It may also be stated that this constitutional provision is considered as rendering void any statute which is retrospective and which destroys a vested right of action arising ex contractu.¹⁴

³Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, 58 L. ed. 1001, 34 S. Ct. 627.

⁴Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341. **Legislation which deprives one of the benefit of a contract** or adds new duties or obligations thereto necessarily impairs the obligation of the contract; and when the state court gives effect to subsequent state or municipal legislation which has the effect to impair contract rights by depriving the parties of their benefit and to make requirements which the contract did not theretofore impose upon them, a case is presented for the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court. Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341.

⁵Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 301, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 S. Ct. 903, 962. **The obligations of a contract** are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, releases or extinguishes them, or derogates from substantial contractual rights. Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507.

⁶State v. Clement Nat. Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 A. 944, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 22, affirmed in 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 S. Ct. 31.

⁷Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, 58 L. ed. 1001, 34 S. Ct. 627.

⁸Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760; Cleveland, P. & A. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. ed. 179; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. 793; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 5 L. ed. 547; Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 81, 70 Am. Dec. 638; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Hubbard v. Hubbard (Mo. App.) 264 S. W. 422, citing R. C. L.; Schuster v. Weiss, 114 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 438, 19 L.R.A. 182; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S. W. (2d) 1007, 96 A.L.R. 802. **A statute converting a covenant in a state grant into a condition subsequent and imposing a forfeiture for its violation** unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of the contract. Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236, 67 L. ed. 629, 43 S. Ct. 306.

⁹Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236, 67 L. ed. 629, 43 S. Ct. 306; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. ed. 179; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 5 L. ed. 547; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Hubbard v. Hubbard (Mo. App.) 264 S. W. 422, citing R. C. L.

¹⁰Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Hubbard v. Hubbard (Mo. App.) 264 S. W. 422, citing R. C. L.; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. Fire Asso. 112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1016.

¹¹Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253, 8 Am. Dec. 183; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Indianapolis v. Robison, 186 Ind. 660, 117 N. E. 861, citing R. C. L.; Hubbard v. Hubbard (Mo. App.) 264 S. W. 422, citing R. C. L.; Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 689, 98 Am. Dec. 494.

¹²McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137, 70 Am. Dec. 642; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Indianapolis v. Robison, 186 Ind. 660, 117 N. E. 861, citing R. C. L.

¹³State ex rel. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa, 96, 89 N. W. 204, 57 L.R.A. 244, 93 Am. St. Rep. 222.

¹⁴Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, 58 L. ed. 1001, 34 S. Ct. 627; Lewis v. Brackenridge, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 220, 12 Am. Dec. 228. 19

In very recent years strict construction of the impairment clause has been eased and courts have adopted a tendency to construe it more liberally. The prohibition is said not to be an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula;¹⁶ it prohibits unreasonable impairment only.¹⁶ Thus, it has been aptly said that in determining whether state legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick can be fashioned, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured and determined, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances.¹⁷

§ 391. Degree of Impairment.—

Since the prohibition as to the impairment of the obligation of contracts is absolute, the amount and extent of the impairment is immaterial.18 An act which in any degree, no matter how slightly, modifies the obligation of a contract, by attempting to relieve one party from any duty under the contract, is repugnant to the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts.19 Any act, therefore, which changes the expressed intention of the parties to a contract, or such as results from their stipulations, is held to impair its validity, and it is immaterial as to the degree or nature of the change,20 whether it relates to the validity, construction, duration, discharge, or evidence of the contract; in all cases the conclusion is the same.1

§ 392. Diminution of Value of Contract.—

One of the tests of impairment is that the value of a contract has been diminished.2 New burdens cannot be

¹⁶Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297. In the determination of whether legislation violates the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, the question is not whether the legislation affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether it is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507.

¹⁷Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297.

¹⁸Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 65 L. ed. 857, 41 S. Ct. 408; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. ed. 558; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 12 L. ed. 447; Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, 86 A.L.R. 1493; Helena Light & R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 57 Mont. 93, 186 P. 702, citing R. C. L.; Re Cranberry Creek Drainage Dist. 202 Wis. 64, 231 N. W. 538, 85 A.L.R. 242. Any alteration of a contract, however unimportant, and even though favorable for the interest of the objecting party, impairs its obligation. Per Washington, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629.

¹⁹Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. ed. 558; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 5 L. ed. 547; County Bd. of Edu. v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W. 465, citing R. C. L.; Helena Light & R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 57 Mont. 93, 186 P. 702; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. F. Asso. 112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1016; Jones v. La Vigne, 202 Wis. 64, 231 N. W. 538, 85 A.L.R. 242; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 109 Wis. 208, 85 N. W. 376, 95 Am. St. Rep. 870.

²⁰Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447; Boswell v. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. 193 N. Y. 465, 86 N. E. 532, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 946.

¹Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Per Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 5 L. ed. 547; State ex rel. Buckwalter v. Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 90 A.L.R. 704; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447; Storen v. Sexton, — Ind. —, 200 N. E. 251, 104 A.L.R. 1359; Indianapolis v. Robison, 186 Ind. 660, 117 N. E. 861, citing R. C. L.; County Bd. of Edu. v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W. 465, citing R. C. L.; Schuster v. Weiss, 114 Mo 158 21 S. W. 438, 19 L.R.A. 182; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. Fire Asso. 112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1016.

²Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 65 L. ed. 857, 41 S. Ct. 408; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Edwards v Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 12 L. ed. 447; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; 20

imposed so as to decrease materially the value and benefit of a contract.³ As will subsequently be shown, a state may alter laws governing remedy on contract as long as an effective remedy is preserved,⁴ but where it so lessens or impairs the value of the remedy as to lessen and impair the value of the contract, the law is void as impairing the obligation of contract,⁵ although a statute does not necessarily impair the obligation of a contract merely because it affects its value either by making performance more difficult or expensive or by diminishing the value of performance to the other party.⁶

§ 393. Diminishing Means of Enforcement.—

Whenever the law is so changed that the means of enforcing the duty imposed by the contract are materially impaired, the obligation of the contract no longer remains the same.7 Therefore, a Constitution8 or a statute impairs the obligation of a contract if it prevents enforcement,9 tends to postpone or retard enforcement,10 or seriously

Storen v. Sexton, — Ind. —, 200 N. E. 251, 104 A.L.R. 1359; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1074, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574; Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W. 595, 62 Am. St. Rep. 878; Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836; Dallas County Levee Improv. Dist. v. Rugel (Tex. Com. App.) 36 S. W. (2d) 188, citing R. C. L.; Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah, 460, 39 P. (2d) 1061, citing R. C. L.; Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 12 Am. Rep. 507; Swinburne v. Mills, 17 Wash. 611, 50 P. 489, 61 Am. St. Rep. 932; Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co. 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 42 L.R.A. 331, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 132; 3 Ann. Cas. 91.

³Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714, 26 L. ed. 602; Briscoe v. Auketell, 28 Miss. 361, 61 Am. Dec. 553; Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah, 460, 39 P. (2d) 1061, citing R. C. L.

⁵Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Cattle Raisers Loan Co. v. Doan (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. (2d) 252 (writ of error refused in 127 Tex. 1, 86 S. W. (2d) 1082) citing R. C. L. Annotation: 3 L. ed. 162; 26 L. ed. 132; 3 Ann. Cas. 91. **The remedy to enforce a contract is a part of the contract,** and any subsequent law of the state which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is such an impairment of the obligation of a contract as to bring it within the inhibition of the U. S. Const. Art. 1, § 10. Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781.

⁷Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 S. Ct. 40; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 575, 19 L. ed. 490; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 304, 14 L. ed. 705; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 12 L. ed. 447; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; State ex rel. Buckwalter v. Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 90 A.L.R. 704; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29, 90 Am. Dec. 311; Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 353, 94 N. E. 1001, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1215, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 251; Swinburne v. Mills, 17 Wash. 611, 50 P. 489, 61 Am. St. Rep. 932. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 132. Contracts between individuals or corporations are impaired within the meaning of the due process provision of the Constitution whenever the right to enforce them by legal process is taken away or materially lessened, although a different rule prevails in respect to contracts of sovereigns. Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 78 L. ed. 1434, 54 S. Ct. 840.

⁸Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36, 32 L. ed. 589, 9 S. Ct. 210; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685. Annotation: 28 L. ed. 331.

⁹International Steel & I. Co. v. National Surety Co. 297 U. S. 657, 80 L. ed. 961, 56 S. Ct. 619; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 34 L. ed. 304, 10 S. Ct. 972; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36, 32 L. ed. 589, 9 S. Ct. 210; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 132. The existing remedy for the enforcement of a contract is a part of its obligation, which cannot be destroyed without violating the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685.

¹⁰Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 S. Ct. 40; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 26 L. ed. 132; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314, writ of certiorari denied in 199 U. S. 607, 50 L. ed. 331, 26 S. Ct. 747; State ex rel. Buckwalter v. Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 90 A.L.R. 704; Storen v. Sexton, — Ind. —, 200 N. E. 251, 104 A.L.R. 21

that the legislature may make changes in the remedy,¹² it is necessary that the

contract be left with the same force and effect, including the substantial means

§ 394. Generally.—

secured by the obligation of contract clause, and its exercise in no wise inter-

feres with the inviolability of contracts.¹⁴ In other words, the constitutional

pairs its obligation. It is a taking, and not an impairment of its obligation.¹⁵

1359; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 A. 405, 4 L.R.A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266; Goodwin v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 426, 22 Am. Rep. 321. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 132. A change of the law which hinders or delays a creditor in the collection of his debt impairs the obligation of the contract within the meaning of the Constitution, although it relates only to the remedy or mode of procedure by which that debt was to be collected. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 27 L. ed. 506, 2 S. Ct. 443. The constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts secures from attack, not merely the con- tract itself, but all the essential incidents which render it valuable and enable its owner to enforce it. Phinney v. Phinney,

¹¹Oshkosh Waterworks v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 249, 23 S. Ct. 234; Barn- itz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93,

¹⁶S. Ct. 1042; Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 132.

¹²Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Hill v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. 134 U. S. 515, 33 L. ed. 994, 10 S. Ct. 589; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Edwards v. Kear- zey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. ed. 365; Cairo & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168, 24 L. ed. 423; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Sturges v. Crownin- shield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Board of Revenue v. Farson, Son & Co. 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881; Dal- las County Levee Improv. Dist. v. Rugel (Tex. Com. App.) 36 S. W. (2d) 188, citing R. C. L.; Cattle Raisers Loan Co. v. Doan (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. (2d) 252, writ of error refused in 127 Tex. 1, 86 S. W. (2d) 1082. See infra, §§ 432, 433.

¹³South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 437, 25 L. ed. 937; Walker v. Whitehead, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. ed. 365; Walker v. Ander- head, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Board of Revenue v. Farson, Son & Co. 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881; Langeyer v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836; Dallas County Levee Improv. Dist. v. Rugel (Tex. Com. App.) 36 S. W. (2d) 188, citing R. C. L.; Cattle Raisers Loan Co. v. Doan (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. (2d) 252, writ of error refused in 127 Tex. 1, 86 S. W. (2d) 1082; Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders (Tex. Civ. App.) 62 S. W. (2d) 348, citing R. C. L.; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. F. Asso. 112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1016. A repeal or change of remedies which does not substantially diminish the value of the agreement or seriously retard or obstruct its enforcement escapes the in- hibition of the Constitution and is valid. Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314, writ of certiorari denied in 199 U. S. 607, 50 L. ed. 331, 26 S. Ct. 747. The legal remedies for the enforcement of a contract which belong to it at the time and place where it is made are a part of its obligations and can be changed only if the change involves no impairment of a substantial right. Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co. 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 42 L.R.A. 331, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934.

²⁴⁵U. S. 20, 62 L. ed. 124, 38 S. Ct. 35; Cincinnati v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 481, 32 S. Ct. 267; Rich- mond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co. 13 How. (U. S.) 71, 14 L. ed. 55; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 137 N. C. 107, 49 S. E. 96, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 604.

²²³U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 481, 32 S. Ct. 267; Long Island Water-Supply Co. v. Brook- lyn, 166 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165, 17 S. Ct. 718; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 12 L. ed. 447. Contract obligations are property and as such may be taken under the power of eminent domain. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co. v. Sabre, 50 R. I. 288, 146 A. 777, 66 A.L.R. 1553. 22

sential to the public welfare that it cannot be abridged by agreement,¹⁷ and a

public use if the public exigencies require it for that purpose,²⁰ even if such

provision in the charter of the latter giving it an exclusive right to its roadbed

C. MEANS OF IMPAIRMENT

§ 395. Federal Laws.—

Federal Constitution is not a limitation on the powers of Congress.⁶ Neverthe-

¹⁶Mills v. St. Clair County, 8 How. (U. S.) 569, 12 L. ed. 1201, holding that the obligation of the contract, if any, under which the owner of lands holds under a grant in fee simple, is not impaired by an abuse of the right of eminent domain un- der the sanction of a state statute.

¹⁹There enters into every contract whether between the state and an individ- ual or between individuals only the un- written condition that it is subordinate to the right of appropriation to a public use. Cincinnati v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 481, 32 S. Ct. 267. The exercise of the power of eminent domain by a state, or under its authority, is not an interference with the inviolabil- ity of contracts with the state, for the rea- son that all contracts are made subject to the right of eminent domain. Terre Haute v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co. 149 Ind. 174,

²⁰New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 S. Ct. 252; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co. 17 Conn. 40, 42 Am. Dec. 716; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec. 466; Narragansett Electric Lighting Co. v. Sabre, 50 R. I. 288, 146 A. 777, 66 A.L.R. 1553.

¹West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Backus v. Le- banon, 11 N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec. 466. Annotation: 35 Am. Dec. 471.

²West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co. 13 How. (U. S.) 71, 14 L. ed. 55.

§ 396. State Laws, Constitutions, and Agencies.—

boards or officers, or the doings of corporations or individuals.¹⁴ Any enact-

lature,¹⁵ municipal ordinances passed pursuant to legislative authority,¹⁶ an

⁹Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352.

¹⁰Norwich & W. R. Co. v. Johnson, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 195, 21 L. ed. 178; Bigler v. Waller, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 297, 20 L. ed. 891; Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 604, 20 L. ed. 547. The acts of Congress known as the "Le- gal Tender Acts" are constitutional when applied to contracts made before their pas- sage, as well as to debts contracted since their passage. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 457, 20 L. ed. 287.

¹¹Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352.

¹²Egan v. McDonald, 246 U. S. 227, 62 L. ed. 680, 38 S. Ct. 223. See PUBLIC LANDS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 246, § 8 et seq.].

²¹L. ed. 212. See also Kener v. La Grange Mills, 231 U. S. 215, 58 L. ed. 189, 34 S. Ct. 83.

¹⁴Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S. 29, 68 L. ed. 547, 44 S. Ct. 246; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 68 L. ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197; McCoy v. Union Elev. R. Co. 247 U. S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1156, 38 S. Ct. 504; Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171, 61 L. ed. 229, 37 S. Ct. 34; Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 150, 57 L. ed. 458, 33 S. Ct. 220, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 224; Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 56 L. ed. 924, 32 S. Ct. 577; Fisher v. New Orleans,

²¹⁸U. S. 438, 54 L. ed. 1099, 31 S. Ct. 57; Weber v. Rogan, 188 U. S. 10, 47 L. ed. 363,

²³S. Ct. 263; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 S. Ct. 1051; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 16 S. Ct. 80; New Orleans Water- works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 S. Ct. 916; State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739, 37 A.L.R. 1298; King v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 195 Mo. 290,

⁹²S. W. 892, 113 Am. St. Rep. 678, 6 Ann. Cas. 618; Sedalia v. Donohue, 190 Mo. 407,

⁸⁹S. W. 386, 4 Ann. Cas. 89; Re First Nat. Bank, 93 Okla. 233, 220 P. 909, 57 A.L.R. 890; Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Natu- ral Gas Co. 138 Pa. 576, 20 A. 1065, 12 L.R.A. 290, 21 Am. St. Rep. 922; Nickoll v. Racine Cloak & Suit Co. 194 Wis. 298,

²¹⁶N. W. 502, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 4 Ann. Cas. 93; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 579. "The contract clause of the Constitu- tion of the United States has reference only to a statute of a state enacted after the making of the contract whose obliga- tion is alleged to have been impaired." Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 249, 23 S. Ct. 234.

¹⁵Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S. 29, 68 L. ed. 547, 44 S. Ct. 246; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444, 68 L. ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197; McCoy v. Union Elev. R. Co.

²⁴⁷U. S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1156, 38 S. Ct. 504; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisi- ana, 185 U. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 S. Ct. 691; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Lou- isiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. ed. 716; Folks v. Marion County, 121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 298, 102 A.L.R. 659; St. John v. Iowa Business Men's Bldg. & L. Asso. 136 Iowa, 448, 113 N. W. 863, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 503; Furlong v. Na- tional Life & Acci. Ins. Co. 185 La. 352,

¹⁶⁹So. 431, 106 A.L.R. 40; Re First Nat. Bank, 93 Okla. 233, 220 P. 909, 57 A.L.R. 890. A law enacted by the Confederate States sequestrating the property and credits within such states of loyal citizens of the United States, if enforced as the law of 24

order by an instrumentality of the state exercising delegated authority,¹⁷ and

ing such purpose,²⁰ the action of public officials in exercising their authority,

§ 397. Municipal Ordinances and Agencies.—

a state, is invalid as impairing the obli- gation of contracts. Williams v. Bruffy,

¹⁷Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 221 U. S. 400, 55 L. ed. 786,

³¹S. Ct. 537. Laws passed by a state impairing the obligation of a contract are void, and if a state cannot pass such a law, it follows that no agency which acts under the state with delegated authority can do so. Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. ed. 699.

⁵⁸L. ed. 912, 34 S. Ct. 517, L.R.A.1918E, 832, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1282; Bier v. Mc- Gehee, 148 U. S. 137, 37 L. ed. 397, 13 S. Ct. 580; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36,

³²L. ed. 589, 9 S. Ct. 210; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741; Fisk v. Jefferson, 116 U. S. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 S. Ct. 329; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gaslight Co. 115 U. S. 683, 29 L. ed. 510, 6 S. Ct. 265; New Orleans Water- works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 29 L. ed. 525, 6 S. Ct. 273; New Orleans Gas- light Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 S. Ct. 252; Butchers' Union S.-H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L.-S. L. & S. H. Co.

¹¹¹U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 S. Ct. 652; Clay County v. Society for Savings, 104 U. S. 579, 26 L. ed. 856; Moultrie County v. Rockingham Ten-Cent Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 631, 23 L. ed. 631; Ochiltree v. Iowa R. Contracting Co. 21 Wall. (U. S.) 249, 22 L. ed. 546; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; Delmas v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. 14 Wall. (U. S.) 661, 20 L. ed. 757; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 654, 20 L. ed. 689; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685; Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 511, 19 L. ed. 997; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (U. S.) 331, 15 L. ed. 401; Allen v. Railroad Commission, 179 Cal. 68, 175 P. 466, 8 A.L.R. 249, P.U.R.1919A, 398; Folks v. Marion County, 121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 298,

¹⁰²A.L.R. 659; Columbus Waterworks Co. v. Columbus, 48 Kan. 99, 28 P. 1097, 15 L.R.A. 354; Slade v. Lexington, 141 Ky. 214, 132 S. W. 404, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 201; Haberlach v. Tillamook County Bank, 134 Or. 279, 293 P. 927, 72 A.L.R. 1245; Lang- ever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836; Simpson v. Pontotoc Common County Line School Dist. (Tex. Civ. App.) 275 S. W. 449, citing R. C. L.; Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co. 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359,

¹⁰L.R.A. 406. A constitutional provision prohibiting the enactment of laws impairing the ob- ligation of contracts becomes a part of each contract protecting it to the extent of the meaning of that clause from impair- ment even by constitutional amendment. Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836.

¹⁹Dallas County v. McKenzie, 110 U. S. 686, 28 L. ed. 285, 4 S. Ct. 184; Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. L. R. Co. 110 U. S. 192, 28 L. ed. 116, 4 S. Ct. 67; Louisiana v. Taylor, 105 U. S. 454, 26 L. ed. 1133; Schuyler County v. Thomas, 98 U. S. 169, 25 L. ed. 88; Moultrie County v. Rockingham Ten-Cent Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 631, 23 L. ed. 631.

²⁰Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Loui- siana, 233 U. S. 362, 58 L. ed. 1001, 34 S. Ct. 627.

²Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Loui- siana, 233 U. S. 362, 58 L. ed. 1001, 34 S. Ct. 627.

³Mercantile Trust & D. Co. v. Colum- bus, 203 U. S. 311, 51 L. ed. 198, 27 S. Ct. 83; St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788, 21 S. Ct. 575.

²³²U. S. 548, 58 L. ed. 721, 34 S. Ct. 364; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341; Mercan- tile Trust & D. Co. v. Columbus, 203 U. S. 311, 51 L. ed. 198, 27 S. Ct. 83; New Or- leans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 S. Ct. 691; St. Paul 25

the state within the meaning of this clause.⁵ A municipal ordinance the effect

of which is merely to deny liability on a contract or to declare the repudiation

thereof and which prescribes no antagonistic rights or duties is not legislation

**§ ³⁹⁸. Judicial Decisions.**—The provision of the Federal Constitution is

at the time it is entered into, be valid by virtue of the construction of a statute

or otherwise, it is not unconstitutionally impaired, in violation of this provi-

sion of the Federal Constitution or like provisions in state Constitutions, by a

change in those decisions rendering it invalid.¹⁰ There is no vested right in

¹⁶S. Ct. 1023; United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 25 L. ed. 225; Mur- ray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760; Louisville v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 155 F. 725, 12 Ann. Cas. 500. Annotation: 12 Ann. Cas. 503; Ann. Cas. 1915A, 991; Ann. Cas. 1917C, 638. The alleged action of a city in appro- priating a power company's asserted par- amount rights through the enforcement of an ordinance for the appropriation of the waters of a stream without constitution- al authority and without giving compen- sation therefor, thereby violating the con- tract clause of the Federal Constitu- tion, is to be regarded as the action of the state. Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Ak- ron, 240 U. S. 462, 60 L. ed. 743, 36 S. Ct. 402. A bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation may be such an exercise of legislative power delegated by the legis- lature to the corporation that it may prop- erly be considered a law within the mean- ing of the clause of the United States Con- stitution forbidding the impairment of contracts. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18,

⁵Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 S. Ct. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253; Pacific Electric R. Co. v. Los Angeles, 194 U. S. 112, 48 L. ed. 896, 24 S. Ct. 586; Vicksburg Water- works Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 46 L. ed. 808, 22 S. Ct. 585. Annotation: 12 Ann. Cas. 503.

⁶Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Ham- ilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 S. Ct. 90; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432,

²⁴L. ed. 760; Louisville v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 155 F. 725, 12 Ann. Cas. 500. See also New Or- leans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741.

⁷McCormick v. Oklahoma City, 236 U. S. 657, 59 L. ed. 771, 35 S. Ct. 455; St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142,

⁴⁵L. ed. 788, 21 S. Ct. 575. Annotation: 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 723. Impairment of contract obligations of a county does not result from the action of its board of county commissioners in refusing to perform a contract entered in- to by them on behalf of the county. State ex rel. Robertson Invest. Co. v. Patter- son, 47 Wyo. 416, 38 P. (2d) 617, 98 A.L.R. 428.

⁸Dawson v. Columbus Ave. Sav. Fund, S. D. Title & T. Co. 197 U. S. 178, 49 L. ed. 713, 25 S. Ct. 420.

¹⁰People's Bkg. Co. v. Sterling, 300 U. S. 175, 81 L. ed. 586, 57 S. Ct. 386; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 77 L. ed. 610, 53 S. Ct. 240; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett,

²⁸⁷U. S. 509, 77 L. ed. 463, 53 S. Ct. 244; Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U. S. 29, 68 L. ed. 547, 44 S. Ct. 246; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flan- agan, 263 U. S. 444, 68 L. ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197; Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236, 67 L. ed. 629, 43 S. Ct. 306; McCoy v. Union Elev. R. Co. 247 U. S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1156, 38 S. Ct. 504; Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U. S. 272, 61 L. ed. 294, 37 S. Ct. 79; Detroit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238,

⁶¹L. ed. 268, 37 S. Ct. 87; Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171, 61 L. ed. 229, 37 S. Ct. 34; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Cleveland,

²³⁵U. S. 50, 59 L. ed. 127, 35 S. Ct. 21; Willoughby v. Chicago, 235 U. S. 45, 59 L. ed. 123, 35 S. Ct. 23; Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Electrical Installation Co. 234 U. S. 619, 58 L. ed. 1503, 34 S. Ct. 941; National Mut. Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635, 48 L. ed. 823,

⁴⁷L. ed. 363, 23 S. Ct. 263; Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S. 479, 47 L. ed. 266, 23 S. Ct. 170; New Orleans Water- 26

constitute the passing of a law, although the effect of such change is to impair

the validity of a contract made in reliance on prior decisions.¹¹ Furthermore,

works Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 S. Ct. 691; Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, 46 L. ed. 86, 22 S. Ct. 26; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 S. Ct. 1051; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 S. Ct. 1023; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 16 S. Ct. 80; Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 36 L. ed. 773, 12 S. Ct. 958; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Plain- view, 143 U. S. 371, 36 L. ed. 191, 12 S. Ct. 530; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741; Knox v. Exchange Bank, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 379, 20 L. ed. 414; Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 511, 19 L. ed. 997; Missis- sippi & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 181, 18 L. ed. 381; Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 30 P. 213, 16 L.R.A. 646; State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739,

³⁷A.L.R. 1298; Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N. E. 280, 18 A.L.R. 992; Swan- son v. Ottumwa, 131 Iowa, 540, 106 N. W. 9, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 860, 9 Ann. Cas. 1117; Crigler v. Shepler, 79 Kan. 834, 101 P. 619, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 500; Pfister v. St. Bernard Cypress Co. 155 La. 575, 99 So. 454, citing R. C. L.; King v. Phoenix Ins. Co.

¹⁹⁵Mo. 290, 92 S. W. 892, 113 Am. St. Rep. 678, 6 Ann. Cas. 618; Re First Nat. Bank,

⁹³Okla. 233, 220 P. 909, 57 A.L.R. 890; Mc- Cray v. Miller, 78 Okla. 16, 186 P. 1089, cit- ing R. C. L.; Commissioners of Sinking Fund of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, 324 Pa. 129, 188 A. 314, 113 A.L.R. 202; Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 38 S. W. 154, 35 L.R.A. 666; Nickoll v. Racine Cloak & Suit Co. 194 Wis. 298, 216 N. W. 502, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 44 L. ed. 886; 16 L.R.A. 646, s. 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 860, and 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 500. A judicial construction by which a state constitutional provision is given a new meaning does not amount to an unconsti- tutional impairment of any contract obli- gation if the new meaning is not due to the compulsion of a statute, but is the product of the independent judgment of the court. People's Bkg. Co. v. Sterling, 300 U. S. 175, 81 L. ed. 586, 57 S. Ct. 386. No impairment of contract obligation in violation of the Federal Constitution is effected by a state court's decision that a grant of perpetual franchise is beyond the powers of the legislature, even though it overrules a contrary decision previously rendered. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52,

⁷⁷L. ed. 610, 53 S. Ct. 240. A change by the highest court of a state of its construction of a state statute, even if its former construction had become a rule of property, cannot constitute a Fed- eral question as to the impairment of the obligation of a contract, for which a writ of error will lie from the Supreme Court of the United States to the state court. Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 S. Ct. 1023. "Whether holding such contract valid or void is made upon the general principles by which courts determine whether a con- sideration is good or bad on principles of public policy, the decision is one we are not authorized to review." Dittmas v. Mer- chants' Mut. Ins. Co. 14 Wall. (U. S.) 661,

²⁰L. ed. 757. The provisions of the Constitution of the United States for the protection of con- tract rights are directed only against the impairment of them by Constitutions or laws adopted or passed subsequent to the date of the contract from which such rights spring, and do not reach decisions of courts construing Constitutions or laws which were in effect when the contract was entered into. Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U. S. 272, 61 L. ed. 294, 37 S. Ct. 79. A change of decision with respect to the constitutionality of a statute vesting in abutting owners the title to dedicated streets when vacated, rather than in the dedicator, does not unconstitutionally im- pair the obligation of a contract. Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N. E. 280, 18 A.L.R. 992. The provision of the Federal Constitu- tion forbidding the enactment of laws im- pairing the obligation of contracts does not apply to a judicial decision overruling a former adjudication, so as to permit a re- covery for services performed subsequent to the former decision, by a person not a party or privy thereto, when such serv- ices are rendered illegal by the subse- quent decision. Crigler v. Shepler, 79 Kan. 834, 101 P. 619, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 500.

¹¹Brown v. Grand Rapids Parlor Furni- ture Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 58 F. 286, 22 L.R.A. 817; State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa, 513, 126 N. W. 454, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 788, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 691; Pfister v. St. Bernard Cypress Co.

¹⁵⁵La. 575, 99 So. 454 (writ of certiorari denied in 266 U. S. 625, 69 L. ed. 474, 45 S. Ct. 125) citing R. C. L.; McCray v. Miller, 78 Okla. 16, 186 P. 1089, citing R. C. L.; Nickoll v. Racine Cloak & Suit Co.

¹⁹⁴Wis. 298, 216 N. W. 502, citing R. C. L. There is no constitutional right to have all general propositions of law once adopt- ed remain unchanged. Patterson v. Col- orado, 205 U. S. 454, 51 L. ed. 879, 27 S. Ct. 556, 10 Ann. Cas. 689.

¹²Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645, 24 L. ed. 302; Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co.

¹⁵⁶Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 293, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 565; Smith v. Robert- son, 106 Ky. 472, 50 S. W. 852, 45 L.R.A. 510; Adams v. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co.

⁷⁷Miss. 194, 24 So. 200, 317, 28 So. 956, 60 L.R.A. 33, affirmed in 180 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 395, 21 S. Ct. 240.

¹³Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Wa- ter Co. 177 U. S. 558, 44 L. ed. 886, 20 S. St. 736; Schell v. Fauché, 138 U. S. 562,

³⁴L. ed. 1040, 11 S. Ct. 376; German Sav. Bank v. Franklin County, 128 U. S. 526,

³²L. ed. 519, 9 S. Ct. 159; Louisiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090; Douglass v. Pike Coun- ty, 101 U. S. 677, 25 L. ed. 968; Pine Grove 27

pairment of contract obligations, but that a decision in the latter case does.¹³

rule adopted after the contract was entered into.¹⁶ In such cases the Federal

itself free to decide what the state law is and to enforce it as laid down by the

in order to be within the prohibition of the provision.¹⁹ The construction of

Twp. v. Talcott, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 666, 22 L. ed. 227; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 50, 19 L. ed. 594; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 294, 18 L. ed. 38; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 175,

¹⁷L. ed. 520 (see Rose's notes, p. 743); Ohio L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. (U. S.) 416, 14 L. ed. 997; Caldwell v. Carrington,

¹⁶L.R.A. 646, s. 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 860, and 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 500. After a statute has been settled by ju- dicial construction, the construction be- comes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decisions is the same in its ef- fect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment. Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677,

²⁵L. ed. 968. "The same principle applies where there is a change of judicial decision, as to the constitutional power of the legislature to enact the law." Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 175, 17 L. ed. 520. The rights of a purchaser of municipal bonds are not affected by a judicial deci- sion against their validity, which decision is in conflict with the law as declared, not only by the Supreme Court of the Unit- ed States, but by the highest court of the state, at and before the time of his pur- chase. Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806,

¹⁴Farrior v. New England Mortg. Secur. Co. 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532, 12 L.R.A. 956; Harmon v. Auditor, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N. E. 161, 5 Am. St. Rep. 502, overruled in Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N. E. 280,

¹⁸A.L.R. 992; Oliver Co. v. Louisville Re- alty Co. 156 Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 293, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 565 (dicta); Mason v. A. E. Nelson Cotton Co.

¹⁴⁸N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1221, 128 Am. St. Rep. 635; Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N. E. 437, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1112, 118 Am. St. Rep. 884. Annotation: 44 L. ed. 886; 16 L.R.A. 646, s. 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 860, and 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 500; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 579. A decision of a court of supreme juris- diction overruling a former decision is ret- rospective in its operation except that where a Constitution or statute has re- ceived a given construction by the courts of last resort and contracts have been made and rights acquired in accordance therewith, such contracts may not be in- validated or vested rights acquired un- der them impaired by a change of con- struction made by a subsequent decision. Mason v. A. E. Nelson Co. 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1221, 128 Am. St. Rep. 635. After a statute has been settled by ju- dicial construction, the construction be- comes, so far as contract rights are con- cerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is, to all intents and purposes, the same in effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enact- ment. Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Nat- ural Gas Co. 138 Pa. 576, 20 A. 1065, 12 L.R.A. 290, 21 Am. St. Rep. 922.

¹⁵Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Natural Gas Co. 138 Pa. 576, 20 A. 1065, 12 L.R.A. 290, 21 Am. St. Rep. 922. This distinction is not referred to in Commissioners of Sinking Fund of Phila- delphia v. Philadelphia, 324 Pa. 129, 188 A. 314, 113 A.L.R. 202.

¹⁶See, for example, Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co. 177 U. S. 558, 44 L. ed. 886, 20 S. Ct. 736.

the decision,⁴ since a decision of a state court may impliedly give effect to a

444, 68 L. ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197; Los Ange- les v. Los Angeles City Water Co. 177 U. S. 558, 44 L. ed. 886, 20 S. Ct. 736; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 S. Ct. 1051; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 S. Ct. 1023; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 16 S. Ct. 80; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36, 32 L. ed. 589, 9 S. Ct. 210; New Orleans Wa- terworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co.

¹²⁵U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 1059, 1 S. Ct. 916; Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 28 L. ed. 1084, 5 S. Ct. 681; Northwestern Uni- versity v. Illinois, 99 U. S. 309, 25 L. ed. 387; Delmas v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. 14 Wall. (U. S.) 661, 20 L. ed. 757; Knox v. Exchange Bank, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 379, 20 L. ed. 414; Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Mc- Clure, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 511, 19 L. ed. 997; Missouri & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 177, 18 L. ed. 381. "Any enactment from whatever source originating to which a state gives the force of law is a statute of the state with- in the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of this court." Wil- liams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. ed. 716. The Federal Supreme Court has juris- diction only when the state court has giv- en effect to a legislative enactment which impairs the obligation of contract. Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Plainview, 143 U. S. 371,

³⁶L. ed. 191, 12 S. Ct. 530; State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739,

²⁰Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341; St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788, 21 S. Ct. 575; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 S. Ct. 1023.

²¹Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 16 S. Ct. 180; New Or- leans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741; Knox v. Exchange Bank, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 379, 20 L. ed. 414; McCray v. Miller, 78 Okla. 16, 186 P. 1089, citing R. C. L.

¹Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 56 L. ed. 924, 32 S. Ct. 577; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 392, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 S. Ct. 916; Chi- cago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574,

²⁸L. ed. 1084, 5 S. Ct. 681; Delmas v. Mer- chants' Mut. Ins. Co. 14 Wall. (U. S.) 661,

⁶⁸L. ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197; Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236, 67 L. ed. 625, 43 S. Ct. 306; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 S. Ct. 40; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341; National Mut. Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635, 48 L. ed. 823, 24 S. Ct. 532; Northern C. R. Co. v. Maryland, 187 U. S. 258, 47 L. ed. 167, 23 S. Ct. 62; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 S. Ct. 691; Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, 46 L. ed. 86, 22 S. Ct. 26; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, 20 S. Ct. 545; Douglas v. Kentucky,

¹⁶⁸U. S. 488, 42 L. ed. 553, 18 S. Ct. 199; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 S. Ct. 1023; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 485, 38 L. ed. 793, 14 S. Ct. 968; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 S. Ct. 741; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 S. Ct. 916; Northwestern University v. Il- linois, 99 U. S. 309, 25 L. ed. 387; Mis- sissippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 511, 19 L. ed. 997; Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 177, 18 L. ed. 381; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black (U. S.) 436, 17 L. ed. 173.

³New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisi- ana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 627, 8 S. Ct. 741.

⁴Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U. S. 272, 61 L. ed. 294, 37 S. Ct. 79; De- troit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238, 61 L. ed. 268, 37 S. Ct. 87; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 S. Ct. 40; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, 20 S. Ct. 545; McCullough v. Vir- ginia, 172 U. S. 102, 43 L. ed. 387, 19 S. Ct. 134. 29

into court as a self-confessed violator of the law and is in no position to raise

may arise against a state for services rendered to it in reliance upon a statute

the constitutionality of which had previously been affirmed by the court of last

subsequent decision that the act is constitutionally void, to receive the stipu-

D. STATE CONTRACTS

§ 399. Generally.—

corporations8 and also with other states.⁹ The legislature of a state may make

⁵Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236, 67 L. ed. 629, 43 S. Ct. 305; Long Sault Development Co. v. Call,

²⁴²U. S. 272, 61 L. ed. 294, 37 S. Ct. 79; Detroit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238, 61 L. ed. 268, 37 S. Ct. 87; Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 56 L. ed. 924, 32 S. Ct. 577; Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 51 L. ed. 1176, 27 S. Ct. 686; Muhlker v. New York & H. R. Co. 197 U. S. 570, 49 L. ed. 872, 25 S. Ct. 522; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673,

²⁰S. Ct. 545. Annotation: 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 500. If the real substance and effect of a state decision denying rights under a contract is to give force to a later statute impairing the effect of the contract, the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review the decision, although the decision is placed by the lower court distinctly on its own construction of the contract. Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236, 67 L. ed. 629, 43 S. Ct. 305. A construction by a state court of a state statute, whereby a cause of action under the statute for default of payments is enforced on the ground that payments previously made and accepted by the state are void, operates to impair the obligation of the implied contract arising out of the acceptance of the payments, and therefore violates the Federal Constitution, although the state court does not mention the statute. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, 20 S. Ct. 545.

⁶Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co. 156 Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 293, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 565. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915C, 579. The doctrine that if a contract when made was valid by the laws of the state, as then administered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent decision of the courts of the state, altering the construction of the law, does not apply where the making of the contract is in itself a violation of law. Therefore, such doctrine has no application where a corporation which has failed to comply with a statute subjecting to a penalty any corporation undertaking to transact any business in the state without filing a statement of the location of its place of business within the state and the name of an agent thereat, upon whom process may be served, seeks to enforce a contract entered into subsequently to an earlier decision of the court to the effect that failure to comply with such statutory requirements will not prevent the enforcement of a contract. Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Asso. 156 Ky. 628,

⁷Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N. E. 437, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1112, 118 Am. St. Rep. 884.

⁸S. Ct. 164; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 S. Ct. 252; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 S. Ct. 903, 962; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Davis 30

latures for the time the contract has to run.¹⁰ The commonest form of obliga-

tions of a state consists of bonds issued by it. The provisions of the laws exist-

sidered as forming part of the contract of the state in reference to its bonds.¹¹

tract with its billholders and depositors to the effect that its funds are to be

v. Gray, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 203, 21 L. ed. 447; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black (U. S.) 436, 17 L. ed. 173; Piqua State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (U. S.) 369, 14 L. ed. 977; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. (U. S.) 190,

⁴Pet. (U. S.) 514, 7 L. ed. 939; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 5 L. ed. 547; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 164, 3 L. ed. 303; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Bauer v. North Arkansas Highway Improv. Dist. 168 Ark. 220, 270 S. W. 533, 38 A.L.R. 1507; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447; State ex rel. Tipton v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466,

¹⁹P. (2d) 227, citing R. C. L.; Visor v. Waters, 320 Pa. 406, 82 A. 241, citing R. C. L. While the state cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts may be judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts under which such property or rights are held is void. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 842, 10 S. Ct. 504. A contract made by the state as one of the parties, although injudicious, cannot be impaired by legislative action or otherwise. Ohio L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. (U. S.) 416, 14 L. ed. 997. It is within the power of the legislature to bind the state by a contract, and such contract is within the protection of the Constitution of the United States, so that the act containing it cannot be repealed or the rights conferred or obligations assumed by it impaired, by subsequent legislation. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co.

¹³How. (U. S.) 71, 14 L. ed. 55. The inhibitions of the state and Federal Constitutions with regard to impairing the obligations of contracts apply to contracts made by a state or municipal corporation. Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781. Contracts between individuals and a state, as well as those between individuals, are within the provisions of the Federal Constitution forbidding the passing of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 106 A. 274, 3 A.L.R. 1658.

¹⁰Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 S. Ct. 652.

⁴³L. ed. 382, 19 S. Ct. 134; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 34 L. ed. 304, 10 S. Ct. 972; Sands v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 585,

²⁹L. ed. 739, 6 S. Ct. 516; Royall v. Virginia, 116 U. S. 572, 29 L. ed. 735, 6 S. Ct. 510; White v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 199, 5 S. Ct. 923, 962; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 S. Ct. 903, 962; Antoni v. Greenhow,

¹⁰⁷U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 S. Ct. 91; Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, 26 L. ed. 271; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. (U. S.) 190, 13 L. ed. 383; State ex rel. Tipton v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466, 19 P. (2d) 227, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. McKinlay v. Cardozo, 8 S. C. 71, 28 Am. Rep. 275.

⁴³L. ed. 382, 19 S. Ct. 134; Royall v. Virginia, 116 U. S. 572, 29 L. ed. 735, 6 S. Ct. 510. Annotation: 100 A.L.R. 1345. The right to pay taxes in coupons issued by the state cannot be treated as a mere right of setoff, which, when given by the general law, is part of the remedy merely, and therefore subject to modification or repeal; because the law which gave it is also a contract, and therefore cannot be changed without mutual consent. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 S. Ct. 903, 962. A provision in bonds that its coupons should be receivable "at and after maturity for all taxes due the state" constitutes a contract within the constitutional provision against its impairment by subsequent legislation. Antoni v. Greenhow,

¹⁰⁷U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 S. Ct. 91. See PUBLIC SECURITIES AND OBLIGATIONS: TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 378, § 337].

¹³Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, 26 L. ed. 271; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 44, 19 L. ed. 370; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. (U. S.) 190, 13 L. ed. 383.

law" permits the state to rescind such contract without impairing the obligation thereof.¹⁵

**§ ⁴⁰⁰. Violation and Impairment.**—A state entering into contracts lays

aside its attributes of sovereignty and binds itself, substantially, as one of its

defeating a contract because of its immunity from suit instituted by individuals.¹⁸ The legislature may avoid payment of the obligations of the state by

cannot impair any of the substantial rights secured to the holder of a tax certificate by the existing laws20 or impose a license tax for the sale of coupons

particular thing, it may abandon it and in such case the obligation of the contract would not be impaired by the refusal of the state to perform it. The

any damages sustained in like manner as if the contract had been between individuals.² This principle is justified on the basis that the breach of a contract by the state does not impair its obligation, but that the state merely has

¹⁶Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282, 30 L. ed. 960, 7 S. Ct. 897. Annotation: 33 L. ed. 836. No rights of contract can be vested under a constitutional provision which a subsequent Constitution may not destroy without impairing the obligation of contract. New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265, 30 L. ed. 411, 7 S. Ct. 198.

¹⁷Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. (U. S.) 190, 13 L. ed. 383; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778, 11 L.R.A. 370, 22 Am. St. Rep. 624. The immunity given to states from suits at law and in equity by the Federal Constitution while of equal authority with every other provision of that instrument and to be construed and applied in harmony with all its provisions does not exempt the state from the operation and effect of the constitutional prohibition against passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 S. Ct. 903, 962.

¹⁸Hays v. Seattle, 251 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 243, 40 S. Ct. 125; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 S. Ct. 164; Caldwell v. Donaghey, 108 Ark. 60, 156 S. W. 839, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 721, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 133. Annotation: 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 721, 723. The constitutional provision against the impairment of the obligations of contracts by laws enacted after they have been entered into, although its protection extends to contracts between an individual and a state, is nevertheless subject to the other constitutional provision of equal authority contained in the Eleventh Amendment giving immunity to a state from suit. Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 S. Ct. 164. As to the liability of a state to be sued, see STATES [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 412, § 49].

¹⁹Rorick v. Everglades Drainage Dist. (D. C.) 57 F. (2d) 1048, citing R. C. L.; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778, 11 L.R.A. 370, 22 Am. St. Rep. 624.

²Hays v. Seattle, 251 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 243, 40 S. Ct. 125; Brown v. Colorado,

¹⁰⁶U. S. 95, 27 L. ed. 132, 1 S. Ct. 175; Caldwell v. Donaghey, 108 Ark. 60, 156 S. W. 839, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 721, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 133. Annotation: 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 721.

³Brown v. Colorado, 106 U. S. 95, 27 L. ed. 132, 1 S. Ct. 175; Caldwell v. Donaghey, 108 Ark. 60, 156 S. W. 839, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 721, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 133; Donolds v. State, 89 N. Y. 36, 42 Am. Rep. 277. Annotation: 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 721. 32

the state is not reviewable in the United States Supreme Court by the defendant on the ground that the statute authorizing the suit violated the contract

should tender coupons of state bonds in payment of taxes impairs the obligation of the contract, provided no discrimination is made in its provisions between genuine and spurious coupons.⁷

**§ ⁴⁰¹. Withdrawal of Right of Action against State as Impairment.**—By

its consent. Accordingly, although a state is forbidden to impair the obligation of a contract entered into by it, a private citizen cannot bring suit against

not invested with power to supply them. There is no remedy for the enforcement of the contracts of the state that may not, under the Constitution of the

United States, be taken away by a law of the state.¹³ In exercising this power,

⁴Caldwell v. Donaghey, 108 Ark. 60, 156 S. W. 839, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 721, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 133.

²⁴⁰U. S. 305, 60 L. ed. 658, 36 S. Ct. 293; Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U. S. 240,

⁴⁰L. ed. 684, 16 S. Ct. 500; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 S. Ct. 164; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 25 L. ed. 960; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. (U. S.) 527, 15 L. ed. 991. As to a state's immunity from suit, see STATES [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 412, § 49].

⁴⁰L. ed. 684, 16 S. Ct. 500; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 S. Ct. 164; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 25 L. ed. 960. Annotation: 15 L. ed. 992.

¹¹Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. (U. S.) 527, 15 L. ed. 991. A state law authorizing suits against the state is not a contract, and a subsequent law prescribing new conditions or taking away such right of action is not invalid even as to pending suits. Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, 20 How. (U. S.) 530,

¹³Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U. S. 240, 40 L. ed. 684, 16 S. Ct. 500; South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Alabama, 101 U. S. 832, 25 L. ed. 973; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 25 L. ed. 960. The repeal of a constitutional provision giving a court jurisdiction to hear claims against the state, making the decision merely recommendatory to the legislature, and denying the right to an execution thereon does not impair the obligation of a contract with persons holding claims against the state. Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U. S. 240, 40 L. ed. 684, 16 S. Ct. 500. 33

the state violates no contract with the parties; it merely regulates the proceedings in its own courts.¹⁴

An erroneous decision to the effect that a constitutional provision giving a court power to hear claims against the state has been repealed does not impair the obligation of a contract, if it would not be impaired by the actual repeal of the provision.¹⁵

**§ ⁴⁰². Modification of Remedies as to State Contracts.**—The general principles permitting the modification of remedies may be applied with respect to attempts by a state to alter the procedure available for the enforcement of the rights of holders of state coupons and bonds. The state clearly may make all such changes in the remedy as do not substantially impair or obstruct the rights of the other party to the contract. It may deprive the holder of a state bond of the right to use his bond in payment of the purchase price of a certain class of public lands, if it provides for the payment by the state of the bond in money on due presentation.¹⁶ It may also modify the statutory proceedings in reference to mandamus; and instead of permitting the issuing of the writ to a tax collector to compel him to accept state bonds and coupons in payment of taxes when tendered, the remedy may be altered so as to require the taxpayer first to pay his taxes in money, and then to require such bonds and coupons to be received in payment of the taxes and the money previously paid refunded.¹⁷ Special courts may be created for the determination of the legality and genuineness of bonds purported to have been issued by the state.¹⁸ On the other hand, in regulating the bringing of actions on bonds or coupons issued by a state, the imposition of a duty on the holder of producing the bonds from which the coupons tendered by him were cut, at the time of offering the same in evidence in court, is an unreasonable condition. Such requirement is unconstitutional, since in many cases its performance would be impossible and it would render valueless all coupons which have been separated from the bonds to which they were attached and have been sold in the open market.¹⁹ The established principles dealing with the shortening of the period of statutes of limitation20 may be applied in determining the legality of such statutes attempting to curtail the time for bringing suit on state obligations. A reasonable time must be afforded within which actions may be brought.¹ Hence, a state statute prohibiting the institution of proceedings to try the genuineness of state bonds and coupons after one year from the time they are due is unreasonable and therefore impairs their obligation.² On the other hand, no impairment of a contract right to use state bonds in payment for state lands is effected by a statute providing for the payment of the bonds in cash and limiting the time for presentation to six months after publication of notice, after the expiration of which the bonds are not to be recognized as valid for any purpose.³ Furthermore, the state may prescribe a reasonable

¹⁴Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U. S. 240, 40 L. ed. 684, 16 S. Ct. 500; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. (U. S.) 527, 15 L. ed. 991.

¹⁶Tipton v. Smythe, 78 Ark. 392, 94 S. W. 678, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 714, 115 Am. St. Rep. 44, 8 Ann. Cas. 521.

³Tipton v. Smythe, 78 Ark. 392, 94 S. W. 678, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 714, 115 Am. St. Rep. 44, 8 Ann. Cas. 521. 34

period of redemption by those in default of a contract to purchase public lands.⁴

E. MATTERS CONSTITUTING CONTRACTS

**§ ⁴⁰³. Generally.**—The term "contract" is generally used in its ordinary sense in the clause of the United States Constitution forbidding state legislation impairing the obligation of contracts.⁵ The provision prohibiting the states from passing laws impairing obligation of contracts has never been understood to embrace contracts other than those which respect property or some other object of value and confer rights which may be asserted in courts of justice.⁶ Only those contracts the parties to which have a vested beneficial interest are the objects afforded protection by the impairment clause of the Federal Constitution.⁷ The term "contracts," however, comprehends a variety of instruments.⁸

A contract should be clearly proved before it invokes the protection of the Federal Constitution,⁹ and to be afforded the protection of this clause, the contract must be complete.¹⁰ Furthermore, the contracts which the Constitution protects relate to property rights, and not those rights which are governmental.¹¹ Hence, a contract which is not contrary to public policy and is formed between parties competent to contract is a contract which is constitutionally protected against hostile legislation.¹²

An immunity from a change of general rules of law will not ordinarily be implied as an unexpressed term of an express contract.¹³

⁵Chase v. Curtis, 113 U. S. 452, 28 L. ed. 1038, 5 S. Ct. 554. The term "contract" is used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense, as signifying the agreement of two or more minds, for considerations proceeding from one to the other, to do or not to do certain acts. Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54. The word "contracts" in U. S. Const. Art. 1, § 10, forbidding a state to impair the obligation of contracts, is used in its usual or popular sense, as signifying an agreement of two or more minds, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent, express or implied, to its terms, is of its very essence. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214. As to essentials of valid contracts, see generally CONTRACTS, infra, §§ 12 et seq.

⁶Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S. clxv, Appx., and 24 L. ed. 1109; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629.

⁹Moultrie County v. Rockingham Tencent Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 631, 23 L. ed. 631; Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 625, 23 L. ed. 628.

¹⁰The constitutional guaranty against the impairment of contracts refers to valid, subsisting obligations, and not to contingent or speculative ones. Ochiltree v. Iowa Railroad Contracting Co. 21 Wall. (U. S.) 249, 22 L. ed. 546.

¹¹Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079; Newton v. Mahoning County, 100 U. S. 548, 25 L. ed. 710; State v. Canal & C. R. Co. 50 La. Ann. 1189, 24 So. 265, 56 L.R.A. 287, writ of error dismissed in (U. S.) 44 L. ed. 1221, 20 S. Ct. 1027. The provisions of the Federal Constitution in reference to contracts only inhibit the states from passing laws impairing the obligations of such contracts as relate to property rights, but not to subjects that are purely governmental. Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 42 L. ed. 553, 18 S. Ct. 199. A grant of a public right or privilege is not a contract within the prohibition of the impairment of contract clause. Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99, 33 L. ed. 825, 10 S. Ct. 431.

¹²Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 S. Ct. 513.

¹³Annotation: 85 A.L.R. 469. The court, in refusing to hold a change of the general rules relating to surface waters an impairment of the obligation of contract, said in Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 59 L. ed. 1204, 35 S. Ct. 678: "The previous immunity from responsibility for such injury was nothing more than a general rule of law, which was not in terms or by necessary intendment imported into the contract. For just as no person has a vested right in any general rule of law or policy of legislation entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit . . . so an immunity from a change of the general rules of law will not ordinarily be implied as an unexpressed term of an express contract." 35

**§ ⁴⁰⁴. Included Matters.**—The provision of the Federal Constitution forbidding any state to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts applies not only to contracts as ordinarily understood but to all instruments, ordinances, and measures, by whatever name known, which embody the inherent qualities or purposes of contracts and carry, like them, their reciprocal obligations of good faith.¹⁴ Within the meaning of the term "contract" as thus protected may be included, therefore, besides contracts of franchises by municipal utes and legislative grants and franchises,¹⁵ grants of franchises by municipal corporations,¹⁶ judgments founded upon contract,¹⁷ contracts contained in public securities representatives18 and public officers,¹⁹ contracts contained in charitable trusts,¹ and trust deeds and obligations,²⁰ contracts establishing charitable trusts,¹ and trust deeds generally.²

A grant upon certain conditions to a state by the United States on acceptance by the state amounts to a contract binding on both, and the state may not dispense with any of the conditions imposed without impairing the obligation of such grant.³

**§ ⁴⁰⁵. Excluded Matters.**—The protection of the impairment clause does not extend to public officers or to the salary affixed to such offices, since these do not come within the import of the term "contracts;"⁴ nor does it extend to contracts of marriage,⁵ judgments not founded in contract,⁶ privileges,⁷ or statutes providing for other and distinct remedies, such as those prescribing penalties or forfeitures.⁸ Furthermore, the inhibition as to the impairment of the obligations of contract does not extend to licenses,⁹ as, for example, the

¹⁹Tracy v. Reed (C. C.) 13 Sawy. 622, 38 F. 69, 2 L.R.A. 773; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1074, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574.

¹The prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, contained in U. S. Const. Art. 1, § 10, applies to contracts establishing charitable trusts. Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92, 7 L.R.A. 765.

²Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 75 L. ed. 562, 51 S. Ct. 306. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 766, § 72]; TRUSTS [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 1160].

⁴See infra, § 420. See also PUBLIC OFFICERS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 379, § 11].

⁸State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 399, 38 Am. Dec. 317, affirmed in 3 How. (U. S.) 534, 11 L. ed. 714. A penalty provided for in the charter of a railroad company, for failure to lay its road through a certain county, is not in the nature of a contract, but is a mere penalty which the legislature can remit by a subsequent statute, although the penalty was for the benefit of the county. Maryland use of Washington County v. Baltimore & O. Co. 3 How. (U. S.) 534, 11 L. ed. 714. See also FORFEITURES AND PENALTIES [Also PENALTIES, 21 R. C. L. p. 210, § 5].

⁹Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. ed. 148; Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 82 N. E. 792, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1147, 14 Ann. Cas. 295; Moran v. Goodwin, 130 Mass. 158, 39 Am. Rep. 443; State v. Hovorka, 100 Minn. 249, 10 N. W. 870, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1272, 10 Ann. Cas. 398; Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268, 49 Am. Dec. 131; State v. American Surety Co. 90 Neb. 154, 91 Neb. 22, 133 N. W. 235, 135 N. W. 365, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 973; Wallace v. Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 P. 528, 63 L.R.A. 337, 103 Am. St. Rep. 747; Ex parte Williams, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 262, 20 S. W. 580, 21 L.R.A. 783; State v. Woodard, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S. E. 385, 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1004. Annotation: 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1272; 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 929; 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1004. Contract obligations are not unconstitutionally impaired by the imposition of an additional license fee upon merchants offering with merchandise bargained or sold coupons, profit-sharing certificates, or other evidence of indebtedness or liability redeemable in premiums, where the statute may be deemed to be prospective in its operation, and not to affect sales completed before its enactment. Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455. 36

license to sell intoxicating liquor,¹⁰ to conduct a lottery,¹¹ or even to practice a profession.¹² In any event an ordinance cannot amount to a contract to the extent of nullifying the police powers of the state acting either directly or indirectly through the municipality.¹³ Likewise, the inhibition as to the impairment clause of the Constitution is not directed against changes in the law affecting remedies14 or purely statutory rights,¹⁵ as, for instance, a right of action against a city for damages caused by a mob,¹⁶ rights to pensions and benefits accruing thereunder,¹⁷ or certain of the laws relating to the custody,¹⁸ disposition,¹⁹ or escheat of the estates of deceased persons.²⁰

Of course, a mere grant of a license to use public ways does not constitute a contract within the protection of the obligation of contract clause.¹

**§ ⁴⁰⁶. Statutes and Legislative Grants.**—It has become the established law that a legislative enactment, in the ordinary form of a statute, may contain provisions which, when accepted as the basis of action by individuals or corporations, become contracts between them and the state within the protection of the clause of the Federal Constitution forbidding impairment of contract obligations;² and when such a right has arisen, the repeal of the statute does

¹⁰La Croix v. Fairfield County, 50 Conn. 321, 47 Am. Rep. 648; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Moran v. Goodwin, 130 Mass. 158, 39 Am. Rep. 443; Wallace v. Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 P. 528, 63 L.R.A. 337, 103 Am. St. Rep. 747; People ex rel. Lodes v. Health Dept. 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 894. A license to sell liquor is not a contract between the state and the licensee, giving the latter vested rights, and it cannot be so granted as to be irrevocable. State v. Gibbs, 82 Vt. 526, 74 A. 229, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 555, 18 Ann. Cas. 525.

¹¹Com. v. Douglass, 100 Ky. 116, 24 S. W. 233, 66 Am. St. Rep. 328, affirmed in 168 U. S. 488, 42 L. ed. 553, 18 S. Ct. 199; Bass v. Nashville, Meigs (Tenn.) 421, 33 Am. Dec. 154.

¹²A tax upon the exercise of the profession of a lawyer is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of a contract. Odlin v. Woodruff, 31 Fla. 160, 12 So. 227, 22 L.R.A. 699. The obligation of the state's contract with one to whom it grants a license to practice law is not impaired by a subsequent statute requiring him to procure a further license from the county clerk as a means of compelling him to pay an occupation tax. Ex parte Williams, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 262, 20 S. W. 580, 21 L.R.A. 783. See ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Vol. 5, p. 268, § 12; LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 476, § 5].

¹³Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 174 Ind. 203, 89 N. E. 885, 91 N. E. 809, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 850, reversed because of the extent of the regulation in 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 33 S. Ct. 303, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 405. See Vol. 11, p. 983, § 254; infra, § 422.

¹⁵Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 S. Ct. 428; Louisiana ex rel. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 648; Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 235, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211; Sherman v. Langham, 92 Tex. 13, 40 S. W. 140, 42 S. W. 961, 39 L.R.A. 258. An abutting owner's vested property right, of statutory origin, to compensation after the completion of an elevated viaduct effecting a change of grade in a street, is not a contract right in the sense of the prohibition of U. S. Const. Art. 1, § 10, against the impairment of contract obligations. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214.

¹⁶Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 S. Ct. 428; Louisiana ex rel. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 648; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211; Sherman v. Langham, 92 Tex. 13, 40 S. W. 140, 42 S. W. 961, 39 L.R.A. 258.

¹⁸Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 55 L. ed. 899, 31 S. Ct. 661, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1129.

²⁰Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 40 L. ed. 691, 16 S. Ct. 585. No unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of a contract exists by taking an old unclaimed bank deposit into the state treasury, where it was made after the passage of the statute providing for such course. Com. v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 A. 569, 1 A.L.R. 1048.

¹Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Raleigh, 242 U. S. 15, 61 L. ed. 121, 37 S. Ct. 8. Consent by a state highway commission to the use of trucks with a specified load by common carriers on public highways is not a contract protected by the Federal Constitution. Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135, 71 L. ed. 966, 47 S. Ct. 548.

²New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co. 235 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 S. Ct. 72, L.R.A.1918E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 906; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 37

not affect the right or an action for its enforcement.³ The principle that a contract may arise from a legislative enactment must always rest for its support in the particular case upon the construction to be given the act.⁴ Furthermore, the acceptance of a grant offered by a state Constitution and part performance thereunder constitute a contract which may not be impaired by subsequent constitutional amendment,⁵ although in the cases where contracts arise under state Constitutions nothing will be implied and the grant is to be construed most strongly against the grantee.⁶

The general principle is established in American jurisprudence that a grant under which rights have vested amounts to a contract and that a subsequent statute attempting to impair or annul such grant is unconstitutional, because it is a law impairing the obligation of contracts.⁷ Thus, if a state makes a grant absolute in terms and without any reservation of a right to alter, modify, or repeal it, this constitutes an executed contract, and the states are forbidden to pass laws impairing the obligation arising therefrom.⁸ The state

U. S. 195, 58 L. ed. 912, 34 S. Ct. 517, L.R.A. 1915E, 882; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1282; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 243, 42 L. ed. 1022, 18 S. Ct. 610; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104, 24 L. ed. 352; Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 450, 17 L. ed. 805; Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson (D. C.) 290 F. 476, citing R. C. L. A contract is created by the acceptance, on the part of holders of claims against a levee board of the proposition made by a statute for the liquidation of the liabilities incurred for levee purposes by the issue of bonds and assessments on the lands benefited, and therefore the rights acquired under that statute cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation. Ford v. Delta & P. Land Co. 164 U. S. 662, 41 L. ed. 590, 17 S. Ct. 230. In Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 363, 11 S. Ct. 699, it was held that a statute offering swamp lands for sale upon compliance with the terms contained therein constituted a contract upon acceptance which could not be impaired by a subsequent statute. One who, under authority of the legislature, which reserves no power of repeal, constructs a dam for the improvement of the navigation of a stream in order to secure the power to be developed by the dam has a contract right which is not subject to repeal. State ex rel. Wausau Street R. Co. v. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 526. As to grants of franchises by municipal corporations, see infra, § 408.

³Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 42 L. ed. 553, 18 S. Ct. 199; Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 450, 17 L. ed. 805; Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson (D. C.) 290 F. 476, citing R. C. L.

⁴American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 103, 51 L. ed. 393, 27 S. Ct. 198, 9 Ann. Cas. 978.

⁵Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195, 58 L. ed. 912, 34 S. Ct. 517, L.R.A.1915E, 882, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1282; Clay County v. Society for Savings, 104 U. S. 579, 26 L. ed. 856. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1287.

⁶Madera Waterworks v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454, 57 L. ed. 915, 33 S. Madera, 228 U. S. Ct. 571.

⁷Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 42 L. ed. 553, 18 S. Ct. 199; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411, 56 Am. Dec. 666; Pingree v. Michigan Central R. Co. 118 Mich. 314, 76 N. W. 635, 53 L.R.A. 274; People v. Platt, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 195, 8 Am. Dec. 382; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coon, 6 Pa. 379, 47 Am. Dec. 474; Allen v. Forrest, 8 Wash. 700, 36 P. 971, 24 L.R.A. 606. Annotation: 47 Am. Dec. 478; 56 Am. Dec. 671. The doctrine of the common law is that when a contract has once passed bona fide into grant, neither the King nor any private person who might be the grantor can recall the grant of the property, although the conveyance may have been purely voluntary, and that a grant of franchises is not, in point of principle, distinguishable from a grant of any other property. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Com. v. Mobile & O. R. Co. (Ky.) 64 S. W. 451, 54 L.R.A. 916. After a grant in fee by a state for a valuable consideration of land under tidewater, a statute providing for the fixing of a bulkhead line and forbidding improvement beyond such line or the placing of any pier within a specified distance of city piers is an unconstitutional impairment of the contract, if the line is fixed across the property granted and the space beyond the bulkhead line is treated as tidewater subject to dredging for public use without compensation to the grantee. Appleby v. New York, 271 U. S. 364, 70 L. ed. 992, 46 S. Ct. 569. Vested rights under an unrestricted grant to an individual or private corporation when a law is in the nature of a contract cannot be divested by a subsequent change or repeal of the law, since to do so would impair the obligation of an executed contract. Smith v. Westcott, 17 R. I. 366, 22 A. 280, 13 L.R.A. 217.

⁸Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 43, 3 L. ed. 650; Franklin County Grammar School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467, 20 A. 820, 10 L.R.A. 405. Annotation: 10 L.R.A. 405. The government has no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to a private person or a corporation for special purposes. Dartmouth College 38

cannot afterwards recall the grant even though it was originally executed without consideration.⁹

A grant of public lands is an executed contract which may not be rescinded by a subsequent act of the state legislature under the impairment clause,¹⁰ provided that all conditions of such a grant are complied with.¹¹ A law passed subsequent to a state grant of lands, which requires the recording of deeds, does not impair the obligation of contract.¹² It should be remembered, however, that grants made by a legislature are not warranties, and that in determining their effect, if the thing granted was not in the grantor at the time of the grant, no estate passes. In such cases there is no room for the application of the doctrine as to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.¹³

Generally, when the legislature confers a franchise, it retains the right to control the recipient in its exercise so far as it does not surrender its authority to do so; this right of control includes the fixing of rates within certain limits14 in order to prevent unjust discrimination and to enforce such reasonable regulations as the state may deem necessary.¹⁵ Furthermore, statutes which operate only to regulate the manner in which the franchises are to be exercised and which do not interfere substantially with the enjoyment of the main object of the grant made by a corporate charter do not impair the contract contained therein.¹⁶ Where, however, the exclusive power to fix rates within a certain maximum is conferred on the recipient of the franchise, a subsequent attempt by the state to fix such rates is invalid as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.¹⁷ For the very reason that such a contract has the effect

⁹Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 43, 3 L. ed. 650; Franklin County Grammar School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467, 20 A. 820, 10 L.R.A. 405. See also Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629. Annotation: 10 L.R.A. 405.

¹⁰McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 143, 18 L. ed. 314; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 3 L. ed. 162. Annotation: 10 L.R.A. 406. A grant of rights in public property accepted by the beneficiary amounts to a contract entitled to protection against impairment by action of the state or municipalities acting under state authority. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 50 L. ed. 801, 26 S. Ct. 427.

¹¹Compliance with the provisions of a state statute governing the sale of tidelands of the state by making an application for their purchase, taking the required oath, and expending money for a survey cannot be said to consummate, without the payment of some installment of the purchase price, a binding contract between the purchaser and the state protected against impairment by subsequent legislation. Banning Co. v. California, 240 U. S. 142, 60 L. ed. 569, 36 S. Ct. 338.

¹²Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 280, 7 L. ed. 679. See RECORDS AND RECORDING LAWS [Also 23 R. C. L. p. 172, § 26].

¹⁴Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 56 L. ed. 594, 32 S. Ct. 389; Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co. 191 U. S. 358, 48 L. ed. 217, 24 S. Ct. 82; Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S. 624, 45 L. ed. 702, 21 S. Ct. 490; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 S. Ct. 198; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526, 27 L. ed. 812, 2 S. Ct. 832; Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180, 24 L. ed. 99; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179, 24 L. ed. 99; Pelk v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 94 U. S. 164, 24 L. ed. 97; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 142 Ga. 841, 83 S. E. 946, L.R.A. 1916E, 358; Chicago v. O'Connell, 278 Ill. 591, 116 N. E. 210, 8 A.L.R. 916; Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312, 48 N. W. 98, 12 L.R.A. 436, 31 Am. St. Rep. 477; Pingree v. Michigan C. R. Co. 118 Mich. 314, 76 N. W. 635, 53 L.R.A. 274; Blake v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 19 Minn. 418, Gil. 362, 18 Am. Rep. 345, affirmed in 94 U. S. 180, 24 L. ed. 99; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co. 159 Wis. 130, 150 N. W. 411, L.R.A.1915F, 732, affirmed in 245 U. S. 633, 62 L. ed. 522, 38 S. Ct. 133; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis. 592, 142 N. W. 491, L.R.A. 1915F, 744, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 911, affirmed in 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. ed. 1254, 35 S. Ct. 820. For detailed discussion as to power over rates, see PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES.

¹⁶Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co. 161 U. S. 646, 40 L. ed. 838, 16 S. Ct. 705.

¹⁷Pingree v. Michigan C. R. Co. 118 Mich. 314, 76 N. W. 635, 53 L.R.A. 274. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1913D, 89. The power to fix rates, if exercised by a city, unless that power is clearly expressed by legislative grant, is in the nature of a license and is revocable at the 39

of extinguishing pro tanto an undoubted power of government, both its existence and the authority to make it must clearly and unmistakably appear, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the continuance of the power of the government,¹⁸ for an agreement as to the surrender or suspension of legislative control will not be raised by mere implication.¹⁹

§ 407. Corporate Charters; Statutory Liability of Stockholders.—

While the charter of a corporation is a law in that it is an act of the legislature, it is also something more than a law. It is a grant of powers and privileges, a contract between the corporation and the state by the terms of which the corporation is to enjoy the rights and privileges granted; and like other contracts, it is protected by the Federal Constitution from legislation impairing its obligation. Consequently, the legislature has no authority, after making such a grant, to restrain, control, or destroy the powers, privileges, and franchises so granted, unless the authority is reserved by the act of incorporation or some prior general law. Since the reserve power to alter, amend, or repeal corporate charters is now reserved by general law in most states, this question has become dead as a practical matter. However, the status of the charter of a corporation as a contract, the obligation of which may not be impaired by any state law, does not affect the power of a state to regulate corporations created by it, for it is a well-recognized principle that this power is implied in every grant of corporate existence. The statutory liability of the stockholders of corporations for corporate debts is a contractual right of creditors, and therefore it cannot be abrogated or impaired in any way so as to affect persons whose claims had previously accrued. These matters are treated in full in another part of this work.20

§ 408. Grants of Franchises by Municipal Corporations.—

A franchise is included within the broader term "grant," and the same general principles are applicable to it in reference to the constitutional inhibition as to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.1 The well-established rule as to fran-

will of the legislature when, in its judgment, the common good demands its reassertion. State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, L.R.A. 1915C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78. See also infra, § 412.

¹⁸Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 50 L. ed. 353, 26 S. Ct. 224; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 S. Ct. 198; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co. 161 U. S. 646, 40 L. ed. 838, 16 S. Ct. 705; St. Clair County Turnp. Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63, 24 L. ed. 651; Minot v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 18 Wall. (U. S.) 206, 21 L. ed. 888; Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 500, 21 L. ed. 133; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha (C. C. A. 8th) 147 P. 1, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614, appeal dismissed in 207 U. S. 584, 52 L. ed. 352, 28 S. Ct. 262; Woodburn v. Public Serv. Commission, 82 Or. 114, 161 P. 391, L.R.A.1917C, 98, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 996; Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & P. Co. 134 Va. 134, 114 S. E. 92, 28 A.L.R. 562; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, L.R.A.1915C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78. Every reasonable doubt should be resolved against the existence of a contract on the part of the state and there must be shown a deliberate intention clearly manifested on the part of the state to grant what is claimed. Newton v. Mahoning County, 100 U. S. 548, 25 L. ed. 710.

¹⁹Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 S. Ct. 198; St. Clair County Turnp. Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63, 24 L. ed. 651; Minot v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 18 Wall. (U. S.) 206, 21 L. ed. 888; Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 500, 21 L. ed. 133; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha (C. C. A. 8th) 147 F. 1, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614, appeal dismissed in 207 U. S. 584, 52 L. ed. 352, 28 S. Ct. 262; Indianapolis v. Navin, 151 Ind. 139, 47 N. E. 525, 51 N. E. 80, 41 L.R.A. 337. A grant by the state to operate a ferry and a prohibition on the state to grant another ferry lease within a certain area do not constitute an implied contract by the state that it will not permit a bridge to be built. Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U. S. 429, 73 L. ed. 441, 49 S. Ct. 196.

¹New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 29 L. ed. 525, 6 S. Ct. 273; People v. State Tax Comrs. 174 N. Y. 417, 67 N. E. 69, 63 L.R.A. 884, 105 Am. St. Rep. 674; Wyoming v. Ohio Traction Co. 104 Ohio St. 325, 135 N. E. 675, citing R. C. L.; Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 40

chises is that where a municipal corporation, acting within its powers, enacts an ordinance conferring rights and privileges on a person or corporation, and the grantee accepts the ordinance and expends money in availing itself of the rights and privileges so conferred, a contract is thereby created which, in the absence of a reserved power to amend or repeal the ordinance, cannot be impaired by subsequent municipal enactment.² The equivalent of a municipal grant or franchise may result from the acceptance of an offer contained in a state statute3 or in the Constitution of the state.⁴ The great weight of au-

⁹⁸Ohio St. 320, 121 N. E. 688, 3 A.L.R. 705 (overruled on other grounds in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio St. 173, 140 N. E. 884, 29 A.L.R. 342); Allen v. Forrest, 8 Wash. 700, 36 P. 971, 24 L.R.A. 606. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 142. See FRANCHISES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 179, § 6].

²New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co. 235 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 S. Ct. 72, L.R.A.1918E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 906; Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84, 57 L. ed. 1400, 33 S. Ct. 997; Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 1339, 33 S. Ct. 988; Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 33 S. Ct. 303, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 405; Louisville v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 224 U. S. 649, 56 L. ed. 934, 32 S. Ct. 572; Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 215 U. S. 417, 54 L. ed. 259, 30 S. Ct. 118; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 206 U. S. 496, 51 L. ed. 1155, 27 S. Ct. 762; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 S. Ct. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253; Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric R. Co. 201 U. S. 529, 50 L. ed. 854, 26 S. Ct. 513; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 S. Ct. 18; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, 22 S. Ct. 410; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 S. Ct. 77; St. Tammany Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 120 U. S. 64, 30 L. ed. 563, 7 S. Ct. 405; Louisiana ex rel. Fisk v. Jefferson, 116 U. S. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 S. Ct. 329; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 29 L. ed. 525, 6 S. Ct. 273; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 S. Ct. 252; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 23 L. ed. 896; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha (C. C. A. 8th) 147 F. 1, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614, appeal dismissed in 207 U. S. 584, 52 L. ed. 352, 28 S. Ct. 262; Colorado & S. R. Co. v. Ft. Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121 P. 747, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 646; Washington v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 136 Ga. 638, 71 S. E. 1066, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 867; Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co. 164 Ind. 162, 73 N. E. 87, 3 Ann. Cas. 86; Michigan Teleph. Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 N. W. 383, 47 L.R.A. 87, 80 Am. St. Rep. 520; Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. v. Minneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 83 N. W. 527, 86 N. W. 69, 53 L.R.A. 175; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec. 466; Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. v. Anderson, 12 N. D. 585, 98 N. W. 706, 65 L.R.A. 771, 102 Am. St. Rep. 580, 1 Ann. Cas. 110; Elliott v. Eugene, 135 Or. 108, 294 P. 358, citing R. C. L.; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis. 592, 142 N. W. 491, L.R.A.1915F, 744, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 911, affirmed in 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. ed. 1254, 35 S. Ct. 820. Annotation: 3 A.L.R. 730, s. 9 A.L.R. 1165, 23 A.L.R. 609, and 29 A.L.R. 356; 50 L.R.A. 145; 3 Ann. Cas. 90; 6 Ann. Cas. 259; Ann. Cas. 1915A, 899. The acceptance of a permit granted by a municipal corporation under legislative authority to place wires in the city streets creates a contract which cannot thereafter constitutionally be revoked or impaired by municipal resolution or ordinance, unless such franchise is lost by misuser or nonuser. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co. 235 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 S. Ct. 72, L.R.A.1918E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 906. When a municipal corporation, by ordinance, gives its consent that a natural gas company may enter the municipality and lay down its pipes therein and furnish gas to consumers upon terms and conditions imposed by the ordinance which is accepted in writing by the corporation, such action by both parties constitutes a contract, and the rights of the parties therein are to be determined by the contract itself. Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 320, 121 N. E. 688, 3 A.L.R. 705, overruled in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio St. 173, 140 N. E. 884, 29 A.L.R. 342; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co. 52 Utah, 210, 173 P. 556, 3 A.L.R. 715. It is a familiar law that when the terms of a valid ordinance are accepted by a grantee, such action constitutes a valid contract and the rights of the parties are determined by the contract itself. Interurban R. & Terminal Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 287, 120 N. E. 831, 3 A.L.R. 596. For a detailed discussion of the general principles above stated, see FRANCHISES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 192, § 19]; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 1149, §§ 424-437].

³The grant resulting from the acceptance by the establishment of a plant devoted to the prescribed public use of the state's offer to permit persons or corporations duly incorporated for the purpose "in any city where there are no public works owned and controlled by the municipality for supplying the same with water or artificial light" to lay pipes in the city streets for the purpose specified constitutes a contract and vests in the accepting individual or corporation a property right protected by the Federal Constitution against impairment. Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195, 58 L. ed. 912, 34 S. Ct. 517, L.R.A.1918E, 882, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1282.

thority accepts the view that a grant by a municipality of a franchise without specifying a time limit constitutes a perpetual provision in the state impairment clause, provided there is no controlling provision in the state Constitution or statutes or a prior adjudication by its courts to the contrary.⁵ If, however, the duration of public franchises is limited by the state Constitution to a definite period, contracts for rates to exceed that period are not protected by the impairment of contract clause as that which protects vested rights principle of these cases is closely akin to that which protects vested rights from divestment, and it is not uncommon to treat the franchise itself as a vested right.⁷ It is necessary though that the power to grant such a franchise reside in the municipality, for if the power in question does not exist, then a grant would not be binding or within the protection of the Federal Constitution to the extent that it purports to be irrevocable and exclusive.⁸ A municipal corporation may by an express contract confer an exclusive franchise or privilege, excluding even itself from competition during the period of the contract.⁹ It seems to be generally recognized that a franchise when granted by a municipality must be accepted and acted upon in order to give it the character of a contract;¹⁰ after this is done, it becomes an irrevocable contract which cannot be amended or diminished without the consent of the grantee.¹¹ It would seem, however, that such acceptance and action upon the offer must be substantial.¹² The mere granting of a franchise does not amount to an implied contract on the part of the grantor that it will do nothing to impair its value,¹³ that it will not grant a rival franchise to a competing corpora-

⁵Northern Ohio Traction & L. Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S. 574, 62 L. ed. 481, 38 S. Ct. 196, L.R.A.1918E, 865. Annotation: 71 A.L.R. 121. See FRANCHISES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 172]; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 678].

⁷Benton Harbor v. Michigan Fuel & Light Co. 250 Mich. 614, 231 N. W. 52, 71 A.L.R. 114; Ingersoll v. Nassau Electric R. Co. 157 N. Y. 453, 52 N. E. 545, 43 L.R.A. 236.

⁸Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. ed. 176, 29 S. Ct. 50; People's Pass. R. Co. v. Memphis City R. Co. 10 Wall. (U. S.) 38, 19 L. ed. 844; Birmingham & P. M. Street R. Co. v. Birmingham Street R. Co. 79 Ala. 465, 58 Am. Rep. 615; Westminster Water Co. v. Westminster, 98 Md. 551, 56 A. 990, 64 L.R.A. 630, 103 Am. St. Rep. 424; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, L.R.A.1915C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78; Clarksburg Electric Light Co. v. Clarksburg, 47 W. Va. 739, 35 S. E. 994, 50 L.R.A. 142, writ of error dismissed in — U. S. —, 46 L. ed. 1267, 22 S. Ct. 942; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis. 592, 142 N. W. 491, L.R.A.1915F, 744, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 911, affirmed in 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. ed. 1254, 35 S. Ct. 820. And see Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 S. Ct. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253; Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & P. Co. 134 Va. 134, 114 S. E. 92, 28 A.L.R. 562; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Clifton Forge (Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Com.) 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 723, 9 A.L.R. 1148, writ of certiorari denied in 251 U. S. 557, 64 L. ed. 413, 40 S. Ct. 179. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 143.

⁹Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 S. Ct. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 S. Ct. 77.

¹⁰Capital City Light & Fuel Co. v. Tallahassee, 186 U. S. 401, 46 L. ed. 1219, 22 S. Ct. 866; Re Russell, 163 Cal. 668, 126 P. 875, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 152, reversed on other grounds in 233 U. S. 195, 58 L. ed. 912, 34 S. Ct. 517, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1282; Stockton Gas & E. Co. v. San Joaquin County, 148 Cal. 313, 83 P. 54, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 174, 7 Ann. Cas. 511; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bowers, 124 Pa. 183, 16 A. 836, 2 L.R.A. 621. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 148; Ann. Cas. 1915A, 899.

¹¹Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84, 57 L. ed. 1400, 33 S. Ct. 997; Shreveport Traction Co. v. Shreveport, 122 La. 1, 47 So. 40, 129 Am. St. Rep. 345; Michigan Teleph. Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 N. W. 383, 47 L.R.A. 87, 80 Am. St. Rep. 520; Westport v. Mulholland, 159 Mo. 86, 60 S. W. 77, 53 L.R.A. 442. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 145.

¹²The appointment of agents to subscribe for stock of a railroad company upon the happening of a certain event, before a new state Constitution went into effect, prohibiting municipal aid, does not create a contract to make the subscription and issue bonds. Buffalo & J. R. Co. v. Falconer, 103 U. S. 821, 26 L. ed. 471.

¹³Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co. 191 U. S. 150, 48 L. ed. 127, 24 S. Ct. 43; Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 354, 46 L. ed. 585, 22 S. Ct. 400; 42

tion,¹⁴ or enter into competition itself in reference to the subject of the franchise.¹⁵ It is to be remembered that franchises granted by cities affecting subjects and matters coming within the police power of the state must be considered as having been granted or passed with reference to the power of the state to legislate in regard to such matters unfettered by provisions of such franchises.¹⁶

§ 409. —

What Constitutes Impairment within Rule.—The repeal of an ordinance granting a privilege which has been accepted or acted upon is, of course, an impairment of the contract where no power of repeal is reserved.17 An attempted reduction of the rates prescribed in a franchise, by subsequent ordinance, is an impairment of the obligation of the contract.18 An ordinance which declares acts unlawful which by contract or franchise were permitted is invalid as impairing the obligation of contract, provided it is not justified under the police power.19 A contract granting an exclusive right and privilege to operate a waterworks for a specified number of years is impaired by the construction of a waterworks system by the municipality.20 After the expiration of the time for which a street railway franchise is granted, no contract obligation is impaired by requiring the removal of its tracks from the streets.1

§ 410. Ultra Vires Grants as Exception to Rule.—

The protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of obligation of contract does not extend to privileges, franchises, and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers.2 However, where the original ordinance is beyond the powers

¹⁴Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 50 L. ed. 353, 26 S. Ct. 224; Helena Waterworks Co. v. Helena, 195 U. S. 383, 49 L. ed. 245, 25 S. Ct. 40; Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co. 191 U. S. 150, 48 L. ed. 127, 24 S. Ct. 43; Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 186 U. S. 212, 46 L. ed. 1132, 22 S. Ct. 820; Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 175 U. S. 109, 44 L. ed. 92, 20 S. Ct. 40; Stein v. Bienville Water Supply Co. 141 U. S. 67, 35 L. ed. 622, 11 S. Ct. 892; Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co. 13 How. (U. S.) 71, 14 L. ed. 55; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha (C. C. A. 8th) 147 F. 1, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614, appeal dismissed in 207 U. S. 584, 52 L. ed. 352, 28 S. Ct. 262; Rockland Water Co. v. Camden & R. Water Co. 80 Me. 544, 15 A. 785, 1 L.R.A. 388.

¹⁵Helena Waterworks v. Helena, 195 U. S. 383, 49 L. ed. 245, 25 S. Ct. 40; Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co. 191 U. S. 150, 48 L. ed. 127, 24 S. Ct. 43; Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 175 U. S. 109, 44 L. ed. 92, 20 S. Ct. 40; Meridian v. Farmer's Loan & T. Co. (C. C. A. 5th) 143 F. 67, 6 Ann. Cas. 599. A Constitution providing that a private corporation may, in any city not having its own public works, use the streets to lay pipes, etc., subject to regulations as to rates by the municipal corporation, does not give such private corporation an exclusive grant and prevent the city from competing, nor will such provision be implied. Madera Waterworks v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454, 57 L. ed. 915, 33 S. Ct. 571.

¹⁷Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 1389, 33 S. Ct. 988; Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 33 S. Ct. 303, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 405; Louisville v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 224 U. S. 649, 56 L. ed. 934, 32 S. Ct. 572. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 901.

¹⁸Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 215 U. S. 417, 54 L. ed. 259, 30 S. Ct. 118; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha (C. C. A. 8th) 147 F. 1, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614, appeal dismissed in 207 U. S. 584, 52 L. ed. 352, 28 S. Ct. 262. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 902.

¹⁹Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 S. Ct. 18. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 902.

²⁰Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 S. Ct. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 902.

¹Detroit United R. Co. v. Detroit, 229 U. S. 39, 57 L. ed. 1056, 33 S. Ct. 697. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 902.

²Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 33 S. Ct. 303, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 405; Murray v. Pocatello, 226 U. S. 318, 57 L. ed. 239, 33 S. Ct. 107; Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. ed. 176, 29 S. Ct. 50; Elizabeth City v. Bank, 150 N. C. 407, 64 S. E. 189, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 925; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, L.R.A.1915C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis. 592, 142 N. W. 491, L.R.A.1915F, 744, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 911, affirmed in 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. ed. 1254, 35 S. Ct. 820. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 904 43

of the municipal corporation, if it is subsequently ratified by the legislature,

§ 411. Effect of Reserved Power to Amend or Repeal.—

§ 412. Rate Fixing by Municipality.—

or confer on the grantee of the franchise the right to fix rates.⁹ Such a franchise may not, however, impair or hamper the paramount power of the state

contracts as to rates subject to the reserved police power of the state to change

such rates, until this power is exerted by the state, a binding contract entered

with the knowledge of the inherent reserved power of the state to alter contracts for rates or that the state itself may at any time waive the rights of the

state.¹² It is generally held that the clause in the Federal Constitution forbidding the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not

rates of public service corporations and that a contract between a municipality and a public service corporation whereby the latter is permitted to

³Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 215 U. S. 417, 54 L. ed. 259, 30 S. Ct. 118. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 904.

⁵Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 1389, 33 S. Ct. 988. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 904.

⁶Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 1389, 33 S. Ct. 988. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 904.

⁸Detroit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238, 61 L. ed. 268, 37 S. Ct. 87; Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 U. S. 517,

⁴⁸L. ed. 1102, 24 S. Ct. 764; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368,

⁴⁶L. ed. 592, 22 S. Ct. 410; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, (C. C. A. 8th) 147 F. 1, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614, appeal dismissed in 207 U. S. 584, 52 L. ed. 352,

²⁸S. Ct. 262. A contract entered into by a municipal corporation fixing the rates for furnishing electricity to its inhabitants under a statute empowering it to contract for a supply of electricity is within the constitu- tional protection against impairment of obligation of contract. Mobile Electric Co. v. Mobile, 201 Ala. 607, 79 So. 39, L.R.A. 1918F, 667.

¹⁰Puget Sound Traction, Light & P. Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574, 61 L. ed. 1325,

³⁷S. Ct. 705, 5 A.L.R. 1; Idaho Power & L. Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 282; Woodburn v. Public Serv. Corp. 82 Or. 114, 161 P. 391, L.R.A.1917C, 98, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 996; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis. 592, 142 N. W. 491, L.R.A.1915F, 744, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 911, affirmed in 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. ed. 1254, 35 S. Ct. 820.

¹¹Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co. 52 Utah, 210, 173 P. 556, 3 A.L.R. 715; Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & P. Co. 134 Va. 134, 114 S. E. 92, 28 A.L.R. 562.

¹³⁴Va. 134, 114 S. E. 92, 28 A.L.R. 562. Annotation: 3 A.L.R. 735, s. 9 A.L.R. 1165, 28 A.L.R. 587, and 29 A.L.R. 356.

police power or express statute or constitutional provision to modify the contract rate in the interest of the public welfare.¹⁴

§ 413. Privileges and Their Recall.—

The general principle is that the legislature has the power to take away by statute that which has been given by

vested right. The recall of such a privilege is not an impairment of the obligation of contracts.¹⁵ So, until a general power granted to corporations has

subject to legislative control.¹⁶ Provisions granting such a right or power to

a corporation do not partake of the nature of a contract,¹⁷ and the revocation

impairment in a constitutional sense.¹⁸ Likewise, a statute limiting the time

within which a certain privilege or license previously granted may be exercised is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligations of a contract.¹⁹ The

general principles stated have been applied to many different classes of laws—

as, for example, to pensions,²⁰ to bounties offered by a state for the purpose

penalties accruing to a public corporation under its charter,² and to extraordinary remedies springing from no inherent right but resting wholly in positive statutory enactments.³ Likewise, the privilege of occupying public lands

§ 414. Privilege of Using Streets and Highways.—

contract.⁶ It seems clear that to bring the grant of a right or privilege in a

¹⁴Annotation: 9 A.L.R. 1425. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 678]; PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES.

³⁶Am. Dec. 701; Templeton v. Linn County, 22 Or. 313, 29 P. 795, 15 L.R.A. 730. And see Washington & B. Turnp. Co. v. Maryland, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 210, 18 L. ed. 180.

¹⁶East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Frazier, 139 U. S. 288, 35 L. ed. 196, 11 S. Ct. 517.

¹⁷Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 163 U. S. 416, 41 L. ed. 211, 16 S. Ct. 1113.

¹⁸Capital City Light & Fuel Co. v. Tallahassee, 186 U. S. 401, 46 L. ed. 1219, 22 S. Ct. 866; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 226, 42 L. ed. 1017, 18 S. Ct. 603; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co.

¹⁶¹U. S. 646, 40 L. ed. 838, 16 S. Ct. 705; People's Pass. R. Co. v. Memphis R. Co. 10 Wall. (U. S.) 38, 19 L. ed. 844; Skillman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 78 Iowa, 404, 43 N. W. 275, 16 Am. St. Rep. 452; Wilkes County v. Call, 123 N. C. 308, 31 S. E. 481, 44 L.R.A. 252.

¹Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 S. Ct. 428; East Saginaw Salt Mfg. Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 373, 20 L. ed. 611.

⁶Northern Ohio Traction & L. Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S. 574, 62 L. ed. 481, 38 S. Ct. 196, L.R.A.1918E, 865; New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co. 235 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 S. Ct. 72, L.R.A. 1918E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 906; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195, 58 L. ed. 912, 45

nonuses.⁹ Of course, if the power to revoke or alter the original grant is re-

privilege of the use of streets is subject to the exercise of the police power by

§ 415. Judgments.—

³⁴S. Ct. 517, L.R.A.1918E, 882, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 282. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 142, s. L.R.A. 1918E, 893. The grant by a county board of a right to locate, construct, maintain, and oper- ate an interurban electric railway along a state highway, without specifying any lim- it of time, must be held—unless there are controlling provisions in the state Consti- tution or statutes or a prior adjudication by its courts to the contrary—to consti- tute, when accepted, a perpetual fran- chise, protected by the United States Const. Art. 1, § 10, against revocation by subsequent resolution of such board. Northern Ohio Traction & L. Co. v. Ohio,

²⁴⁵U. S. 574, 62 L. ed. 481, 38 S. Ct. 196, L.R.A.1918E, 865. For a detailed discussion, see FRAN- CHISES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 187, § 13]; HIGHWAYS, STREETS, AND SIDEWALKS [Also

⁸Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S. 574, 62 L. ed. 481, 38 S. Ct. 196, L.R.A.1918E, 865. See New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co. 235 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 S. Ct. 72, L.R.A.1918E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 906. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 142, s. L.R.A. 1918E, 899.

⁹New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co. 235 U. S. 179, v. Empire 184, 35 S. Ct. 72, L.R.A.1918E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 906. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 142, s. L.R.A. 1918E, 901. See FRANCHISES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 201, § 26].

¹⁰Northern Ohio Traction & L. Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S. 574, 62 L. ed. 481, 38 S. Ct. 196, L.R.A.1918E, 865. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 142, s. L.R.A. 1918E, 892.

¹¹See, Pomona v. Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 224 U. S. 330, 56 L. ed. 788, 32 S. Ct. 477. Annotation: 50 L.R.A. 142, s. L.R.A. 1918E, 902.

¹²Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88, 42 L. ed. 87, 17 S. Ct. 748; Colorado & S. R. Co. v. Ft. Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121 P. 747, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 646.

¹⁵Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 196, 22 L. ed. 612. Annotation: 17 L.R.A. 613.

¹⁴⁶U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54; Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McFadden (C. C. A. 8th) 105 F. 293, 58 L.R.A. 900, af- firmed in 185 U. S. 505, 46 L. ed. 1012, 22 S. Ct. 758; Sprott v. Reid, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 489, 56 Am. Dec. 549; Stanford v. Coram, 28 Mont. 288, 72 P. 655, 98 Am. St. Rep. 556; Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 69 N. E. 123, 61 L.R.A. 800, 93 Am. St. Rep. 600; Wyoming Nat. Bank v. Brown, 7 Wyo. 494, 53 P. 291, 75 Am. St. Rep. 935. Annotation: 17 L.R.A. 615. In a proceeding to condemn property for 46

hibition is the maintenance of good faith in the stipulations of parties against

provision as such.¹⁸ Likewise, a judgment founded on a tort is not a contract,

§ 416. Marriage.—

public use, there is nothing in the nature of a contract between the owner and a state, or the corporation which the state authorizes to take the property, that will entitle the owner of property condemned to public use to maintain an action for the recovery of the award made in the condemnation proceeding, after the vaca- tion of the order confirming the same. Gar- rison v. New York, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 196,

²²L. ed. 612. A judgment is not the obligation of the contract, but the authorized power under which antecedent obligations are to be en- forced. Sprott v. Reid, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 489, 56 Am. Dec. 549.

¹⁴⁶U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54; Chase v. Curtis, 113 U. S. 452, 28 L. ed. 1038, 5 S. Ct. 554; Garrison v. New York,

²¹Wall. (U. S.) 196, 22 L. ed. 612; McAfee v. Covington, 71 Ga. 272, 51 Am. Rep. 263.

¹¹³U. S. 452, 28 L. ed. 1038, 5 S. Ct. 554; Louisiana ex rel. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 648; Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Or- leans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211; McAfee v. Covington, 71 Ga. 272, 51 Am. Rep. 263; Douglass v. Loftus, 85 Kan. 720, 119 P. 74, L.R.A.1915B, 797, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 378; Cossard v. Tracy, 52 La. Ann. 835, 27 So. 368, 49 L.R.A. 272; Sherman v. Langham, 92 Tex. 13, 40 S. W. 140, 42 S. W. 961, 39 L.R.A. 258; Bettman v. Cowley,

¹⁹Wash. 207, 53 P. 53, 40 L.R.A. 815. Annotation: 17 L.R.A. 613. The statutory obligation resting upon a municipality to make indemnity for dam- ages caused by a mob has no more element of contract in it because it was merged in a judgment than it had previously. Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans,

²⁰Odell v. Green, 72 Ind. App. 65, 122 N. E. 791, citing R. C. L.; Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 69 N. E. 123, 61 L.R.A. 800, 93 Am. St. Rep. 600.

¹A judgment for damages for a tres- pass to real estate, where the tort bene- fited the tort-feasor's estate to the full ex- tent of the actual damages recovered by the injured party, is not a judgment upon a tort, pure and simple, but upon a cause of action so far contractual as to bring the judgment within the protection of the provisions of the Federal Constitution against legislation impairing the obligation of a contract. Douglass v. Loftus, 85 Kan. 720, 119 P. 74, L.R.A.1915B, 797, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 378.

²W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426, 78 L. ed. 1344, 54 S. Ct. 816, 93 A.L.R. 173; Louisiana v. St. Martins Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 648; Rat- cliffe v. Anderson, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 105, 31 Am. Rep. 716. Annotation: 17 L.R.A. 613. A judgment upon a contract does not terminate its obligation because it does not pay the debt: the debt remains con- tractual in character, and its payment is as much within the obligation of the con- tract after the judgment as it was before. Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 132 F. 434, 67 L.R.A. 558. The legislature cannot enlarge the dow- er rights of a widow as against the rights of one who has contracted with the hus- band for a judgment lien on the property of the husband in view of the constitu- tional provision against impairing the ob- ligation of contracts, although the judg- ment is not actually entered until after the statute is passed. Davidson v. Rich- ardson, 50 Or. 323, 91 P. 1080, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 319, 126 Am. St. Rep. 738. 47

pairing the obligation of a contract,³ and legislation affecting or annulling the marriage relationship is not, therefore, within the protection of that provision.⁴ In certain aspects laws regulating divorces resemble laws regulating remedies in other cases of breach of contracts, and for this reason are not treated as impairing the obligation of contracts.⁵ Furthermore, since marriage is not within the protection of the clause forbidding impairment of contract, a statute amending the procedure required in divorce actions does not impair the obligation of contract.⁶ The provision of the Constitution never has been understood to embrace contracts other than those which respect property or some object of value and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice.⁷

F. LAWS AFFECTING POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

§ 417. General Rule.—

In determining whether a statute affecting a municipal corporation operates as an impairment of the obligation of a contract, regard must be had to the distinction between the rights of such a corporation in its public or governmental capacity and its private rights. So far as a municipality is an agency of government, created by the legislature, it has no rights or powers which, as between it and the state, the legislature may not modify or abrogate at pleasure.8 Neither the charter of a municipal cor-

³Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 S. Ct. 723; Georgia v. Tutty (C. C.) 41 F. 753, 7 L.R.A. 50; Berthelemy v. Johnson, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 90, 38 Am. Dec. 179; Worthington v. District Ct. 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230, L.R.A.1916A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1097; Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 273 N. Y. 525, 5 N. E. (2d) 815, 7 N. E. (2d) 671, 109 A.L.R. 1229, appeal dismissed in 301 U. S. 667, 81 L. ed. 1332, 57 S. Ct. 933, which has a rehearing denied in — U. S. —, 82 L. ed. (Adv. 30), 58 S. Ct. 6; Rugh v. Ottenheimer, 6 Or. 231, 25 Am. Rep. 513; State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N. W. 83, 31 L.R.A. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 928. Annotation: 54 Am. St. Rep. 449.

⁴Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 S. Ct. 723; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Worthington v. District Ct. 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230, L.R.A.1916A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1097; State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N. W. 83, 31 L.R.A. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 928.

⁵The provision of the Constitution prohibiting states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not restrict the general right of a state legislature to legislate on the subject of divorce. Acts authorizing divorces do not impair the marriage contract, but liberate one of the parties because it has been broken by the other. Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S. clxv, Appx. and 24 L. ed. 1109. State laws in regard to divorce, being remedial in nature, do not come within the provision of the Constitution forbidding the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629. As to the nature of legislation respecting divorce generally, see DIVORCE AND SEPARATION [Also 9 R. C. L. p. 232].

⁶Worthington v. District Ct. 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230, L.R.A.1916A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1097.

⁷Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 S. Ct. 723; Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S. clxv, Appx. and 24 L. ed. 1109; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Worthington v. District Ct. 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230, L.R.A.1916A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1097.

⁸Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 S. Ct. 534, 29 A.L.R. 1471; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. 250 U. S. 394, 63 L. ed. 1054, 39 S. Ct. 526; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 S. Ct. 40; Worcester v. Worcester Consol. Street R. Co. 196 U. S. 539, 49 L. ed. 591, 25 S. Ct. 327; New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. ed. 552; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. (U. S.) 511, 13 L. ed. 518; Dubuque Electric Co. v. Dubuque (C. C. A. 8th) 260 F. 353, 10 A.L.R. 495; La Mesa, L. G. & S. Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Halley, 197 Cal. 50, 239 P. 719, citing R. C. L.; Hershey v. Cole, 130 Cal. App. 683, 20 P. (2d) 972, citing R. C. L.; State use of Washington County v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 399, 38 Am. Dec. 317, affirmed in 3 How. (U. S.) 534, 11 L. ed. 714; Harsha v. Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N. W. 849, 90 A.L.R. 853; Saginaw County v. Hubinger, 137 Mich. 72, 100 N. W. 261, 4 Ann. Cas. 792; Com. v. Delaware Twp. 18 Pa. D. & C. 447, 36 Dauph. Co. Rep. 60; Oneida v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co. 169 Tenn. 449, 88 S. W. (2d) 998, citing R. C. L.; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12, 67 Am. Dec. 748. Annotation: 4 Ann. Cas. 794. The state has power over the rights and property of cities, held and used for "governmental purposes," which is unrestricted by the contract or due process clauses of the Federal Constitution. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 S. Ct. 534, 29 A.L.R. 1471. A municipal corporation being a public corporation and a creature of the legisla- 48

poration nor any legislative act regulating the use of property held by it for governmental or public purposes is a contract within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.⁹

A municipality being a creature of the state may not question the power of the state to exercise its police power on the ground that by so doing the state would impair the obligation of contract.¹⁰ Furthermore, the repeal or modification of the charter of a municipal corporation is not within the inhibition of the contract clause.¹¹ Municipalities, however, have and exercise powers that are not strictly governmental in character. They may lawfully make contracts under which rights are acquired or liabilities incurred, and the legislature cannot legally pass any statute impairing rights thus acquired either by a municipal corporation12 or by persons dealing with it,¹³ provided, of

ture, its charter is subject to amendment, change, or abrogation at the will of the latter without violating the constitutional provision against the impairment of contracts. New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142. See supra, Vol. 11, p. 615, § 17. As to home-rule municipalities, see MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 678].

⁹Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 S. Ct. 534, 29 A.L.R. 1471; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. 250 U. S. 394, 63 L. ed. 1054, 39 S. Ct. 526; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 S. Ct. 40; Worcester v. Worcester Consol. Street R. Co. 196 U. S. 539, 49 L. ed. 591, 25 S. Ct. 327; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, 43 L. ed. 679, 19 S. Ct. 383; New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142; La Mesa, L. G. & S. Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Halley, 197 Cal. 50, 239 P. 719, citing R. C. L.; Hershey v. Cole, 130 Cal. App. 683, 20 P. (2d) 972, citing R. C. L.; Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. Sandpoint, 31 Idaho, 498, 173 P. 972, L.R.A. 1918F, 1106; Com. v. Delaware Twp. 18 Pa. D. & C. 447, 36 Dauph. Co. Rep. 60; Oneida v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co. 169 Tenn. 449, 88 S. W. (2d) 998, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 4 Ann. Cas. 794. Neither the charters of municipal corporations nor any law conferring governmental powers, vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it constitute a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution so that the state, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation, and may do this, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 S. Ct. 40. A state may withdraw from a municipality a grant of governmental authority previously given without violating the contract clause of the Constitution. Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. 250 U. S. 394, 63 L. ed. 1054, 39 S. Ct. 526.

¹⁰Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. Sandpoint, 31 Idaho, 498, 173 P. 972, L.R.A. 1918F, 1106; Com. v. Delaware Twp. 18 Pa. D. & C. 447, 36 Dauph. Co. Rep. 60.

¹¹Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 S. Ct. 40; New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 23 L. ed. 896; Oneida v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co. 169 Tenn. 449, 88 S. W. (2d) 998, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 4 Ann. Cas. 795.

¹²Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 S. Ct. 40; Worcester v. Worcester Consol. Street R. Co. 196 U. S. 539, 49 L. ed. 591, 25 S. Ct. 327 (dictum); Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 731. Annotation: 4 Ann. Cas. 796. The private or proprietary rights and interests of a municipal corporation may be entitled to constitutional protection against legislation impairing the obligation of contracts or depriving of property without due process of law. New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142. A contract concerning proprietary rights, harmless in itself, made by a municipality in the exercise of power clearly conferred is protected by the Constitution, and the police power cannot be invoked to abrogate or impair it. Interurban R. & Terminal Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 287, 120 N. E. 831, 3 A.L.R. 696. In Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Me. 112, 19 Am. Dec. 197, it was held that where an act incorporating part of a town into a new town provided that the latter should support its proportion of all the paupers then supported in whole or in part by the original town, a subsequent act exonerating the new town from such liability in the future was unconstitutional and void as impairing the obligation of contracts.

¹³Graham v. Folsom, 200 U. S. 248, 50 L. ed. 464, 26 S. Ct. 245; Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646, 42 L. ed. 310, 17 S. Ct. 957; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36, 32 L. ed. 589, 9 S. Ct. 210; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 29 L. ed. 620, 6 S. Ct. 398; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. ed. 699; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 23 L. ed. 896; Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403. 49

substituting an indeterminate time therefor.¹⁵ The approval by the electors of

political divisions of a state as well as to municipal corporations proper.¹⁷

§ 418. Taxing Power as Inherent Part of Contract.—

contract,²⁰ the laws relating to the rights of enforcement existing at the time

⁶⁸L. ed. 212, 44 S. Ct. 40. Under the contract clause of the Federal Constitution a state cannot substitute an indeterminate permit to supply a munici- pality with water for a contract between the municipality and the supply company, giving an exclusive right to furnish such supply for a definite term, with an obliga- tion on the part of the municipality to pur- chase the supply system at the termina- tion of such term, at a specified price. Superior Water, Light & P. Co. v. Supe- rior, 263 U. S. 125, 68 L. ed. 204, 44 S. Ct. 82.

¹⁶Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Filmer, 217 Cal. 754, 21 P. (2d) 112, 91 A.L.R. 1; Peery v. Los Angeles, 187 Cal. 753, 203 P. 992, 19 A.L.R. 1044.

²³⁹U. S. 254, 60 L. ed. 266, 36 S. Ct. 58; Newton v. Mahoning County, 100 U. S. 548,

²⁵L. ed. 710; McSurely v. McGrew, 140 Iowa, 163, 118 N. W. 415, 132 Am. St. Rep. 248; Miller v. Henry, 62 Or. 4, 124 P. 197,

⁴¹L.R.A.(N.S.) 97; Nelson v. Haywood County, 87 Tenn. 781, 11 S. W. 885, 4 L.R.A. 648. Annotation: 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97. The charter of a drainage district as a public corporation does not constitute a contract with its members that the laws it was created to administer will not be changed. Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist. 239 U. S. 254, 60 L. ed. 266, 36 S. Ct. 58. As respects grants of political or govern- mental authority to cities, towns, counties, and the like, the legislative power of the states is not restrained by the contract clause of the Constitution. Dubuque Elec- tric Co. v. Dubuque (C. C. A. 8th) 260 F. 353, 10 A.L.R. 495.

¹⁸Even assuming that the fulfilment of certain terms prescribed by statute as the conditions on which a county seat should be considered permanently established cre- ates a contract, its obligation is not im- paired by a statute changing its location, since such contract was satisfied on the part of the state establishing the county seat at a certain point with the intent that it should remain there, there being no stipulation that it should remain there in perpetuity. Newton v. Mahoning County,

¹⁹Atty. Gen. ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233, 50 L. ed. 167, 26 S. Ct. 27.

²Farson v. Bird, 248 U. S. 268, 63 L. ed. 233, 39 S. Ct. 111; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 29 L. ed. 620, 6 S. Ct. 398; Lou- isiana ex rel. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish,

¹¹¹U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 S. Ct. 648; Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans,

¹⁰⁹U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211; Ralls County Ct. v. United States, 105 U. S. 733, 26 L. ed. 1220; Louisiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278,

²⁶L. ed. 1090; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Meriwether v. Gar- rett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197; Rees v. 50

forbidden by the Constitution of the United States and is null and void.⁴ This

Watertown, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 107, 22 L. ed. 72; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 575, 19 L. ed. 490; Riggs v. Johnson Coun- ty, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 166, 18 L. ed. 768; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Board of Revenue v. Farson, Son & Co. 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A. 1918B, 881; Hershey v. Cole, 130 Cal. App. 683, 20 P. (2d) 972, citing R. C. L. Goodie v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 426, 22 Am. Rep. 321; Pitts v. Allen, 138 Okla. 295, 281 P. 126, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Clancy v. Columbia Irrig. Dist. 121 Wash. 79, 208 P. 27, citing R. C. L. Annotation: L.R.A.1918B, 886. Where a municipal corporation is author- ized to contract and to exercise the power of local taxation to meet its contractual engagements, this power must continue un- til the contracts are satisfied, and it is an impairment of an obligation of the con- tract to destroy or lessen the means by which it can be enforced. Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170,

⁵⁴L. ed. 144, 30 S. Ct. 40. When a contract is made with a munic- ipal corporation on the faith that taxes will be levied, legislation repealing or mod- ifying the taxing power of the corporation, so as to deprive the holder of the contract of all adequate and efficacious remedy, is within the constitutional inhibition and is null and void. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403.

³Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289,

²⁹L. ed. 620, 6 S. Ct. 398; Ralls County Ct. v. United States, 105 U. S. 733, 26 L. ed. 1220; Louisiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Board of Reve- nue v. Farson, Son & Co. 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881; Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 124 N. C. 478, 32 S. E. 804, 70 Am. St. Rep. 610. Annotation: L.R.A.1918B, 887. After services have been rendered to a municipality under a law, resolution, or ordinance which fixes the rate of compen- sation, there results an implied contract to pay for the services at that rate, which cannot be impaired by the adoption of a state Constitution so restricting the rate of municipal taxation as to destroy the right to enforce the contract. Fisk v. Jef- ferson, 116 U. S. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 S. Ct. 329.

⁴Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289,

²⁹L. ed. 620, 6 S. Ct. 398; Ralls County Ct. v. United States, 105 U. S. 733, 26 L. ed. 1220; Louisiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Galena v. Amy (Galena v. United States) 5 Wall. (U. S.) 705, 18 L. ed. 560; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Board of Revenue v. Farson, Son & Co. 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881; Broadfoot v. Fayetteville,

¹²⁴N. C. 478, 32 S. E. 804, 70 Am. St. Rep. 610. Annotation: L.R.A.1918B, 887.

¹⁹⁷Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881. Annotation: L.R.A.1918B, 886. As the power to determine what persons and property shall be taxed belongs ex- clusively to the legislative branch of the government and is strictly a legislative power whether directly exercised by the legislature or delegated to a municipality, municipal ordinances assessing taxes upon municipal bonds and thereby lessening the amount of interest agreed to be paid un- der such obligations violate the constitu- tional provision against the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607,

⁶Ralls County Ct. v. United States, 105 U. S. 733, 26 L. ed. 1220; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Galena v. Amy (Galena v. United States), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 705, 18 L. ed. 560; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403. Annotation: L.R.A.1918B, 887. Legislation of a state impairing contracts made under its authority is void as im- pairing the obligation of contracts. Lou- isiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury,

¹⁰⁵U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090. Where a statute authorizing the issue of municipal bonds provides for their pay- ment by levy and collection of a special tax "in the same manner as county taxes are levied," the obligation of the contract is impaired by any change in the remedy making it less efficacious than that pro- vided at the same time for securing the revenues of the county. Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190. Legislation taking away the existing remedy for the enforcement of municipal bonds by repealing a statute authorizing the levy of a tax to pay the interest or principal due on such bonds impairs the obligation of a contract where no other remedy is substituted. Louisiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278,

power of the city to levy taxes impairs the obligation of contract.⁹ A statute,

to the power of the state.¹² Under the foregoing conditions, a statute increas-

fall within the protection of the impairment clause,¹⁴ a statute which limits

§ 419. Reorganized Municipal Corporations.—

nicipal taxation as to prevent a municipal- ity from meeting the interest on its bonds by levying a tax under a law in force when the bonds were issued is invalid as im- pairing contract obligations. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403.

⁷Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190.

⁸Ibid. Laws passed since municipal securities were issued, taking away from the proper authority power to levy taxes necessary to meet the payment, are invalid, and manda- mus will issue to require the proper au- thorities to do all that the law required when the securities were issued to raise the means to pay the judgment. Ralls County Ct. v. United States, 105 U. S. 733,

⁹A receiver as representative of the in- terested creditors is unconstitutionally de- prived of the right of taxation by a city for the payment of their claims, which right existed before the enactment of a statute by the provisions of which the payment of the judgment recovered by such receiver against the city upon out- standing indebtedness of the debtor, con- tracted on the faith of the exercise of the city's power to levy taxes for its payment, may be indefinitely postponed until such time as the city is ready and willing to make such payment. Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 S. Ct. 40.

¹¹Arkansas S. R. Co. v. Louisiana & A. R. Co. 218 U. S. 431, 54 L. ed. 1097, 31 S. Ct. 56; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 S. Ct. 40; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395. The power of taxation belongs exclusive- ly to the legislative department of the gov- ernment and the extent to which it shall be delegated to a municipal body is a matter of discretion and such delegation of power may be limited or revoked at the pleasure of the legislature, except that such revocation must not operate directly upon contracts of the municipality so as to impair their obligation by abrogating or lessening the means of their enforce- ment. Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211.

¹²Arkansas S. R. Co. v. Louisiana & A. R. Co. 218 U. S. 431, 54 L. ed. 1097, 31 S. Ct. 56; Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville,

¹⁸⁹U. S. 434, 47 L. ed. 887, 23 S. Ct. 531; Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 50 L. ed. 274, 26 S. Ct. 127; Harsha v. Detroit,

¹³Harsha v. Detroit, 261 Mich. 856, 246 N. W. 849, 90 A.L.R. 853. Annotation: 90 A.L.R. 859. For a detailed discussion of the impair- ment of the obligation of public securities and obligations, see PUBLIC SECURITIES AND OBLIGATIONS.

¹⁵A state law limiting the power of tax- ation of a city is not unconstitutional be- cause it prevents the collection of a judg- ment for damages caused by a mob. It does not violate the impairment of obliga- tion clause, because the judgment is not founded on contract. Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211. 52

of the old corporation fall on the new as its legal successor, and the powers of

tered into the contracts, also survive and pass into the new corporation.¹⁶ Fur-

thermore, the exercise by a state of its right to destroy its political subdivisions

contracts.¹⁷ The legislature cannot, in the exercise of the power to merge mu-

voters necessary to the assumption by a new municipality of a debt of its prede-

statute.¹⁹ An act providing, however, that residents of territory recently added

to a city shall not be liable for municipal debts contracted previous to the an-

§ 420. Matters Affecting Public Officers and Employees.—

that state legislatures have the power to enlarge, repeal, and limit the authori-

ties of public officers in their official capacities, in all cases where the state Con-

be between private citizens.⁴ A contract for commissions resulting from a stat-

¹⁶Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646, 42 L. ed. 310, 17 S. Ct. 957; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 29 L. ed. 620, 6 S. Ct. 398; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. ed. 699; Broughton v. Pensa- cola, 93 U. S. 266, 23 L. ed. 896; Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 124 N. C. 478, 32 S. E. 804,

¹⁷Graham v. Folsom, 200 U. S. 248, 50 L. ed. 464, 26 S. Ct. 245. The laws establishing local municipal corporations cannot be altered or repealed so as to invade the constitutional rights of their creditors. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 29 L. ed. 620, 6 S. Ct. 398.

¹⁸Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 29 L. ed. 620, 6 S. Ct. 398; Mt. Pleasant v. Beck- with, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. ed. 699.

²Oneida v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co. 169 Tenn. 449, 88 S. W. (2d) 998, cit- ing R. C. L.

²⁷⁶U. S. 174, 72 L. ed. 517, 48 S. Ct. 266; Missouri ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 125 U. S. 339, 31 L. ed. 769, 8 S. Ct. 929; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed. 302; Dart- mouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629. A positive contract made by a state un- der authority of law employing an agent in a particular service for a particular term cannot be rescinded by the state at will any more than a like contract by an individual employer can be. Missouri ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 125 U. S. 339, 31 L. ed. 769, 8 S. Ct. 929. If a person is employed to perform a service under a contract with a state with- out becoming an officer, and a contract is made accordingly, it will be within the protection of the Federal Constitution, and 53

ute authorizing an officer to bring suits to discover and recover delinquent taxes

and entitling him to a percentage of the amount recovered is impaired by a stat-

islature may release a public officer or his sureties from liability for loss of

agencies of the state, such as counties, townships, and school districts.⁸ There

G. POLICE POWER AS AFFECTING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS

§ 421. Generally.—

the courts, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights.¹⁰ This

cannot be impaired by state legislation. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed. 302. An express contract between the state and an individual for the performance of services comes within the protection of the Federal Constitution, and, as to the obli- gation thereof, forms an exception to the rule that public officers are, at all times, subject to the control of the legislature. Per Story, J., Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629.

²⁷⁶U. S. 174, 72 L. ed. 517, 48 S. Ct. 266. In Atkins v. Kingsbury, 247 U. S. 484, 62 L. ed. 1226, 38 S. Ct. 558, it was held that the obligations of the contract of the State of California with a purchaser of public land, which gave to the state the right to foreclose for default in payment of the purchase price and to the purchaser the privilege of redemption within twenty days from the entry of the foreclosure decree upon payment of the amount due the state and the costs of suit, were not impaired by the enactment of subsequent legislation under which, in case the principal and in- terest were in arrears for five years and the state had issued to a subsequent pur- chaser another certificate for the same land, the first purchaser's right to the land and to complete the contract of purchase was cut off unless he should pay all un- paid interest within six months from the passage of the act.

⁶Miller v. Henry, 62 Or. 4, 124 P. 197, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97. Annotation: 38 A.L.R. 1512, s. 96 A.L.R. 295; 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97.

⁸⁰L. ed. 1031, 56 S. Ct. 672; Pearson v. State, 56 Ark. 148, 19 S. W. 499, 35 Am. St. Rep. 91; McSurely v. McGrew, 140 Iowa, 163, 118 N. W. 415, 132 Am. St. Rep. 248; Board of Education v. McLandsborough, 36 Ohio St. 227, 38 Am. Rep. 582; Miller v. Henry, 62 Or. 4, 124 P. 197, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97. Annotation: 38 A.L.R. 1512, s. 96 A.L.R. 295; 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97. State and Federal constitutional provi- sions against laws impairing the obliga- tion of contracts are not violated by a statute relieving uncompensated sureties on bonds of public depositories of liability on such bonds to the extent that deposits represent funds raised by general taxa- tion, and from liability upon judgments obtained thereon, and upon any evidence of indebtedness given in lieu of such li- ability, since depository bonds are in sub- stance contracts with the state itself through political subdivisions as its agents. Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271. A constitutional provision forbidding laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the legislature from re- leasing the liability of a county treasurer upon his bond for loss of public funds through the failure of a bank in which they were deposited, at least where the bond runs to the state, and not to the county. Miller v. Henry, 62 Or. 4, 124 P. 197, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97.

⁸Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawk- ins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; McSurely v. McGrew, 140 Iowa, 163,

¹¹⁸N. W. 415, 132 Am. St. Rep. 248. Annotation: 38 A.L.R. 1512, s. 96 A.L.R. 297.

¹⁰Semler v. Oregon State Dental Exam- iners, 294 U. S. 608, 79 L. ed. 1086, 55 S. Ct. 570; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blais- dell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Chi- cago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 59 L. ed. 1204, 35 S. Ct. 678; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 54

principle applies to contracts made with the state, as well as to contracts between

individuals.¹¹ Although the obligation of contracts must yield to a proper exer-

cise of the police power and vested rights cannot inhibit proper exertion of the

must not be arbitrary or oppressive.¹² All contracts made with reference to any

as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power.¹³ This is based on

349, 52 L. ed. 828, 28 S. Ct. 529, 14 Ann. Cas. 560; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341; Mani- gault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 50 L. ed. 274, 26 S. Ct. 127; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U. S. 453,

⁴⁹L. ed. 831, 25 S. Ct. 471; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636,

⁶S. Ct. 334, 388, 1191; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gaslight Co. 115 U. S. 683, 29 L. ed. 510, 6 S. Ct. 265; Ft. Smith v. Hunt, 72 Ark. 556, 82 S. W. 163, 66 L.R.A. 238, 105 Am. St. Rep. 51; Schiller Piano Co. v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co. 288 Ill. 580, 123 N. E. 631, 11 A.L.R. 454; Storen v. Sexton, Ind. —, 200 N. E. 251, 104 A.L.R. 1359; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A.L.R. 270; Dey v. Knights & Ladies of Security, 113 Kan. 86, 213 P. 1066, citing R. C. L.; Treigle v. Acme Homestead Asso. 181 La. 941, 160 So. 637, 98 A.L.R. 69, reversed in 297 U. S. 189, 80 L. ed. 575, 56 S. Ct. 408, 101 A.L.R. 1284, which has rehearing denied in 297 U. S. 728, 80 L. ed. 1010, 56 S. Ct. 587, 588; Com. v. R. I. Sherman Mfg. Co. 189 Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71, 4 Ann. Cas. 268; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. State, 67 Okla. 10, 168 P. 239, L.R.A.1918C, 492; Woodburn v. Public Serv. Commission, 82 Or. 114, 161 P. 391, L.R.A.1917C, 98, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 996; Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 121,

⁴⁷Am. Rep. 326; State v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 99 Tex. 516, 91 S. W. 214, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 783, 13 Ann. Cas. 1072; Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light & Water Co. 92 Wash. 330, 159 P. 133, L.R.A.1917C, 574; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct.

⁶⁷Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, L.R.A.1915C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78; Seattle v. Hurst, 50 Wash. 424, 97 P. 454, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 169; Filipkowski v. Springfield, F. & M. Ins. Co.

²⁰⁶Wis. 39, 238 N. W. 828, 78 A.L.R. 613. Annotation: 3 Ann. Cas. 92. It does not matter that legislation appro- priate to a legitimate end has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts al- ready in effect, as contracts are to be re- garded as having been made subject to the future exercise of the constitutional power of the state, and the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481. An exercise of public policy cannot be restricted because of conduct or contracts done or made upon the faith of former exercises of it, upon the ground that its later exercises deprive of property or in- validate those contracts. Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U. S. 361, 65 L. ed. 304, 41 S. Ct. 137. The sovereign right of the government is not less because the property in question happens to be a contract. Calhoun v. Mas- sie, 253 U. S. 170, 64 L. ed. 843, 40 S. Ct. 474. One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot re- move them from the power of the state by making a contract involving them, for the contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter. Hudson County Wa- ter Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828, 28 S. Ct. 529, 14 Ann. Cas. 560. Private contract rights must yield to the public welfare where the latter is appropri- ately declared and defined and the two conflict. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. ed. 309, 39 S. Ct. 117, 9 A.L.R. 1420; Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Serv. Commis- sion, 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557, 7 A.L.R. 1081. An unconstitutional impairment of a contract is not effected by the statutory prohibition of the further performance of a contract which is so injurious to the rights and interests of the citizens gen- erally as to justify an exercise of the po- lice power. State v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 99 Tex. 516, 91 S. W. 214, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 783, 13 Ann. Cas. 1072.

¹⁶⁵U. S. 1, 41 L. ed. 611, 17 S. Ct. 243, affirm- ing 121 Mo. 298, 24 S. W. 591, 25 L.R.A. 161; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisi- ana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 S. Ct. 252; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Chap- pell, 183 Ind. 141, 106 N. E. 403, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 627. Rights and privileges arising from con- tracts with a state are subject to regula- tions for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, in the same sense and to the same extent as are all contracts and all prop- erty, whether owned by natural persons or corporations. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 S. Ct. 252.

¹²Treigle v. Acme Homestead Asso. 297 U. S. 189, 80 L. ed. 575, 56 S. Ct. 408, 101 A.L.R. 1284, rehearing denied in 297 U. S. 728, 80 L. ed. 1010, 56 S. Ct. 587, 588. See Vol. 11, p. 1075, § 303.

¹³Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370, 68 L. ed. 742,

⁴⁴S. Ct. 362; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 65 L. ed. 877, 41 S. Ct. 465; Erie R. Co. v. Public Utility Comrs. 254 U. S. 394, 65 L. ed. 322, 41 S. Ct. 169; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. ed. 55

the principle that if the legislature has no power to alter its police laws when contracts will be affected, then the most important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited.¹⁴ Furthermore, franchises, privileges, and contracts granted by municipalities affecting matters coming within the police power of the state must be considered as having been granted or passed with reference to the power of the state to legislate with respect to such matters unfettered by provisions of such franchises.¹⁵

The power to fix rates and tolls to be charged by public utilities is one of the attributes of sovereignty. Clearly, the legislature should not part with this power even for a limited time, except upon the most potent and convincing considerations.¹⁶ Thus, it has been uniformly held that contracts between private parties and public utilities fixing the compensation to be paid for the services rendered, although executed under state or Federal authority, are made subject to the sovereign right of state to modify or annul them.¹⁷ This rule is fur-

309, 39 S. Ct. 117, 9 A.L.R. 1420; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 55 L. ed. 297, 31 S. Ct. 265, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 671; Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co. 191 U. S. 358, 48 L. ed. 217, 24 S. Ct. 82; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 S. Ct. 513; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 654, 20 L. ed. 689; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 457, 20 L. ed. 287; Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. Sandpoint, 31 Idaho, 498, 173 P. 972, L.R.A.1918F, 1106; Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 282; Woodburn v. Public Serv. Commission, 82 Or. 114, 161 P. 391, L.R.A.1917C, 98, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 996; Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light & Water Co. 92 Wash. 330, 159 P. 133, L.R.A.1917C, 574. "Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481. The operation of reasonable laws for the protection of the public cannot be headed off by making contracts reaching into the future. Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370, 68 L. ed. 742, 44 S. Ct. 362. All contracts are inherently subject to the paramount power of the sovereign, and the exercise of such power is never understood to involve their violation and is not within the provision of the Constitution forbidding a state to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 654, 20 L. ed. 689.

¹⁴Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 55 L. ed. 297, 31 S. Ct. 265, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 671; Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 282; Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light & Water Co. 92 Wash. 330, 159 P. 133, L.R.A.1917C, 574; State v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78. Parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 50 L. ed. 274, 26 S. Ct. 127. It is well settled by the decisions that the making of contracts between individuals or between individuals and corporations or municipalities can never be held to abrogate or prevent the exercise by the state of its police power in any manner that it may consider just and proper. If it were conceded that such contracts could be entered into, every substantial power conferred by the commission by the legislature in the public utilities act could easily have been nullified and set at naught by the simple act of making contracts prior to the time the act became effective. Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 282.

¹⁵Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 33 S. Ct. 303, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 405; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 S. Ct. 18; New York ex rel. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Squire, 145 U. S. 175, 36 L. ed. 666, 12 S. Ct. 880; Richmond, F. O. P. R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 24 L. ed. 734; Colorado & S. R. Co. v. Ft. Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121 P. 747, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 646; Cape Girardeau v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. 305 Mo. 590, 267 S. W. 601, 36 A.L.R. 1488; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, 120 P. 861, L.R.A. 1915C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 902. The constitutional provision against the impairment of contract obligations does not apply where the legislation which is alleged to impair a contract right under an ordinance granting a privilege is an exercise of the police power. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 142 Ga. 841, 83 S. E. 946, L.R.A.1916E, 358.

¹⁶Minneapolis, St. P. & Ste. M. R. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co. 159 Wis. 130, 150 N. W. 411, L.R.A.1915F, 732, affirmed in 245 U. S. 633, 62 L. ed. 522, 38 S. Ct. 133; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission, 153 Wis. 592, 142 N. W. 491, L.R.A.1915F, 744, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 911, affirmed in 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. ed. 1254, 35 S. Ct. 820. For a full discussion of rate regulations, see PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES.

¹⁷Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. ed. 309, 39 S. Ct. 117, 9 A.L.R. 1420; Portland R. Light & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 229 U. S. 56

ther justified on the ground that public utilities are only agencies of the state in regulating rates and have no authority to enter into a contract not subject to modification or revocation by the state.¹⁸

§ 422. Contracts Restricting Police Power.—

It is a fundamental principle that the governmental power of self-protection cannot be contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights granted or the use of property be withdrawn from the implied liability to governmental regulation in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from injury.19 In accordance with the principle that the power to legislate in the interest of the morals, health, and safety of the public is not restricted by the contract clause of the Constitution,20 the exercise of the police power cannot be limited by contract, and it is immaterial on what consideration the contracts rest, since in all cases it is beyond the authority of a state or its municipalities to abrogate this power so necessary to the public safety.1 Hence, it is well settled that a municipality cannot, by a contract in

397, 57 L. ed. 1248, 33 S. Ct. 820; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 55 L. ed. 297, 31 S. Ct. 265, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 671; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 52 L. ed. 681, 28 S. Ct. 428; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 32 L. ed. 377, 9 S. Ct. 47; Minneapolis, St. P. & Ste. M. R. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co. 159 Wis. 130, 150 N. W. 411, L.R.A.1915F, 732, affirmed in 245 U. S. 633, 62 L. ed. 522, 38 S. Ct. 133.

¹⁸Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 142 Ga. 841, 83 S. E. 946, L.R.A. 1916E, 358, affirmed in 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. ed. 309, 39 S. Ct. 117, 9 A.L.R. 1420; Minnesota, St. P. & Ste. M. R. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co. 159 Wis. 130, 150 N. W. 411, L.R.A.1915F, 732, affirmed in 245 U. S. 633, 62 L. ed. 522, 38 S. Ct. 133; Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & N. Traction Co. 145 Wis. 13, 129 N. W. 925, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1056.

²⁰New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 S. Ct. 437; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 29 L. ed. 525, 6 S. Ct. 273; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 S. Ct. 252; Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 149 Ga. 1, 98 S. E. 696, 5 A.L.R. 1; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 190 Iowa, 487, 130 N. W. 649, 16 A.L.R. 249; Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 106 A. 274, 3 A.L.R. 1658; Davison v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 100 Neb. 462, 160 N. W. 877, L.R.A.1917C, 135; Interurban R. & Terminal Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 287, 120 N. E. 831, 3 A.L.R. 696. The state may not surrender, or bind itself not to exert, its police power. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629, 80 L. ed. 943, 56 S. Ct. 611, rehearing denied in 298 U. S. 691, 80 L. ed. 1409, 56 S. Ct. 745. Contracts affecting the safety and welfare of the public are within the supervising power and control of the legislature, when exercised to protect the public safety, health, and morals. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 S. Ct. 513. The inhibition of the Constitution of the United States upon the impairment of the obligation of contracts is not violated by the legitimate exercise of legislative power in securing the public safety, health, and morals. New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 S. Ct. 437.

¹Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629, 80 L. ed. 943, 56 S. Ct. 611, rehearing denied in 298 U. S. 691, 80 L. ed. 1409, 56 S. Ct. 745; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 59 L. ed. 1204, 35 S. Ct. 678; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. ed. 831, 25 S. Ct. 471; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 S. Ct. 77; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 S. Ct. 513; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; Colorado & S. R. Co. v. Ft. Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121 P. 747, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 646; Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 149 Ga. 1, 98 S. E. 696, 5 A.L.R. 1; Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 282; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Chappell, 183 Ind. 141, 106 N. E. 403, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 627; Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. R. Co. 167 La. 771, 120 So. 290, 62 A.L.R. 1512; Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light & Water Co. 92 Wash. 330, 159 P. 133, L.R.A.1917C, 574. The state cannot, by virtue of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, divest itself by contract of the right to exert its governmental authority in matters which, from their very nature, so concern that authority that to restrain its exercise by contract would be a renunciation of power to legislate for the preservation of society or to secure the performance of essential governmental duties. Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U. S. 20, 62 L. ed. 124, 38 S. Ct. 35. The right to exercise the police power is a continuing one which cannot be contracted away and a requirement that a company or an individual comply with reasonable police regulations without compensation is the legitimate exercise of the power and not in violation of the constitutional inhibition against the impairment 57

the form of a franchise as to rates, foreclose the exercise of the police power of the state unless clearly authorized to do so by the supreme legislative power.² The proper exercise of the police power cannot be treated as an impairment of the obligation of contracts, although a contract purports to limit such police the obligation of contracts, although a contracts or warranties on the part of power.³ The same is true as to implied contracts or warranties on the part of the state apparently limiting the right to exercise such power.⁴ In many cases involving an inquiry as to whether a law is valid as an exercise of the police power or void as impairing the obligation of a contract, the determination ultimately depends on the nature of the contract and the right of government to make it. On the one hand there is general want of authority to barter away the police power, whose continued existence is essential to the well-being of society, and on the other hand, the undoubted right of government to contract as to some matters without the power, when such contract is made, to destroy or impair its obligation.⁵ In some cases it has been decided that the right of the state to exercise its police power may be abrogated for a limited period by a binding contract either directly6 or by delegating its authority to a municipality.⁷

§ 423. Emergency Legislation.—

As previously shown, the legislature may, subject to limitations, enact statutes during emergencies to cope with the unusual exigencies which arise. This right is based upon the police power which is reserved to the legislature. It is, however, subject to certain constitutional restraints and a law depending upon the existence of an emergency to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases, even though the law was valid when passed.8 Under the broad rule that the economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of its protective power notwithstanding interference

of the obligation of contracts. Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 S. Ct. 341. The police power, in so far as its exercise is essential to the health of a community, cannot be contracted away. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. ed. 831, 25 S. Ct. 471. One legislature may not, by any contract with an individual, restrain the power of a subsequent legislature to legislate for the public welfare. Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645, 24 L. ed. 302. It is a fundamental rule of law that the right of the sovereign to direct that which is for the welfare of the general public cannot be contracted away or abridged by individuals. Jones v. Hadfield, 192 Ark. 224, 96 S. W. (2d) 959, 109 A.L.R. 488. The clause of the Constitution of the United States inhibiting the states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts is not violated by the legitimate exercise of legislative power in securing the public safety, health, and morals, and this governmental power of protection of the people cannot be contracted away. Washington v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 136 Ga. 638, 71 S. E. 1066, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 867. A city cannot contract away any police powers delegated to it by the legislature. Chicago v. O'Connell, 278 Ill. 591, 116 N. E. 210, 8 A.L.R. 916.

²Annotation: 3 A.L.R. 730, s. 9 A.L.R. 1165, 28 A.L.R. 587, and 29 A.L.R. 356. See PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES.

³Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828, 28 S. Ct. 529, 14 Ann. Cas. 560; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. R. Co. 167 La. 771, 120 So. 290, 62 A.L.R. 1512; Cape Girardeau v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. 305 Mo. 590, 267 S. W. 601, 36 A.L.R. 1488.

⁴State ex rel. Remley v. Meek, 112 Iowa, 338, 84 N. W. 3, 51 L.R.A. 414, 84 Am. St. Rep. 342.

⁵Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 57 L. ed. 633, 33 S. Ct. 303, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 405; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803.

⁶Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 206 U. S. 496, 51 L. ed. 1155, 27 S. Ct. 762; Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 U. S. 517, 48 L. ed. 1102, 24 S. Ct. 756; Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. Sandpoint, 31 Idaho, 498, 173 P. 972, L.R.A.1918F, 1106; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Clifton Forge (Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Com.) 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 723, 9 A.L.R. 1148, writ of certiorari denied in 251 U. S. 557, 64 L. ed. 413, 40 S. Ct. 179.

⁷Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co. 177 U. S. 558, 44 L. ed. 886, 20 S. Ct. 736; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Clifton Forge (Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Com.) 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 723, 9 A.L.R. 1148, writ of certiorari denied in 251 U. S. 557, 64 L. ed. 413, 40 S. Ct. 179.

with existing contracts,⁹ a statute which impairs the obligation of a contract may be justified in times of emergency as such an exercise of the police power.¹⁰

The principles applicable to the passage of emergency legislation have been extended in general to the so-called "moratorium" acts passed by the various state legislatures in order to afford relief to financially embarrassed mortgagors.¹¹ Many states have passed statutes which through some means postpone or delay foreclosures,¹² and the courts in determining whether such statutes are valid make the test one of reasonableness.¹³ If the stay which is provided is reasonable as to the length of time and proper means are provided to care for the interests of the mortgagee, such an act is valid.¹⁴ On the other hand, statutes which attempt to protect the owner on a foreclosure sale by fixing an upset or minimum price, by requiring credit of a specified amount on the mortgage debt, or by limiting the amount of deficiency judgments have been only fairly successful.¹⁵

Statutes which forbid the exacting of unreasonable rents and suspend the operation of the eviction laws are a valid exercise of the police power during an emergency, and if reasonable, do not impair the obligation of contracts.¹⁶

§ 424. Generally.—

The charter of a corporation in no sense exempts it from police supervision and regulation. Such an exemption can never be implied from a mere grant of power and will not be valid if expressly conferred. It is frequently and rightly said that sovereign authority cannot divest itself of its ordinary police power over persons, whether natural or artificial, any more than it can of the power to make laws or to punish crime.17 A requirement that

⁹Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297. Annotation: 86 A.L.R. 1539, s. 88 A.L.R. 1519, 96 A.L.R. 312, 826. A state in the exercise of its police power may give temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts when the urgent public need demanding such relief is produced by economic causes, as well as in the presence of disasters caused by fire, flood, or earthquake. Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481.

¹⁰Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 66 L. ed. 595, 42 S. Ct. 289; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 65 L. ed. 877, 41 S. Ct. 465; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. ed. 865, 41 S. Ct. 458, 16 A.L.R. 165; Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297; People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dismissed in 257 U. S. 665, 66 L. ed. 424, 42 S. Ct. 47. Annotation: 86 A.L.R. 1539, s. 88 A.L.R. 1519, 96 A.L.R. 312, 826. Legislation intended to prevent the free liquidation, in times of economic stress, of great amounts of indebtedness secured by mortgages, with resultant widespread ruin to real estate owners and probable widespread damage to investors, is not invalid as impairing contract obligations if the means employed are legitimate and reasonable. Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297.

¹¹Annotation: 85 A.L.R. 1480, s. 89 A.L.R. 1087, 90 A.L.R. 1330, s. 94 A.L.R. 1352, 96 A.L.R. 853, 97 A.L.R. 1123, and 104 A.L.R. 375. See generally MORTGAGES [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 225].

¹²Annotation: 90 A.L.R. 1330, s. 94 A.L.R. 1352, 96 A.L.R. 853, 97 A.L.R. 1123, and 104 A.L.R. 375.

¹³Annotation: 90 A.L.R. 1330, s. 94 A.L.R. 1352, 96 A.L.R. 853, 97 A.L.R. 1123, and 104 A.L.R. 375.

¹⁴Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481. Annotation: 90 A.L.R. 1330, s. 94 A.L.R. 1352, 96 A.L.R. 853, 97 A.L.R. 1123, and 104 A.L.R. 375.

¹⁵Annotation: 86 A.L.R. 1539, s. 88 A.L.R. 1519, 96 A.L.R. 312, 826; 85 A.L.R. 1480, s. 89 A.L.R. 1087; 90 A.L.R. 1330, s. 94 A.L.R. 1352, 96 A.L.R. 853, 97 A.L.R. 1123, and 104 A.L.R. 375.

¹⁶Annotation: 11 A.L.R. 1238, s. 16 A.L.R. 178; 66 L. ed. 595. See LANDLORD AND TENANT [Also 16 R. C. L. Perm. Supp. p. 4170, § 480a].

¹⁷Cosmopolitan Club v. Virginia, 208 U. S. 378, 52 L. ed. 536, 28 S. Ct. 394; Westport v. Mulholland, 159 Mo. 86, 60 S. W. 77, 53 L.R.A. 442; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581, 88 A. 775, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 977, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 157. See Vol. 11, p. 1068, § 298. 59

is not in violation of the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of the

obligation of contracts.17a The legislature may by general laws impose new burdens on corporations, in addition to those imposed by their charters, when such

also in the exercise of its police power supervise and control public utilities in

a reasonable manner regardless of the impairment clause of the Federal Constitution.²⁰ Therefore, statutes which regulate the rates1 or the size, speed, and

loads permitted to motor carriers do not impair the obligation of contracts between the shipper and carrier which were entered into prior to the passage of

this type of law.² Furthermore, statutes which are passed to control the use of

Under the police power a state may, without impairing the obligation of existing contracts or charters,⁴ control the manufacture and sale of intoxicating

liquors,⁵ forbid the further conduct of a lottery,⁶ regulate the use of streets and

highways,⁷ order the discontinuance or removal of a corporation which has become a nuisance,⁸ and regulate corporations or individuals in order to prevent

See also CORPORATIONS [Also 7 R. C. L. p. 616, § 611]. 17a See Vol. 11, p. 1068, § 293.

¹⁹Westport v. Mulholland, 159 Mo. 86, 60 S. W. 77, 53 L.R.A. 442. For a detailed discussion as to the above principles, see CORPORATIONS [Also 7 R. C. L. p. 616, § 611].

¹The obligation of existing contracts for the transportation of goods by contract carriers on highways is not unconstitutionally impaired by the enactment of a statute empowering the state public service commission to fix the minimum rates of such carriers, as such contracts are to be regarded as having been made subject to the future exercise of the constitutional power of the state to regulate the use of its highways for gain. Stephenson v. Binford,

²Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691, 87 A.L.R. 534. See MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.

³Walls v. Midland Carbon Co. 254 U. S. 300, 65 L. ed. 276, 41 S. Ct. 118. A statute regulating the use of natural gas is a proper exercise of the police power and does not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts which it affects only incidentally. Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U. S. 258, 81 L. ed. 632, 57 S. Ct. 447. See GAS AND OIL [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 867, § 4].

⁵Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989. See INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 270, §§ 24 et seq.].

⁶The legislature of a state cannot, by the charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the people, authoritatively expressed by the adoption of a new state Constitution, in relation to the further continuance of such business in their midst. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079. See LOTTERIES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 1208].

⁷Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88, 42 L. ed. 87, 17 S. Ct. 748; Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691, 87 A.L.R. 534. See HIGHWAYS, STREETS, AND SIDEWALKS [Also 13 R. C. L. p. 163, §§ 143 et seq.].

⁸The states retain adequate power to protect the public health and safety against the maintenance of nuisances, despite insistence upon existing contracts. Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398,

⁷⁸L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481. A contract on the part of a municipal corporation not to legislate against the storage of oil and gasoline in a given situation if the public welfare shall require it is not imported from the fact that the removal of such a business to its present site was made at the municipality's request, and such a contract, if made, would have no effect. Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope,

²⁴⁸U. S. 498, 63 L. ed. 381, 39 S. Ct. 172. A charter authorizing the manufacture of animal matter into a fertilizer does not guarantee exemption from the exercise of the police power of the state, when the business becomes a nuisance by reason of the growth of population around the locality. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036. A conveyance by a municipality of premises to be used by the grantee as a powder magazine, subject to such regulations relative to the storage, receipt, delivery, and transportation of powder as the council may prescribe, does not prevent the municipality from subsequently declaring the 60

§ 425. Labor Legislation.—

obligation of contracts. Such attempts have usually resulted in failure.¹¹ Thus,

the obligation of contracts is not unconstitutionally impaired by a statute limiting the hours of labor in factories to ten hours per day, except in cases of

emergency or public necessity.¹² This class of legislation is justified on the

basis that it is for the best welfare of the citizens concerned and that the interests of the public require such a law.¹³ Furthermore, workmen's compensation

acts may validly interfere with existing contracts provided such interference is

done by a proper exercise of the police power,¹⁴ and that such a workman's compensation act, as applied to existing contracts, gives the employees an option to

of the state to legislate on the question, and legislation forbidding employers to

contract.¹⁶ Statutes which relate to the release of claims for personal injuries

in respect of an injury to an employee generally are held not to impair the obligation of contract.¹⁷

§ 426. Banks.—

proper exercise of the police power by the enactment of wholesome and reasonable laws for the common good.¹⁸ A bill requiring all banks to become

members of a corporation and to pay a small assessment thereto for the purpose of affording relief to banks needing temporary financial assistance is a

magazine dangerous to life and property and directing that it be removed to some more remote locality. Davenport v. Richmond, 81 Va. 636, 59 Am. Rep. 694.

⁹Where the protective power of the state is exercised in a manner otherwise appropriate in the regulation of a business, it is no objection that the performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of injurious practices. Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398,

⁷⁸L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481. The charter of an insurance company does not exempt it from obligation to comply with the subsequently established police regulations of the state, requiring insurance companies to make annual statements of their condition. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 446, 38 L. ed. 778, 14 S. Ct. 868.

¹⁰State v. Meek, 112 Iowa, 338, 84 N. W. 3, 1 L.R.A. 414, 84 Am. St. Rep. 342.

¹¹For the constitutionality of labor legislation generally, see LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 410].

¹⁴Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803.

¹⁵Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 489. No contract right is impaired by making applicable to existing contracts which are to terminate in the future, an employees' indemnity act which gives the employees an option to take advantage of it or to stand on their common-law right, under the contract, to maintain an action to redress an injury received in the employment. Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 327,

¹³³N. W. 209, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 489. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS [Also 28 R. C. L. pp. 742, 748].

¹⁷Annotation: 84 A.L.R. 1297. For a detailed discussion, see MASTER AND SERVANT [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 832, §§ 288 et seq.].

regulate the rate of interest paid by banks,²⁰ a contract between a depositor and

which is lower than the one specified in the contract.¹ In comparatively recent

years, statutes have been enacted in various states relating to the rights of dis-

solidation, or sale of the assets of insolvent or financially embarrassed banking

institutions. While these statutes differ to a large extent in many respects, it

nonassenting stockholders, depositors, or other unsecured creditors by an agree-

proved by the state liquidating officer. The minority are obliged either to accept

provided, they may be entitled to receive the liquidating value of their interests.²

The question as to the constitutionality of such acts resolves itself apparently

into one of substantial prejudice to nonconsenting depositors or creditors of the

constitutional as an impairment of contract obligations, if, in view of the prac-

tical situation involved, no substantial injury results to such minority objecting

parties.³ While a number of courts adopt a liberal view and hold that such acts

are valid and do not impair the obligation of contracts,⁴ other courts take a more

tion of contracts of the dissenting minority.⁵ Under the liberal view the fact

¹⁹Opinion of Justices, 278 Mass. 607, 181 N. E. 833, 82 A.L.R. 1021. Annotation: 82 A.L.R. 1025.

¹Holland v. Nakdimen, 177 Ark. 920, 9 S. W. (2d) 307, 62 A.L.R. 484. Annotation: 62 A.L.R. 489.

²Annotation: 92 A.L.R. 1337, s. 96 A.L.R. 1445, and 104 A.L.R. 1203. See BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 537, § 814.

³Lansing Drop Forge Co. v. American State Sav. Bank, 273 Mich. 124, 262 N. W. 756, 104 A.L.R. 1199, appeal dismissed in

²⁹⁷U. S. 697, 80 L. ed. 987, 56 S. Ct. 593; Dunn v. Love, 172 Miss. 342, 155 So. 331, 92 A.L.R. 1323, affirmed in 295 U. S. 64, 79 L. ed. 1303, 55 S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438. Annotation: 92 A.L.R. 1338, s. 96 A.L.R. 1445, and 104 A.L.R. 1203.

⁴Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64, 79 L. ed. 1303, 55 S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438; Dunn v. Love, 172 Miss. 342, 155 So. 331, 92 A.L.R. 1323, affirmed in 295 U. S. 64, 79 L. ed. 1303,

⁵⁵S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438. Annotation: 92 A.L.R. 1338, s. 96 A.L.R. 1445, and 104 A.L.R. 1203; 95 A.L.R. 1214. A statute conferring on creditors or stockholders of an embarrassed or insol- vent banking corporation dissenting from a proposed plan of reorganization, the right to receive the fair liquidating value of their claims as fixed by the court, is not unconstitutional as impairing contract ob- ligations by taking away existing legal remedies without providing a substantial equivalent. Nagel v. Ghingher, 166 Md. 315,

¹⁷¹A. 65, 92 A.L.R. 1315. Unconstitutional impairment of contract rights does not result as to a depositor in an insolvent state bank, by a statute en- acted after the making of the deposit, which, in providing for the reorganization of such banks, requires depositors who dissent from the proposed plan of reor- ganization to file written objections to ap- proval of the plan, in which case the court may set aside assets in such amount and character as it shall find to be just and equitable for the purpose of paying the claims of such dissenters, who are there- upon excluded from participation in the remaining assets. Lansing Drop Forge Co. v. American State Sav. Bank, 273 Mich. 124, 262 N. W. 756, 104 A.L.R. 1199, appeal dismissed in 297 U. S. 697, 80 L. ed. 987,

⁵⁶S. Ct. 593. A statute providing that when a stabili- zation agreement approved by the state banking commissioner shall have been en- tered into between a bank and its deposi- tors and unsecured creditors representing 80 per cent of the amount of deposits and unsecured credits, the claims of all other depositors and unsecured creditors shall be treated as if they had joined in the agreement, does not unconstitutionally im- pair the obligation of the contract between the bank and one who made deposits after the law was passed, even though he may have prosecuted an action for the amount of his deposits to judgment before the stabilization agreement became effective. Wausau Malt Products Co. v. Citizens' State Bank, 214 Wis. 654, 254 N. W. 379, 95 A.L.R. 1206.

of contracts in violation of the Federal Constitution.⁶ The legislature has the

right to provide the order and priority of claims against an insolvent bank based

upon a reasonable classification.⁷ Hence, a statute giving a preference to the

owners of proceeds of collection items in the hands of the collecting bank where

stitutionally impair the obligation of contracts as affecting stockholders of in-

corporation and a bank, by establishing in lieu thereof a contract of general de-

H. INTEREST AND MONEY

§ 427. Generally.—

legislature, without impairing the obligation of contracts, to reduce the rate of

interest payable under contracts and the right to do so with respect to interest

the time a contract is made is deemed to be a part of such contract and protected

from impairment by subsequent legislation.¹¹ This is true irrespective of wheth-

er the change in the statute authorizes an increase12 or a decrease in the legal

rate13 or abolishes interest entirely.¹⁴ The application of a state statute, how-

⁸Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1068. Annotation: 31 A.L.R. 790, s. 79 A.L.R. 582, and 83 A.L.R. 1080.

²⁰⁹P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781. Annotation: 31 A.L.R. 790, s. 79 A.L.R. 582, and 83 A.L.R. 1080.

¹⁰A statute permitting the holder of a bank's obligations the right to set them off against debts due from him to the bank does not impair the obligation of contracts, provided a third person's rights are not impaired. Blount v. Windley, 95 U. S. 173,

²⁴L. ed. 424. A statute denying to the creditors of an insolvent bank the right to enforce the constitutional liability of stockholders in individual actions, but requiring the re- ceiver to maintain such a suit for their benefit, does not infringe their vested rights or impair contract obligations, but is a change of remedy within the power of the legislature. Cowden v. Williams, 32 Ariz. 407, 259 P. 670, 55 A.L.R. 1059.

²⁶L. ed. 886; Aguirre v. Packard, 14 Cal. 171, 73 Am. Dec. 645; Seymour v. Conti- nental L. Ins. Co. 44 Conn. 300, 26 Am. Rep. 469; Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 524,

²Am. St. Rep. 44; Pounds v. Rodgers, 52 Kan. 558, 35 P. 223, 39 Am. St. Rep. 360; Lee v. Davis, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 397, 10 Am. Dec. 746; Richardson v. Campbell, 27 Neb. 644, 43 N. W. 405, 11 L.R.A. 189; North River Meadow Co. v. Christ Church,

²²N. J. L. 424, 53 Am. Dec. 258; Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Or. 266, 55 P. 967, 43 L.R.A. 634,

⁷⁵Am. St. Rep. 641; Goggans v. Turnip- seed, 1 S. C. 80, 98 Am. Dec. 397, 7 Am. Rep. 23; Cecil v. Hicks, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 26 Am. Rep. 391; Union Sav. Bank & T. Co. v. Gelbach, 8 Wash. 497, 36 P. 467, 24 L.R.A. 359. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 464; 17 L.R.A. 613. County warrants indorsed "Not paid for want of funds," upon which, by statute, interest is payable at the legal rate, are thereby made contracts on which the rate of interest cannot be decreased by subse- quent statute. Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Or. 266,

¹²Aguirre v. Packard, 14 Cal. 171, 73 Am. Dec. 645; Lee v. Davis, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 397, 10 Am. Dec. 746. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 469.

¹³Seymour v. Continental L. Ins. Co. 44 Conn. 300, 26 Am. Rep. 469. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 465. See also infra, § 428.

ever, permitting the recovery of interest in an action on contract for unliquidated damages, to contracts entered into prior to its effective date, does not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of such contracts.¹⁵ Of course, in the case of an express agreement for nonliability for interest, a subsequent statute imposing such liability if construed to apply to such existing contract would impair its obligation.¹⁶

The rate of interest due payable on a judgment stands on a different basis from that due under a contract. It is generally recognized that interest allowed for nonpayment of judgments is in the nature of statutory damages, and the rule is established that a state without impairing the obligation of contracts may legislate to reduce the rate of interest on judgments previously obtained in its courts.¹⁷ Moreover, the state may decree through legislative action that all interest on judgments shall cease to accrue without impairing any contract rights.¹⁸ The theory upon which this view is based is that the interest on the judgment is not a matter of contract between the parties, but is an obligation implied or imposed by law and that accordingly the right to receive such interest depends entirely upon what the state chooses to prescribe.¹⁹ The rule has been justified also on the principle that a change in interest rates on judgments is a change which merely affects the remedy and does not impair any obligation.²⁰ On the other hand, in some early cases the view has been taken that an enactment changing the rate of interest does not affect existing debts due prior to the passage of the law, whether evidenced by statute, judgment, or agreement of the parties.²¹ On somewhat the same principle as that which governs judgments a statute reducing the rate of interest to be paid on redemption from a

¹⁵Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co. 290 U. S. 163, 78 L. ed. 243, 54 S. Ct. 134. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 464. The court, in J. B. Preston Co. v. Funkhouser, 261 N. Y. 140, 639, 184 N. E. 737, 185 N. E. 472, 87 A.L.R. 459, affirmed in 290 U. S. 163, 78 L. ed. 243, 54 S. Ct. 134, on the ground that parties who enter into a contract the breach of which results in a claim for unliquidated damages do not make an agreement that no interest will be charged on the principal sum found due in an action thereon and that, hence, there is no agreement to that effect which is impaired by a later statute which permits the recovery of interest on such a claim for unliquidated damages, upheld as constitutional a statute imposing interest in such an action.

¹⁷Missouri & A. Lumber & Min. Co. v. Greenwood Dist. 249 U. S. 170, 63 L. ed. 538, 39 S. Ct. 202; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54; Read v. Mississippi County, 69 Ark. 365, 63 S. W. 807, 86 Am. St. Rep. 202, affirmed in 188 U. S. 739, 47 L. ed. 671, 23 S. Ct. 849; Stanford v. Coram, 28 Mont. 288, 72 P. 655, 98 Am. St. Rep. 566; O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428, 47 Am. Rep. 64; Wyoming Nat. Bank v. Brown, 7 Wyo. 494, 53 P. 291, 75 Am. St. Rep. 935. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 477; 17 L.R.A. 613. A state law that changed the rate of interest thereafter to accrue on a subsisting judgment did not infringe a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, although the judgment was founded on a contract. Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54. Where interest is given on the basis of damages, and not on contract, the rate of interest must at all times be the statutory rate, and it would seem to follow that if the rate of interest is changed during the default, the damages increase or diminish pari passu in the absence of any exception in the statute. The rule of damages does not change, but simply the computation. O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428, 47 Am. Rep.

¹⁸Missouri & A. Lumber & Min. Co. v. Greenwood Dist. 249 U. S. 170, 63 L. ed. 538, 39 S. Ct. 202; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54. The application to a subsisting judgment on noninterest-bearing county warrants which awards interest at a definite specified rate, of the provisions of a statute subsequently enacted that "no judgment rendered or to be rendered against any county in the state on county warrants or other evidence of county indebtedness shall bear any interest after the passage of this act," does not violate the contract or due process of law clauses of the Federal Constitution. Missouri & A. Lumber & Min. Co. v. Greenwood Dist. 249 U. S. 170, 63 L. ed. 538, 39 S. Ct. 202.

¹⁹Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54; Wyoming Nat. Bank v. Brown, 7 Wyo. 494, 53 P. 291, 75 Am. St. Rep. 935.

²⁰Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co. 290 U. S. 163, 78 L. ed. 243, 54 S. Ct. 134.

²¹Butler v. Rockwell, 17 Colo. 290, 29 P. 458, 17 L.R.A. 611; Cox v. Marlatt, 36 N. J. L. 389, 13 Am. Rep. 454. Annotation: 17 L.R.A. 613; 6 Am. Dec. 197. 64

foreclosure sale does not impair the obligation of a contract,¹ at least where the rate to which it is reduced is not lower than the rate of interest agreed on in the mortgage.²

No impairment of contract obligations is involved in giving a retroactive operation to a statute decreasing the rate of interest chargeable on delinquent taxes, since it is merely a change in the method of collection.³

§ 428. Changes in Usury Laws.—

Although there is a conflict of authority, the majority rule exists that where a contract is entered into in violation of a statutory or constitutional provision, the subsequent repeal of such provision does not make the contract valid.4 Nevertheless, an exception has been established by the great weight of authority that the legislature may repeal a usury law and that no one has any vested right to take advantage of such laws.5 Furthermore, the repeal of usury laws does not operate as an impairment of the obligation of contract.6 Independent of the nature of the forfeiture as a penalty which is taken away by repeal of usury statutes, the repeal of such statutes is supported on the ground that the right of a defendant to avoid his contract is given to him by statute for purposes of its own, and not because the statute affects the merits of his obligation; and whatever the statute gives, under such circumstances, as long as it remains in fieri, and is not realized by having passed into a completed transaction, may by a subsequent statute be taken away. Such a statute is a privilege that belongs to the remedy and forms no element in the rights that inhere in the contract.7 Thus, a statute relieving from the imputation of usury all contracts made by a building and loan association under a charter of doubtful validity is not unconstitutional as to those contracts because it is retroactive.8 On the other hand, there is respectable authority for the proposition that the repeal of the prohibitory provision will not infuse new life into a contract void for usury.9

It is well established that a statute which imposes a more stringent penalty on an usurious contract than the one imposed at the time the contract was executed

¹Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 27 L. ed. 648, 2 S. Ct. 236. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 476. In Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, 48 L. ed. 1046, 24 S. Ct. 706, it was held that "no contract right of an independent purchaser at a foreclosure sale, who has no other connection with the mortgage contract than that arising from his purchase for a sum sufficient to pay the mortgage debt, is impaired by changes in the law subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, but prior to the sale, with reference to the time of redemption and the rate of interest payable in order to redeem."

²Robertson v. Vancleave, 129 Ind. 217, 26 N. E. 899, 29 N. E. 781, 15 L.R.A. 68. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 476.

³Henry v. McKay, 164 Wash. 526, 3 P. (2d) 145, 77 A.L.R. 1025. See TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 386, § 343].

⁵Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 27 L. ed. 682, 2 S. Ct. 408; Woodruff v. Scruggs, 27 Ark. 26, 11 Am. Rep. 777; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 79 Am. Dec. 236; Iowa Sav. & L. Asso. v. Heidt, 107 Iowa, 297, 77 N. W. 1050, 43 L.R.A. 689, 70 Am. St. Rep. 197; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. F. Asso. 112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1016; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 18 Am. Rep. 663. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 470; Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1401.

⁶Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 27 L. ed. 682, 2 S. Ct. 408; Woodruff v. Scruggs, 27 Ark. 26, 11 Am. Rep. 777; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 79 Am. Dec. 236; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill (Md.) 299, 52 Am. Dec. 694; Smoot v. People's Perpetual Loan & Bldg. Asso. 95 Va. 686, 29 S. E. 746, 41 L.R.A. 589; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 18 Am. Rep. 663. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 470; Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1401.

⁷Gross v. United States Mortg. Co. 108 U. S. 477, 27 L. ed. 795, 2 S. Ct. 940; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 27 L. ed. 682, 2 S. Ct. 408; Woodruff v. Scruggs, 27 Ark. 26, 11 Am. Rep. 777; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 79 Am. Dec. 236; Iowa Sav. & L. Asso. v. Heidt, 107 Iowa, 297, 77 N. W. 1050, 43 L.R.A. 689, 70 Am. St. Rep. 197. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 470; Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1401.

⁸Smoot v. People's Perpetual Loan & Bldg. Asso. 95 Va. 686, 29 S. E. 746, 41 L.R.A. 589.

does not impair the obligation of contract.¹⁰ A state law, however, which declares usurious and void contracts already existing and reserving interest at a rate which was legal at the time the contract was made impairs the obligation of such contracts and is clearly unconstitutional.¹¹

**§ ⁴²⁹. Generally.**—As pointed out heretofore, the impairment clause is not a limitation upon Congress or the Federal Government.¹² Hence, the obligation of private contracts for the payment of money is subject to the exercise of the power vested in Congress over the monetary system,¹³ with the result that Congress has the power to invalidate the provisions of private contracts for the payment of gold coin.¹⁴

Shortly after the Civil War the question arose as to the status of Confederate money and the effect as impairing the obligation of contracts of statutes determining its legality or illegality. The general principle in such cases was established that any act of the legislature of a state during the period of secession, the tendency or purpose of which was to force the circulation of Confederate currency, was unconstitutional and wholly without force as a law as being in aid of the prosecution of the war against the United States Government.¹⁵ But contracts made in the southern states, during the war between residents of those states, with reference to Confederate notes as a standard of value, and not designed to aid the insurrectionary government, could be enforced in the Federal courts;¹⁶ and the value of the contracts was to be determined by the value of the Confederate notes in lawful money of the United States at the time when and place where such contracts were made.¹⁷

¹⁰Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 473.

¹¹Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Seymour v. Continental L. Ins. Co. 44 Conn. 300, 26 Am. Rep. 469; Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 524, 19 Am. Rep. 564; Swint v. Carr, 76 Ga. 322, 2 Am. St. Rep. 44; Pounds v. Rodgers, 52 Kan. 558, 35 P. 223, 39 Am. St. Rep. 360; Richardson v. Campbell, 27 Neb. 644, 43 N. W. 405, 11 L.R.A. 189; North River Meadow Co. v. Christ Church, 22 N. J. L. 424, 53 Am. Dec. 258; Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Or. 266, 55 P. 967, 43 L.R.A. 634, 75 Am. St. Rep. 641; Cecil v. Hicks, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 26 Am. Rep. 391; Union Sav. Bank & T. Co. v. Gelbach, 8 Wash. 497, 36 P. 467, 24 L.R.A. 359. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 465. A statute invalidating a contract for the loan of money at interest greater than a certain rate cannot be made to apply to contracts existing at the time of its passage in view of the impairment clause. Annotation: 87 A.L.R. 465.

¹³Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 835, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352. Annotation: 95 A.L.R. 1383, s. 101 A.L.R. 1318. As to the principles governing money generally, see MONEY [Also 13 R. C. L. p. 1266].

¹⁴Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 835, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352. Annotation: 95 A.L.R. 1383, s. 101 A.L.R. 1318.

¹⁵Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. 566, 29 L. ed. 495, 6 S. Ct. 179 (dictum); Ray v. Thompson, 43 Ala. 434, 94 Am. Dec. 696. Treasury notes issued under the Mississippi Act of December 19, 1861, as advances upon cotton, receivable in payment of all dues of the state except the military tax, were issued in aid of the Rebellion, and were therefore void, and did not constitute a contract which subsequent legislation could not impair. Taylor v. Thomas, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 479, 22 L. ed. 789.

¹⁶Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. 566, 29 L. ed. 495, 6 S. Ct. 179; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454, 24 L. ed. 1071; Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. King, 91 U. S. 3, 23 L. ed. 186; Delmas v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. 14 Wall. (U. S.) 661, 20 L. ed. 757.

¹⁷Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. 566, 29 L. ed. 495, 6 S. Ct. 179; Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. King, 91 U. S. 3, 23 L. ed. 186. When an act was passed unconstitutionally purporting to validate Confederate money and bonds and to authorize guardians and trustees to invest trust funds in Confederate bonds, the decision was reached that such statute was itself unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts by changing the ward's solvent credits for what was not gold or silver or their equivalent. Houston v. Delooch, 43 Ala. 364, 94 Am. Dec. 689. 66

I. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS AS AFFECTED BY TAXING POWER

**§ ⁴³⁰. Generally.**—As a general rule in the absence of any express contract of exemption from taxation, there is no implied restriction, and the state, without in any way impairing the obligation of contracts, may tax contract rights as well as any other property within the jurisdiction of the taxing power. With reference to powers reserved by the state, the elementary rule is that if at the time the corporation is chartered and given either commutation or exemption from taxation, there exists a general statute reserving the legislative power to repeal, alter, or amend, the exemption or commutation from taxation may be revoked without impairing the obligations of the contract. The foundation of this rule is that a general statute reserving the power to repeal, alter, or amend is by implication read into a subsequent charter and prevents it from becoming irrevocable.

In the absence of special restrictions in its Constitution, a state may make a valid contract for exemption from taxation complete or partial, for a limited time or perpetually. When it does so explicitly and upon consideration, a provision for tax immunity may not be violated and is as binding as other parts of the grant. All such contracts are within the provision of the Federal Constitution inhibiting the passage of laws by the state impairing the obligation of contracts. Exemptions from taxation, in order to constitute a contract binding on the state, must be clearly and unequivocally expressed, because such exemptions are regarded as being in derogation of the state's sovereignty and of common right, and therefore not to be extended beyond the exact and express requirements of the language used construed strictissimi juris. In order that a grant of exemption may be irrevocable and beyond recall on the part of the state, it must be supported by an adequate consideration, for if there is no consideration for such an exemption, it is deemed to be a mere bounty or privilege and revocable as such at the pleasure of the state. An acceptance of a corporate charter and the attainment of a public benefit thereunder constitute a sufficient consideration and bring the granted right within the protection of the Federal Constitution.¹⁸

J. STATE CONTROL OVER REMEDIES

**§ ⁴³¹. Remedies as Part of Contract.**—It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law in reference to the obligation of contracts that the laws in force at the time of making a contract and the right to a remedy enter into and form a part of it as if they were expressly referred to, or incorporated in, its terms19 and that they likewise constitute a part of its obligation.¹

¹⁹Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co. 226 U. S. 276, 57 L. ed. 221, 33 S. Ct. 17; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 249, 23 S. Ct. 234; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 S. Ct. 164; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 S. Ct. 91; Memphis v. United States, 97 U. S. 293, 24 L. ed. 920; Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 107, 22 L. ed. 72; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Gantly v. Ewing, 3 How. (U. S.) 707, 11 L. ed. 794; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314, writ of certiorari denied in 199 U. S. 607, 50 L. ed. 331, 26 S. Ct. 747; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C.) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171; Board of Revenue v. Farson, Son & Co. 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881; Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, 86 A.L.R. 1493; Welsh v. Cross, 146 Cal. 621, 81 P. 229, 106 Am. St. Rep. 63, 2 Ann. Cas. 796; Folks v. Marion County, 67

principle embraces alike those laws which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement.² The remedy which is protected by the contract clause of the Constitution is something more than the privilege of having a claim adjudicated. Mere judicial inquiry into the rights of parties is not enough. There must be power to enforce the results of such an inquiry before there can be said to be a remedy which the Constitution deems part of the contract. Nothing is more material to the obligation of a contract than the means of its enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy are therefore inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation which is guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment.³

²Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Shriver v. Woodbine Sav. Bank, 285 U. S. 467, 76 L. ed. 884, 52 S. Ct. 430; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314, writ of certiorari denied in 199 U. S. 607, 50 L. ed. 331, 26 S. Ct. 747; Board of Revenue v. Farson, Son & Co. 197 Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A. 1918B, 881; Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, 86 A.L.R. 1493; State ex rel. Buckwalter v. Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 90 A.L.R. 704; Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119, 90 Am. Dec. 358, overruled on another point in Johnson v. Fletcher, 54 Miss. 628, 28 Am. Rep. 388; Lander v. Deemy, 46 N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922, citing R. C. L.; Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Or. 133, 117 P. 814, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1257; Chadwick v. Moore, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 49, 42 Am. Dec. 267; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 719, citing R. C. L.; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah, 100, 61 P. 338, 58 L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St. Rep. 774; Merchants' Bank v. Ballou, 98 Va. 112, 32 S. E. 481, 44 L.R.A. 306, 81 Am. St. Rep. 715; Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 12 Am. Rep. 507; Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co. 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 42 L.R.A. 331, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 132; 1 L.R.A. 356. Validity and remedy are both parts of the obligation and are guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment. Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357.

³Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, 86 A.L.R. 1493; Folks v. Marion County, 121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 298, 102 A.L.R. 659; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Sovereign Camp, W. W. v. Lenoir County, 208 N. C. 433, 181 S. E. 339, citing R. C. L. 68

**§ ⁴³². Alteration of Remedies.**—Under the inhibition in the Federal Constitution as to legislation impairing the obligation of contracts, it is immaterial whether the obligation of a contract is impaired by acting on the remedy or directly upon the contract. Impairment in either case is prohibited by the Constitution.⁴ Hence, while it is now established beyond question that the remedy within certain limits may be altered or modified, according to the will of the state,⁵ even though such statutes in certain cases may have a

⁴Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 34 L. ed. 304, 10 S. Ct. 972; Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714, 26 L. ed. 602; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 575, 19 L. ed. 490; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 304, 14 L. ed. 705; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 5 L. ed. 547; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C. A. 3d) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171; Teralta Land & Water Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518, 48 P. 613, 58 Am. St. Rep. 194; Sammon v. Wing, 105 Cal. App. 639, 288 P. 711, citing R. C. L.; Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447; Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 572, 79 Am. Dec. 490; Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. (La.) 530, 6 Am. Dec. 675; Barton v. Conley, 119 Me. 581, 112 A. 670 (affirmed in 260 U. S. 677, 67 L. ed. 456, 43 S. Ct. 238), citing R. C. L.; Briscoe v. Anketell, 28 Miss. 361, 61 Am. Dec. 553; People ex rel. Reynolds v. Buffalo, 140 N. Y. 300, 35 N. E. 485, 37 Am. St. Rep. 563; First Nat. Bank v. Bovey, Shute & Jackson, 49 N. D. 450, 191 N. W. 765, citing R. C. L.; B. J. Lander & Co. v. Deemy, 46 N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922, citing R. C. L.; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1074, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574; Slover v. Union Bank, 115 Tenn. 347, 89 S. W. 399, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 528; Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 688, 98 Am. Dec. 494; Howard v. Ross, 38 Wash. 627, 30 P. 819, 3 Ann. Cas. 1146. Annotation: 61 Am. St. Rep. 940. A law does not impair the obligation of a contract, within the meaning of the Constitution, if neither party is relieved thereby from performing anything of that which he obligated himself to do; but if either party is absolved from performance, such obligation is impaired, whether affected directly or indirectly and only as a result of some modification of the legal proceedings for enforcement. State ex rel. National Bond & Secur. Co. v. Krahmer, 105 Minn. 422, 117 N. W. 780, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 157.

⁵United States.—W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Shriver v. Woodbine Sav. Bank, 285 U. S. 467, 76 L. ed. 884, 52 S. Ct. 430; Conley v. Barton, 260 U. S. 677, 67 L. ed. 456, 43 S. Ct. 238; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 S. Ct. 428; Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 S. Ct. 755; Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 609, 23 S. Ct. 345; Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 46 L. ed. 612, 22 S. Ct. 384; Red River Valley Nat. Bank v. Craig, 181 U. S. 548, 45 L. ed. 994, 21 S. Ct. 703; Hill v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. 134 U. S. 515, 33 L. ed. 994, 10 S. Ct. 589; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714, 26 L. ed. 602; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 24 L. ed. 610; Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137, 23 L. ed. 124; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301, 12 L. ed. 447; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L. ed. 773; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Re Inland Dredging Corp. (C. C. A. 2d) 61 F. (2d) 765, 88 A.L.R. 254, writ of certiorari denied in 288 U. S. 611, 77 L. ed. 985, 53 S. Ct. 403; Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McFadden (C. C. A. 8th) 105 F. 293, 58 L.R.A. 900, affirmed in 185 U. S. 505, 46 L. ed. 1012, 22 S. Ct. 758. Arizona.—Cowden v. Williams, 32 Ariz. 407, 259 P. 670, 55 A.L.R. 1059. Delaware.—Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. 455, 81 Am. Dec. 135. Georgia.—Morris v. Interstate Bond Co. 180 Ga. 639, 180 S. E. 819, 100 A.L.R. 415. Illinois.—Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447. Iowa.—Iowa Sav. & L. Asso. v. Heidt, 107 Iowa, 297, 77 N. W. 1050, 43 L.R.A. 689, 70 Am. St. Rep. 197; McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127, 83 Am. Dec. 401. Maine.—Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 A. 405, 4 L.R.A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266. Maryland.—Miners' & M. Bank v. Snyder, 100 Md. 57, 59 A. 707, 68 L.R.A. 312, 108 Am. St. Rep. 390; Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 96 Am. Dec. 613. Nebraska.—Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N. W. 911, 57 Am. Rep. 825. New Hampshire.—Simpson v. City Sav. Bank, 56 N. H. 466, 22 Am. Rep. 491. New York.—People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dismissed in 257 U. S. 665, 66 L. ed. 424, 42 S. Ct. 47. North Carolina.—Bateman v. Sterrett, 201 N. C. 59, 159 S. E. 14, citing R. C. L.; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 565. North Dakota.—State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523. Pennsylvania.—Breitenbach v. Rush, 44 Pa. 313, 84 Am. Dec. 442. South Carolina.—Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 49 S. C. L. (15 Rich.) 158, 94 Am. Dec. 148; State v. Carew, 47 S. C. L. (13 Rich.) 498, 91 Am. Dec. 245. Tennessee.—Slover v. Union Bank, 115 Tenn. 347, 89 S. W. 399, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 69

retrospective effect6 and to some extent incidentally affect vested rights,⁷ the alteration cannot, however, go to the extent of impairing the obligation of the contract.⁸ In placing the obligation of contracts under the protection of the

528; Townsend v. Townsend, Peck, 1, 14 Am. Dec. 722. Texas.—Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836. Utah.—Kirkham v. Bird, 22 Utah Rep. 774. P. 338, 58 L.R.A. 769, 63 Am. Neck. Mut. Virginia.—Smith v. Va. 192, 20 S. E. 482, 33 Gratt. F. Asso. 432, 112 Va. 192, 20 S. E. 482, 33 Gratt. (N.S.) 1015; Homestead Co. v. Buxton, 67 266, 12 Am. Rep. 507. West Virginia.—Boggess v. Buxton, 67 W. Va. 679, 3 L. ed. 162; 21 Ann. Cas. 289. Annotation: 3 Am. Rep. 940. The contract clause of the Federal Constitution is qualified by the control which the state retains over remedial processes. Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481. A state statute providing that notes given to the cashier of a bank may be sued on in the name of the bank affects the remedy only, and does not impair the obligation of the contract in respect of notes made before the act. The statute is constitutional. Crawford v. Branch Bank, 7 How. (U. S.) 279, 12 L. ed. 700. The constitutional inhibition of impairment of contract obligation permits minor changes which, though they may somewhat prejudice the creditor's recourse against the debtor, leave him with substantial sanctions. Re Inland Dredging Corp. (C. C. A. 2d) 61 F. (2d) 765, 88 A.L.R. 1009, writ of certiorari denied in 288 U. S. 611, 77 L. ed. 985, 53 S. Ct. 403. The legislature has power to formulate, prescribe, modify, and alter remedies, provided its action does not impair the obligation of contracts or vested property rights. Boggess v. Buxton, 67 W. Va. 679, 69 S. E. 367, 21 Ann. Cas. 289. The constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not apply to a change in the form of a remedy merely or a modification of it, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. Owen v. Roberts, 81 Me. 439, 17 A. 403, 4 L.R.A. 229. A change in remedies open to parties to a contract does not necessarily constitute an impairment of its obligation. Preston Co. v. Funkhouser, 261 N. Y. 140, 184 N. E. 737, 87 A.L.R. 459.

⁶Teralta Land & W. Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518, 48 P. 613, 58 Am. St. Rep. 194; Morris v. Interstate Bond Co. 180 Ga. 689, 180 S. E. 819, 100 A.L.R. 415.

⁷Morris v. Interstate Bond Co. 180 Ga. 689, 180 S. E. 819, 100 A.L.R. 415; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 18 Am. Rep. 663.

⁸Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & T. Co. 300 U. S. 124, 81 L. ed. 552, 57 S. Ct. 338, 108 A.L.R. 886; W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 S. Ct. 428; Hill v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. 134 U. S. 515, 33 L. ed. 994, 10 S. Ct. 589; Seibert v. Lewis (C. C. United States) 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 S. Ct. 91; South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 433, 25 L. ed. 937; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Cairo & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168, 24 L. ed. 423; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; Butz v. Muscatine, Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 5 L. ed. 547; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C. A. 3d) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Reapers' Bank v. Willard, 24 Ill. 433, 76 Am. Dec. 755; Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 79 Am. Dec. 468; McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127, 83 Am. Dec. 401; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 A. 405, 4 L.R.A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266; Miners' & M. Bank v. Snyder, 100 Md. 57, 59 A. 707, 68 L.R.A. 312, 108 Am. St. Rep. 390; Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co. 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227, 88 A.L.R. 1263; Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119, 90 Am. Dec. 358, overruled on another point in Johnson v. Fletcher, 54 Miss. 628, 28 Am. Rep. 388; Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29, 90 Am. Dec. 311; State v. Weldon, 47 N. J. L. 59, 54 Am. Rep. 144; Boswell v. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. 193 N. Y. 465, 86 N. E. 532, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 946; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 565; Bank of Gallipolis v. Domigan, 12 Ohio, 220, 40 Am. Dec. 475; State v. Carew, 47 S. C. L. (13 Rich.) 498, 91 Am. Dec. 245; International Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Hardy, 86 Tex. 610, 26 S. W. 497, 24 L.R.A. 284, 40 Am. St. Rep. 870; Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745, 7 Am. Rep. 270; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah, 100, 61 P. 338, 53 L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St. Rep. 774; Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 12 Am. Rep. 507; Boggess v. Buxton, 67 W. Va. 679, 69 S. E. 367, 21 Ann. Cas. 289; Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co. 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 42 L.R.A. 331, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 283. Annotation: 76 Am. Dec. 287. The legislature may modify, limit, or alter the remedy for the enforcement of a contract without impairing its obligations; but in so doing, it may not deny all remedy or so circumscribe the existing remedy with conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right. Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & T. Co. 300 U. S. 124, 81 L. ed. 552, 57 S. Ct. 338, 108 A.L.R. 886. Statutes concerning remedies are such as relate to the course and mode of procedure to enforce or defend a substantive right. Matters which belong to the remedy are subject to change and alteration and even repeal, provided the legislation does not operate to impair a contract or deprive one of a vested property right. If the changing or repealing statute leaves the parties a substantial remedy, the legislature does not exceed its authority. Et- 70

Constitution, the framers looked to the essentials of the contract more than to the forms and modes of proceeding by which it was to be carried into execution; after annulling all state legislation which impaired the obligation, they left to the states the right to prescribe and shape the remedy to enforce it.⁹ While a statute which facilitates the intention of the parties to a contract by giving it validity never impairs its obligation10 or divests or impairs any vested rights,¹¹ any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties as indicated from the stipulations in the contract necessarily impairs it. Whether the law professes to apply to the contract itself or to regulate the remedy, it is equally within the true meaning of the Constitution if it in effect impairs the obligation of existing contracts.¹² Likewise, any law which in its operation amounts to a denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on the remedy, is obnoxious to the Constitution and will not be upheld.¹³

tor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 S. Ct. 428. The legislature may not so change the remedy for the enforcement of a contract as to leave a remedy which is incomplete or which does not secure all the substantial rights of the parties. Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858.

⁹McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. S.) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Larrabee v. Talbott, 5 Gill (Md.) 426, 46 Am. Dec. 637, overruled on another point in Pinckney v. Lanahan, 62 Md. 447.

¹⁰National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co. 226 U. S. 276, 57 L. ed. 221, 33 S. Ct. 17; Gross v. United States Mortg. Co. 108 U. S. 477, 27 L. ed. 795, 2 S. Ct. 940; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 27 L. ed. 682, 2 S. Ct. 408; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 79 Am. Dec. 236; Shields v. Clifton Hill Land Co. 94 Tenn. 123, 28 S. W. 668, 26 L.R.A. 509, 45 Am. St. Rep. 700. Annotation: 22 L.R.A. 379. Where parties have in good faith and for a valuable consideration entered into an engagement that is not contrary to good morals and is invalid only because of some legal impediment, such as the incapacity of a nominal party or the omission of some merely formal requirement, there is ground for maintaining that the legislature may by subsequent enactment provide a legal remedy and thereby give vitality to the obligation that the parties intended to create. National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co. 226 U. S. 276, 57 L. ed. 221, 33 S. Ct. 17. One who contracts to do a certain thing cannot claim that the obligation of his contract is impaired by legislation designed only to enforce it. New Orleans City & Lake R. Co. v. Louisiana, 157 U. S. 219, 39 L. ed. 679, 15 S. Ct. 581. Laws repealing laws which prevent the operation of contracts otherwise within the competency of the parties and permitting their enforcement according to their terms do not impair the obligation of contracts or impair vested rights. Rosenplanter v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. (C. C. A. 6th) 96 F. 721, 46 L.R.A. 473.

¹¹Swartz v. Andrews, 137 Iowa, 261, 114 N. W. 888, 126 Am. St. Rep. 285; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, 80 Am. Dec. 718. Annotation: 10 Am. Dec. 133; 80 Am. Dec. 730. The legislature cannot, however, go to the extent of validating a void contract. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 380, 7 L. ed. 458.

¹²Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Sammon v. Wing, 105 Cal. App. 689, 288 P. 711, citing R. C. L.; Schuster v. Weiss, 114 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 438, 19 L.R.A. 182; Boswell v. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. 193 N. Y. 465, 86 N. E. 532, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 946; Goggans v. Turnipseed, 1 S. C. 80, 98 Am. Dec. 397, 7 Am. Rep. 33; State v. Carew, 47 S. C. L. (13 Rich.) 498, 91 Am. Dec. 245. A statute pertaining to the judicial enforcement of contract rights which abridges rights of a party resulting from stipulations of the agreement in such manner as to make the contract less valuable and which denies him lawful remedies existing when the contract was made, without substituting others equally valuable and effective, unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of contracts, even though it is regarded as operating merely upon the remedy. Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836. The legislature may enlarge, limit, or alter modes of proceedings and forms to enforce contracts, provided it does not deny a remedy or so embarrass it with conditions as seriously to impair the value of the right. Penniman's Case (Vial v. Penniman) 103 U. S. 714, 26 L. ed. 602. The obligation of a contract is impaired by any law which prevents its enforcement or which materially abridges the remedy for enforcing it which existed at the time the contract was made and does not supply an alternative remedy equally adequate and efficacious. Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C. A. 3d) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171.

¹³Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 27 L. ed. 104, 1 S. Ct. 102; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 304, 14 L. ed. 705; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 12 L. ed. 447; Gantly v. Ewing, 3 How. (U. S.) 707, 11 L. ed. 794; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. S.) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co (C. C. A. 3d) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171; Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, 86 A.L.R. 1493; Pusey & J. Co. v. Love, 6 Penn. (Del.) 80, 71

legislature may seem appropriate constitute a proper exercise of sovereignty,¹⁹

**§ ⁴³³. Abrogation and Substitution of Remedies.**—While the legislature

⁶⁶A. 1013, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 953, 130 Am. St. Rep. 144; People ex rel. Durham Real- ty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dis- missed in 257 U. S. 665, 66 L. ed. 424, 42 S. Ct. 47; Merchants Bank v. Ballou, 98 Va. 112, 32 S. E. 481, 44 L.R.A. 306, 81 Am. St. Rep. 715; Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 12 Am. Rep. 507; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31,

³⁹L.R.A. 569. The obligation of a contract which can- not be impaired consists in the binding force of its stipulations upon those who make them and depends upon the contin- ued existence of the means of enforcing them. A subsequent law which denies or diminishes the right of the obligee to re- quire performance or discharges the other party impairs the obligation, even though it professes to act only upon the remedy. Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 132 F. 434, 67 L.R.A. 558.

¹⁴Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 24 L. ed. 610; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C. A. 3d) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171; Detroit Trust Co. v. Storm- feltz-Loveley Co. 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227, 83 A.L.R. 1263; Hope Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483, 90 Am. Dec. 438; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 103.

¹⁶Hope Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483, 90 Am. Dec. 438. As to changes affecting time of com- mencing actions, see infra, § 445.

¹⁸Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co. 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 42 L.R.A. 331, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934.

²²W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905.

²Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & T. Co. 300 U. S. 124, 81 L. ed. 552, 57 S. Ct. 338, 108 A.L.R. 886; W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905; National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co. 226 U. S. 276, 57 L. ed. 221,

³³S. Ct. 17; Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 609, 23 S. Ct. 345; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437,

⁴⁷L. ed. 249, 23 S. Ct. 234; Butz v. Mus- catine, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 575, 19 L. ed. 490; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 304,

¹⁴L. ed. 705; Per Trimble, J., Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realty Co.

¹⁰¹Fla. 1324, 135 So. 795, citing R. C. L.; Re Davis, 103 Neb. 703, 173 N. W. 695, citing R. C. L.; E. J. Lander & Co. v. Deemy, 46 N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922, citing R. C. L. The legislature of a state may make laws affecting the remedy for the enforce- ment of a contract, altering its character or substituting one remedy for another. 72

even though the contract, so far as it pertains to its obligation, is of statutory

U. S. 677, 67 L. ed. 456, 43 S. Ct. 238; Etor

S. Ct. 428; Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U. S.

U. S. 219, 39 L. ed. 679, 15 S. Ct. 581;

N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dis-

S. Ct. 47; Brearley School v. Ward, 201

N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.)

C. L.; E. J. Lander & Co. v. Deemy, 46

N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922, citing R. C. L.;

S. W. (2d) 1025, 96 A.L.R. 836.

U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97

N. W. 695, citing R. C. L.; Graves v. How-

§ 434. Tests and Operation of Rule.—

rights,¹⁰ generally speaking, the difficulties of stating a rule render it impera-

last analysis is ordinarily one as to reasonableness.¹² It has also been stated

⁶Townsend v. Townsend, Peck (Tenn.) 30 1, 14 Am. Dec. 723; Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 688, 98 Am. Dec. 495.

⁶²L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; McGahey v. Vir- ginia, 135 U. S. 662, 34 L. ed. 304, 10 S. Ct. 972; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 2 S. Ct. 91, 27 L. ed. 468; Louisiana ex rel. Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278,

¹⁰¹U. S. 433, 25 L. ed. 937; Brine v. Hart- ford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 24 L. ed. 610; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. ed. 365; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Gunn v. Barry,

¹⁵Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 370, 6 L. ed. 660; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Re Davis,

¹⁰³Neb. 703, 173 N. W. 695, citing R. C. L.; People ex rel. Reynolds v. Buffalo, 140 N. Y. 300, 35 N. E. 485, 37 Am. St. Rep. 563; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co. 56 Pa. 46,

⁹³Am. Dec. 778; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569. Annotation: 61 Am. St. Rep. 940.

⁸Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 25 L. ed. 960; Re Davis, 103 Neb. 703, 173 N. W. 695, citing R. C. L.

⁸⁸A.L.R. 1481. There is a broad distinction between laws impairing the obligation of contracts and those which simply undertake to give a more efficient remedy to enforce a con- tract already made. Bernheimer v. Con- verse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 S. Ct. 755; Seibert v. United States, 122 U. S. 122, 32 L. ed. 645, 9 S. Ct. 271; Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311,

¹¹L. ed. 143; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C. A. 3d) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171; Miners' & M. Bank v. Snyder, 100 Md. 57, 59 A. 707, 68 L.R.A. 312, 108 Am. St. Rep. 390; State v. Carew, 47 S. C. L. (13 Rich.) 498, 91 Am. Dec. 245; Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. (2d) 835, citing R. C. L.; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 283.

¹¹Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Sei- bert v. United States, 129 U. S. 192, 32 L. ed. 645, 9 S. Ct. 271; Von Hoffman v. Quin- cy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 553, 18 L. ed. 403; Min- ers' & M. Bank v. Snyder, 100 Md. 57, 59 A. 707, 68 L.R.A. 312, 108 Am. St. Rep. 390; Re Davis, 103 Neb. 703, 173 N. W. 695, cit- ing R. C. L.; Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. (2d) 835, citing R. C. L.

²⁹⁰U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 34 L. ed. 304, 10 S. Ct. 972; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468,

²S. Ct. 91; Koch v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. (Mo.) 181 S. W. 44, citing R. C. L.; Re Davis, 103 Neb. 703, 173 N. W. 695, citing R. C. L.; People ex rel. Durham Realty Corn. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429,

¹³⁰N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dismissed in 257 U. S. 665, 66 L. ed. 424, 42 S. Ct. 47; Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. (2d) 835, citing R. C. L.

¹³Re Inland Dredging Corp. (C. C. A. 2d) 61 F. (2d) 765, 88 A.L.R. 254, writ of certiorari denied in 288 U. S. 611, 77 L. ed. 985, 53 S. Ct. 403. 74

§ 435. Stipulated Remedies.—

edy impairs the obligation and is unconstitutional.¹⁸ For example, the parties

statutes.¹⁹ The effect of such specific reference to, and incorporation of, reme-

¹⁴Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 26 L. ed. 132; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 304, 14 L. ed. 705; East Hart- ford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. (U. S.) 511, 13 L. ed. 518; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. (U. S.) 190, 13 L. ed. 383; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. S.) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 132.

¹⁵Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & T. Co. 300 U. S. 124, 81 L. ed. 552, 57 S. Ct. 338, 108 A.L.R. 886; Seibert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States)

¹²²U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781; Koch v. Mis- souri-Lincoln Trust Co. (Mo.) 181 S. W. 44, citing R. C. L.; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (C. C. A. 3d) 139 F. 111, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1171; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1074, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574; Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. (2d) 835, citing R. C. L.; Merchants Bank v. Ballou, 98 Va. 112, 32 S. E. 481,

⁴⁴L.R.A. 306, 81 Am. St. Rep. 715; Re Heilbron, 14 Wash. 536, 45 P. 153, 35 L.R.A. 602; Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union Oil & Paint Co. 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 42 L.R.A. 331, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 283. Annotation: 6 Am. Dec. 540. The legislature may modify, limit, or al- ter the remedy for the enforcement of a contract without impairing its obligations; but in so doing, it may not deny all rem- edy or so circumscribe the existing remedy with conditions and restrictions as serious- ly to impair the value of the right. Rich- mond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & T. Co. 300 U. S. 124, 81 L. ed. 552,

¹⁶W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 79 L. ed. 1298, 55 S. Ct. 555, 97 A.L.R. 905; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 S. Ct. 44; Sei- bert v. Lewis (Seibert v. United States)

¹²²U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190; Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627,

²⁴L. ed. 858; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 24 L. ed. 610; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314, writ of certi- orari denied in 199 U. S. 607, 50 L. ed. 331,

²⁶S. Ct. 747; Koch v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. (Mo.) 181 S. W. 44, citing R. C. L.; Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. (2d) 835, citing R. C. L.; Merchants Bank v. Ballou, 98 Va. 112, 32 S. E. 481, 44 L.R.A. 306, 81 Am. St. Rep. 715; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569.

¹⁷Koch v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. (Mo.) 181 S. W. 44, citing R. C. L.; Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S. W. (2d) 835, citing R. C. L.

¹⁹⁷Ala. 375, 72 So. 613, L.R.A.1918B, 881; Atlantic Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266,

¹⁸²S. E. 15, citing R. C. L.; Breitenbach v. Rush, 44 Pa. 313, 84 Am. Dec. 442; Cha- pin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. Ann.) 236 S. W. 1006 (affirmed in (Tex.) 263 S. W. 255, which is modified in (Tex. Com. App.) 19 S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 719, citing R. C. L. A change of the expressed stipulations of a contract can no more be affected by the exercise of the taxing power than it can be by the exercise of any other power of the state. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760.

the stipulation as to the remedy the directions of the statute are disregarded.²⁰

Similarly, where a state enters into a contract with a private individual, it is

§ 436. Curative Legislation.—

curative laws.³ Legislation of this character is upheld as affecting merely the

al defect or one which goes to the substance of a vested right.⁶ If a legalizing

²⁰International Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Hardy, 86 Tex. 610, 26 S. W. 497, 24 L.R.A. 284, 40 Am. St. Rep. 870; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.) 236 S. W. 1006 (affirmed in (Tex.) 263 S. W. 255, which is modified in (Tex. Com. App.) 10 S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.

¹Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 46 L. ed. 612, 22 S. Ct. 384. A specific remedy provided by the con- tract itself cannot be changed by legisla- tion because it constitutes a part of the contract itself. Ibid.

¹⁸⁵U. S. 505, 46 L. ed. 1012, 22 S. Ct. 758; Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 137, 23 L. ed. 124; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 12 L. ed. 447; Watson v. Mer- cer, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 88, 8 L. ed. 876; William- son v. Lazarus, 66 Ark. 226, 48 S. W. 974, 74 Am. St. Rep. 91; Summer v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179, 10 So. 562, 14 L.R.A. 815, 30 Am. St. Rep. 106; Steger v. Travelling Men's Bldg. & L. Asso. 208 Ill. 236, 70 N. E. 236,

¹⁰⁰Am. St. Rep. 225; Eckles v. Wood, 143 Ky. 451, 136 S. W. 907, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 832; Wingert v. Zeigler, 91 Md. 318, 46 A. 1074,

⁵¹L.R.A. 316, 80 Am. St. Rep. 453; Wistar v. Foster, 46 Minn. 484, 49 N. W. 247, 24 Am. St. Rep. 241; Swartz v. Carlisle, 237 Pa. 473, 85 A. 847, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 458; Grim v. Weissenberg School Dist. 57 Pa. 433, 98 Am. Dec. 237; Lycoming County v. Union County, 15 Pa. 166, 53 Am. Dec. 575; Bleakney v. Farmers' & M. Bank, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 64, 17 Am. Dec. 635. Annotation: 57 A.L.R. 1197.

²³L. ed. 124; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 88, 8 L. ed. 876; Chesnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio, 599, 47 Am. Dec. 387.

⁴⁸S. W. 1043, 53 L.R.A. 878; Iowa Sav. & L. Asso. v. Heidt, 107 Iowa, 297, 77 N. W. 1050, 43 L.R.A. 689, 70 Am. St. Rep. 197; Wingert v. Zeigler, 91 Md. 318, 46 A. 1074,

⁵Summer v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179, 10 So. 562, 14 L.R.A. 815, 30 Am. St. Rep. 106; Champion Fibre Co. v. Cozad, 183 N. C. 600, 112 S. E. 810, citing R. C. L.

¹¹²Conn. 129, 151 A. 518, 70 A.L.R. 1426; Maguire v. Henry, 84 Ky. 1, 4 Am. St. Rep. 182. Annotation: 22 L.R.A. 385. See Vol. 11, p. 1203, § 379.

K. MODIFICATION OF PARTICULAR REMEDIES

§ 437. Generally.—

able limitations as indicated in the preceding sections,¹⁶ the legislature may,

laws relating to the rules of procedure,¹⁷ to parties,¹⁸ provisional remedies,¹⁹

process,²⁰ and evidence generally.¹ It may act in many ways, as, for instance,

¹⁴Gross v. United States Mortg. Co. 108 U. S. 477, 27 L. ed. 795, 2 S. Ct. 940. A state statute which gives validity to a void contract is not repugnant to the con- tract clause of the Federal Constitution. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 380,

¹⁷Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714, 26 L. ed. 602; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69,

²⁴L. ed. 610; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 21 L. ed. 357; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 20 L. ed. 685; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Teralta Land & Water Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518,

⁴⁸P. 613, 58 Am. St. Rep. 194; Arnold & M. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 251, 145 N. E. 342, 40 A.L.R. 1470; Henley v. Myers, 76 Kan. 723, 93 P. 168, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 779, affirmed in 215 U. S. 373, 54 L. ed. 240, 30 S. Ct. 148; Miners & M. Bank v. Snyder, 100 Md. 57, 59 A. 707, 68 L.R.A. 312, 108 Am. St. Rep. 390; Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 96 Am. Dec. 613; Brown v. Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827, 5 L.R.A. 226, 13 Am. St. Rep. 438; Schuster v. Weiss, 114 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 438, 19 L.R.A. 182; State, United R. & Canal Co., Prosecutor, v. Weldon, 47 N. J. L. 59, 54 Am. Rep. 114; Davis v. Johnson,

⁴¹N. D. 85, 170 N. W. 520, citing R. C. L.; Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745, 7 Am. Rep. 270; Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 688, 98 Am. Dec. 494; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah, 100, 61 P. 338, 58 L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St. Rep. 774; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Osh- kosh, 109 Wis. 208, 85 N. W. 376, 95 Am. St. Rep. 870, affirmed in 187 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 249, 23 S. Ct. 234; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 283. Annotation: 95 Am. St. Rep. 893. The legislature may repeal at will stat- utory provisions for the summary dispos- session of tenants, without impairing the obligation of a contract. People ex rel. Durham Realty Co. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dismissed in 257 U. S. 665, 66 L. ed. 424, 42 S. Ct. 47. This rule that the legislature may make changes in rules of procedure is applicable alike to past, as well as future, contracts. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. (Del.) 455, 81 Am. Dec. 185; Briscoe v. Anketell,

²⁸Miss. 361, 61 Am. Dec. 553; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah, 100, 61 P. 338, 58 L.R.A. 669,

⁶⁷W. Va. 679, 69 S. E. 367, 21 Ann. Cas. 289; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck,

⁹⁷Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 283. Annotation: 61 Am. Dec. 557;

¹⁸People's Bkg. Co. v. Sterling, 300 U. S. 175, 81 L. ed. 536, 57 S. Ct. 386; Craw- ford v. Branch Bank, 7 How. (U. S.) 279,

¹²L. ed. 700; Stein v. Indianapolis Bldg. Loan Fund & Sav. Asso. 18 Ind. 237, 81 Am. Dec. 353. Annotation: 10 Am. Dec. 139. A statute authorizing a bank to sue on notes made payable to one of its officers in its own name, the bank having a bene- ficial interest therein, affects the remedy alone and does not impair the obligation of the contract. Crawford v. Branch Bank,

¹Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437, 56 L. ed. 491, 32 S. Ct. 248; Marx v. Hanthorn,

than the existing ones,³ by enlarging the operation of writs,⁴ by limiting the

time of actions,⁵ by removing, but not creating, exemptions,⁶ by creating or

removing statutory liens,⁷ by prescribing rights as to setoff,⁸ by preventing

trials,¹⁰ by abolishing, absolutely or conditionally, the right of imprisonment

of instruments,¹³ and generally, within the limits defined in preceding sections,

by creating and modifying remedies, and even abolishing certain specific remedies where other reasonable and efficient remedies remain.¹⁴ It is also generally conceded that the state, under its general power to change and alter remedies, may vary the times of holding courts, shift jurisdiction from one to another,¹⁵ and create new courts and abolish old ones without in any wise impairing the obligation of contracts.¹⁶

§ 438. State Insolvency Laws.—

Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247, 24 L.R.A. 141, 41 Am. St. Rep. 278; People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170, 69 A.L.R. 1024; Meighen v. Strong, 6 Minn. 177, Gill. 111, 80 Am. Dec. 441; Hope Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483, 90 Am. Dec. 433; State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523. Without impairing the obligation of contracts, the state may give the entry of a record the effect of prima facie evidence of the regularity of steps leading up to such entry. Rettler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437, 56 L. ed. 497, 32 S. Ct. 248. Mere rules of evidence do not form a part of contracts entered into while they are in force, and it is competent for the legislature to change such rules from time to time and to make the changes apply to existing causes. Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U. S. 172, 37 L. ed. 410, 13 S. Ct. 508.

²National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co. 226 U. S. 276, 57 L. ed. 221,

³Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co. 290 U. S. 163, 78 L. ed. 243, 54 S. Ct. 134; Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 S. Ct. 755; Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 609, 23 S. Ct. 345; Red River Valley Nat. Bank v. Craig, 181 U. S. 548, 45 L. ed. 994, 21 S. Ct. 703; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 98 U. S. 569, 25 L. ed. 143. The state may give an additional and more efficacious remedy for the enforcement of contracts in the performance of which the public health and safety are involved, provided always that the new remedy is consistent with the nature of the obligation to be enforced and does not impair any substantial right given by the contract. New Orleans & L. R. Co. v. Louisiana, 157 U. S. 219, 39 L. ed. 679, 15 S. Ct. 581.

⁸Blount v. Windley, 95 U. S. 173, 24 L. ed. 424. The legal and equitable right of a debtor to procure the obligations of his creditor and use them as a setoff for his own debt will hardly be denied where the law of the state authorizes it, and such a law does not impair the obligation of a contract. Amy v. Taxing Dist. 114 U. S. 387, 29 L. ed. 172, 5 S. Ct. 893.

¹³American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 S. Ct. 200; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 68, 20 L. ed. 513; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. (U. S.) 163, 12 L. ed. 1030; McCracken v. Hayward,

²How. (U. S.) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Jackson v. Lamphire, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 280, 7 L. ed. 679; Pritchard v. Savannah Street & R. Resort R. Co. 87 Ga. 294, 13 S. E. 493, 14 L.R.A. 721; Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1, 58 Am. Dec. 488; Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 197, 45 Am. Dec. 246; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. F. Asso. 112 Va. 192,

¹⁵Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 572, 79 Am. Dec. 490; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Maughlin, 153 Md. 367, 138 A. 334; State, United R. & Canal Co., Prosecutor, v. Weldon, 47 N. J. L. 59, 54 Am. Rep. 114; Richardson v. Cook, 37 Vt. 599, 88 Am. Dec. 622. Annotation: 79 Am. Dec. 494.

¹⁶Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Maughlin, 153 Md. 367, 138 A. 334, citing R. C. L.; Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N. W. 911, 57 Am. Rep. 825. 78

property within its jurisdiction,¹⁷ provided such legislation does not impair

than a Federal bankruptcy law,³ it is a rule that in consequence of the prohibition as to the impairment of the obligation of contracts, a nonassenting

insolvency laws,⁴ unless he voluntarily becomes a party to the proceedings.⁵

law, he thereby waives the benefit of the protection afforded by the constitutional inhibition as to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.⁶ The

right to imprison for debt constitutes no part of the contract, but is a remedy,

and a discharge of the party from imprisonment does not impair the obligation of contract, but leaves it in full force against his property and effects.⁷

¹⁸Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 46 L. ed. 1113, 22 S. Ct. 857; Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 36 L. ed. 773, 12 S. Ct. 958; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 S. Ct. 269; Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 32 L. ed. 491, 9 S. Ct. 134; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 409, 18 L. ed. 432; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 223, 17 L. ed. 531; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. (U. S.) 295, 12 L. ed. 159; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213,

⁶L. ed. 606; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Larrabee v. Talbott, 5 Gill (Md.) 426, 46 Am. Dec. 637; Barry v. Iseman, 48 S. C. L. (14 Rich.) 129, 91 Am. Dec. 262; Second Ward Sav. Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L.R.A. 569. Annotation: 4 L. ed. 529.

¹⁹Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 62 L. ed. 507, 38 S. Ct. 215; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 223, 17 L. ed. 531; Frey v. Kirk, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 509, 23 Am. Dec. 581; Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 233, 8 Am. Dec. 313; Smith v. Parsons,

¹Ohio, 236, 13 Am. Dec. 608; Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 1, 82 A. 268, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 945. Annotation: 4 L. ed. 530. A bankrupt or insolvent law of any state, which discharges both the person of the debtor and his future acquisition of property, is not a law impairing the obligation of contracts so far as respects debts contracted subsequent to the passage of such law. Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 348, 8 L. ed. 423.

²⁰Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 32 L. ed. 491, 9 S. Ct. 134; Ogden v. Saunders,

¹²Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Barry v. Iseman, 48 S. C. L. (14 Rich.) 129, 91 Am. Dec. 262.

¹Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 62 L. ed. 507, 38 S. Ct. 215; Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 36 L. ed. 773, 12 S. Ct. 958; Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 32 L. ed. 491, 9 S. Ct. 134; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 223, 17 L. ed. 531; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 12 L. ed. 447; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. (U. S.) 295, 12 L. ed. 159; Farmers' & M. Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 131, 5 L. ed. 224; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253, 8 Am. Dec. 183. Annotation: 4 L. ed. 530.

²Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 36 L. ed. 773, 12 S. Ct. 958; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 223, 17 L. ed. 531; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 233, 8 Am. Dec. 313.

³Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 46 L. ed. 1113, 22 S. Ct. 857; Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 32 L. ed. 491, 9 S. Ct. 134.

⁴Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 62 L. ed. 507, 38 S. Ct. 215; Brown v. Smart,

¹⁴⁵U. S. 454, 36 L. ed. 773, 12 S. Ct. 958; Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 32 L. ed. 491, 9 S. Ct. 134; State Tax on Foreignheld Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. ed.

¹⁷⁹(dictum); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 223, 17 L. ed. 531; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. (U. S.) 295, 12 L. ed. 159; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Hawley v. Hunt,

²⁷Iowa, 303, 1 Am. Rep. 273; Brigham v. Henderson, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 430, 48 Am. Dec. 610. Annotation: 4 L. ed. 530. A state insolvency law is unconstitutional so far as it authorizes a discharge to be pleaded in bar of a contract made in another state, although such law was passed before the contract was made. M'Millan v. M'Neill, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 209,

¹⁰³U. S. 714, 26 L. ed. 602; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 24 L. ed. 610; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 329, 9 L. ed. 145; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 370, 6 79

§ 439. Preferences in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Distribution.—

In determining whether a statute creating preferences in the distribution of bankrupt or insolvent estates impairs the obligation of contracts, the cases depend largely on the question whether the statute affects merely the remedy or whether it alters the substantive rights of the parties.8 On the principle that it merely affects the remedy, the application to claims of creditors in existence at the time of its enactment of a statute giving certain claims priority in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings involves no unconstitutional impairment of contract rights.9 This principle has been extended to statutes giving claims for premiums due an insurer, under a workmen's compensation act, priority in either insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings,10 to statutes regulating disbursements and preferences in an insolvent estate,11 and to statutes giving liens or rights of preference to wage claims of laborers in case of the insolvency of employers.12 The legislature may constitutionally change the priority of payment as to existing contracts where the creditor has no lien.13 On the other hand, there is authority which supports the view that once the debt has been contracted, a statute which varies or alters the relationship in any way is unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts.14 Some of these cases, however, may be distinguished on the basis of statutory construction.15

§ 440. Mortgages.—

The general rule is that the law in force at the time a mortgage is executed, with all the conditions and limitations it imposes, is the law which determines the force and effect of the mortgage.16 Thus, any

L. ed. 660; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 197, 45 Am. Dec. 246; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 103; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah, 100, 61 P. 338, 53 L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St. Rep. 774. Annotation: 4 L. ed. 529.

⁹Re Inland Dredging Corp. (C. C. A. 2d) 61 F. (2d) 765, 88 A.L.R. 254, writ of certiorari denied in 288 U. S. 611, 77 L. ed. 985, 53 S. Ct. 403. Annotation: 88 A.L.R. 257.

¹⁰Annotation: 88 A.L.R. 257. Where an insurer of a corporation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of New York obtained judgment against it for unpaid premiums and subsequently the statute was changed so as to give priority to debts for premiums in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings, it was held that on the subsequent filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the insured, the judgment creditor was entitled to priority, and that such an interpretation of the statute would not give it an unconstitutional retroactive effect. The court regarded the case as coming within the doctrine that changes may be made in the remedy so long as they do not affect the rights. Re Inland Dredging Corp. (C. C. A. 2d) 61 F. (2d) 765, 88 A.L.R. 254, writ of certiorari denied in 288 U. S. 611, 77 L. ed. 985, 53 S. Ct. 403.

¹¹Annotation: 88 A.L.R. 258. The rule is laid down in McLure v. Melton, 24 S. C. 569, 58 Am. Rep. 272, writ of error dismissed in 133 U. S. 380, 33 L. ed. 660, 10 S. Ct. 407, that the right of priority given to certain classes of creditors by a statute prescribing the order in which the assets of a decedent's estate shall be applied to the payment of his debts is a mere direction to the executor or administrator as to the manner in which he shall administer the assets, which is at all times subject to legislative control, and no vested right beyond such control is thereby conferred upon the creditor. Under a statute which in regulating the settlement of intestate estates abolishes the distinction between debts of the deceased and places all creditors on an equal footing, a judgment creditor is not entitled to priority, but is placed by such statute on a level with other creditors. Annotation: 88 A.L.R. 261.

¹³Annotation: 88 A.L.R. 258. The legislature may constitutionally make an existing contract debt a lien on real property of the debtor, since no alteration of the rights of the parties is involved, but only the giving of a specific remedy against the property, and retrospective laws are sustained where they touch not the rights but the remedies. Bolton v. Johns, 5 Pa. 145, 47 Am. Dec. 404.

¹⁶Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1, 49 L. ed. 65, 24 S. Ct. 748; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Frazier, 139 U. S. 288, 35 L. ed. 196, 11 S. Ct. 517; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 11 L. ed. 143; Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 79, 11 So. 97, 16 L.R.A. 308, 30 Am. St. Rep. 95; People v. Perlowski, 251 Ill. App. 506, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523; 80

changes in the law which impose conditions and restrictions on a mortgagee in the enforcement of his right and which affect its substance are invalid as impairing the obligation and cannot prevail.¹⁷ Changes in the remedies available for the enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse, be pressed so far as to lessen the security of a mortgage without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression.¹⁸ Following this rule, the law will not permit changes to be made by statute which, as to pre-existing mortgages, extend or otherwise alter the period of redemption,¹⁹ even though a sale has not yet taken place,²⁰ or direct that decrees be made

Olson v. Gowan-Lenning Brown Co. ⁴⁷ N. D. ⁵⁴⁴, ¹⁸² N. W. ⁹²⁹, citing R. C. L.; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.) ²³⁶ S. W. 1006 (affirmed in Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.) ²⁶³ S. W. ²⁵⁵, which is modified on rehearing in (Tex. Com. App.) ¹⁰ S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. Civ. App.) ¹⁹³ S. W. ⁷¹⁹, citing R. C. L.

A power of sale contained in a mortgage is subject to existing statutes. Faxon v. All Persons, ¹⁶⁶ Cal. ⁷⁰⁷, ¹³⁷ P. ⁹¹⁹, L.R.A. 1916B, 1209.

The statutory remedy for the foreclosure of mortgages existing at the time a mortgage is executed becomes a part of the contract to the extent that any subsequent change by legislative authority which affects it substantially to the injury of the mortgagee is invalid as impairing the obligation of contracts. Clark v. Reyburn, ⁸ Wall. (U. S.) ³¹⁸, ¹⁹ L. ed. ³⁵⁴.

For a detailed discussion of general principles herein discussed, see MORTGAGES [Also ¹⁹ R. C. L. p. ³⁰², § 77].

17 Barnitz v. Beverly, ¹⁶³ U. S. ¹¹⁸, ⁴¹ L. ed. ⁹³, ¹⁶ S. Ct. 1042; Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. ⁹⁶ U. S. ⁶²⁷, ²⁴ L. ed. ⁸⁵⁸; Bronson v. Kinzie, ¹ How. (U. S.) ³¹¹, ¹¹ L. ed. ¹⁴³; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, ⁴ Wall. (U. S.) ⁵³⁵, ⁸ L. ed. ⁴⁰³; People v. Perlowski, ²⁵¹ Ill. App. ⁵⁰⁶, citing R. C. L.; Scobey v. Gibson, ¹⁷ Ind. ⁵⁷², ⁷⁹ Am. Dec. ⁴⁹⁰; McCormick v. Rusch, ¹⁵ Iowa, ¹²⁷, ⁸³ Am. Dec. ⁴⁰¹; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.) ²³⁶ S. W. 1006 (affirmed in Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.) ²⁶³ S. W. ²⁵⁵, which is modified on rehearing in (Tex. Com. App.) ¹⁰ S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. Civ. App.) ¹⁹³ S. W. ⁷¹⁹, citing R. C. L.

The obligation of the contract of a mortgagee in possession after a condition broken, who afterwards bids in the property for less than the mortgage debt on the sale in foreclosure proceedings initiated by her before a statute took effect, is impaired by the requirement of a section in the statute that the master's deed be taken out within a specified time after the expiration of the time for redemption, where failure to comply with this requirement is held by the highest state court to destroy the right of possession taken under the mortgage, to avoid the certificate of sale, and to entitle the mortgagor, without payment of the mortgage debt, to recover possession in ejectment, on the strength of a perfect title. Bradley v. Lightcap, ¹⁹⁵ U. S. ¹, ⁴⁹ L. ed. ⁶⁵, ²⁴ S. Ct. ⁷⁴⁸.

The contract of mortgage is a vested interest, and its main incident is a right to have the land applied in discharge of the

debt, either by an execution, as on a judgment at law, or by some form of remedy substantially equal. A new remedy which changes the contract and requires among other things that the mortgaged premises shall not be sold to satisfy the debt, unless they are first valued, and a certain proportion of that value is bid for them, impairs or defeats the obligation under the disguise of regulating the remedy. Gantly v. Ewing, ³ How. (U. S.) ⁷⁰⁷, ¹¹ L. ed. ⁷⁹⁴.

The obligation of a mortgage contract is impaired by a subsequent state statute which prevents a sale on foreclosure unless two thirds of the amount at which the premises have been valued by three householders is bid. Bronson v. Kinzie, ¹ How. (U. S.) ³¹¹, ¹¹ L. ed. ¹⁴³.

A provision for notice of sale under a deed of trust, which is included in the contract, cannot be changed by a subsequent statute providing for different notice in all such cases. International Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Hardy, ⁸⁶ Tex. ⁶¹⁰, ²⁸ S. W. ⁴⁹⁷, ²⁴ L.R.A. ²⁸⁴, ⁴⁰ Am. St. Rep. ⁸⁷⁰.

18 W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, ²⁹⁵ U. S. ⁵⁶, ⁷⁹ L. ed. 1293, ⁵⁵ S. Ct. ⁵⁵⁵, ⁹⁷ A.L.R. ⁹⁰⁵.

In Federal Land Bank v. Wilmarth, ²¹⁸ Iowa, ³³⁹, ²⁵² N. W. ⁵⁰⁷, ⁹⁴ A.L.R. 1338, it was held that equity could not refuse to foreclose a mortgage and allow a judgment for the full amount of the money loaned, because of the existence of a financial panic or economic depression, by reason of which the mortgaged property had depreciated about three fourths in market value.

In Kenly v. Huntingdon Bldg. Asso. ¹⁶⁶ Md. ¹⁸², ¹⁷⁰ A. ⁵²⁶, ⁹⁰ A.L.R. 1321, it was held that unfavorable market conditions affecting the price obtainable at a mortgage foreclosure sale do not warrant a court of equity in making confirmation of a sale to the mortgagee conditional upon a waiver of the right to a deficiency judgment.

In Langever v. Miller, ¹²⁴ Tex. ⁸⁰, ⁷⁶ S. W. (2d) 1025, ⁹⁶ A.L.R. ⁸³⁶, it was held that a state statute enacted to meet the existing economic emergency, but not by its terms limited as to duration, in effect annulling valid deficiency judgments in proceedings to foreclose liens or after sale under deeds of trust, violates the constitutional provision against impairing the obligation of contracts.

As to the effect of moratory legislation on mortgages, see MORTGAGES [Also ¹⁹ R. C. L. p. 225].

Furthermore, under the same principle a statute which authorizes the redemption of property sold upon foreclosure of a mortgage, where no right of redemption previously existed, cannot constitutionally apply to a sale under a

former4 or to file an affidavit5 before the purchaser may take his deed does not

of the redemption period.⁶ On the same principle a statute requiring the redemptioner to record a notice of redemption does not impair the obligation

necessary legal operation controlled or affected the obligation of the mortgage.⁸ Thus, a statute enacted subsequent to the mortgage but prior to redemption, which reduces the rate of interest to be paid the purchaser at a

in order to redeem the property, which is enacted prior to the sale but subsequent to the mortgage, does not impair any contract obligation of the purchaser.¹⁰ The legislature may not, without the consent of all mortgage bond-

³⁴P. 967, 22 L.R.A. 465; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.) 263 S. W. 1006 (affirmed in Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.)

²⁶³S. W. 255, which is modified on rehearing in (Tex. Com. App.) 10 S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 719, citing R. C. L.

¹January v. January, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 542, 18 Am. Dec. 211; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.) 236 S. W. 1006 (affirmed in Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.) 263 S. W. 255, which is modified on rehearing in (Tex. Com. App.) 10 S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 719, citing R. C. L.

²Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 27 L. ed. 648, 2 S. Ct. 236; Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. (U. S.) 461, 16 L. ed. 753; State ex rel. German Sav. & L. Soc. v. Sears, 29 Or. 580, 46 P. 785, 54 Am. St. Rep. 808; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.) 236 S. W. 1006 (affirmed in Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.)

²⁶³S. W. 255, which is modified on rehearing in (Tex. Com. App.) 10 S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. App.) 193 S. W. 719, citing R. C. L.; Swinburne v. Mills, 17 Wash. 611, 50 P. 489, 61 Am. St. Rep. 932. Annotation: 54 Am. St. Rep. 811.

³Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1, 49 L. ed. 65, 24 S. Ct. 748; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. ed. 858; Welsh v. Cross, 146 Cal. 621, 81 P. 229, 106 Am. St. Rep. 63, 2 Ann. Cas. 796; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.)

²³⁶S. W. 1006 (affirmed in Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex.) 263 S. W. 255, which is modified on rehearing in (Tex. Com. App.) 10 S. W. (2d) 704) citing R. C. L.

²⁰L. ed. 513; Clark Implement Co. v. Wadden, 34 S. D. 550, 149 N. W. 424, L.R.A. 1915C, 414.

⁵A statute requiring a mortgagee, within three months after completion of foreclosure, to record an affidavit setting forth the facts, which is to be the condition on which the validity of the foreclosure depends, does not unconstitutionally impair a provision in an existing mortgage that the right to redeem shall be forever foreclosed in one year after the commencement of the foreclosure, since compliance with the condition does not involve any delay, is easy, and effects no substantial alteration of the remedy provided for in the contract. Conley v. Barton, 260 U. S. 677,

⁶Conley v. Barton, 260 U. S. 677, 67 L. ed. 456, 43 S. Ct. 238; Curtis v. Whitney,

¹³Wall. (U. S.) 68, 20 L. ed. 513; Clark Implement Co. v. Wadden, 34 S. D. 550, 149 N. W. 424, L.R.A.1915C, 414.

⁷A statute may provide that notices of redemption shall be recorded with the register of deeds, rather than filed; and the law may be applied to mortgages which were executed before its enactment. Heitsch v. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. 29 N. D. 94, 150 N. W. 457, L.R.A.1915D, 349.

⁸Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 27 L. ed. 648, 2 S. Ct. 236.

§ 441. Redemption.—

or tax sale or giving such a right where none before existed cannot constitutionally be given a retroactive operation. Such a statute does not act merely

on the remedy, but directly upon the contract itself.¹² Thus, statutes extending the period for redemption or giving a right of redemption where none before existed are not constitutional as applied to sales upon execution under

judgments rendered on contracts made or debts incurred before their adoption.¹³ Likewise, the obligation of a mortgage or deed of trust is impaired by

applying to a sale thereunder a statute enacted since its execution, authorizing

the redemption of property sold upon foreclosure, where no right of redemption previously existed, or extending the period of redemption beyond the

passage of such an act,¹⁵ the right of a purchaser, other than a state or some

¹¹Annotation: 88 A.L.R. 1270. **Contract obligations of nonassenting bondholders** are impaired by a statute enacted subsequent to the execution of the mortgage indenture, providing that if it shall appear that, on foreclosure sale under a trust mortgage, no bid is obtainable for a sum representing the fair and reasonable value of the mortgaged premises, the court may, on request of holders of a majority of the bonds, authorize the sale of the property at the fair and reasonable value of the interest of the bondholders to the mortgage trustee for the benefit of all the bondholders, and that the property shall be managed and administered by the trustee as an express trust, and sold by him as soon as can be done without sacrifice of its fair and reasonable value, either for cash, or for bonds, notes, debentures, stocks, or other securities. Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co. 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227, 88 A.L.R. 1263.

¹²Rott v. Steffens, 229 Mich. 241, 201 N. W. 227, 38 A.L.R. 224. Annotation: 1 A.L.R. 143, s. 38 A.L.R. 229, and 89 A.L.R. 966. See cases cited infra, notes 13-19.

⁷⁹⁶(overruling Moore v. Martin, 38 Cal. 428); Thresher v. Atchison, 117 Cal. 73, 48 P. 1020, 59 Am. St. Rep. 159 (obiter); Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 572, 79 Am. Dec. 490; Greenwood v. Butler, 52 Kan. 424, 34 P. 967, 22 L.R.A. 465. Annotation: 1 A.L.R. 143, s. 38 A.L.R. 229, and 89 A.L.R. 966.

¹⁴Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 S. Ct. 1042; Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. (U. S.) 461, 16 L. ed. 753; Thresher v. Atchison, 117 Cal. 73, 48 P. 1020, 59 Am. St. Rep. 159; Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 30 P. 213, 16 L.R.A. 646; Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 79, 11 So. 97, 16 L.R.A. 308, 30 Am. St. Rep. 95; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 A. 405, 4 L.R.A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266; State ex rel. Thomas Cruse Sav. Bank v. Gilliam, 18 Mont. 94, 44 P. 394, 45 P. 661, 31 L.R.A. 721, 33 L.R.A. 556; Bateman v. Sterrett, 201 N. C. 59, 159 S. E. 14, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein,

⁶³N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523; State ex rel. German Sav. & L. Soc. v. Sears, 29 Or. 580, 46 P. 785, 54 Am. St. Rep. 808; Womble v. Shirley (Tex. Civ. App.)

¹⁹³S. W. 719, citing R. C. L.; Chapin v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.) 236 S. W. 1006, citing R. C. L.; Canadian & A. Mortg. Trust Co. v. Blake, 24 Wash. 102, 63 P. 1100, 85 Am. St. Rep. 946. Annotation: 1 A.L.R. 143, s. 38 A.L.R. 229, and 89 A.L.R. 966; 85 Am. St. Rep. 947. A statute abrogating a right which a mortgagee has at the time the mortgage is taken, of a fixed and definite period for the foreclosure of the mortgagor's equity, by providing that in case of an attachment of the mortgagor's interest by a creditor who files a bill in equity, the right of redemption shall not expire pending such proceedings by any attempted foreclosure of the mortgage is unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contract. Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450, 17 A. 405, 4 L.R.A. 348, 10 Am. St. Rep. 266. The law fixing the period of redemption from a real-estate mortgage foreclosure sale, existing at the time of the entering into a contract of mortgage, wherein the parties agree that upon default in the payment of the debt secured by the mortgage the land may be sold "agreeable to the statute in such case made and provided," is a part of the contract of the mortgage, and any change in the law fixing the period of redemption—whether the law shortens the period of redemption or extends the period of redemption—is an impairment of the obligations of such contract. State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523.

¹⁵State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523. Annotation: 89 A.L.R. 966. 83

expiration of the original period for redemption.¹⁶ This latter rule is subject

course, take subject to the conditions imposed by the existing statute.¹⁷ This

has assigned the certificate originally issued to it to a private individual, prior

to the time when the statute extending the time for redemption took effect.¹⁸

§ 442. Exemptions.—

¹⁶Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 79, 11 So. 97, 16 L.R.A. 308, 30 Am. St. Rep. 95. Annotation: 1 A.L.R. 143, s. 38 A.L.R. 229, and 89 A.L.R. 966. An attempt by the legislature to extend the time for redemption from a sale under a decree foreclosing a tax lien, after the period in force when the sale was made for such redemption has expired, is void as impairing the obligation of contract, even though the sale had not been con- firmed when the extension was attempted. Smith v. Snillman, 135 Ark. 279, 205 S. W. 107, 1 A.L.R. 136. A provision of a municipal charter ex- tending the time before a deed can be se- cured by a purchaser at a tax sale, until the expiration of a specified number of months after notice to be given at the expiration of the time as formerly fixed, cannot be applied to sales which occurred before its adoption, without unconstitu- tionally impairing the obligation of the contract. Rott v. Steffens, 229 Mich. 241,

²⁰¹N. W. 227, 38 A.L.R. 224. For a detailed discussion, see TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 434].

¹⁷State ex rel. Dowling v. Butts, 111 Fla. 630, 149 So. 746, 89 A.L.R. 946. Annotation: 1 A.L.R. 143, s. 39 A.L.R. 229, and 89 A.L.R. 966.

¹Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kan. 123, 87 Am. Dec. 458; Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 197, 45 Am. Dec. 246; Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119, 90 Am. Dec. 358; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 103. Annotation: 93 A.L.R. 179; 21 L. ed. 212.

²See Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 12 Am. Rep. 507. Annotation: 93 A.L.R. 180.

⁴New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600, 26 L. ed. 1184; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Wilson v. Brown, 58 Ala. 62, 29 Am. Rep. 727; Johnson v. Fletcher, 84

the exemption of farm stock,¹² wages,¹³ pensions,¹⁴ dower or like statutory

⁵⁴Miss. 628, 28 Am. Rep. 388; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co. 56 Pa. 46, 93 Am. Dec. 778. Annotation: 93 A.L.R. 178; 21 L. ed. 212;

¹L.R.A. 359. Since there is no universal principle of law that every part of the property of a debtor is liable to be seized for the pay- ment of a judgment against him, the va- lidity of an exemption statute depends up- on the question whether the law which prevailed when the contract was made has been so far changed that there does not remain a substantial and reasonable mode of enforcing it. Per Hunt, J., in Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793. The exemption to married men or heads of families of their earnings for personal services rendered within sixty days next preceding the levy of execution by gar- nishment or otherwise, provided by stat- ute, being reasonable, and directed to the remedy, and not the right, does not impair the obligation of contracts entered into prior to its passage, in violation of the Federal Constitution. Kirkman v. Bird,

⁷Kener v. La Grange Mills, 231 U. S. 215, 58 L. ed. 189, 34 S. Ct. 83; Wilson v. Brown, 58 Ala. 62, 29 Am. Rep. 727 (in- crease to $1,200 in real estate and $1,000 in personalty); Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 12 Am. Rep. 507 (exemption of $2,000 created). Annotation: 93 A.L.R. 181. The provision of a state Constitution making exemption from execution of home- steads not exceeding $1,000 in value is in- valid as to contracts previously existing. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793.

⁸Kener v. La Grange Mills, 231 U. S. 215, 58 L. ed. 189, 34 S. Ct. 83; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 212.

⁹W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426, 78 L. ed. 1344, 54 S. Ct. 816, 93 A.L.R. 173; Bank of Minden v. Clement,

²⁵⁶U. S. 126, 65 L. ed. 857, 41 S. Ct. 408; Addiss v. Selig, 264 N. Y. 274, 674, 190 N. E. 490, 191 N. E. 621, 92 A.L.R. 1384; Skin- ner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W. 595, 62 Am. St. Rep. 878; Re Heitron, 14 Wash. 536, 45 P. 153, 35 L.R.A. 602. Annotation: 93 A.L.R. 182. A statute undertaking to exempt from the claims of creditors of the recipient the avails of life, sick, accident, or disability insurance cannot be sustained, as against the objection that it impairs contract obli- gations to existing creditors, as emergency legislation, where, although purporting to be such, it contains no limitation as to time, amount, circumstances, or need. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426,

¹¹Le Blanc's Succession, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223, L.R.A.1917F, 1137. Annotation: 93 A.L.R. 183.

¹²Annotation: 93 A.L.R. 183. An increase of a debtor's personal ex- emption by allowing him two horses in- stead of one impairs materially the obliga- tion of a pre-existing judgment. Johnson v. Fletcher, 54 Miss. 628, 28 Am. Rep. 388.

emptions,¹⁷ the objection to the validity of statutes creating or extending exemptions, that they impair the obligation of contracts, has in a number of cases been held inapplicable to statutes which lessen or abrogate exemptions that have been previously granted, the interests of the debtors alone being affected in such cases and the remedies of creditors being not involved.¹⁸

§ 443. Liens.—

A lien created by statute for the payment of a debt is only a part of the remedy afforded by the law for its collection; a change of that remedy does not affect the obligation of the contract,19 even though the statute may operate retrospectively.20 Thus, a statute requiring a notice to be given of an intention to file a lien, the right to which already existed, does not impair the obligation of contract.21 Furthermore, a mechanic's lien given by statute is, as a general rule, liable always to modification or repeal by the same power that created it. Since such a lien is only a means for enforcing the payment of a debt arising from the performance of a contract, it is not a vested right, but may be taken away without impairing the obligation of the contract.1 Where, however, the lien is not purely statutory but is an integral part of the contract right, a different rule prevails in many jurisdictions. Hence, it is generally recognized that to postpone a legal existing lien upon real property to a subsequent lien by a statute enacted subsequent to the attaching of such prior lien is to impair the obligation of a contract;2 an act of the legislature which postpones an existing valid mortgage lien and makes a subsequently created lien superior to the mortgage lien is a law impairing vested property rights and likewise impairs the obligations of a contract.3 In other jurisdictions the rule is that a statutory lien may be given superiority over a prior mortgage and that statutes designed to effect this are not necessarily unconstitutional as impairing contractual obligations.4

¹⁸A statute providing a remedy which accelerates the enforcement of a contract or subjects a fund to the satisfaction of the obligation of a contract which was not previously subject to its satisfaction does not impair the obligation of contract. Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1215, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 251; Laird v. Carton, 196 N. Y. 169, 89 N. E. 822, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 189.

¹⁹Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 469, 8 L. ed. 751; Bangor v. Goding, 35 Me. 73, 56 Am. Dec. 688; John S. Hanes & Co. v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 178, 41 N. W. 222, 2 L.R.A. 498; Best v. Baumgardner, 122 Pa. 17, 15 A. 691, 1 L.R.A. 356. Annotation: 88 A.L.R. 261; 56 Am. Dec. 690.

¹John S. Hanes & Co. v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 178, 41 N. W. 222, 2 L.R.A. 498. The power which gave a mechanic's lien may at any time take it away entirely and still not in any sense become answerable to the imputation of impairing the obligation of contract. Best v. Baumgardner, 122 Pa. 17, 15 A. 691, 1 L.R.A. 356.

²Toledo, D. & B. R. Co. v. Hamilton, 134 U. S. 296, 33 L. ed. 905, 10 S. Ct. 546; Yeatman v. King, 2 N. D. 421, 51 N. W. 721, 33 Am. St. Rep. 797.

³National Bank v. Jones, 18 Okla. 555, 91 P. 191, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 310, 11 Ann. Cas. 1041. The vested priority of a mortgagee is beyond the power of the mortgagor or the legislature thereafter to disturb. Toledo, D. & B. R. Co. v. Hamilton, 134 U. S. 296, 33 L. ed. 905, 10 S. Ct. 546. A statutory lien cannot be given priority over a mortgage existing and of record before the enactment of the statute creating the lien. Eccles v. Will, 23 N. M. 623, 170 P. 748, L.R.A.1918C, 1022.

⁴Wimberly v. Mayberry, 94 Ala. 240, 10 So. 157, 14 L.R.A. 305; Wabash E. R. Co. v. East Lake Fork Special Drainage Dist. 134 Ill. 384, 25 N. E. 781, 10 L.R.A. 285; Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co. 122 Pa. 627, 15 A. 917, 1 L.R.A. 361. Giving a mechanic's lien superiority over a prior mortgage, as to the building or improvement added by the lienor, is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of a contract. Wimberly v. Mayberry, 94 Ala. 240, 10 So. 157, 14 L.R.A. 305. An alteration and enlargement of the remedy for enforcing a mechanic's lien after a sale under foreclosure of a mortgage on the premises, subject to the lien, by providing in addition to the right under the former statute to sell the building on the lien claim and remove it from the land, that the court, for the best interests of all the parties, might require the land and improvements to be sold together and the proceeds distributed so as to secure the prior mortgage or other lien priority upon the land and to the mechanic's lien 86

A statute giving an improvement lien priority over a pre-existing mortgage on the property subsequently so assessed does not impair the obligation of contract contained in the mortgage.⁵ The justification for this rule lies in the inherent power of a sovereignty to tax, and all contracts are made subject to this power.⁶ Some courts justify the rule on the basis that if the legislature did not have this power, it would be within the power of the owner of the property to render his property immune from any assessment by merely giving a mortgage thereon.⁷

§ 444. Insurance.—

Attacks on the validity of statutes regulating the affairs of insurance companies are frequently made on the ground that the statutes called in question impair the obligation of the contract contained in the charter of the company, in the policies of insurance, or in some special contract relating to the company's affairs. Acting under the general principle that the legislature may regulate such corporations, the legislature, without impairing the obligation of contracts, may provide that no breach of condition in an insurance policy shall avoid it where such provisions amount to the mere establishment of limitations in relation to forfeiture of the contracts.8 Furthermore, the state, in pursuance of its police power and of its right to provide or change the remedies by which its objects are to be attained, may, without impairing the obligation of contracts, authorize proceedings through designated officers of the law for the dissolution of insurance companies which upon examination seem to be insolvent or in such condition as to render their further continuance in business hazardous to the insured or to the public.9 Other statutes have been upheld as not amounting to laws impairing the obligation of contracts, as, for example, where a statute provides that in all actions upon fire insurance policies issued after its enactment the defendant should be permitted to deny that the property insured was worth at the time of the issuing of the policy the full amount insured;10 where the legislature acts within its right to change the statutory liability of persons or corporations causing fires;11 or where, under a state statute made applicable to existing policies, the court is authorized to give judgment for an additional specified proportionate amount of the policy as a penalty in cases where there has been an unsuccessful defense interposed not in good faith.12

priority building, does not impair the obligation of the contract with the mortgagee or the purchaser on foreclosure. Red River Valley Nat. Bank v. Craig, 181 U. S. 548, 45 L. ed. 994, 21 S. Ct. 703.

⁵Wabash E. R. Co. v. East Lake Fork Special Drainage Dist. 134 Ill. 334, 25 N. E. 781, 10 L.R.A. 285; Baldwin v. Moroney, 173 Ind. 574, 91 N. E. 3, 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 761; State ex rel. White v. Kansas City, 134 Kan. 157, 4 P. (2d) 422, 78 A.L.R. 507. And see Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 28 L. ed. 1102, 5 S. Ct. 612. Annotation: 78 A.L.R. 513. See SPECIAL OR LOCAL ASSESSMENTS [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 188, § 101].

⁷Annotation: 78 A.L.R. 516. A state statute which provides that when the holder of an obligation secured by real estate or personal property causes a sale of the property by a trustee becomes the purchaser for a sum less than the amount of the debt, and afterwards brings an action for the deficiency, the defendant may show by way of defense and setoff that the property sold was fairly worth the amount of the debt or that the sum bid was substantially less than the true value of the property, and thus defeat the claim in whole or in part, does not unconstitutionally impair contract obligations. Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & T. Co. 300 U. S. 124, 81 L. ed. 552, 57 S. Ct. 338, 108 A.L.R. 886.

⁸McGannon v. Michigan Millers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. 127 Mich. 636, 87 N. W. 61, 54 L.R.A. 739, 89 Am. St. Rep. 501. See generally INSURANCE [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 823].

¹⁰Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co. 136 Mo. 382, 38 S. W. 85, 35 L.R.A. 227, 58 Am. St. Rep. 638, affirmed in 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281.

¹²Snyder v. Supreme Ruler, F. M. C. 122 Tenn. 248, 122 S. W. 981, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 87

Furthermore, statutes allowing an attorney's fee for failure to pay an insurance loss promptly, which are made applicable to existing policies, are not unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contract.¹³ This principle has been applied to insurers under a workmen's compensation act who seek a review of an award. A statute enacted subsequent to an injury which permits the recovery of attorneys' fees by the employee does not impair the obligation of contract.¹⁴ This view is supported on the basis that such legislation affects the remedy, as fees are merely cost items,¹⁵ or is a valid exercise of the police power by the state in regulating insurance companies.¹⁶ There is some authority to the contrary, however, which holds such statutes void as to existing contracts.¹⁷

The power, however, of the legislature over insurance companies and their policies of insurance is not unlimited. For example, under an existing policy of fire insurance the insured has a vested right from the date of the contract to be recompensed upon the happening of the contingency defined in the policy, and any statute destroying that right or the security upon which reliance was placed and which entered into the consideration for the policy would impair the obligation of the contract.¹⁸ Likewise, a statute which provides that each insurer shall be liable for its proportionate share of the loss impairs the obligation of an existing fire insurance policy which provides that the insurer shall be exonerated from loss occurring while the insured has any other contract of insurance.¹⁹

Statutes which attempt to change beneficiaries of insurance policies already issued are void as impairing the obligation of contracts,²⁰ as are statutes which attempt to change provisions as to the availability of the defense of suicide.¹ Furthermore, a statute which attempts to change previous provisions relating

209, affirmed in 227 U. S. 497, 57 L. ed. 611, 33 S. Ct. 292. Annotation: 78 L. ed. 997. The obligation of an existing insurance contract was not unconstitutionally impaired by applying to it the provisions of a statute subsequently enacted, under which, in case the refusal of the insurance company to pay a loss is found not to have been in good faith, such additional recovery as shall be determined to be reasonable compensation for the resulting damage, if any, may be allowed, not exceeding 25 per cent of the liability under the policy. Supreme Ruling, F. M. C. v. Snyder, 227 U. S. 497, 57 L. ed. 611, 33 S. Ct. 292.

¹³Germania F. In. Co. v. Bally, 19 Ariz. 580, 173 P. 1052, 1 A.L.R. 488; L'Engle v. Scottish Union & Nat. F. Ins. Co. 48 Fla. 82, 37 So. 462, 67 L.R.A. 581, 111 Am. St. Rep. 77, 5 Ann. Cas. 748; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Redding, 47 Fla. 228, 37 So. 62, 67 L.R.A. 518, 110 Am. St. Rep. 118; Reed v. American Bonding Co. 102 Neb. 113, 166 N. W. 196, L.R.A.1918C, 63. Annotation: 90 A.L.R. 536; 78 L. ed. 998. A statute providing that upon the trial of an action the court shall award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed as costs and be included in the judgment rendered, does not impair contractual obligations, as applied to a surety on a contractor's bond who became such before the statute was enacted. Igoe Bros. v. National Surety Co. 112 N. J. L. 243, 169 A. 841, 96 A.L.R. 1422. No unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts is involved in applying to actions on insurance policies written before it went into effect, a statute providing for the allowance of an attorney's fee to the successful respondent on an appeal by an insurer from a judgment against it in an action on a policy, such statute being in effect one relating to costs. Spicer v. Benefit Asso. R. E. 142 Or. 574, 21 P. (2d) 187, 90 A.L.R. 517.

¹⁴Norman's Case, 278 Mass. 464, 180 N. E. 238, 82 A.L.R. 885; Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 179 N. E. 684, 79 A.L.R. 669. Annotation: 90 A.L.R. 538.

¹⁵Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Bally, 19 Ariz. 580, 173 P. 1052, 1 A.L.R. 488; Reed v. American Bonding Co. 102 Neb. 113, 166 N. W. 196, L.R.A.1918C, 63. Annotation: 90 A.L.R. 537.

¹⁸British America Assur. Co. v. Colorado & S. R. Co. 52 Colo. 589, 125 P. 508, 1135, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1202. Annotation: 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1202.

¹⁹Filipkowski v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. 206 Wis. 39, 238 N. W. 828, 78 A.L.R. 613.

²⁰Hess v. Segenfelter (Morgan v. Segenfelter) 127 Ky. 348, 105 S. W. 476, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1172, 128 Am. St. Rep. 343. Annotation: 106 A.L.R. 52; 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 487.

to incontestability and which determines the grounds therefor,² or a statute which substantially alters an earlier statute providing for the application of accumulated reserve to the purchase of extended insurance, where no other option expressed in the policy was availed of by the insured,³ or which changes materially the results of misrepresentations contained in the application, impairs the obligation of the contract.⁴

The contract rights of one who has undertaken to be bound by all the rules of a mutual benefit society are not impaired by a statute permitting the society to distribute its funds according to its rules and regulations, even though a member is thereby deprived of the benefit of a statute providing for extended insurance in case of forfeiture of his policy for nonpayment of premiums.⁵

§ 445. Statutes of Limitation.—

An existing law of limitations is not considered as being a part of the contract. Hence, the legislature may enact a statute which limits the time within which actions may be brought to enforce demands where there was previously no period of limitation or which shortens the existing time of limitation, and such a law may operate upon existing contracts without necessarily being invalid as impairing their obligations.6 The legislature by enactment may suspend the operation of a statute of limitations as to contracts in existence at the time of the passage of the act7 or may control the statute of limitations, if it does not thereby take away the remedy to enforce existing contracts.8 Such statutes relate only to the remedy and the enforcement of rights and, as a general rule, control future procedure in reference to previously existing causes of action, where they contain no language clearly limiting their application to causes of action arising in the future.9 It is within the power of the legislature to shorten the period of limitation, leaving always a reasonable time within which to invoke a remedy for a breach of contract, or to prolong the period of limitation, where the right to plead it has not accrued.10 If, however, the period fixed by a

³Annotation: 106 A.L.R. 49. An amendment which alters an earlier statute under which an insurer, upon default in the payment of life insurance premiums, was required to apply the accumulated reserve to the purchase of extended insurance where no other option expressed in the policy was availed of by the insured, by giving the insurer the right to elect between applying the reserve to the purchase of paid-up insurance or the continuance of the insurance in force at its full amount, cannot, in view of the constitutional prohibition of legislation impairing the obligation of contracts, be constitutionally applied where the policy, the premiums of which are in default, was in force at the time of such amendment. Furlong v. National L. & Acci. Ins. Co. 185 La. 352, 169 So. 431, 106 A.L.R. 40.

⁴Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Galligan, 71 Ark. 295, 73 S. W. 102, 100 Am. St. Rep. 73. Annotation: 106 A.L.R. 53.

⁵Westerman v. Supreme Lodge, K. P. 196 Mo. 670, 94 S. W. 470, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1114. See MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 1175].

⁶Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245, 34 L. ed. 659, 11 S. Ct. 76; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668, 26 L. ed. 886; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. (U. S.) 163, 12 L. ed. 1030; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124, 92 Am. Dec. 56; Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 197, 45 Am. Dec. 246; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 103; State Land Bd. v. Lee, 84 Or. 431, 165 P. 372, citing R. C. L.; Frank v. State Bank & T. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 10 S. W. (2d) 704, citing R. C. L.; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 283. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 886. A state law requiring bondholders dissenting to a refunding plan to file their dissent within a certain period of time or else they will be deemed to assent to the plan is valid on the same principle as providing a statute of limitations. Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co. 109 U. S. 401, 27 L. ed. 977, 3 S. Ct. 304. Statutes of limitation referring to the remedy, and not to the obligation of a contract, do not fall within the constitutional inhibition of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 4 L. ed. 529. See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS [Also 17 R. C. L. pp. 680 et seq.].

⁷Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 49 S. C. L. (15 Rich.) 158, 94 Am. Dec. 148; Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 688, 98 Am. Dec. 494; Caperton v. Martin, 4 W. Va. 138, 6 Am. Rep. 270.

¹⁰Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co. 258 U. S. 190, 66 L. ed. 89

remedy upon pre-existing contracts, which is part of their obligation, the stat-

bar an action upon a contract is, however, an arbitrary destruction of contract-

ual rights and, therefore, unconstitutional,¹² as would also be a statute which

right is for the determination of the legislature, and is in no sense a judicial

a denial of justice, the court will not interfere with the legislative discretion.¹⁴

§ 446. Generally.—

559, 42 S. Ct. 284; Canadian N. R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 64 L. ed. 713, 40 S. Ct. 402; Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales,

²³⁰U. S. 139, 57 L. ed. 1427, 33 S. Ct. 1033; Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55, 46 L. ed. 804, 22 S. Ct. 573; Turner v. New York,

¹⁶⁸U. S. 90, 42 L. ed. 392, 18 S. Ct. 38; MacFarland v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 253, 34 L. ed. 664, 11 S. Ct. 79; Wheeler v. Jackson,

¹³⁷U. S. 245, 34 L. ed. 659, 11 S. Ct. 76; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 34 L. ed. 304, 10 S. Ct. 972; Mitchell v. Clark,

¹¹⁰U. S. 633, 28 L. ed. 279, 4 S. Ct. 170, 312; Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514, 27 L. ed. 808, 2 S. Ct. 854; Koshkonong v. Bur- ton, 104 U. S. 668, 26 L. ed. 886; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. ed. 365; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 596, 21 L. ed. 737; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. (U. S.) 63) 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Hawkins v. Barney,

⁵Pet. (U. S.) 457, 8 L. ed. 190; Tipton v. Smythe, 78 Ark. 392, 94 S. W. 678, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 714, 115 Am. St. Rep. 44, 8 Ann. Cas. 521; Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 198 Cal. 631, 246 P. 1046, 46 A.L.R. 1095; Los Angeles Bond & Securi- ties Co. v. Heath, 120 Cal. App. 328, 7 P. (2d) 1039, citing R. C. L.; Briscoe v. An- ketell, 28 Miss. 361, 61 Am. Dec. 553; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 565; Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Or. 133, 177 P. 814, Ann. Cas. 1919D, 1257; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. F. Asso. 112 Va. 192, 70 S. E. 482, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1016; Bettman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 P. 53, 40 L.R.A. 815; Parker v. Kane,

¹L.R.A.(N.S.) 528, s. 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 715, and 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 157; 8 Ann. Cas. 525. Shortening the time within which ac- tions on existing contracts must be brought impairs no obligation of the contract if a reasonable time is given to bring the suit before the bar attaches. Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co. 109 U. S. 401, 27 L. ed. 977, 3 S. Ct. 304. Statutes of limitation operating pro- spectively do not impair vested rights or the obligations of contracts, and their va- lidity cannot be questioned unless their provisions are so stringent and unreason- able as to amount to a denial of the right instead of merely affecting the remedy. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 290,

¹¹Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793. Annotation: 26 L. ed. 887. A statute prohibiting proceedings to try the genuineness of the tax-receivable cou- pons issued under the law of 1871, which became due before July 1, 1888, after one year from that date, and prohibiting such proceedings as to other coupons after one year from the time they are due, is an unreasonable law and impairs the obliga- tion of the contract. McGahey v. Virginia,

¹²Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N. E. 402, 14 Ann. Cas. 349. Annotation: 34 L. ed. 660.

¹³Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co. 98 Me. 268, 56 A. 908, 99 Am. St. Rep. 397; Bris- coe v. Anketell, 28 Miss. 361, 61 Am. Dec. 553; Gilbert v. Ackerman, 159 N. Y. 118,

⁵³N. E. 753, 45 L.R.A. 118; Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1, 81 N. W. 72, 46 L.R.A. 715, 81 Am. St. Rep. 516. Annotation: 34 L. ed. 660.

¹⁴Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55, 46 L. ed. 804, 22 S. Ct. 573; Antoni v. Green- how, 107 U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 S. Ct. 91; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. ed. 365. Annotation: 8 Ann. Cas. 526. Statutes of limitation applicable to ac- tions to recover land do not impair con- tract obligations unless so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of a right. The time and manner of their operation, the exceptions to them, and the acts from which the time limited shall begin to run will generally depend on the sound discre- tion of the legislature, according to the nature of the titles, the situation of the country, and the emergency which leads to their enactment. Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 280, 7 L. ed. 679. 90

to a practical alienage against citizens of other states.¹⁵ The recent tendency,

§ 447. Article 4, § 2, of Federal Constitution.—

the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states.¹⁹ The intention

state would be entitled to under the like circumstances.²⁰ Hence, it is intended

to prevent discrimination by the several states against citizens of other states

Under Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution, no privileges are secured

United States citizens from its own citizens violates this clause of the Federal

Article ⁴, § ², is only a limitation upon the powers of the states. It in no

¹⁷Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606 (opinion of Johnson, J.).

²⁰Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. Mc- Clung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 S. Ct. 269. The purpose of the pertinent clause in the Fourth Article was to require each state to accord equality of treatment to the citizens of other states in respect of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

¹Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 80 L. ed. 778, 56 S. Ct. 532; Maxwell v. Bugbee,

²⁵⁰U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; Williams v. Bruffy,

of the Federal Government, such as unorganized territories and Indian reservations.⁷

**§ ⁴⁴⁸. Fourteenth Amendment to Federal Constitution.**—The second clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that "no state shall make or impose any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."⁸ The national scope of the government under the Federal Constitution was completely broadened by the Fourteenth Amendment, by causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount and dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative, the amendment operating upon all the powers conferred by the Constitution.⁹

The Fourteenth Amendment deals only with the rights of citizens of the United States as such, and the privileges and immunities protected thereby are those of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from the privileges and immunities of the citizens of a state as such.¹⁰ It places the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States under the protection of the Federal Constitution and leaves the privileges and immunities of citizens of a state under the protection of the state Constitution.¹¹

This clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not add to the privileges or immunities of citizenship in the United States;¹² it merely furnishes

⁷Haavik v. Alaska Packers' Asso. 263 U. S. 510, 63 L. ed. 414, 44 S. Ct. 177; McFadden v. Blocker, 3 Ind. Terr. 224, 54 S. W. 873, 58 L.R.A. 894.

⁹Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Kramer v. United States, 245 U. S. 478, 62 L. ed. 413, 38 S. Ct. 168; Jones v. Perkins, 245 U. S. 390, 62 L. ed. 358, 38 S. Ct. 166; Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States) 245 U. S. 366, 62 L. ed. 352, 38 S. Ct. 159, L.R.A.1918C, 361, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 856.

¹⁰Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 77 L. ed. 1015, 53 S. Ct. 431; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 S. Ct. 516, 27 A.L.R. 27; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212, 33 S. Ct. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; In Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 S. Ct. 930; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 29 L. ed. 615, 6 S. Ct. 580; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 130, 21 L. ed. 442; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 354, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. 214 Iowa, 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308; Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; State v. Hunter, 164 La. 405, 114 So. 76, 55 A.L.R. 309, affirmed in 275 U. S. 508, 72 L. ed. 406, 48 S. Ct. 158; Re Taylor, 48 Md. 28, 30 Am. Rep. 451; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L.R.A. 385. Annotation: 25 Am. St. Rep. 871.

¹¹Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. ed. 716; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394, 738; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738; Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765, 11 L.R.A. 828, 23 Am. St. Rep. 895; People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L.R.A.1915D, 538. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 579. By leaving out the words "citizen of the state" which are used in contradistinction to "citizen of the United States" in the preceding sentence, the second clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States under the protection of the Federal Constitution and leaves the privileges and immunities of citizens of a state under the protection of the state Constitution. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738.

¹²Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162, 22 L. ed. 627; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co. 114 Mo. 88, 21 S. W. 457, 19 L.R.A. 269; State v. Jackman, 69 N. H. 318, 41 A. 347, 42 L.R.A. 438. Such provision of the Fourteenth Amendment does not undertake to confer any new rights or regulate individual rights, but simply prohibits state legislation. Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co. 114 Mo. 88, 21 S. W. 457, 19 L.R.A. 269. The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not create any new or substantive legal right or add 92

guaranties additional to those which already existed.¹³ Hence, this clause does not have the effect of making all the provisions contained in the First Ten Amendments—or, more accurately, in the First Eight Amendments—operative in state courts, on the ground that the fundamental rights protected by those amendments are, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, to be regarded as privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.¹⁴ Its function is negative, and not affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular measures of reform.¹⁵ Its object in respect of citizenship was to preserve equality of rights and to prevent discrimination between citizens, but not radically to change the whole theory of the relations of the state and Federal Governments to each other and of both governments to the people.¹⁶ It was not the purpose of this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to transfer from the states to the Federal Government the security and protection of those civil rights that inhere in state citizenship17 or to confer upon Congress power to legislate within the domain of state legislation.¹⁸ Moreover, it does not operate to extend to the states the limitations on the powers of the Federal Government contained in the Tenth Amendment.¹⁹ It does, however, make the fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to a citizen of the United States independent of his citizenship of any state,²⁰ prohibits discriminating legislation by one state against the citizens of another, and secures to all the equal protection of the laws.¹ A provision which thus extended and completed the shield of national protection between the citizen and hostile and discriminating state legislation cannot be lightly dismissed as a mere duplication, as subordinate or of no value, or as an almost-forgotten clause of the Constitution.²

**§ ⁴⁴⁹. Effect of Article ⁴, § ², and Fourteenth Amendment.**—The very status of national citizenship connotes equality of rights and privileges, so far as they flow from such citizenship, everywhere within the limits of the United States.³ The constitutional guaranty of rights and immunities to the citizen insures to him the privilege of having those rights and immunities judicially declared and protected.⁴ Article ⁴, § ², of the Constitution, by

to or enlarge the general classification of rights of persons or things existing in any state under the laws thereof. The provision, however, operated upon them as it found them already established and declared in substance that such as they were in each state they should be held and enjoyed alike by all persons within its jurisdiction. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405.

¹³Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162, 22 L. ed. 627. Annotation: 25 Am. St. Rep. 872. The Fourteenth Amendment adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another, but simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the states upon the fundamental rights of the citizens. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588.

¹⁴Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494. See infra, § 465.

¹⁵Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873.

¹⁸Re Rahrer (Wilkerson v. Rahrer) 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 S. Ct. 865.

¹⁹Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 S. Ct. 930.

²⁰Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394.

¹State v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 73 Conn. 255, 47 A. 299, 57 L.R.A. 481, affirmed in 185 U. S. 364, 46 L. ed. 949, 22 S. Ct. 673.

²Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

³Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54. The privileges and immunities of an individual as a citizen of the United States protect him in any state and, under treaties and the law of nations, in foreign lands. State v. Bates, 14 Utah, 293, 47 P. 78, 43 L.R.A. 33.

⁴Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 76 L. ed. 1102, 52 S. Ct. 556, 87 A.L.R. 374. 93

therefore be void,⁶ and that consequently it leaves to the state perfect freedom

to grant such privileges to its own citizens as it may see fit, but secures to the

citizens of all the other states, by virtue of the constitutional enactment itself,

out that it forbids such legislation affecting citizens of the respective states

of the Constitution relieves a citizen of one state from the disabilities of alien-

age in all other states; inhibits discriminating legislation against him by other

states; gives him the right of free ingress into, and egress from, other states;

as this.⁹ The guaranty to the citizens of each state contained in this provision

Even though the claimed constitutional protection as to privileges and immunities is denied in the decision of a state court on non-Federal grounds, it is the province of the Supreme Court of the United States to inquire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substan- tial basis. Lawrence v. State Tax Com- mission, 286 U. S. 276, 76 L. ed. 1102, 52 S. Ct. 556, 87 A.L.R. 374.

⁶⁵L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 S. Ct. 366; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U. S.) 393, 15 L. ed. 691; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (as to extent to which the Dred Scott case is overruled, see Max- well v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597,

²⁰S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 S. Ct. 269; Slaughter-House Cases,

¹⁶Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; McRea- den v. Blocker, 3 Ind. Terr. 224, 54 S. W. 873, 53 L.R.A. 894); State ex rel. Hoadley v. Insurance Comrs. 37 Fla. 564, 20 So. 772,

³³L.R.A. 288. To render a state law obnoxious to the U. S. Const. Art. 4, § 2, it is essential that the privilege denied be a civil right common to the citizens of the enacting state and that it be denied to a natural citizen of another state in his capacity as such citizen. State v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 73 Conn. 255, 47 A. 299,

⁷Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 1190, writ of error dismissed in 255 U. S. 445, 65 L. ed. 723, 41 S. Ct. 373; Re Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 P. 424, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161.

⁹United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168,

⁹⁴Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386. As to what are privileges and immuni- ties of citizenship, see infra, §§ 456 et seq.

¹⁰Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 94

The inhibition of Article ⁴, § ², applies to discriminations against noncitizens

of a state; it does not apply to the forbidding of certain conduct by all persons

since it merely forbids discrimination between citizens and noncitizens, it does

tion by a state against citizens of adjoining states would not be cured if those

he has come, but has no right to claim any greater privileges.¹⁵ Article ⁴,

§ ², is intended to give the citizens of each state the privileges of citizens in the

its own citizens; it does not exempt noncitizens of a state exercising privileges

The effect of Article ⁴, § ², is limited in that in inhibiting discriminatory

state legislation it protects only citizens of states other than the state enact-

privileges and immunities between citizens of different states,¹⁷ and that its

those rights which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the states.

It threw around them in Article ⁴, § ², no security for the citizen of the state

650, 8 S. Ct. 737, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 24; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Lexington v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 212, 54 Am. Dec. 522.

¹¹State v. Hunter, 164 La. 405, 114 So. 76, 55 A.L.R. 309, affirmed in 275 U. S. 508,

¹²State v. Hunter, 164 La. 405, 114 So. 76, 55 A.L.R. 309, affirmed in 275 U. S. 508,

¹⁵Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 34 L. ed. 260, 10 S. Ct. 1012; People v. Gris- wold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L.R.A. 1915D, 538. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 580. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own state are not secured to them in other states by the provision of the Federal Constitution relative to the privileges and immunities of the citizens of each state in the several states. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 19 L. ed. 357.

¹⁶Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 S. Ct. 221; Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 32 L. ed. 695, 9 S. Ct. 277, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 407; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 519, 10 L. ed. 274.

¹⁸Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 130, 21 L. ed. 442; Slaughter-House Cases,

power of the state governments over the rights of its own citizens.²⁰ "Its sole

be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states within your jurisdiction."¹

rights as citizens and against a participation in the same rights by citizens of

pass laws to regulate the privileges and immunities of its own citizens provided

that in so doing it does not abridge their privileges and immunities as citizens

abridge the privileges of a citizen of the United States, albeit he is at the same

immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment abridges the right of protection inherent in a state and reserved when the Federal Constitution was

ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Re Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 P. 424, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161.

²⁰Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Re Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 P. 424, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161.

¹Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 80 L. ed. 778, 56 S. Ct. 532; Blake v. McClung,

¹⁷²U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Re Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 P. 424, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161.

²State v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 73 Conn. 255, 47 A. 299, 57 L.R.A. 481, affirmed in

³Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

⁵Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54. Contra.—Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1114 (semble) (may now be regarded as overruled by Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404,

⁸⁰L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54). In Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 31 A. 322,

²⁹L.R.A. 404, the court indicated that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to a citizen of the state of which the laws are complained. This conclusion was reached through a misapplication of the principles stated in Bradwell v. Illinois,

¹⁶Wall. (U. S.) 130, 21 L. ed. 442, and may be disregarded in the light of the squarely opposite and controlling opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

⁶Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

⁷Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Robison v. Fishback, 175 Ind. 132, 93 N. E. 666, L.R.A. 1917B, 1179, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1271.

⁸State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 A. 723, L.R.A.1917C, 528; De Grazier v. Stephens,

good;⁹ such provisions do not interfere with the power of the state to protect

a particular and personal right in the citizen to use public property in defiance

grazing of sheep on the Federal public domain upon a range previously occupied by cattle does not deny privileges and immunities of citizens of the

a local standpoint considerations of public policy of a state do not affirmatively require the extension of benefits conferred by a statute of that state

to citizens of other states as strongly as to its own citizens furnishes absolutely no ground for the exclusion of noncitizens from the benefits of the

§ 450. State Citizenship and Its Privileges.—

which belong to a citizen solely by virtue of state rather than national citizenship are not broadly protected. The privileges and immunities guaranteed

to a citizen by Article ⁴, § ², in a state other than that of his citizenship are

virtue of his state citizenship.¹⁸ The state may pass laws to regulate the privileges and immunities of its own citizens, provided that in so doing it does

not abridge their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States.¹⁹

¹⁰⁵S. W. 992, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059. See also Wilmington Star Min. Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60, 51 L. ed. 708,

¹⁴Chambers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34.

¹⁵Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 1190, writ of error dismissed in 255 U. S. 445, 65 L. ed. 723, 41 S. Ct. 373.

¹⁸Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah, 71, 46 P. 756, 37 L.R.A. 103, affirmed in 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383. The power to create and define the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states is reserved to be exercised by the people. State v. Bates, 14 Utah, 293, 47 P. 78, 43 L.R.A. 33.

¹⁹Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 29 L. ed. 615, 6 S. Ct. 580; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357. [12 Am. Jur.]—7 97

to sit upon juries, and the right to hold public office. The reasons are patent. If a state were to intrust the elective franchise to residents of another state even only in part, its sovereignty would not rest upon the will of its own citizens; or if it permitted its offices to be filled and their functions to be exercised by persons from other states, its citizens to that extent would not enjoy the right of self-government.²⁰ There are also numerous privileges that may be accorded by a state to its own people in which citizens of other states may not participate except in conformity to such reasonable regulations as may be established by the state. For instance, a state cannot forbid citizens of other states to sue in its courts, that right being enjoyed by its own people; but it may require a nonresident, although a citizen of another state, to give a bond for costs, although such bond is not required of a resident.¹ Hence, the Federal Constitution does not guarantee to the citizens in one state, while residents there, all the privileges that they would enjoy if they had their domicil and legal residence in another state.² It has been held, however, that if a state seeks to grant special privileges to its own citizens which are of such a nature as to fall within the purview of the privileges and immunities covered by Article ⁴, § ², the constitutional provision will automatically secure to citizens of other states the special privileges so granted by the state to its own citizens.³

In some jurisdictions the state Constitution specifically provides that no citizen shall be deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity.⁴ Provisions of a statute which in effect deny the right to carry on a business which involves the manufacture, sale, and delivery of a commodity, is ordinary in every respect, and does not affect adversely the public health, morals, and welfare, and which further authorize the purchase by one party engaged in such a business of the property of others so engaged violate such a guaranty in the state Constitution.⁵

B. WHO ARE CITIZENS ENTITLED TO PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

§ 451. Generally.—

To determine who were citizens of the United States before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary to ascertain which persons originally associated themselves together to form the nation, and which persons were afterwards admitted to membership.6 "Looking at the Constitution itself, we find that it was ordained and established by 'the people of the United States' (Preamble, 1 Stat. at L. 10), and then going further back, we find that these were the people of the several states that had before dissolved the political bands which connected them with Great Britain, and assumed a separate and equal station among the powers of the earth (Declaration of Independence, 1 Stat. at L. 1), and that had by Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, in which they took the name of 'the United States of America,' entered into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defense, the security of their liberties and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other

²McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co. 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 197, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, 10 Ann. Cas. 116, affirmed in 209 U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828, 28 S. Ct. 529, 14 Ann. Cas. 560.

³Re Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 P. 424, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161 (exemptions in inheritance tax).

⁴Cap. F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utilities Co. 180 Ark. 770, 22 S. W. (2d) 993, 68 A.L.R. 1018.

against all force offered to or attack made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever. Articles of Confederation, § ³, ¹ Stat. at L. ⁴."⁷ Whoever, therefore, was one of the people of any of the original states when the Constitution of the United States was adopted became ipso facto a citizen—a member of the nation created by its adoption. He was one of the persons associating together to form the nation and was, consequently, one of its original citizens. As to this there has never been a doubt. Disputes have arisen as to whether certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were.⁸

Only a few years before the outbreak of the Civil War the Supreme Court of the United States decided that a man of African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a state or of the United States.⁹ This decision, while it met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled; and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, those who composed the negro race and who had recently been made freemen were incapable of becoming citizens except through an amendment to the Constitution. To remove this difficulty primarily and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States and also citizenship of a state, the first clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provided: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."¹⁰

In the Constitution of the United States the word "citizen" is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a state or of the United States. It is so used in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹¹ Under this amendment it is now clear that the inhabitants of a state have a dual citizenship, one a general12 or national citizenship13 which is independent of, and separate from, their citizenship of the particular state,¹⁴ and the other a citizenship of the state in which they reside.¹⁵ As a matter of fact, such dual character of citizenship had been forecasted by a decision which antedated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁶

A man may be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a state.¹⁷ There is no separate citizenship of a territory, and the only citizen-

¹³Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 S. Ct. 375; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; McFadden v. Blocker, 3 Ind. Terr. 224, 54 S. W. 873, 58 L.R.A. 894; State v. Moore, 104 N. C. 714, 10 S. E. 143, 17 Am. St. Rep. 696.

¹⁴Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738.

¹⁵Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 46 L. ed. 196, 22 S. Ct. 213; Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 S. Ct. 375; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 S. Ct. 930.

¹⁷Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394. A person residing within the District of Columbia or in one of the territories may be a citizen of the United States, but not of any one of the states. Pope v. Williams, 98 Md. 59, 56 A. 543, 66 L.R.A. 398, 103 Am. St. Rep. 379, affirmed in 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. ed. 817, 24 S. Ct. 573. 99

ship its inhabitants and residents have, or which Congress can confer on them, is national as citizens of the United States. Accordingly, it has been held that nonresidents of unorganized territories need not be given the rights of residents therein by reason of the constitutional provision that citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the different states.¹⁸

§ 452. Negroes, Mongolians, Indians, and Aliens.—

While the main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to establish the citizenship of the negro population of the United States, the operation of that constitutional provision is by no means confined to any race or races.20 A state must give to any citizen of the United States, whether white or colored, who becomes a bona fide resident therein, the same rights, privileges, and immunities secured by its Constitution and laws to its other citizens.1

A person of the Mongolian race who is born in the United States is a citizen of the United States even though his parents are not citizens either by birth or naturalization.²

Congress has the power to confer upon Indians the privileges of citizenship.³ Indians are, however, peculiarly subject to the guardianship of the Federal Government.⁴ Accordingly, it has been held that a citizen of Indian blood is not deprived of any constitutional privileges and immunities by a statute prohibiting the sale or giving of intoxicating liquors to any Indian.⁵ Indians are not excepted from the protection guaranteed by the Constitution, and their private rights are secured and enforced to the same extent and in the same way as other residents or citizens of the United States. Moreover, this right of private property is not subject to impairment by legislative action, even while an Indian is, as a member of a tribe, subject to the guardianship of the United States as to his political and personal status.⁶

An alien is not a citizen of the United States and is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship. He is, however, a person whom the state cannot deprive of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and to whom the state cannot deny, while he is within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.⁷

§ 453. Corporations, Business Trusts, Municipal Corporations, and State Agencies.—

Article 4, § 2, of the Federal Constitution, in employing the term "citizens," refers only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing

¹⁸McFadden v. Blocker, 3 Ind. Terr. 224, 54 S. W. 873, 58 L.R.A. 894. See also Haavik v. Alaska Packers' Asso. 263 U. S. 510, 68 L. ed. 414, 44 S. Ct. 177.

¹⁹Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162, 22 L. ed. 627; State v. Ehr, 57 N. D. 310, 221 N. W. 833, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 49 L.R.A. 114.

¹Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738. See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. ed. 664.

³Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 S. Ct. 578; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158. See INDIANS [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 117, §§ 9 et seq.].

⁴Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 S. Ct. 578; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 47 L. ed. 183, 23 S. Ct. 115; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158.

⁷Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610. For a detailed discussion, see ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 467, §§ 8, 9, 10.

allegiance to the state.⁸ It is universally recognized that a grant of corporate existence is a grant of special privileges to the corporators, enabling them to act for certain designated purposes as a single individual and exempting them unless otherwise specially provided from individual liability, and that a corporation, being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created. Accordingly, a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the constitutional provision as to privileges and immunities of citizens9 and cannot claim protection under that provision against abridgment or impairment of its privileges by the law of a state.¹⁰ This is true although a corporation is designated as a "person" within the meaning of constitutional provisions that "no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;"¹¹ and although, for the purposes of jurisdiction and within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution extending the judicial powers of the United States to controversies between citizens of different states, a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state creating it.¹² Moreover, the natural persons who own a corporation cannot claim their own privileges and immunities as citizens for such purposes as are solely and entirely corporate.¹³

It has been held that a business trust cannot set up a contention of abridgment of privileges and immunities.¹⁴ The same principle applies to individuals interested in such a trust and forbids such individuals operating a business trust to claim for it their personal privileges and immunities.¹⁵ Hence, the trustees and members are not unconstitutionally deprived of the rights and immunities guaranteed by Article ⁴, § ², by denying to the trust the right to do business in another state without complying with the laws relating to foreign corporations.¹⁶

⁸Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 8 S. Ct. 737; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 19 L. ed. 357.

¹⁰Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Marketing Asso. 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291; Selover, B. & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112, 57 L. ed. 146, 33 S. Ct. 69; Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 S. Ct. 384; Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. 191 U. S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 S. Ct. 92; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 44 L. ed. 657, 20 S. Ct. 518; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 10 S. Ct. 958; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 8 S. Ct. 737; Fire Asso. of Phila. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 30 L. ed. 342, 7 S. Ct. 108; Liverpool & L. Life & F. Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts (Liverpool & L. Life & F. Ins. Co. v. Oliver) 10 Wall. (U. S.) 566, 19 L. ed. 1029; Re Speed, 216 Ill. 23, 74 N. E. 809, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 787, 120 Am. St. Rep. 386; State v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 97 Miss. 35, 51 So. 918, 53 So. 454, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1150; Humphreys v. State, 70 Ohio St. 67, 70 N. E. 957, 65 L.R.A. 776, 101 Am. St. Rep. 888, 1 Ann. Cas. 233; Hawley v. Hurd, 72 Vt. 122, 47 A. 401, 52 L.R.A. 195, 82 Am. St. Rep. 922. See Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553, 51 L. ed. 314, 27 S. Ct. 171, 8 Ann. Cas. 157. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 580; 82 Am. St. Rep. 926.

¹³Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 72 L. ed. 978, 48 S. Ct. 577; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 44 L. ed. 657, 20 S. Ct. 518; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 519, 10 L. ed. 274. See also Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Herbring v. Lee, 126 Or. 588, 269 P. 236, 60 A.L.R. 1165 and Cook v. Howland, 74 Vt. 393, 52 A. 973, 59 L.R.A. 338, 93 Am. St. Rep. 912, stating that the same principle relates to such natural persons who act for corporations. A corporation is not a mere collection of individuals capable of claiming the benefits assured individuals by the constitutional provision entitling the citizens of each state to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 72 L. ed. 978, 48 S. Ct. 577.

¹⁴Hemphill v. Orloff, 238 Mich. 508, 213 N. W. 867, 58 A.L.R. 507, affirmed in 277 U. S. 537, 72 L. ed. 978, 48 S. Ct. 577; State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243 P. 2, 247 P. 476, 46 A.L.R. 165.

A municipal corporation created by a state for the better ordering of government has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke.¹⁷ The same principle applies to a board or agency created by the state to enable it to perform certain governmental duties.¹⁸

§ 454. Residents and Nonresidents of a State.—

A citizen of a state may acquire and claim rights under the laws of another state without actually going into it. He may enter into contracts to be executed in another state and may acquire and own property, personal and real, situated therein, by purchase, bequest, or inheritance.19 After a citizen has moved into another state he undoubtedly has the right, as a privilege and immunity of citizenship, to become a citizen of any state by a bona fide residence therein with the same rights as other citizens therein.20 As long as he remains a citizen of a particular state, however, he may within certain limits owe allegiance to its sovereignty.1

A citizenship and residence in a state are not necessarily synonymous,² for although the Fourteenth Amendment specifically says that United States citizens are citizens of the state in which they reside,³ there may be a temporary residence in one state, with intent to return to another, which will not create citizenship in the former.⁴ It has been held in some instances that a statute which makes discriminations and distinctions against nonresidents by permitting only residents to engage in certain occupations or by granting certain privileges only to residents does not violate the privileges and immunities of citizens of other states or United States citizens, provided the statute has been construed to include within the class of residents, not only citizens of the state, but also such citizens of other states who happen to be residents of the state.⁵ In a recent case the Supreme Court has stated quite broadly that a statute conferring privileges may validly discriminate between residents and nonresidents where the distinction is based on rational considerations.⁶ Residents of a state are generally, however, citizens of that state, and citizens of a state are usually residents of that state.⁷ Unless the distinction is made clear by enactment or by judicial interpretation, as a usual rule residents include only citizens, and nonresidents are noncitizens. Hence, any law of a state which broadly discriminates against all nonresidents without being construed to include nonresident citizens of such state and which generally seeks to create an alienage which, although based upon residence in form, is based upon citizenship in meaning and effect discriminates against

¹⁷Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 77 L. ed. 1015, 53 S. Ct. 431; George v. Asheville (C. C. A. 4th) 80 F. (2d) 50, 103 A.L.R. 563; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271 (recognizing and approving rule).

¹⁸Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 271.

¹Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 S. Ct. 269; Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1008, 122 Am. St. Rep. 446.

²Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 63 L. ed. 362, 39 S. Ct. 160; State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 A. 723, L.R.A.1917C, 528.

³Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

⁵Haavik v. Alaska Packers' Asso. 263 U. S. 510, 68 L. ed. 414, 44 S. Ct. 177; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 63 L. ed. 362, 39 S. Ct. 160; State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 A. 723, L.R.A.1917C, 528. See Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. 250, 20 A. 583, 9 L.R.A. 366. See infra, §§ 461, 463.

⁶Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 279 U. S. 377, 73 L. ed. 747, 49 S. Ct. 355.

United States citizens who are not citizens of the state and unconstitutionally violates their privileges and immunities.⁸ An unsecured nonresident creditor of a foreign corporation is entitled, under Article ⁴, § ², of the Constitution, to share in the distribution of its assets upon the same level as like creditors of the company who reside within the state.⁹ Hence, a state statute giving to residents of that state a priority over nonresidents in the distribution of the assets of a foreign corporation which, by filing its charter or articles of association in the state, is deemed a corporation of that state is, so far as it discriminates against citizens of other states, a violation of Article ⁴, § ².¹⁰ A decree refusing to turn over local assets of a foreign insurance company having local creditors to the statutory liquidator of the company in its home state does not, however, violate Article ⁴, § ², of the Constitution.¹¹

C. WHO ARE INHIBITED FROM IMPAIRING PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

§ 455. Generally.—

The United States Supreme Court has stated the inclusive principle that all the powers possessed by a state must be exercised consistently with the privileges and immunities granted or protected by the Constitution of the United States.12 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any act by a state which abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, whether such act is by the legislative, executive, or judicial authorities of the state. The prohibitions of the amendment extend to every department of the state and every officer or agent by whom the powers of the state are exerted.13 Moreover, Congress has the power, where privileges and immunities are abridged, to counteract and render nugatory all state laws and proceedings which have the effect of abridging any of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.14

The general rule is firmly settled by authoritative decisions that the constitutional guaranties against the impairment of privileges or immunities operate only to inhibit impairment of such privileges and immunities by action

⁸Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 S. Ct. 935; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165, also reported in 176 U. S. 59, 44 L. ed. 371, 20 S. Ct. 307; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 1190. See People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109, 15 A.L.R. 1319. A workmen's compensation act which extends its protection to residents injured in other states while working under contracts entered into in the state, without extending the same protection to nonresidents working under similar contracts, violates the provision of the Federal Constitution entitling the citizens of each state to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 1190.

⁹Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 S. Ct. 935. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873.

¹⁰Blake v. McClung, 176 U. S. 59, 44 L. ed. 371, 20 S. Ct. 307, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165. Annotation: 23 L.R.A. 37 et seq.; 65 L.R.A. 354, 368. A preference in favor of resident creditors of a foreign corporation over a nonresident mortgagee, whose mortgage is not registered when their debts are created, and when such preference is not given them over a resident mortgagee, constitutes an illegal discrimination against the nonresident. Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 S. Ct. 935.

¹¹Davis v. Amra Grotto M. O. V. P. E. R. 169 Tenn. 564, 170 Tenn. 19, 89 S. W. (2d) 754, 91 S. W. (2d) 294, 106 A.L.R. 1506.

¹³Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317, 61 L. ed. 1163, 37 S. Ct. 638; Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 57 L. ed. 510, 33 S. Ct. 312; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667. Both judicial and legislative acts of a state in rebellion, which acts are hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government or which impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution of the United States, are invalid and void. Taylor v. Thomas, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 479, 22 L. ed. 789.

¹⁴State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285, 6 L.R.A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863.

and of Article ⁴, § ²,¹⁷ have reference to state action exclusively, and not to

conduct of individual persons.¹⁸ In all cases where the Constitution seeks to

not authorize direct legislation by Congress to regulate the conduct of citizens

and immunities of citizens of the United States.²⁰ The legislation authorized

laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings,² such impairment is simply

D. WHAT ARE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

§ 456. History and Definition.—

¹⁵Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; United States v. Har- ris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; McFadden v. Blocker, 3 Ind. Terr. 224, 54 S. W. 873, 58 L.R.A. 894. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 579. See CIVIL RIGHTS, Vol. 10, p. 901, § 8.

¹⁶Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; Hammer v. State,

¹⁷³Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 795, 140 Am. St. Rep. 248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. ed. 256, 16 S. Ct. 1138.

¹⁷United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 19 S. W. 1109, 16 L.R.A. 558, 33 Am. St. Rep. 527.

¹⁸United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629,

²⁷L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; Robison v. Fish- back, 175 Ind. 132, 93 N. E. 666, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1271; Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co. 114 Mo. 88, 21 S. W. 457, 19 L.R.A. 269; Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 19 S. W. 1109, 16 L.R.A. 558, 33 Am. St. Rep. 527. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 579.

²⁰Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; United States v. Har- ris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 579. The United States is without power to forbid and punish infractions by individ- uals of the right of citizens to reside peacefully in the several states, and to have free ingress into and egress from such states. Authority to deal with such wrongs is exclusively within the power reserved by the Federal Constitution to the states. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133.

Confederation, the corresponding provision is found in Article ², § ⁴, in the

⁴Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394.

⁸Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. (U. S.) 591, 15 L. ed. 497; Roby v. Smith, 131 Ind. 342, 30 N. E. 1093,

¹⁵L.R.A. 792, 31 Am. St. Rep. 439; State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 A. 723, L.R.A. 1917C, 528; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367,

⁵⁴P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789; Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N. W. 284, 94 A.L.R. 480. The court should not attempt a specific definition of such a broad provision of the Federal Constitution, not only involving matters of great delicacy and importance, but those which are furthermore of such a character that any merely abstract definition could scarcely be correct. Con- ner v. Elliott, 18 How. (U. S.) 591, 15 L. ed. 497.

¹⁵L. ed. 497; Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 795, 140 Am. St. Rep. 248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034; Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; Cofrode v. Circuit Judge, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623, 7 L.R.A. 511.

¹⁰Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mil. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 8 S. Ct. 737; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 19 L. ed. 357.

¹²Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 S. Ct. 516, 27 A.L.R. 27; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14. See Tashiro v. Jordan, 201 Cal. 236, 256 P. 545, 53 A.L.R. 1279.

¹³Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 46 L. ed. 196, 22 S. Ct. 213; Duncan v. Missouri,

¹⁵²U. S. 377, 38 L. ed. 485, 14 S. Ct. 570; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721; McPherson v. Blacker,

¹⁴⁶U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Ex parte Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519,

of.¹⁴ These privileges and immunities, arising out of United States citizenship, are the ones which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁵

§ 457. General Illustrations.—

The Supreme Court, in determining what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, has repeatedly adopted the statement of Mr. Justice Washington, stating that it feels no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are fundamental,16 which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments,17 and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several states which compose this Union from the time of their becoming

10 S. Ct. ⁹³⁰; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, ¹²⁵ U. S. ¹⁸¹, ³¹ L. ed. ⁶⁵⁰, ⁸ S. Ct. ⁷³⁷; Bunter City L. S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. ¹¹¹ U. S. ⁷⁴⁶, ²⁸ L. ed. ⁵⁸⁵, ⁴ S. Ct. ⁶⁵²; Paul v. Virginia, ⁸ Wall. (U. S.) ¹⁶⁸, ¹⁹ L. ed. ³⁵⁷; State ex rel. Hoadley v. Insurance Comrs. ³⁷ Fla. ⁵⁶⁴, ²⁰ So. ⁷⁷², ³³ L.R.A. ²⁸⁸; Robison v. Fishback, ¹⁷⁵ Ind. ¹³², ⁹³ N. E. ⁶⁶⁶, Ann. Cas. 1913B, ³³. But see State v. State, ¹⁷³ Ind. Am. St. E ⁸⁵⁰, ²⁴ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁷⁹⁵, ¹⁴⁰ Am. St. Rep. ²⁴⁸, ²¹ Ann. Cas. 1034; Com. v. Milton, ¹² B. Mon. (Ky.) ²¹², ⁵⁴ Am. Dec. ⁵²².

The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are those which arise out of the nature and essential character of the National Government, the provisions of its Constitution or its laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof; and it is these which are placed under the protection of Congress by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Slaughter-House Cases, ¹⁶ Wall. (U. S.) ³⁶, ²¹ L. ed. ³⁹⁴.

As to immunities guaranteed prior to the adoption of the civil rights amendments, first under the Articles of Confederation and later under the Federal Constitution, see CIVIL RIGHTS, Vol. ¹⁰, p. ⁸⁹⁵, § ².

14 McPherson v. Blacker, ¹⁴⁶ U. S. ¹, ³⁶ L. ed. ⁸⁶³, ¹³ S. Ct. ³; Slaughter-House Cases, ¹⁶ Wall. (U. S.) ³⁶, ²¹ L. ed. ³⁹⁴.

15 Hamilton v. University of California, ²⁹³ U. S. ²⁴⁵, ⁷⁹ L. ed. ³⁴³, ⁵⁵ S. Ct. ¹⁹⁷, rehearing denied in ²⁹³ U. S. ⁶³³, ⁷⁹ L. ed. ⁷¹⁷, ⁵⁵ S. Ct. ³⁴⁵; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, ²⁵⁹ U. S. ⁵³⁰, ⁶⁶ L. ed. 1044, ⁴² S. Ct. ⁵¹⁶, ²⁷ A.L.R. ²⁷; Ownbey v. Morgan, ²⁵⁶ U. S. ⁹⁴, ⁶⁵ L. ed. ⁸³⁷, ⁴¹ S. Ct. ⁴³³, ¹⁷ A.L.R. ⁸⁷³; Duncan v. Missouri, ¹⁵² U. S. ³⁷⁷, ³⁸ L. ed. ⁴⁸⁵, ¹⁴ S. Ct. ⁵⁷⁰; Re Kemmler, ¹³⁶ U. S. ⁴³⁶, ³⁴ L. ed. ⁵¹⁹, ¹⁰ S. Ct. ⁹³⁰; Slaughter-House Cases, ¹⁶ Wall. (U. S.) ³⁶, ²¹ L. ed. ³⁹⁴.

The "privileges and immunities" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution are only those that belong to citizens of the United States as distinguished from citizens of the state—those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States as contrasted with those that spring from other sources. Hamilton v. University of California, ²⁹³ U. S. ²⁴⁵, ⁷⁹ L. ed. ³⁴³, ⁵⁵ S. Ct. ¹⁹⁷.

16 United States v. Wheeler, ²⁵⁴ U. S. ²⁸¹, ⁶⁵ L. ed. ²⁷⁰, ⁴¹ S. Ct. ¹³³; Canadian N. R. Co. v. Eggen, ²⁵² U. S. ⁵⁵³, ⁶⁴ L. ed. ⁷¹³, ⁴⁰ S. Ct. ⁴⁰²; Hodges v. United States, ²⁰³ U. S. ¹, ⁵¹ L. ed. ⁶⁵, ²⁷ S. Ct. ⁶; Maxwell v. Dow, ¹⁷⁶ U. S. ⁵⁸¹, ⁴⁴ L. ed. ⁵⁹⁷, ²⁰ S. Ct. ⁴⁴⁸, ⁴⁹⁴; Blake v. McClung,

172 U. S. ²³⁹, ⁴³ L. ed. ⁴³², ¹⁹ S. Ct. ¹⁶⁵; McCready v. Virginia, ⁹⁴ U. S. ³⁹¹, ²⁴ L. ed. ²⁴⁸; Slaughter-House Cases, ¹⁶ Wall. (U. S.) ³⁶, ²¹ L. ed. ³⁹⁴; Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, ¹⁷⁴ Ga. ⁹⁹, ¹⁶² S. E. ⁴⁹⁷, ⁸⁷ A.L.R. ⁵⁰⁷, appeal dismissed in ²⁸⁹ U. S. ⁷⁰⁷, ⁷⁷ L. ed. 1269, ⁵² S. Ct. ⁴⁹⁵; State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. ¹²⁶ Minn. ⁵⁰¹, ¹⁴⁸ N. W. ⁴⁶³, Ann. Cas. 1915D, ¹⁹⁸; Bode v. Flynn, ²¹³ Wis. ⁵⁰⁹, ²⁵² N. W. ²⁸⁴, ⁹⁴ A.L.R. ⁴⁸⁰. See Rosa v. Portland, ⁸⁶ Or. ⁴³⁸ P. ⁸⁶⁵, L.R.A.1918B, ⁸⁵¹.

"This court has never attempted to formulate a comprehensive list of the rights included within the 'privileges and immunities' clause of the Constitution (Art. ⁴, § 2), but it has repeatedly approved as authoritative the statement by Mr. Justice Washington, in 1825, in Corfield v. Coryell, ⁴ Wash. C. C. ³⁷¹, ³⁸⁹, Fed. Cas. No. ³,²³⁰ (the first Federal case in which this clause considered), saying: 'We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental.'" Canadian N. R. Co. v. Eggen, ²⁵² U. S. ⁵⁵³, ⁶⁴ L. ed. ⁷¹³, ⁴⁰ S. Ct. ⁴⁰².

A right to accident insurance created within a state as an incident to certain contracts of employment is substantial in nature. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, ¹⁸⁴ Cal. ²⁶, ¹⁹² P. 1021, ¹² A.L.R. 1190, writ of error dismissed in ²⁵⁵ U. S. ⁴⁴⁵, ⁶⁵ L. ed. ⁷²³, ⁴¹ S. Ct. ³⁷³.

The provision of the Federal Constitution that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states applies to fundamental and universal rights, and not to special privileges. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Chambers, ⁷³ Ohio St. ¹⁶, ⁷⁶ N. E. ⁹¹, ¹¹ L.R.A.(N.S.) 1012, affirmed in ²⁰⁷ U. S. ¹⁴², ⁵² L. ed. ¹⁴³, ²⁸ S. Ct. ³⁴.

The privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are only those fundamental rights which all individuals enjoy alike, except in so far as they are all restrained alike. State v. Hunter, ¹⁶⁴ La. ⁴⁰⁵, ¹¹⁴ So. ⁷⁶, ⁵⁵ A.L.R. ³⁰⁹, affirmed in ²⁷⁵ U. S. ⁵⁰⁸, ⁷² L. ed. ³⁹⁸, ⁴⁸ S. Ct. ¹⁵⁸.

17 United States v. Wheeler, ²⁵⁴ U. S. ²⁸¹, ⁶⁵ L. ed. ²⁷⁰, ⁴¹ S. Ct. ¹³³; Hodges v. United States, ²⁰³ U. S. ¹, ⁵¹ L. ed. ⁶⁵, ²⁷ S. Ct. ⁶; Maxwell v. Dow, ¹⁷⁶ U. S. ⁵⁸¹, ⁴⁴ L. ed. ⁵⁹⁷, ²⁰ S. Ct. ⁴⁴⁸, ⁴⁹⁴; Blake v. McClung, ¹⁷² U. S. ²³⁹, ⁴³ L. ed. ⁴³², ¹⁹ S. Ct. ¹⁶⁵; Slaughter-House Cases, ¹⁶ Wall. (U. S.) ³⁶, ²¹ L. ed. ³⁹⁴; Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, ¹⁷⁴ Ga. ⁹⁹, ¹⁶² S. E. ⁴⁹⁷, ⁸⁷ A.L.R. ⁵⁰⁷; State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. ¹²⁶ Minn. ⁵⁰¹, ¹⁴⁸ N. W. ⁴⁶³, Ann. Cas. 1915D, ¹⁹⁸.

free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under the following general heads: "Protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole."¹⁸ They have always been held to be the class of rights which the state governments were created to establish and secure.¹⁹ The court has pointed out, furthermore, that the words "privileges and immunities," as used in Article ⁴, § ², of the Constitution are words of very comprehensive meaning.²⁰

The Supreme Court of the United States has pointed out in numerous cases that Article ⁴, § ², plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any other state of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation,¹ to acquire personal property, to take and hold real estate, to protect and defend such property in law,² to maintain actions in the courts of a state together with the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the enforcement of other personal rights,³ and to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises than are imposed by a state upon its own citizens.⁴

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is essential to determine what constitutes the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States. It is settled that a citizen has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim which he may have upon that government, to transact any business which he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its seaports through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the subtreasury, to the land offices, and to the revenue offices.⁵ Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Federal Government on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government.⁶ There can be no doubt of this or that the right depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States. The right to assemble peaceably and petition for redress of grievances and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several states, and all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a state.

¹⁸United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133; Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 S. Ct. 578; Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 65, 27 S. Ct. 6; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, 174 Ga. 99, 162 S. E. 497, 87 A.L.R. 507. The privilege of a citizen is the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 63 L. ed. 362, 39 S. Ct. 160. As to right to acquire and possess property, see infra, § 460.

¹⁹Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394.

⁵Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 18 L. ed. 745.

⁶Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158.

Another of these privileges is conferred by the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any state of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that state. To all these may also be added the rights secured by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and by the other clauses of the Fourteenth.⁷ Other privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment include the right to serve on juries, both petit8 and grand,⁹ to serve as witnesses,¹⁰ to enter the public lands of the United States,¹¹ and to demand protection from the Federal Government while subject to a Federal agency, as, for example, while in the custody of a United States Marshal.¹² The right of a citizen of the United States resident in one state to contract in another may be a liberty safeguarded by the due process of law clause and at the same time a privilege protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹³

§ 458. Distinction between Fundamental Rights of Persons and Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship.—

The inherent and inalienable rights which are common to all persons who are members of a civilized society from the complexity of human relationships include a great variety of social prerogatives. In so far as it is possible for the purpose of comparison to reduce such rights to a class, they may be said to include generically those rights which are essential to individual freedom, to the pursuit of happiness and the ability to gain a livelihood, and to acquire possessions.14 It has frequently been said that all men have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.15 These fundamental rights appear to be distinct from the privileges and immunities of citizens as such, possess characteristics peculiar to themselves, and have received separate consideration.16 In accordance with these distinctions the courts generally recognize that there are certain fundamental rights of every person, which, of course, includes every citizen, and that a statute which violates any of these rights is unconstitutional and void, even though the enactment thereof is not expressly forbidden.17 Artificial or remedial rights are contradistinguished from these and include such rights as that of citizenship

⁷Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394. See Re Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676. As to the writ of habeas corpus as a distinct privilege and immunity of national citizenship, see Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158. As to the right to assemble and petition, see Vol. 11, p. 1118, § 325.

⁸Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110, 27 L. ed. 354, 1 S. Ct. 625; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. ed. 664. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 581.

⁹Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110, 27 L. ed. 354, 1 S. Ct. 625; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Re Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 581.

¹¹Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 28 L. ed. 673, 5 S. Ct. 35.

¹²Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429, 12 S. Ct. 617.

¹³Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54. As to liberty of contract generally, see Vol. 11, p. 1153, § 339.

¹⁷Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N. E. 1126, 14 L.R.A. 325, 31 Am. St. Rep. 533; Jordon v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. Rep. 531, 103 S. W. 633, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 603, 14 Ann. Cas. 618. See Vol. 11, p. 897, § 194; p. 1131, §§ 328 et seq.

itself, the right to vote, and the right to the particular methods of procedure pointed out in the Constitution which are peculiar to our jurisprudence.¹⁸ It has been pointed out, in a case in which citizenship was being considered from the standpoint of excluding aliens from public works, that whatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship.¹⁹

§ 459. Removal from One State to Another.—

In all the states, from the beginning down to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent authority in the states to forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right.20 The authority which the several states possessed prior to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation to deal with infractions of the right of free residence, ingress, and egress was reserved to the states by Article 4 of such Articles of Confederation, with a limitation inhibiting the power from being used to discriminate.1 Such limitation as to discrimination, imposed upon the several states by Article 4 of the Articles of Confederation when dealing with infractions of the right of free residence, ingress, and egress, was preserved and enforced by Article 4, § 2, of the Federal Constitution, thus necessarily assuming the continued possession by the states of the reserved power to deal with this subject.2

The rule is firmly settled that not only by virtue of Article ⁴, § ², but also because of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any other state of the Union or to reside therein for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation is secured and protected.³ Accordingly, a state law providing for the levying and collection of a capitation tax on every person leaving the state by any railroad or stagecoach, to be paid by the transportation company, is illegal.⁴ A tax on emigrant agents who hire persons in a state to be employed in another state is not, however, an impairment of the right of a citizen to move from one state to another or an abridgment of his privileges or immunities as a citizen of the United States.⁵ A state cannot make it a crime for anyone to come into such state after committing an offense in another, since the immunities and privileges of citizenship in-

¹⁹People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, L.R.A.1916D, 550, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254, affirmed in 239 U. S. 195, 60 L. ed. 218, 36 S. Ct. 85.

³Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 71 L. ed. 1091, 47 S. Ct. 632; United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 S. Ct. 221; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 45 L. ed. 186, 21 S. Ct. 128; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 18 L. ed. 745; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158; Roby v. Smith, 131 Ind. 342, 30 N. E. 1093, 15 L.R.A. 792, 31 Am. St. Rep. 439; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789; Sprague v. Fletcher, 69 Vt. 69, 37 A. 239, 37 L.R.A. 840; Bussell v. Gill, 58 Wash. 468, 108 P. 1080, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1070. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 580.

⁵Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 45 L. ed. 186, 21 S. Ct. 128; State v. Hunt, 129 N. C. 686, 40 S. E. 216, 85 Am. St. Rep.

§ 460. Acquisition of Property.—

Under Article 4, § 2, of the Federal Constitution and under the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth

another state a policy insuring his life.⁹ Legislation of one state denying the

property are subject, however, to such restraints as a state may justly prescribe for the general welfare.¹¹ Hence, no privileges or immunities of

⁶State v. Cutshall, 110 N. C. 538, 15 S. E. 261, 16 L.R.A. 130. 6ᵃ See EXTRADITION [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 720, § 10].

⁷United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 S. Ct. 133; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; Maxwell v. Bugbee,

²⁵⁰U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Murchie-Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 S. Ct. 578; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. ed. 716; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158; Marallis v. Chicago,

³⁴⁹Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38, 46 N. E. 339, 37 L.R.A. 64, 62 Am. St. Rep. 487; Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 P. 137, 13 L.R.A. 282; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789; Sprague v. Fletcher, 69 Vt. 69, 37 A. 239, 37 L.R.A. 840. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 582.

⁸Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Maxwell v. Dow,

¹⁷⁶U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Russell v. Gill, 58 Wash. 468, 108 P. 1080, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1076. Discrimination between sheep brought into the state and those which are already therein, made by Idaho Sess. Laws 1895, p. 125, and Idaho Sess. Laws 1897, p. 115, requiring all sheep, whether healthy or not, to be dipped before they are brought into the state at any time of year, while sheep within the state are exempt from dipping between December 1 and the time when they are sheared in the following spring, and also exempting ewes with lambs between March 15 and May 15, constitutes a violation of the equal privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. State v. Duckworth, 5 Idaho, 642,

⁹Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

¹¹Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. 258 U. S. 314, 66 L. ed. 635, 42 S. Ct. 358, 20 A.L.R. 1326; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158.

¹²Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 32 L. ed. 695, 9 S. Ct. 277. The privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states are not denied by the provisions of Colo. Sess. Laws 1885, p. 335, for the protection of domestic cattle against the communication of disease by cattle from other states where the statute is equally applicable to citizens of all states. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 47 L. ed. 108, 23 S. Ct. 92.

¹⁴Ferry v. Corbett, 258 U. S. 609, 66 L. ed. 783, 42 S. Ct. 381; Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co. 258 U. S. 314, 66 L. ed. 635, 42 S. Ct. 358, 20 A.L.R. 1326. There is no unconstitutional discrimination against a nonresident widow under the Fourteenth Amendment, in the making of a conveyance by her husband of his property sufficient to cut off her interest if she was not then and never had been a resident of the state. Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 P. 137, 13 L.R.A. 282.

therein acquired are not privileges and immunities. Hence, a statute attaching such gains only to contracts of marriage within the state is not unconstitutional.¹⁵ On the other hand, if the right of a husband, a citizen of a

taken by the laws of the state, to disturb in such a manner which is forbidden as to the property of its own citizens the same property rights of a

bringing his property with him is clearly to abridge his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States.¹⁶ Hence, a statute enlarging

separate property if acquired while domiciled in the state, is unconstitutional.¹⁷

§ 461. Pursuit of Occupations.—

callings of life is one of the privileges of a citizen of the United States.¹⁸

citizens of other states from carrying on legitimate business within its borders

like its own citizens.¹⁹ Moreover, the right of a citizen of the United States

is not absolute. It includes only the right to pursue any lawful calling without

¹⁵L. ed. 497. The law of Louisiana, providing that persons married within the state or coming into the state after marriage to reside and acquiring property therein shall be nuptial partners as to the property so acquired and leaving their rights respecting such property, where the marriage takes place outside the state and the domicil of the parties continues outside the state, to be regulated by the law of the place of such domicil discriminates between contracts only, and not between citizens of the state and other states. Ibid.

¹⁸Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124,

⁴⁰S. Ct. 2; La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 63 L. ed. 362, 39 S. Ct. 160; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 S. Ct. 652; Chicago v. Kautz, 313 Ill. 196, 144 N. E. 805, 35 A.L.R. 1050; Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38, 46 N. E. 339, 37 L.R.A. 644, 62 Am. St. Rep. 487; Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co. 182 N. Y. 83, 74 N. E. 561,

⁷⁰L.R.A. 722, 108 Am. St. Rep. 790; State v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 P. 851, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 674, 114 Am. St. Rep. 114, 7 Ann. Cas. 577. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253, 8 S. Ct. 992, 1257. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 582.

¹⁹Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 S. Ct. 221; Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. 214 Iowa, 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308. Under the Federal Constitution, a citizen of one state is guaranteed the right to enjoy in all the states equality of commercial privileges with their citizens; but he cannot have his chief office in every one of them. Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 S. Ct. 366.

²⁰Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54.

³⁴L. ed. 620, 11 S. Ct. 13; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120, 37 So. 332, 67 L.R.A. 286, 109 Am. St. Rep. 23,

³Ann. Cas. 319; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Schmaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co. 182 N. Y. 83, 74 N. E. 561, 70 L.R.A. 722, 108 Am. St. Rep. 790; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; State v. Moore,

¹¹³N. C. 697, 18 S. E. 342, 22 L.R.A. 472. Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are not unconstitutionally abridged by the provisions of a state statute which, as construed by the highest court of the state, make it a criminal offense for a dealer or collector of junk, metals, or secondhand materials to buy or receive any stolen wire, cable, copper, lead, solder, iron, or brass used by, or belonging to, a railroad, telephone, telegraph, gas, or electric light company without making

sonable conditions upon the citizens of a foreign state who seek to do business within its borders, especially when like conditions are imposed upon its own citizens.² Moreover, the constitutional provisions as to equal privileges and immunities do not prevent the exclusion of certain classes of peddlers from the streets while permitting other classes to use them, since the right to use the streets for the prosecution of private business is not one of the privileges of citizenship.³

In some cases the extreme position has been taken that a calling or occupation which, although lawful, is subject to abuse and is likely to become injurious to the community may be limited to a state's own residents and the right denied to all others without violating Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution.⁴ Admission to professions may also be regulated without violation of the privileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution.⁵ For example, although it is true that the practice of law is a lawful occupation in itself, it is also well established that it is not a natural right or a right guaranteed by the Constitution, but a privilege granted by the state and one which may be surrounded with whatever restrictions the legislature may in reason prescribe.⁶ Likewise, the privileges and immunities of national citizenship do not include the right to practice medicine.⁷

§ 462. Freedom from Discriminatory Taxation.—

The general rule is well settled that a citizen coming into a state has a right to be exempt from taxes or excises which are higher than those imposed by the state on its own citizens.8 A general taxing scheme which discriminates against all non-

diligent inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether the person selling or delivering it has a legal right to do so. Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212, 33 S. Ct. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71. Privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states are not abridged, contrary to U. S. Const. Art. 4, § 2, by the provisions of a state statute that only citizens of the United States may be employed in the construction of public works by or for the state or a municipality, and that in such employment citizens of the state must be given preference. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 60 L. ed. 206, 36 S. Ct. 78, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 287. See Vol. 11, p. 1147, § 336.

²Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. 214 Iowa, 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308.

⁴Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149 N. W. 9, L.R.A.1915B, 151. As to licensing statutes, see infra, § 463.

⁶Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116, 38 L. ed. 929, 14 S. Ct. 1082; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 130, 21 L. ed. 442; State v. Rossman, 53 Wash. 1, 101 P. 357, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821, 17 Ann. Cas. 625. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 581; 25 Am. St. Rep. 372. The right to practice law in the state courts is not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The power of a state to prescribe qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is un- affected by that amendment. Re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116, 38 L. ed. 929, 14 S. Ct. 1082; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 130, 21 L. ed. 442. See ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Vol. 5, p. 274, §§ 21, 22.

⁷Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610; State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L.R.A. 252. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 346; 14 L.R.A. 581; 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 284. A dentist who has practiced for years in one state does not thereby acquire a right to practice in another state, for the practice of dentistry is not a privilege of United States citizenship. People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L.R.A. 1915D, 538. A statute to secure the possession of requisite skill and learning by practitioners of medicine, surgery, and dentistry which excepts from its provisions persons who have practiced their professions in the place of their present residence for a certain time and also physicians residing outside the state and called into the state for consultation or to attend patients in the regular course of business is unconstitutional in discriminating between persons engaged in the same business or profession and also in discriminating against citizens of other states. State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, 18 A. 878, 5 L.R.A. 709. See PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 353, §§ 3 et seq.].

⁸Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 S. Ct. 221; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522,

residents has the necessary effect of including in the discrimination those who are citizens of other states; and if there is no reasonable ground for the diversity of treatment, such a scheme abridges the privileges and immunities to which such citizens are entitled.⁹ The business of nonresidents, however, may be required to make a ratable contribution in taxes for the support of a state government. The very fact that a citizen of one state has the right to hold property or carry on an occupation or business in another state is a very reasonable ground for subjecting such nonresident, though not personally, yet to the extent of his property held or his occupation or business carried on therein, to a duty to pay taxes not more onerous in effect than those imposed under like circumstances upon citizens of the latter state.¹⁰

§ 463. Freedom from Discriminatory License Laws.11—

It is a general rule that license legislation which discriminates against nonresidents, including in that class only noncitizens, either by refusing to grant licenses to them or by granting such licenses on terms different from those upon which they are granted to residents, as by charging such nonresidents a higher fee or adding other burdens, where not actually required under the police power for the protection of local citizens, is unconstitutional and void because, generally speaking, it denies to citizens of other states the privileges and immunities of citizens of the state enacting the license legislation, contrary to Article 4, § 2, of the Constitution, and moreover in some instances abridges privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.12 This rule is subject to two well-recognized exceptions: (1) Licenses to sell intoxicating liquor, and (2) licenses to hunt, fish, or trap.13 The discrimination in the case of hunting and fishing licenses is sometimes justified under the police power, but oftener on the ground that game, fish, and furbearing animals when not reduced to possession belong to the state, as a part of its natural resources, which it can protect and save for its own citizens.14

Statutes requiring licenses to engage in various types of occupations graphically illustrate the principles involved in the general rule hereinabove

⁶³L. ed. 748, 39 S. Ct. 366; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449; People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109, 15 A.L.R. 1319; Sprague v. Fletcher, 69 Vt. 69, 37 A. 239, 37 L.R.A. 840.

¹⁰Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 S. Ct. 221; People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109, 15 A.L.R. 1319. See State ex rel. Bolens v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673, 135 N. W. 164, L.R.A.1915B, 569, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1147, writ of error dismissed in 231 U. S. 616, 58 L. ed. 400, 34 S. Ct. 272. Annotation: 15 A.L.R. 1331.

¹¹As to persons subject to license laws, generally, see LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 488, §§ 15 et seq.].

¹²Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 337; 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 281. An unconstitutional discrimination in favor of citizens of Tennessee as against those of other states, forbidden by U. S. Const. Art. 4, § 2, results from the pro- vision of an act under which an annual license tax of $100 in each county is imposed upon a person engaged in railway construction work in Tennessee who has his chief office outside the state, while a person engaged in the same business, but having his chief office within the state, pays an annual tax of only $25 in each county. Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 S. Ct. 366. A requirement that only agents who sell trees grown in other states must carry duplicates of the principal's permit illegally discriminates between resident and nonresident dealers. Ex parte Hawley (State ex rel. Hawley v. Nelson) 22 S. D. 23, 115 N. W. 93, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 138. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 348; 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 290.

¹³Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 338; 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 284, 285. As to the sale of intoxicating liquor, see infra, § 467. As to hunting and fishing, see infra, § 465.

¹⁴Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 338; 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 285. See infra, § 465. [12 Am. Jur.]—8 113

stated.¹⁵ In a very early case the Supreme Court stated the broad rule that a citizen of one state may lawfully sell, offer, or expose for sale, within any other state, any goods which the permanent residents of the latter state might sell, offer, or expose for sale, without being subjected to any higher license tax than that exacted by law of such permanent residents.¹⁶ The test is whether there is any discrimination in favor of citizens of the state enacting the licensing law over citizens of other states; such discrimination between citizens is fatal.¹⁷ Many license laws imposing upon such nonresident vendors as are noncitizens of the state conditions different from those imposed upon residents, where the term "residents" means only citizens of the enacting state, have been declared unconstitutional because they abridge the privileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution.¹⁸ Thus, a state statute requiring a license to engage in peddling and giving such license only to persons who have resided in the state for one year is unconstitutional as discriminating against nonresidents.¹⁹ State statutes requiring licenses from peddlers or itinerant vendors have been held unconstitutional and void as violating Article ⁴, § ², of the United States Constitution where they exempted from the payment of the license fee manufacturers who had paid taxes on capital employed,²⁰ farmers peddling their products,¹ citizens of a county selling products of their own growth or manufacture and merchants having a regular place of business in the county,² residents of a particular county and adjoining counties,³ citizens of the state,⁴ and persons having a permanent place of business.⁵

A borough ordinance which discriminates against nonresidents by prohibiting all persons from peddling or selling goods from house to house without a license, which is fixed at so high a figure that it amounts to prohibition, but which excepts residents of the borough from its provisions, is void. The borough can have no better right to adopt discriminating trade regulations than the state has. Sayre v. Phillips, ¹⁴⁸ Pa. ⁴⁸², ²⁴ A. ⁷⁶, ¹⁶ L.R.A. ⁴⁹, ³³ Am. St. Rep. ⁸⁴². Annotation: ¹⁶ L.R.A. ⁴⁹.

A state statute imposing a heavy license tax upon the right to canvass from house to house for a certain limited number of articles not produced or manufactured within the state, which articles are not injurious to health or morals, for the apparent purpose of favoring resident merchants with established places of business violates the provisions of the Federal Constitution against abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. State v. Bayer, ³⁴ Utah, ²⁵⁷, ⁹⁷ P. ¹²⁹, ¹⁹ L.R.A.(N.S.) ²⁹⁷.

¹⁶Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449. See also Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 S. Ct. 366; Re Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 122 Kan. 33, 250 P. 1056, 1057, 61 A.L.R. 332. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 350. A statute fixing the price of licenses for the sale of lightning rods at $100 to citizens of the state and $500 to citizens of other states is a discrimination prohibited by U. S. Const. Art. 4, § 2. State v. Wiggin, 64 N. H. 508, 15 A. 128, 1 L.R.A. 56.

¹⁸Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 Ill. 284, 42 N. E. 837, 31 L.R.A. 522 (semble). Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 342, 343; 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 286 et seq. A statute providing for the licensing of itinerant vendors and defining an itinerant vendor as any person who engages either as principal or agent in a temporary or transient business in the state either in one locality, or in traveling about the country or from place to place, selling manufactured goods, wares, or merchandise violates Art. 4, § 2, of the Federal Constitution, since a citizen of another state who has no permanent place of business therein is inhibited from selling his manufactured articles to consumers in the state, except by payment of a license fee, if he seeks and secures such customers in a manner which would make him an itinerant vendor as defined by the act, while the citizen and resident of the state with a permanent place of business therein is exempted from its operation. Annotation is 61 A.L.R. 342; 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 287.

⁴Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 342. A municipal ordinance requiring a license to peddle violates Art. 4, § 2, of the United States Constitution where it exempts citizens of the city. Grafty v. Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 8 N. E. 609, 57 Am. Rep. 128. A municipal ordinance which imposes a higher license tax upon sellers whose principal place of business is not within the

In some cases license laws, the effect of which upon a casual inspection indicates an imposition of burdens upon nonresidents different from those imposed upon resident citizens, have been sustained; such statutes, however, upon careful analysis disclose the distinguishing factor that they affect the business to be carried on in the state, the place where the business is done or the service is rendered, or the exemption of merchandise itself which is locally manufactured or sold, and do not actually discriminate between nonresidents, including in that class only noncitizens, and citizens of the state enacting the license law.⁶ For example, it has been held that a statute which, for the purpose of revenue, imposes taxes on occupations and punishes a failure to take out a license as a misdemeanor is not rendered obnoxious to Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution by the passage of another statute providing that it shall be lawful for all persons to peddle and sell without a license all things made or manufactured in the state, since it is within the power of the state to exempt from taxation manufacturers within its borders.⁷ Similarly, a state statute imposing an annual license fee upon all sellers of merchandise in the state, the amount of which is determined by the sum of a merchant's purchases during the year, does not violate the privileges and immunities clause because it excludes such manufacturers as are taxed on capital by the state who offer for sale at the place of manufacture goods manufactured by themselves.⁸ The cases dealing with the licensing of insurance agents well illustrate the principles involved in licensing laws as affected by the constitutional provisions pertaining to privileges and immunities of citizens.⁹ The regulation of the conduct of insurance agents is within the power of a state. Thus, persons desiring to act as such agents may be compelled to be licensed before being permitted to engage in such business.¹⁰

city violates U. S. Const. Art. ⁴, § ², even though the discrimination includes not only nonresidents of the state, but also residents of the state who are nonresidents of the city. Annotation: ⁶¹ A.L.R. ³⁴⁵. This decision seems to go too far if based solely upon Art. ⁴, § ², because under that article a state is not forbidden to abridge privileges and immunities of citizens generally. That article merely guarantees that privileges or immunities which a state grants to its own citizens are secured to citizens of other states. It does not prevent a state from denying privileges to its own citizens (see supra, §§ ⁴⁴⁷, 449) or from also denying such privileges to citizens of other states which it denies to its own citizens, since citizens of other states are guaranteed equal privileges and immunities, but not immunities and privileges greater than those of citizens of the state. See supra, §§ ⁴⁴⁷, ⁴⁴⁹. Such an ordinance, however, might be logically declared invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. It affects the ordinary sale of ordinary articles. The carrying on of an ordinary business is a privilege or immunity arising out of United States citizenship (see supra, § 461); and under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state can abridge a privilege of United States citizens, including, under the present view of the law, as laid down in Colgate v. Harvey, ²⁹⁶ U. S. ⁴⁰⁴, ⁸⁰ L. ed. ²⁹⁹, ⁵⁶ S. Ct. ²⁵², ¹⁰² A.L.R. ⁵⁴ (see supra, § ⁴⁴⁹, notes 2-6) not only privileges of United States citizens belonging to citizens of other states, but such privileges of citizens of its own state. Hence, if the imposition of a license fee would interfere with the ordinary business of selling to the extent of abridging a privilege of United States citizenship,—an assumption which probably would not, however, be borne out by the courts in the usual case,—an ordinance imposing it might be held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even though it would apply not only to citizens or residents of other states, but also to citizens or residents of its own state not having a principal place of business within the city.

5 Leonard v. Reed, ⁴⁶ Colo. ³⁰⁷, ¹⁰⁴ P. ⁴¹⁰, ¹³³ Am. St. Rep. ⁷⁷.

6 See Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, ¹⁷⁴ Ga. ⁹⁹, ¹⁵² S. E. ⁴⁹⁷, ⁸⁷ A.L.R. ⁵⁰⁷, appeal dismissed in ²⁸⁶ U. S. ⁵²⁶, ⁷⁶ L. ed. 1269, ⁵² S. Ct. ⁴⁹⁵, as to different burden imposed upon that part of business carried on outside the city.

In Sears v. Warren County, ³⁶ Ind. ²⁶⁷, ¹⁰ Am. Rep. ⁶², it was held that a statute requiring a license fee to be paid by traveling merchants and peddlers not residents of the state was not in conflict with the privileges and immunities clause, upon the ground that the tax was not on the person or property of nonresidents, but on a particular business carried on in the state.

8 Armour & Co. v. Virginia, ²⁴⁶ U. S. ¹, ⁶² L. ed. ⁵⁴⁷, ³⁸ S. Ct. ²⁶⁷.

States or as denying equal privileges to citizens of other states because of this

states, no discrimination against citizens of other states, contrary to Article ⁴,

§ ², of the Constitution, has been created.¹² Elsewhere it has been held that

confining the right to act as agent for foreign insurance companies to residents

nities of citizens of other states, since corporations are not within the protec-

citizens of other states created by a statute declaring it to be unlawful for any

the insurance commissioner.¹⁴ Other similar laws pertaining to insurance have

been held valid. Thus, a state statute requiring a $⁵⁰⁰ fee from a foreign in-

located within a city, and those only, to pay a tax and procure a license before

since it relates directly to, and deals with, the individual representative.¹⁶

$¹⁵⁰,⁰⁰⁰ invested in a specified manner, without requiring any such property

viduals, violates Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution.¹⁷ It has frequent-

ly been held that where an occupation is so related to the public health, safety,

¹¹La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 63 L. ed. 362, 39 S. Ct. 160; Cook v. Howland, 74 Vt. 393, 52 A. 973, 59 L.R.A. 338, 93 Am. St. Rep. 912. Annotation: 36 A.L.R. 1514; 61 A.L.R. 349.

¹³Herbring v. Lee, 126 Or. 588, 269 P. 236, 60 A.L.R. 1165, affirmed in 280 U. S. 111, 74 L. ed. 217, 56 S. Ct. 49, 64 U. S. 1430; Cook v. Howland, 74 Vt. 393, 52 A. 973, 59 L.R.A. 338, 93 Am. St. Rep. 912.

¹⁵Herbring v. Lee, 280 U. S. 111, 74 L. ed. 217, 50 S. Ct. 49, 64 A.L.R. 1430, affirming

¹⁶Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 14 S. W. 369, 9 L.R.A. 556, 29 Am. St. Rep.

³⁹⁸(invalidated not on privileges and im- munities clause, but as an ordinance un- reasonable because of discrimination).

¹⁷State ex rel. Hoadley v. Insurance Comrs. 37 Fla. 564, 20 So. 772, 33 L.R.A. 288.

no natural right to sell them as agent.²⁰ The same reasoning has prevailed in

§ 464. Access to Courts.—

ship is included the right of access to courts,² for the purpose of bringing and

¹⁸Annotation: 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 281. As to the effect of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally in relation to the exercise of police power by the states, see supra, § 449.

¹⁹Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149 N. W. 9, L.R.A.1915B, 151. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 346.

²⁰State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 A. 723, L.R.A.1917C, 528. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 348.

²McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 292 U. S. 230, 78 L. ed. 1227, 54 S. Ct. 690, re- hearing denied in 292 U. S. 613, 78 L. ed. 1472, 54 S. Ct. 855; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co. 257 U. S. 533, 66 L. ed. 354, 42 S. Ct. 210; Barbier v. Con- nolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Ward v. Maryland,

¹²Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Cran- dall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 18 L. ed. 745; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422,

¹⁸²N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Jones v. Chi- cago, E. I. & P. R. Co. 231 Ill. 302, 83 N. E. 215, 121 Am. St. Rep. 313; Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862, 59 L.R.A. 190; Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623, 7 L.R.A. 511; State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 198; State v. Penn- oyer, 65 N. H. 113, 18 A. 878, 5 L.R.A. 709; Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N. W. 284,

⁹⁴A.L.R. 480. See also State ex rel. Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N. E. 808, 74 A.L.R. 631. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 533. The privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution requires a state to accord to citizens of other states sub- stantially the same right of access to its courts as it accords to its own citizens. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 292 U. S. 230, 78 L. ed. 1227, 54 S. Ct. 690, re- hearing denied in 292 U. S. 613, 78 L. ed. 1472, 54 S. Ct. 855.

³Canadian N. R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 64 L. ed. 713, 40 S. Ct. 402; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 S. Ct. 228; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538,

¹⁰S. Ct. 269; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418, 20 L. ed. 449; People v. Bray,

¹⁰⁵Cal. 344, 38 P. 731, 27 L.R.A. 158; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789.

⁴Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Holbrook v. Ford,

¹⁵³Ill. 633, 39 N. E. 1091, 27 L.R.A. 324, 46 Am. St. Rep. 917; Bussell v. Gill, 58 Wash. 468, 108 P. 1080, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1070; Brower v. Watson, 146 Tenn. 626, 244 S. W. 362, 26 A.L.R. 982 (recognizing rule as to an ordinary action brought in one state to enforce a right of action accruing else- where); Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789.

⁵Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, Gil. 1, 82 Am. Dec. 65. A statute making it a crime to send any chose in action out of the state for the purpose of suit thereon and of having garnishments or other process issued against the wages of a resident of the state and served upon any person indebted to him for wages who is subject to the processes of the courts of the state is in violation of the provisions of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United

the right to sue and defend in the courts is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship and must be allowed by each state to the citizens of all other states to the precise extent that it is allowed to its own citizens. Equality of treatment in this respect is not left to depend upon the comity between the states,⁶ but is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.⁷ If the state provides a court to which its own citizens may resort in a certain class of cases, citizens of other states of the Union also will have a right to resort to it in cases of the same class.⁸

A distinction not based on the citizenship of prospective litigants does not violate Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution.⁹ If a wrongful death action is given to the widow or personal representatives of a decedent, a statute—as construed by the state court of last resort—which permits wrongful death actions in the forum only if the decedent was a resident of such forum does not violate any privileges and immunities of citizens forbidden to bring such an action, in such an instance in which the decedent was not a citizen of the state; the discrimination is based solely on the citizenship of the deceased, and as far as the parties to the litigation are concerned, there is no discrimination based on citizenship, because the courts are open to plaintiffs who are residents of other states if the deceased was a resident of the forum and are closed to plaintiffs who actually are citizens of the forum if the decedent was a citizen of another state.¹⁰

The effect of the privileges and immunities clause in relation to access to the courts has been raised most often in those cases in which courts have sought to decline jurisdiction of transitory actions in which the plaintiff or both of the parties are nonresidents of the forum.¹¹ The position has generally been taken that under Article ⁴, § ², a state court may not decline to entertain an action by a citizen of another state, even though the cause of action arose outside the state of suit and although the defendant is also a noncitizen, unless the circumstances of the case are such that the court would also decline the action if brought by a citizen of the state of suit.¹² A more difficult ques-

States. Re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125, 57 S. W. 545, 51 L.R.A. 176, 80 Am. St. Rep. 619.

⁶Chambers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34; State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 198; Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 P. 681, L.R.A.1916A, 432; Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N. W. 284, 94 A.L.R. 480. See also State use of Strepay v. Cohen, 166 Md. 682, 172 A. 274, 94 A.L.R. 427.

⁷Chambers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34; Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623, 7 L.R.A. 511; State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 198; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789; Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N. W. 284, 94 A.L.R. 480. See also Life & C. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566, 78 L. ed. 987, 54 S. Ct. 482, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 600, 78 L. ed. 1464, 54 S. Ct. 627; Life & C. Ins. Co. v. Barefield, 291 U. S. 515, 78 L. ed. 999, 54 S. Ct. 436, rehearing denied 292 U. S. 600, 78 L. ed. 1464, 54 S. Ct. 627.

⁸Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. 191 U. S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 S. Ct. 92.

⁹Chambers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34.

¹¹For a general discussion of the power of the courts to decline jurisdiction of actions involving nonresidents, see COURTS [Also 7 R. C. L. p. 1035, § 65].

¹²Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623, 7 L.R.A. 511; State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 198; Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 714, 47 Am. Dec. 190; Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co. 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664, 34 L.R.A. 503, 59 Am. St. Rep. 859. See also Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 P. 681, L.R.A.1916A, 432. Annotation: 32 A.L.R. 12. The refusal of a court to entertain jurisdiction of an action brought in Minnesota by a citizen of Iowa, upon a transitory cause of action for a tort committed there, against a railroad company incorporated in Illinois which has a line of railway in Iowa and Minnesota, does business in each, and is subject to the service of process and jurisdiction in each, is violative of the U. S. Const. Art. 4, § 2. State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 198. There is considerable conflict of authority or at least uncertainty as to the extent to which the constitutional guaranty of the

tion arises as to whether the constitutional guaranty in effect prevents a discrimination, not only on the basis of difference of citizenship, but also on the basis of difference of residence; in other words, whether a court which may not, merely because the plaintiff is a citizen of another state, refuse to entertain an action on a foreign tort which it would entertain if the plaintiff were a citizen of the forum, may nevertheless refuse to entertain the action, not because the plaintiff is a citizen of another state, but because he is a resident of another state.¹³ In a case in which the trial court refused to assume jurisdiction of an action where the facts actually were that both parties were nonresidents, the state supreme court held that such refusal violated the privileges and immunities clause. Any specific distinctions which might exist between nonresidents and noncitizens were not discussed, the court stating broadly that such refusal violated the privileges of citizens. The consideration that nonresidents may include both citizens and noncitizens was not raised or discussed.¹⁴ It has been held elsewhere that the power of a court in its discretion to decline jurisdiction of a foreign transitory nonstatutory tort action the parties to which are nonresidents, although citizens of another state, is not denied to the state courts by Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution.¹⁵ One theory of the courts following this view is that the right of a nonresident to sue on a parity with residents in the courts of a state is not one of the privileges and immunities granted to citizens of the several states by the Federal Constitution, since nonresidents may include not only noncitizens but citizens.¹⁶ Hence, the provisions of Article ⁴, § ², are not violated by a state statute making it discretionary with the courts to entertain an action by a nonresident of the state against a foreign corporation doing business in the state, such statute being applicable alike to nonresident citizens and nonresident noncitizens.¹⁷ The Supreme Court has also said: "From very early in our history, requirements have been imposed upon nonresidents in many, perhaps in all, of the states, as a condition of resorting to their courts, which have not been im-

privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states operates as a limitation of the power of a court, in the exercise of its discretion, to refuse to entertain actions by citizens and residents of other states based on torts occurring beyond the forum; but it may be observed at this point that even in the view most unfavorable to the right to decline jurisdiction, it does not interfere with the right of the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to decline jurisdiction of such an action on grounds other than the noncitizenship or nonresidence at the forum, assuming, at least, that jurisdiction of an action by a citizen and resident of the forum would be declined in circumstances otherwise the same. Annotation: 32 A.L.R. 13.

¹⁴Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co. 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664, 34 L.R.A. 503, 59 Am. St. Rep. 859. See also Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623, 7 L.R.A. 511; State ex rel. Prall v. District Ct. 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 198. Annotation: 32 A.L.R. 16 et seq.

¹⁵Annotation: 32 A.L.R. 19. It is not strict right, but comity which enables one to bring a cause of action in one state for the enforcement of a cause of action which arises in another, and therefore there are well-known exceptions, not within the provisions of our Constitution, which prevent jurisdiction attaching where the cause of action arose in another state in favor of a citizen of that state against another citizen of that state. These exceptions grow naturally out of the principle that one state will not interfere with regulations relating to the government of another state. One of the exceptions to the general rule is that "no court will take cognizance of a matter which concerns the internal police regulations of another state." Hence, the courts of one state will not entertain an action for a tort committed in another state where both the parties reside, if the action is to recover on the official bond of the defendant, made payable to the state, and if a statute of the locus delicti requires actions on such bonds to be brought in the name of the state. Brower v. Watson, 146 Tenn. 626, 244 S. W. 362, 26 A.L.R. 991.

¹⁶Robinson v. Ocean Steam Nav. Co. 112 N. Y. 315, 19 N. E. 625, 2 L.R.A. 636. Annotation: 32 A.L.R. 22, 23; 74 A.L.R. 720 et seq. s. 100 A.L.R. 1152.

¹⁷Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 279 U. S. 377, 73 L. ed. 747, 49 S. Ct. 355. Annotation: 74 A.L.R. 720, s. 100 A.L.R. 1152.

rights of citizens of other states. . . . Article ⁴, § ², is satisfied if the non-

or legal obligations may be enforced.²⁰ Hence, it is not a privilege or immu-

a nonresident, in all actions growing out of, or connected with, the business of

a local office in the state for the sale of securities, a business subjected in the

is entitled.³ Similarly, a statute making a state officer the agent of a nonresi-

dent motorist to receive service of process in any civil suit or proceeding by a

"resident of the state" arising out of or by reason of any accident or collision

occurring within the state does not contravene Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal

require a state to dispense with the exaction of special security from a defend-

fense by operation of a statute of limitations has been sustained by the courts.⁷

¹Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 40 L. ed. 467, 16 S. Ct. 344. See also Porter v. Wilson, 239 U. S. 170, 60 L. ed. 204, 36 S. Ct. 91. None of the privileges and immunities of a former convict as a citizen of the United States are abridged by bringing him, after conviction, before the court of another county in a separate proceeding by infor- mation charging him with prior convic- tions which were not alleged in the indict- ment on which he was last tried and con- victed, and, on the finding of the jury that he was the former convict, sentencing him to additional punishment prescribed by law. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 S. Ct. 583. Privileges and immunities of citizenship are not impaired by a state law providing for a presumption of fraud against the president and directors of an insolvent bank. Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L.R.A.1915C, 716, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 80.

²⁹⁴U. S. 623, 79 L. ed. 1097, 55 S. Ct. 553; Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. 214 Iowa, 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308.

⁵Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873. Annotation: 17 A.L.R. 884.

⁷Canadian N. R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 64 L. ed. 713, 40 S. Ct. 402; Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N. W. 284, 94 A.L.R. 480. Constitutional privileges and immunities of a nonresident citizen are not denied by the exemption accorded to resident citizens by a state statute providing that "when a cause of action has arisen outside of this state and, by the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be

A man cannot be said to be denied, in a constitutional or in any rational sense,

the privilege of resorting to courts to enforce his rights when he is given free

of limitations shall not run against a resident plaintiff but shall run against a

nonresident plaintiff is not repugnant to Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Con-

his property against the illegal acts of its officers, a citizen of another state

for redress in its own courts.¹⁰ The converse is also generally true. A state

ployers' Liability Act, solely because the suit is brought under a Federal law.¹¹

access to its courts equal to that accorded to its own citizens, but not greater

E. WHAT ARE NOT PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

§ 465. Generally.—

maintained in this state unless the plain- tiff be a citizen of the state who has owned the cause of action ever since it accrued," where the foreign limitation, though short- er than that of Minnesota, is not unduly short. Canadian N. R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 64 L. ed. 713, 40 S. Ct. 402. A state statute which denies to a citizen of another state against whom suit might have been brought on a cause of action growing out of his use of an automobile on the highways of the state by service of process on the secretary of state, the right to the benefit of the statute of limitations until he shall come into or remove to the state, does not contravene the U. S. Const. Art. 4, § 2. Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509,

¹⁰Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. ed. 150, 29 S. Ct. 67; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 S. Ct. 418; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co.

²⁹²U. S. 230, 78 L. ed. 1227, 54 S. Ct. 690, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 613, 78 L. ed. 1472, 54 S. Ct. 855.

¹³Missouri P. R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co. 257 U. S. 533, 66 L. ed. 354, 42 S. Ct. 210.

¹⁷⁶U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494. See Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Ver- mont, 207 U. S. 541, 52 L. ed. 327, 28 S. Ct. 178, 12 Ann. Cas. 658; Spies v. Illi- nois, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. ed. 80, 8 S. Ct. 21, 22. A conclusion opposite in result to the rule announced in the text—although it has never been adopted by the Supreme Court as the law—was announced by Jus- tice Field in his dissenting opinion in

ed States do not include the right to a trial by jury in suits at common law in the state courts, the right to a trial by jury in a state court for a criminal offense against the state, the right to be exempt from any trial in such case for an infamous crime unless upon presentment by a grand jury,¹⁶ the right to exemption from self-incrimination in state criminal proceedings,¹⁷ the right for exemption from self-incrimination in state criminal proceedings,¹⁷ the right to exemption from self-incrimination in state laws to carry arms,¹⁸ or the right to drill or parade with together as a military company or organization or to drill or parade with arms, without or independent of an act of Congress or law of a state authorizing the same.¹⁹ The same principle has been applied to negative many assertions of privileges and immunities sought to be established to prevent various

O'Neil v. Vermont, ¹⁴⁴ U. S. ³²³, ³⁶ L. ed. ⁴⁵⁰, ¹² S. Ct. ⁶⁹³. He said: "The rights thus recognized and declared [in the Federal Bill of Rights] are rights of citizens of the United States under their Constitution which could not be violated by Federal authority. But when the late civil war closed, and slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, there was legislation in the former slaveholding states inconsistent with these rights, and a general apprehension arose in a portion of the country—whether justified or not is immaterial—that this legislation would still be enforced and the rights of the freedmen would not be respected. The Fourteenth Amendment followed, which declares that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.' The freedmen thus became citizens of the United States and entitled in the future to all the privileges and immunities of such citizens. But owing to previous legislation many of those privileges and immunities, if that legislation was allowed to stand, would be abridged; therefore, in the same amendment by which they were made citizens, it was ordained that 'no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' thus nullifying existing legislation of that character, and prohibiting its enactment in the future.

While, therefore, the ten amendments as limitations on power, and, so far as they accomplish their purpose and find their fruition in such limitations, are applicable only to the Federal Government and not to the states, yet, so far as they declare or recognize the rights of persons, they are rights belonging to them as citizens of the United States under the Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment, as to all such rights, places a limit upon state power by ordaining that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge them. . . . These rights, as those of citizens of the United States, find their recognition and guaranty against Federal action in the Constitution of the United States, and against state action in the Fourteenth Amendment. The inhibition by that amendment is not the less valuable and effective because of the prior and existing inhibition against such action in the Constitutions of the several states. The amendment only gives additional security to the rights of the citizen. It was natural that it should forbid the abridgment by any state of privileges and immunities

which the Constitution recognized and guaranteed as rights of citizens of the United States. A similar additional guaranty of private rights is found in other instances. An inhibition is contained in the several state Constitutions against their legislatures passing a bill of attainder of an ex post facto law, and yet a like inhibition against state action is embodied in the Constitution of the United States. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Maxwell v. Dow, ¹⁷⁶ U. S. ⁵⁸¹, ⁴⁴ L. ed. ⁵⁹⁷, ²⁰ S. Ct. ⁴⁴⁸, ⁴⁹⁴, in which it is stated that without enumerating the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States, it ought to be deemed safe to say that such privileges and immunities embrace at least those expressly recognized by the Constitution of the United States and placed beyond the power of Congress to take away or impair, which include the rights enumerated in the Federal Bill of Rights.

15 French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. ¹⁸¹ U. S. ³²⁴, ⁴⁵ L. ed. ⁸⁷⁹, ²¹ S. Ct. ⁶²⁵; Maxwell v. Dow, ¹⁷⁶ U. S. ⁵⁸¹, ⁴⁴ L. ed. ⁵⁹⁷, ²⁰ S. Ct. ⁴⁴⁸, ⁴⁹⁴; Holden v. Hardy, ¹⁶⁹ U. S. ³⁶⁶, ⁴² L. ed. ⁷⁸⁰, ¹⁸ S. Ct. ³⁸³, affirming ¹⁴ Utah, ⁷¹, ⁴⁶ P. ⁷⁵⁶, ³⁷ L.R.A. ¹⁰³; Hallinger v. Davis, ¹⁴⁶ U. S. ³¹⁴, ³⁶ L. ed. ⁹⁸⁶, ¹³ S. Ct. ¹⁰⁵; Walker v. Sauvinet, ⁹² U. S. ⁹⁰, ²³ L. ed. ⁶⁷⁸.

A state may provide for a jury trial by a jury of less than twelve jurors. State v. Bates, ¹⁴ Utah, ²⁹³, ⁴⁷ P. ⁷⁸, ⁴³ L.R.A. ³³, overruled so far as a retroactive effect was given thereto, in Thompson v. Utah, ¹⁷⁰ U. S. ³⁴³, ⁴² L. ed. 1061, ¹⁸ S. Ct. ⁶²⁰.

16 Maxwell v. Dow, ¹⁷⁶ U. S. ⁵⁸¹, ⁴⁴ L. ed. ⁵⁹⁷, ²⁰ S. Ct. ⁴⁴⁸, ⁴⁹⁴.

17 Twining v. New Jersey, ²¹¹ U. S. ⁷⁸, ⁵³ L. ed. ⁹⁷, ²⁹ S. Ct. ¹⁴. See Banks v. State, ²⁰⁷ Ala. ¹⁷⁹, ⁹³ So. ²⁹³, ²⁴ A.L.R. 1359, writ of certiorari denied in ²⁶⁰ U. S. ⁷³⁶, ⁶⁷ L. ed. ⁴⁸⁸, ⁴³ S. Ct. ⁹⁶.

18 Miller v. Texas, ¹⁵³ U. S. ⁵³⁵, ³⁸ L. ed. ⁸¹², ¹⁴ S. Ct. ⁸⁷⁴.

A state law prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid.

19 Presser v. Illinois, ¹¹⁶ U. S. ²⁵², ²⁹ L. ed. ⁶¹⁵, ⁶ S. Ct. ⁵⁸⁰.

Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are not abridged by state legislation prohibiting bodies of men, other than the organized militia of the state and the troops of the United States, from associating as a military company and drilling with arms in cities or towns. Ibid.

criminal proceedings in the states.²⁰ A seizure in one state of a fugitive from justice of another state, who has committed a crime in the latter state, does not violate any privilege or immunity which the accused can claim under the Constitution of the United States.¹ The imposition of the death penalty by electrocution as a punishment for murder does not violate the privileges and immunities of a citizen;² and the keeping of such a prisoner in solitary confinement until the execution of such a sentence does not violate the Constitution.³ Habitual criminal penalties do not violate the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.⁴

The privileges and immunities clauses do not confer rights, exemptions, or privileges to any individuals or class which are denied to others as common rights or which are subject to regulation by the state.⁵ Membership in a secret, oath-bound association within a state is not a privilege arising out of citizenship of the United States so as to be protected by the privilege and immunity clause of the Federal Constitution.⁶

According to the express words and clear meaning of Article ⁴, § ², of the Constitution, no privileges are secured except those which belong to citizenship. Rights attached by the law of contracts, by reason of the law of the place where such contracts are made or executed, wholly irrespective of the citizenship of the parties to such contracts, cannot be deemed privileges within the meaning of the Constitution.⁷ Privileges and immunities which are protected by constitutional inhibition concern the personal and private rights of citizens. They do not, however, include within their meaning the right to hold office,⁸ the right to be appointed and act as an executor,⁹ the right to intermarry, so as to invalidate a statute prohibiting the intermarriage of white and colored persons,¹⁰ or the right to secure a divorce in a state without com-

²⁰See infra, notes 1-4, this section. The constitutional privileges and immunities of a citizen are not abridged by an error of the court in a charge to the jury in a criminal case. Davis v. Texas, 139 U. S. 651, 35 L. ed. 300, 11 S. Ct. 675.

²McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, 35 L. ed. 971, 12 S. Ct. 156; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 S. Ct. 930. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 S. Ct. 583.

⁵Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 795, 140 Am. St. Rep. 248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034.

⁶People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785. Annotation: 43 A.L.R. 914, s. 62 A.L.R. 798.

⁸Re Mulford, 217 Ill. 242, 75 N. E. 345, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 341, 108 Am. St. Rep. 249, 3 Ann. Cas. 986; State v. Goldthwait, 172 Ind. 210, 87 N. E. 133, 19 Ann. Cas. 737; Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; Barker v. People, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 686, 15 Am. Dec. 322; State v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 480. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 580; 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 480; 3 Ann. Cas. 1049. The privileges and immunities of citizens which a state Constitution protects against discrimination do not include the right to hold a minor municipal office. Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039.

⁹Re Mulford, 217 Ill. 242, 75 N. E. 345, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 341, 108 Am. St. Rep. 249, 3 Ann. Cas. 986. Annotation: 3 Ann. Cas. 990. In Roby v. Smith, 131 Ind. 342, 30 N. E. 1093, 15 L.R.A. 792, 31 Am. St. Rep. 439, on the theory that the right to hold the title to property in trust is part of the right to hold property and therefore is a privilege and immunity of citizenship, the court held that a statute prohibiting any person who is not a bona fide resident of the state to act or be appointed as a trustee in any deed, mortgage, or other instrument in writing, except wills, was in violation of the constitutional right of citizens of each state to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. Annotation: 3 Ann. Cas. 990.

¹⁰State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 42. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 580. See MARRIAGE [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 387, § 8].

The rights, immunities, and privileges which are secured by the Constitution of the United States to the inhabitants of the several states do not include,

inhabitants of other states.¹⁴ A statutory prohibition against the transportation outside the state, of its waters—of lakes, ponds, rivers, and streams—

does not infringe Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution.¹⁵ A state may

public waters.¹⁶ It may, moreover, preserve wild game for its own citizens if

¹³Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405; Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765, 11 L.R.A. 828, 23 Am. St. Rep. 895; Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164, 134 S. E. 360, 48 A.L.R. 654. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Edu. 175 U. S. 528, 44 L. ed. 262, 20 S. Ct. 197. But see State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 8 Am. Rep. 713, apparently holding to the contrary. Annotation: 44 L. ed. 262; 14 L.R.A. 581; 3 Ann. Cas. 693. A state statute requiring a member of a Greek letter fraternity at another college to renounce his affiliation to such fraternity before permitting his admission as a student to any educational institution supported by the state does not violate the privileges and immunities of United States citizens. Waugh v. University of Mississippi, 237 U. S. 589, 59 L. ed. 1131, 35 S. Ct. 720. The enforcement of an order of the board of regents of a state university prescribing instruction in military science and tactics as a required course does not unconstitutionally abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 79 L. ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197, rehearing denied in 293 U. S. 633, 79 L. ed. 717, 55 S. Ct. 345. See SCHOOLS [Also 24 R. C. L. p. 624, § 82].

¹⁴Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248; Com. v. Hilton, 174 Mass. 29, 54 N. E. 362, 45 L.R.A. 475. See State v. Catholic, 75 Or. 367,

¹⁴⁷P. 372, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 913. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 339. The citizens of one state are not invested by the United States Constitution with any interest in the common property of the citizens of another state. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248.

¹⁵McCarter ex rel. Kummel v. Hudson County Water Co. 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 197, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, 10 Ann. Cas. 116, affirmed in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828, 28 S. Ct. 529, 14 Ann. Cas. 560.

¹⁶McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248; Com. v. Hilton, 174 Mass. 29, 54 N. E. 362, 45 L.R.A. 475; State v. Kofines,

³³R. I. 211, 80 A. 432, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1120. Imposing a license tax upon nonresidents who come onto the waters of a territory to fish does not conflict with the provision of the Federal Constitution that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens in the several states. Haavik v. Alaska Packers Asso. 263 U. S. 510, 68 L. ed. 414, 44 S. Ct. 177. The exclusion of citizens of other states from the right to dig clams for sale on certain flats, by a regulation restricting the right to residents of the town, does not violate the constitutional privileges or immunities of citizens. Com. v. Hilton, 174 Mass. 29, 54 N. E. 362, 45 L.R.A. 475. See FISH AND FISHERIES [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 1024, § 10].

⁵⁸L. ed. 539, 34 S. Ct. 281. See GAME AND GAME LAWS [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 693, § 10].

¹⁸State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693, 92 P. 995, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1259. See SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 1416, § 5].

depriving citizens of any privilege of citizenship.¹⁹ It has been held, however,

In most of the cases which have reached the higher courts, in which a statute has been attacked on the ground that it violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such attack has failed.¹

§ 466. Right to Suffrage.—

Moreover, it is usually considered not to be an inherent or natural right existing in the absence of constitutional and legislative grant.³ It is rather deemed

to be a political and civil right under the control of the state.⁴ It is clear,

decided that the citizen's right to vote at elections for officers of the state and

even for officers of the United States exists by reason of the fact that he is a

citizen of, and entitled to vote under the laws of, the state in which he resides.⁶

¹⁹Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419, 10 Ann. Cas. 525, affirming 74 Neb. 757, 105 N. W. 298, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079, 121 Am. St. Rep. 754. Annotation: 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079.

²⁰Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N. E. 41, 49 L.R.A. 181, 76 Am. St. Rep. 30.

¹In Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54, Justice Stone pointed out in his dissenting opinion that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment at least forty-four cases have been brought to the Supreme Court of the United States in which state statutes have been assailed as infringements of the privileges and immunities clause. Until the decision in Colgate v. Harvey, no decision of the Supreme Court has concluded that state legislation infringed that clause.

²Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. ed. 817, 24 S. Ct. 573; Maxwell v. Dow,

¹⁷⁶U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1,

³⁶L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162,

²²L. ed. 627; Davis v. Teague, 220 Ala. 309, 125 So. 51 (appeal dismissed in 281 U. S. 695, 74 L. ed. 1123, 50 S. Ct. 248) citing R. C. L. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 580; 25 Am. St. Rep. 872. See ELECTIONS [Also 9 R. C. L. p. 1023, §§ 40 et seq.].

⁵¹(appeal dismissed in 281 U. S. 695, 74 L. ed. 1123, 50 S. Ct. 248) citing R. C. L.; Spencer v. Board of Registration, 1 MacArth. (D. C.) 169, 29 Am. Rep. 582; Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38, 46 N. E. 339, 37 L.R.A. 644, 62 Am. St. Rep. 487; Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121,

¹⁰L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; Chamberlain v. Wood, 15 S. D. 216, 88 N. W. 109, 56 L.R.A. 187, 91 Am. St. Rep. 674.

⁵¹(appeal dismissed in 281 U. S. 695, 74 L. ed. 1123, 50 S. Ct. 248) citing R. C. L.; Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 51 Am. Rep. 479; Election Comrs. v. Knight, 187 Ind. 108, 117 N. E. 565, 650, citing R. C. L.; Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38, 46 N. E. 339, 37 L.R.A. 644, 62 Am. St. Rep. 487; Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; Chamberlain v. Wood, 15 S. D. 216, 88 N. W. 109, 56 L.R.A. 187, 91 Am. St. Rep. 674.

⁵Pope v. Williams, 98 Md. 59, 56 A. 543, 66 L.R.A. 398, 103 Am. St. Rep. 379; Cook v. State, 90 Tenn. 407, 16 S. W. 471,

¹³L.R.A. 183. The privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are not denied to a citizen removing from the District of Columbia to a state by requiring him, as a condition to the exercise of the elective franchise, to record in a public record his intention of becoming a citizen a certain time before he can qualify as a voter. Pope v. Williams, 98 Md. 59, 56 A. 543, 66 L.R.A. 398,

¹⁰³Am. St. Rep. 379, affirmed in 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. ed. 817, 24 S. Ct. 573.

¹⁷⁹U. S. 58, 45 L. ed. 84, 21 S. Ct. 17; Re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 39 L. ed. 1080, 15 S. Ct. 959; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274, 4 S. Ct. 152.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution did not add the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship.⁸ The Fifteenth Amendment has, however, invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right—namely, exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. From this it appears that although the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship, exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right on account of race is such an attribute. The right to vote in the states comes from the states; but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States.⁹ The Nineteenth Amendment has invested citizens of the United States with an exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the right to vote on account of sex.¹⁰

§ 467. Rights Pertaining to Intoxicating Liquors.—

It is settled that the states have full control over all matters relating to intoxicating liquors within their local sovereignties11 and that the usual regulations pertaining to liquors in general do not violate any of the constitutional rights of the citizen.12 Thus, the entire business of manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquors is completely within the control of the states.13 There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent them from regulating and restraining the traffic or from prohibiting it altogether.14

The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States15 or an inherent right of citizenship.¹⁶

⁸Pope v. Williams, 93 Md. 59, 56 A. 543, 66 L.R.A. 398, 103 Am. St. Rep. 379, affirmed in 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. ed. 817, 24 S. Ct. 573.

⁹Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. ed. 817, 24 S. Ct. 573; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162, 22 L. ed. 627.

¹³State v. Nicolls, 61 Wash. 142, 112 P. 269, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1088. Annotation: 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 362. Although the sale of alcohol for certain specified purposes, under certain restrictions, is not unlawful, the Georgia Prohibition Act, which prohibits entirely the manufacture of alcohol, is not violative of the Federal constitutional provision that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. Cureton v. State, 135 Ga. 660, 70 S. E. 332, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 182, appeal dismissed in 229 U. S. 630, 57 L. ed. 1358, 33 S. Ct. 778. A statute making it a criminal offense for any person to circulate or distribute any price lists, circulars, or order blanks advertising liquors within the state does not, as applied to a liquor dealer residing and doing business in another state, who, by agency of the United States mails, sends into the state unsolicited, and thus circulates or distributes to prospective customers, price lists, circulars, and order blanks advertising his liquor for sale, violate the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. State v. Davis, 77 W. Va. 271, 87 S. E. 262, L.R.A.1917C, 639.

¹⁴Rippey v. Texas, 193 U. S. 504, 48 L. ed. 767, 24 S. Ct. 516; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 S. Ct. 273; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. (U. S.) 504, 12 L. ed. 256; State v. Baker, 50 Or. 381, 12 P. 1076, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1040. There is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the state or of a citizen of the United States. It may be entirely prohibited by state legislation or be permitted under such conditions as will limit its evils. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 S. Ct. 13.

¹⁵Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446, 50 L. ed. 1099, 26 S. Ct. 671; Cronin v. Denver, 192 U. S. 115, 48 L. ed. 368, 24 S. Ct. 220; Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108, 48 L. ed. 365, 24 S. Ct. 219; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 45 L. ed. 224, 21 S. Ct. 132; Mette v. McGuckin (U. S.) 37 L. ed. 934; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 S. Ct. 13; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 S. Ct. 273; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 129, 21 L. ed. 929; Barbour v. State, 146 Ga. 667, 92 S. E. 70, 2 A.L.R. 1095, affirmed in 249 U. S. 454, 63 L. ed. 704, 39 S. Ct. 316; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A.L.R. 270; Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind. 512, N. E. 544, 67 L.R.A. 613, 2 Ann. Cas. 96; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. 469, 33 L.R.A. 313; State v. Durein, Kan. 1, 78 P. 152, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 908,

The state may grant to one class the privilege to sell liquor and deny it to another class.¹⁷ It may restrict the right to obtain licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors to the male inhabitants of the state.¹⁸

The right to hold intoxicating liquors for personal use is not one of those fundamental privileges of a citizen of the United States which no state may abridge.¹⁹

It cannot be said that a woman of full age is denied any constitutional privilege or immunity by a law that forbids her to remain in and about saloons.²⁰

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMAND OF EQUALITY

§ 468. Generally.—

American social and political philosophy has been based upon general principles of equality since the beginning of the American Government. The fundamental generalization as to the equality of all men is contained in the well-known and historic phrases of the Declaration of Independence. It is only natural, therefore, that such philosophical theories are carried out in the specific guaranties of equality and in the protection from arbitrary, capricious, and unjust disparity of treatment contained in the Fed-

affirmed in 208 U. S. 613, 52 L. ed. 645, 28 S. Ct. 567; Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905, 9 L.R.A. 780, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587; State v. Baker, 50 Or. 381, 92 P. 1076, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1040; State ex rel. George v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 20 S. E. 221, 26 L.R.A. 345. Annotation: 9 L.R.A. 780; 14 L.R.A. 582; 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 362. No citizen of the United States can complain because a state police regulation denies him the privilege of selling spirituous liquors, even if the privilege is granted to other citizens. Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N. E. 883, 9 L.R.A. 664; Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905, 9 L.R.A. 780, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587.

¹⁶Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 S. Ct. 13; State v. Calloway, 11 Idaho, 719, 84 P. 27, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 109, 114 Am. St. Rep. 285; State ex rel. George v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 20 S. E. 221, 26 L.R.A. 345. An ordinance regulating the hours in which intoxicating liquors shall be sold is not objectionable as class legislation where it is equally applicable to all dealers in intoxicating liquors, whether at wholesale or retail; nor does it infringe any right, privilege, or immunity secured to the citizen by the Federal Constitution or that of the State of Idaho. State v. Calloway, 11 Idaho, 719, 84 P. 27, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 109, 114 Am. St. Rep. 285.

¹⁷Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905, 9 L.R.A. 780, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587; State v. Nicolls, 61 Wash. 142, 112 P. 269, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1088. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 340. A special license tax imposed by a city for the privilege of selling beer is not, as to beer manufactured in other places within the state, obnoxious to the clause of the Federal Constitution declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. Downham v. Alexandria, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 173, 19 L. ed. 929. Liquor sellers are not denied the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, under the Fourteenth Amendment, because producers or manufacturers of domestic wines are exempted by a state statute, while such wines are in their hands, from the tax imposed and the bond required by preceding articles regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors. Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446, 50 L. ed. 1099, 26 S. Ct. 671.

¹⁸Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N. E. 883, 9 L.R.A. 664. The requirement of a residence within the state for two years as a condition for the granting of a license to sell intoxicating liquor does not deprive the citizens of another state of the privileges and immunities and equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the Federal Constitution. De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059.

¹⁹Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304, 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98; State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 51 Utah, 569, 172 P. 1050, L.R.A.1918E, 943. Annotation: 2 A.L.R. 1089. The mere possession of whisky for personal use may be rendered criminal by state legislation without abridging privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304, 62 L. ed. 304, 38 S. Ct. 98. The limitation by a state of the amount of intoxicating liquors which a citizen may lawfully receive and possess in dry territory for personal use does not violate the provision of the Federal Constitution prohibiting any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Southern Exp. Co. v. Whittle, 194 Ala. 406, 69 So. 652, L.R.A.1916C, 278.

the variety of situations involved, and the sensible desire of the courts to feel

§ 469. Definition and Nature.—

has not been precisely defined.⁷ In fact, the phrase is not susceptible of ex-

⁷Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423; Ma- goun v. Illinois Trust & S. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 43 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 799; Ex parte Hollman, 79 S. C. 9,

⁸Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423.

¹⁰Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Louis- ville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard)

¹⁸³U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819,

¹⁸S. Ct. 418; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, affirmed in 239 U. S. 637, 60 L. ed. 480,

¹¹Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513.

¹²Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. King County, 264 U. S. 22, 68 L. ed. 541, 44 S. Ct. 261; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. ed. 688, 30 S. Ct. 496; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania,

¹³⁴U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 A. 861,

¹³Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. King County, 264 U. S. 22, 68 L. ed. 541, 44 S. Ct. 261; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. ed. 688, 30 S. Ct. 496.

limit precisely the equal protection clause,¹⁴ various broad and sweeping gen-

laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances,¹⁵

in their lives, liberty, and property, and in pursuit of happiness.¹⁶ It has fre-

equality of opportunity to all in like circumstances.¹⁸ The guiding principle

Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 A. 861, 50 L.R.A. 86.

¹⁵Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp. 262 U. S. 544, 67 L. ed. 1112, 43 S. Ct. 636; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U. S. 325, 50 L. ed. 212, 26 S. Ct. 106; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 45 L. ed. 1015, 21 S. Ct. 730; French v. Barber Asphalt Pav- ing Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Moore v. Mis- souri, 159 U. S. 673, 40 L. ed. 301, 16 S. Ct. 179; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; Van Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce (Del.) 578, 91 A. 385, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 104; Ex parte Holl- man, 79 S. C. 9, 60 S. E. 19, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 242, 14 Ann. Cas. 1105. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 583, 584.

¹⁶Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452, 40 L. ed. 490, 16 S. Ct. 345; Hallinger v. Davis,

¹⁴⁶U. S. 314, 36 L. ed. 986, 13 S. Ct. 105; Santa Clara County v. Southern P. R. Co.

¹¹⁸U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 S. Ct. 1132; Re Mallon, 16 Idaho, 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123; State v. Richcreek, 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 874,

¹¹⁹Am. St. Rep. 491, 10 Ann. Cas. 899; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165,

⁸⁰Am. St. Rep. 386; Templar v. State Ex- aminers, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 583, 584; 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1144. Equality is an attribute of liberty. Mc- Kinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268.

¹⁷Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 71 L. ed. 1165, 47 S. Ct. 678; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254,

⁴²S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U. S. 510, 63 L. ed. 735, 39 S. Ct. 357; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; South Carolina ex rel. Phœnix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, 59 L. ed. 839, 35 S. Ct. 504; Ger- man Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 55 L. ed. 229, 31 S. Ct. 246; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Con- nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540,

⁴⁶L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 41 L. ed. 140,

¹⁶S. Ct. 977; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Morales v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 33 A.L.R. 1222; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell,

¹⁸¹Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, affirmed in 239 U. S. 637, 60 L. ed. 480,

³⁶S. Ct. 445; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 418; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Re Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 601,

⁹⁴N. E. 558, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 604; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804, 8 Ann. Cas. 717; State v. Cadigan, 73 Vt. 245, 50 A. 1079, 57 L.R.A. 666, 87 Am. St. Rep. 714.

¹⁹United States.—Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 81 L. ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838; Old Dear- born Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476; Colgate v. Harvey,

¹⁰²A.L.R. 54; State Tax Comrs. v. Jack- son, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Corpo- ration Commission v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431,

⁷⁴L. ed. 945, 50 S. Ct. 397; Frost v. Corpo- ration Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770,

⁴⁸S. Ct. 423; Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387, 71 L. ed. 1112, 47 S. Ct. 595; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254,

⁴²S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washing- ton, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; South Carolina ex rel. Phœnix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMas- ter, 237 U. S. 63, 59 L. ed. 839, 35 S. Ct. 504; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.

²³⁵U. S. 151, 59 L. ed. 169, 35 S. Ct. 69; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. ed. [12 Am. Jur.]—9 129

some cases the principle is stated a little more fully so as to include also with-

U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287; Ann.

U. S. 57, 67 L. ed. 707; State v. State, Boyce,

U. S. 283, 61 L. ed. 302, 37 S. Ct. 124; Ham-

S. Ct. 1122; Richmond v. Dudley (Ind.) 26

N. E. 184, 10 L.R.A. 137.

N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; Vigeant v. Postal

R. C. L.

S. E. 516, 47 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U.

S. Ct. 1031.

L. R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364, 37

L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L.

U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Bar-

property right is just as clearly a denial of equal protection of the laws to the

of the laws is not one of equality of operation or application of state legislation upon all citizens of a state.² Hence, laws need not affect every man,

woman, and child exactly alike in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality.³ Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according

§ 470. Equality of Right.—

²⁰Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 S. Ct. 207; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Re Mallon, 16 Idaho, 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123. Annotation: 23 Am. St. Rep. 28. A law subjecting all citizens of the state to equal burdens and inflicting equal penalties on every person violating it is an equal law. State v. Dow, 70 N. H. 286, 47 A. 734, 53 L.R.A. 314.

¹Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375.

²Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 69 L. ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44 A.L.R. 1454; Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N. E. (2d) 905,

⁴Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 69 L. ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44 A.L.R. 1454; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Keningham v. Blake, 135 Md. 320, 109 A. 65, 8 A.L.R. 1066.

⁸Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 638, 78 L. ed. 1037, 54 S. Ct. 550; Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 78 L. ed. 1025, 54 S. Ct. 542, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 603, 78 L. ed. 1466, 54 S. Ct. 712.

⁹Concordia F. Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535, 78 L. ed. 1411, 54 S. Ct. 830; Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 638,

⁷⁸L. ed. 1037, 54 S. Ct. 550; Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619,

⁷⁸L. ed. 1025, 54 S. Ct. 542, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 603, 78 L. ed. 1466, 54 S. Ct. 712; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 A.L.R. 699; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; State v. Old Tavern Farm, 133 Me. 468, 180 A. 473,

¹⁰¹A.L.R. 810; Re Opinion of Justices, 220 Mass. 627, 108 N. E. 807, L.R.A.1917B, 1119; Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 A. 193, 94 A.L.R. 1067; State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, 18 A. 878, 5 L.R.A. 709; Ex parte Leslie,

⁸⁷Tex. Crim. Rep. 476, 223 S. W. 227, citing R. C. L.; Sammarco v. Boysa, 193 Wis. 642, 215 N. W. 446, 55 A.L.R. 370. Government is instituted for the benefit of all the people, and not for the benefit of any one class to the exclusion of others. Miller v. Des Moines, 143 Iowa, 409, 122 N. W. 226, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 815, 21 Ann. Cas. 207.

¹⁰McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Marx & H. Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391, 56 L.R.A. 951, 90 Am. St. Rep. 440.

fundamental principle of state Constitutions.¹¹ The equality of rights protected by a provision of a state Constitution that government is instituted for the equal benefit, security, and protection of the people is the same as that preserved by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.¹² No legislative act is valid that is clearly obnoxious to the principle of equality of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.¹³

The philosophy of equality of rights as bulwarked by constitutional guaranties is peculiar to the American system of constitutional law. It has been said that it would be in vain to look to the laws of England, written or unwritten, for a declaration or institution making all men equal before the law, for by the laws of that Kingdom from the earliest institutions down to the present time the whole framework of the government has been based on classes, titles, ranks, and precedence.¹⁴

It is important to note that the equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment did not create any new or substantive legal rights or enlarge the general classification of rights of persons or things existing in any state under the laws thereof. It operated on them as it found them established, and it declared, in substance, that in whatever form they were in each state they should be held and enjoyed alike by all persons within its jurisdiction.¹⁵ The clause as to the equal protection of the laws, moreover, does not restrain the normal exercise of governmental power, but only abuse in the exertion of such authority.¹⁶

When the government, under the Constitutions of the states and of the United States, secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it accomplished the end for which it is organized and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with which it is endowed. It is generally recognized that legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based on physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the situation. If one race is inferior to another socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put it upon the same plane with the other races living in this country.¹⁷ The equal protection clause does not demand that laws operate with rigid sameness upon all persons within a state.¹⁸ It guarantees equality, and not identity, of rights.¹⁹ Some of the courts, in determining the nature of the equality required, have held that the equality demanded by the Constitution is equality of right, and not of enjoyment.²⁰

¹³State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 33 A. 519, 31 L.R.A. 55, 48 Am. St. Rep. 227; State v. Old Tavern Farm, 133 Me. 468, 180 A. 473, 101 A.L.R. 810; Beasley v. Cunningham, 171 Tenn. 334, 103 S. W. (2d) 18, 110 A.L.R. 306; Southern R. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. 662, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 828, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 153.

¹⁵State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799. See also infra, § 471.

¹⁶Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Malton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84.

¹⁷Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. ed. 256, 16 S. Ct. 1138; State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 A. 546, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1087, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 957; People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232.

¹⁹Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765, 11 L.R.A. 828, 23 Am. St. Rep. 895.

²⁰Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N. E. (2d) 905, 105 A.L.R. 1045; Re Opinion of Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 A. 117, 39 A.L.R. 1023; Thompson v. Kidder, 74 N. H. 89, 65 A. 392, 12 Ann. Cas. 948; State v. Aldrich, 70 N. H. 391, 47 A. 602, 85 Am. St. Rep. 631; State v. Dow, 70 N. H. 286, 47 A. 734, 53 L.R.A. 314; State v. Griffin, 69 N. H. 1, 39 A. 260, 41 L.R.A. 177, 76 Am. St. Rep. 139. The duty of protecting all citizens in the enjoyment of equality of rights was origi-

§ 471. Effect of Fourteenth Amendment.—

By the Fourteenth Amendment all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are made citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside; and the states are forbidden to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.1 That amendment, in declaring that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; and all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property.2

The primary object of the Fourteenth Amendment, in relation to the equal protection clause as to other clauses of § ¹ of that amendment, was to secure to the colored race, then recently emancipated, the full enjoyment of its freedom.³ It extends its protection, however, to all persons without regard to race, color, or class and prohibits any state legislation which has the effect of denying to any race, class, or individual the equal protection of the laws.⁴

In accordance with the very wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power by appropriate legislation to enforce the provision preventing any state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.⁵ Such congressional legislation, however, must be

nally assumed by the states and still remains with them. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588. Since it is self-evident that unless all things are held in common some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. ed. 441, 35 S. Ct. 240, L.R.A.1915C, 960.

¹Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. ed. 256, 16 S. Ct. 1138; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162, 22 L. ed. 627; McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; State v. Martin, 193 Ind. 120, 139 N. E. 282, 26 A.L.R. 1386; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 42.

²Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, 59 L. ed. 839, 35 S. Ct. 504; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Re Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 122 Kan. 33, 250 P. 1056, 61 A.L.R. 332; Aberdeen Sav. & L. Asso. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536, 290 P. 697, 71 A.L.R. 232. See also supra, § 469.

³Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 71 L. ed. 759, 47 S. Ct. 446; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149, 38 S. Ct. 16, L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 231, affirming 14 Utah, 71, 46 P. 756, 37 L.R.A. 103; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. ed. 664; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394. The object of the Fourteenth Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law. Johnson v. Board of Education, 166 N. C. 468, 82 S. E. 832, L.R.A.1915A, 828. See CIVIL RIGHTS, Vol. 10, p. 898, § 4.

⁴Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149, 38 S. Ct. 16, L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 633, 26 S. Ct. 387, 5 Ann. Cas. 692; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 41 L. ed. 140, 16 S. Ct. 977; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 40 L. ed. 1075, 16 S. Ct. 904; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L.R.A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948.

⁵Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. ed. 664.

corrective in nature—that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting any laws which the states may adopt and enforce which are prohibited by the amendment. It is absurd to affirm that because the amendment forbids denial of the equal protection of the laws, therefore Congress may establish laws generally for the equal protection of persons.⁶ At least, Congress has no power to legislate on subjects which are within the domain of state legislation.⁷ The equal protection clause does not operate to change in any way the theory of the relations of the state and Federal Governments to each other and of both kinds of government to the people,⁸ but leaves to the states the power to amend their laws so as to make them conform to the wishes of their citizens or to the exigencies of their social life.⁹ It was not intended to bring within Federal control everything done by the state or by its instrumentalities that is simply illegal under the state laws, but only such acts by the states or their instrumentalities as are violative of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.¹⁰

The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect property from every injurious or oppressive action by a state.¹¹ Furthermore, it affords no protection from the consequences of competition arising from state activity.¹²

§ 472. —

Relation between Due Process of Law and Equal Protection Clauses.—In a recent decision the Supreme Court has pointed out for the first time the probable line of demarcation between the extent of the due process clause and that of the equal protection clause. The court indicated that although the equal protection clause is associated in the Fourteenth Amendment with the due process clause and it is customary to consider them together and although they may overlap and a violation of one may at times involve the violation of the other, the spheres of protection they offer are not coterminous.13 The requirement of due process tends to secure equality in that it demands a required minimum of protection of rights which is coupled with a spirit of equality in the administration of all governmental functions. The framers and adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, were not content to depend upon a mere minimum secured by the due process clause or

⁶Re Rahrer (Wilkerson v. Rahrer) 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 S. Ct. 865; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601. The power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws does not authorize Congress to pass a law making it a crime for two or more persons in a state to conspire to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws, since the power of Congress is merely negative, affording protection against acts of the states, and does not extend to the passage of laws of a positive nature for the suppression of crime within the states. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601.

⁷Re Rahrer (Wilkerson v. Rahrer) 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 S. Ct. 865; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18.

⁸Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 46 L. ed. 196, 22 S. Ct. 213; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 S. Ct. 930; 136 U. S. son v. Secretary of State, 92 Mich. 377, 52 N. W. 469, 16 L.R.A. 475, 31 Am. St. Rep. 587. Reasonable classification in state legislation implies action consistent with the legitimate interests of the state and these cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring them into hostility to exclusive Federal power. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283.

¹⁰Owensboro Waterworks Co. v. Owensboro, 200 U. S. 38, 50 L. ed. 361, 26 S. Ct. 249.

¹¹Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 638, 78 L. ed. 1037, 54 S. Ct. 550; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 78 L. ed. 1025, 54 S. Ct. 542, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 603, 78 L. ed. 1466, 54 S. Ct. 712.

¹²Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 638, 78 L. ed. 1037, 54 S. Ct. 550; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 78 L. ed. 1025, 54 S. Ct. 542, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 603, 78 L. ed. 1466, 54 S. Ct. 712.

¹³Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375.

upon the spirit of equality which might not be insisted upon by local public opinion. They therefore embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty.¹⁴

Under the broad generalities of the principles laid down in the earlier cases, not much, if any distinction had been drawn between the scopes of the due process and equal protection clauses. The courts pointed out the extent to which equality of treatment was essential to due process, but did not indicate the further extent of protection afforded by the equal protection clause alone. Due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment was defined in terms of the equal protection of the laws—that is, as being secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice.¹⁵ Some decisions indicated that a test with respect to the requirement of due process of law seemed to be that if the law under consideration operated equally upon all who came within the class to be affected, embracing all persons who were or might be in like situation and circumstances, and the designation of the class was reasonable, not unjust, capricious, or arbitrary, but based upon a real distinction, and the law operated uniformly, and that if, added to this, the law was enforced by usual and appropriate methods, the requirement as to "due process of law" was satisfied.¹⁶ It was said by the Federal Supreme Court that legislation was not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law if such legislation was general in its operation upon the subjects to which it related and was enforceable in the usual modes adapted to the nature of the case.¹⁷ It was even stated that in order that a statute might comply with the necessary requirements as to due process of law, it could not violate the limitations as to classification imposed by the constitutional inhibition as to the denial of the equal protection of the laws.¹⁸ The rules of these authorities are probably correct in declaring that due process demands equality. As recently pointed out by the Supreme Court, however, the equality demanded by the equal protection clause is not a mere generality or a minimum, but is specific and more extensive than that demanded by due process.¹⁹

¹⁴Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375.

¹⁵Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Minder v. Georgia, 183 U. S. 559, 46 L. ed. 328, 22 S. Ct. 224; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, 41 L. ed. 78, 16 S. Ct. 1031; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 38 L. ed. 485, 14 S. Ct. 570; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 S. Ct. 577; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 34 L. ed. 816, 11 S. Ct. 224; Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512, 17 A.L.R. 789; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; People v. Gordon, 274 Ill. 462, 113 N. E. 864, citing R. C. L.; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 144, 59 P. 340, 47 L.R.A. 369; State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260; Ivie v. Bailey, 319 Mo. 474, 5 S. W. (2d) 60, 57 A.L.R. 881; State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627, 48 L.R.A. 265, 77 Am. St. Rep. 765; White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409, 53 A.L.R. 1215; Ex parte Sizemore, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 232, 8 S. W. (2d) 134, 59 A.L.R. 430. "Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws" are secured if the laws operate on all alike and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 418. As to due process of law generally, see infra, §§ 567 et seq.

¹⁶Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512, 17 A.L.R. 789; State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N. E. 572, 52 L.R.A. 863, 81 Am. St. Rep. 626.

¹⁷Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512, 17 A.L.R. 789; State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N. E. 572, 52 L.R.A. 863, 81 Am. St. Rep. 626.

congressional legislation of the same rules as to classification which are applied to determine the validity of state legislation under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment1 indicate that the Supreme Court often tests the validity of Federal legislation under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by the same rules of equality that are employed to test the validity of state legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.

**§ ⁴⁷³. Agencies Bound.**—The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a restriction on the state governments and operates exclusively upon them.² It does not extend to authority exercised by the government of the United States3 and does not purport to do so.⁴

The equal protection clause was designed as a safeguard against acts of the state, and not against the conduct of private individuals or persons.⁵ It does not add anything to the rights which one citizen has against another under the Constitution.⁶ Hence, the enforcement of a covenant in a deed against the occupation of property by persons of a particular race7 or the exclusion of persons of a particular race from the right to burial in cemeteries owned by private corporations8 does not violate the equal protection clause. A rule of a political party limiting membership to white voters, the effect of which is to exclude negroes from voting at primaries, is not in violation of this clause, even though nominees of the party are ordinarily elected at the general election, where the holding of primary elections is wholly optional, and the state appoints no officers to hold them, and does not pay the cost

¹See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & L. Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352, and District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 53 L. ed. 941, 29 S. Ct. 560.

²Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; Robinson v. Holman, 181 Ark. 428, 26 S. W. (2d) 66, 70 A.L.R. 1480, writ of certiorari denied in 282 U. S. 804, 75 L. ed. 722, 51 S. Ct. 88; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 40 N. D. 69, 168 N. W. 634, 12 A.L.R. 744, writ of error dismissed in 254 U. S. 370, 65 L. ed. 310, 41 S. Ct. 140.

³Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375. Inasmuch as § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to action by the states and imposes no inhibition against the action of the Federal Government, the question whether the Selective Draft Act of 1917, in exempting from military service certain persons mentioned therein, contained such arbitrary discriminations as to render it class legislation did not arise. Annotation: 7 B. R. C. 598. As to testing Federal legislation under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by rules of equality, see supra, § 472.

⁴Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 45 L. ed. 900, 21 S. Ct. 616; People v. Daniels, 6 Utah, 288, 22 P. 159, 5 L.R.A. 444.

⁵Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 76 L. ed. 265, 52 S. Ct. 133; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 70 L. ed. 969, 46 S. Ct. 521; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 3 S. Ct. 18; 667; Los Angeles Invest. Co. 313, 25 L. ed. Cal. 680, 186 P. 596, 9 A.L.R. v. Gary, 181 115; People ex rel. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co. 258 Ill. 36, 101 N. E. 219, L.R.A.1917B, 946, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 277, writ of error dismissed in 238 U. S. 606, 59 L. ed. 1486, 35 S. Ct. 602; Indiana Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. State, 158 Ind. 516, 63 N. E. 220, 57 L.R.A. 761; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A. 1916B, 1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1248; Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N. W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267; Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 19 S. W. 1109, 16 L.R.A. 558, 33 Am. St. Rep. 527; Bullock v. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 47 A. 62, 86 Am. St. Rep. 668; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 40 N. D. 69, 168 N. W. 634, 12 A.L.R. 744, writ of error dismissed in 254 U. S. 370, 65 L. ed. 310, 41 S. Ct. 140. See also United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 S. Ct. 601, in which it is said as a dictum that the only way a private person can deprive another of the equal protection of the laws is by the commission of some offense against the laws which protect the rights of persons, as by theft, burglary, arson, libel, assault, or murder. Annotation: 9 A.L.R. 121, s. 38 A.L.R. 1185; and 66 A.L.R. 532.

⁷Los Angeles Invest. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 P. 596, 9 A.L.R. 115; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A.1916B, 1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1248. Annotation: 9 A.L.R. 121, s. 38 A.L.R. 1185; and 66 A.L.R. 532.

⁸People ex rel. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co. 258 Ill. 36, 101 N. E. 219, L.R.A.1917B, 946, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 277, writ of error dismissed in 238 U. S. 606, 59 L. ed. 1486, 35 S. Ct. 602. Annotation: L.R.A.1917B, 948.

thereof.⁹ It is well established that the equal protection clause like other similar clauses in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in no way comprises a code of remedial law according to which reformation may or must be made for every temporary denial of a right secured by it. The clause spends its force in permitting state action to be set aside where such action involves a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and where the right is sought to be vindicated in ordinary channels. The remedial law, as between individual suitors, is left entirely untouched and remains subject to such imperfections as are inherent in a judicial system that is compelled to respect practical considerations in measuring individual rights. Theoretically, there would be no occasion for fastening a liability upon an individual defendant because a state had violated the amendment; the amendment contemplates that such an action can and should be entirely prevented by a resort to appropriate legal remedies.¹⁰ Thus, when a statute prescribing rates is held invalid under the Federal Constitution because of its confiscatory character, it does not follow that a shipper is obliged, as a matter of law, to make reparation to the carrier.¹¹

The inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment include all the departments of state government, the judicial as well as the political.¹² A similar extent is accorded to like state constitutional provisions. A constitutional mandate to maintain equality before the law and equal laws rests upon the judicial department of government with as much force as upon the other departments.¹³

The general rule is well settled that the provisions of the equal protection clause are not confined to the action of the state through its legislature or through the executive or judicial authority. They relate to and cover all the instrumentalities by which the state acts, and whoever, by virtue of a public position under a state government, deprives another of any right protected by that amendment against deprivation by the state violates the constitutional inhibition; and since he acts in the name of the state and for the state and is clothed with the state's powers, his act is that of the state.¹⁴ Hence, the prohibitions include every person, whether natural or juridical, who is the re-

⁹Robinson v. Holman, 181 Ark. 428, 26 S. W. (2d) 66, 70 A.L.R. 1480, writ of certiorari denied in 282 U. S. 804, 75 L. ed. 722, 51 S. Ct. 88.

¹⁰Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 40 N. D. 69, 168 N. W. 634, 12 A.L.R. 744, writ of error dismissed in 254 U. S. 370, 65 L. ed. 310, 41 S. Ct. 140.

¹³Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407.

¹⁴Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 57 L. ed. 510, 33 S. Ct. 312; Raymond v. Chicago Edison Co. 207 U. S. 42, 52 L. ed. 90, 28 S. Ct. 14, 13 Ann. Cas. 757; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; Indiana Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. State, 158 Ind. 516, 63 N. E. 220, 57 L.R.A. 761; George v. Portland, 114 Or. 418, 235 P. 681, 39 A.L.R. 341; Ladner v. Siegel Co. 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172; Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. Rep. 297, 277 S. W. 1091, citing R. C. L. If an individual is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which, under substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 235 U. S. 151, 59 L. ed. 169, 35 S. Ct. 69. In Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U. S. 571, 63 L. ed. 780, 39 S. Ct. 380, it was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a so-called specification promulgated by a state official, on the ground that its enforcement unconstitutionally interfered with private business in disregard of the guaranty as to equal protection of the laws was properly dismissed, where it was found that such specification did not have the force of law, its function being educational, or at most advisory.

pository of state power.¹⁵ All governmental agencies authorized by the state,¹⁶

itself is rendered possible or is efficiently aided by the state authority lodged

in the wrongdoer.¹⁸ Hence, the rights protected by the equal protection clause

§ 474. Persons Protected.—

was designed to prevent any person or class from being singled out as a special subject of hostile or discriminating legislation.²⁰ It relates to individuals,¹ but its protective scope goes much further, for it forbids the legislature

to select any person, natural or artificial, and impose discriminations not cast

within the meaning of this clause is so well settled as to be open to no question.³ Declaring a business trust to be a corporation, however, denies to no

cannot invoke the equal protection clause against an act of the state legislature.⁵ The legislature is not precluded from putting a burden upon a municipality because it may result in incidental benefit to another.⁶ Moreover, a

state is not compelled by the Federal Constitution to grant to all its municipal

has been held, however, that the legislature cannot arbitrarily classify municipal corporations, but that there must be some reasonable relation to the situation of the municipalities classified and the objects to be attained.⁸ The

¹⁵Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 57 L. ed. 510, 33 S. Ct. 312.

¹⁷Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 57 L. ed. 510, 33 S. Ct. 312; George v. Portland, 114 Or. 418, 235 P. 681, 39 A.L.R. 341. As to the principle of equality which is required in municipal legislation, see MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 812, § 117].

¹⁸Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 57 L. ed. 510, 33 S. Ct. 312.

¹⁹Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 76 L. ed. 265, 52 S. Ct. 133.

²⁰Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 8 S. Ct. 737; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965.

⁴State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243 P. 2, 247 P. 476, 46 A.L.R. 165.

⁵Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 77 L. ed. 1015, 53 S. Ct. 431. See also Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937,

⁴²L. ed. 1047, 18 S. Ct. 617. Towns are not denied the equal protection of the laws because the legislature puts them in a class by themselves, organized into a single municipal corporation and separated from other towns in the state by being subjected to different control in respect to highways. Ibid.

⁸People ex rel. Hatfield v. Grover, 258 Ill. 124, 101 N. E. 216, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 212.

for the exercise of legislative discretion, and the equal protection of the law is

The rule is well settled that in order for a person to urge that a law is discriminatory, he must show that he himself belongs to the affected class,¹⁰ and

the same position as the other is, if a discrimination at all, a purely academic

§ 475. —

"Within Its Jurisdiction."—By the very wording of the equal protection clause the state is forbidden to deny to any person "within its jurisdiction" the equal protection of the laws.13 The Supreme Court has pointed

out that this phrase places a definite scope upon the inhibition against legislation by a state,¹⁴ and that the prohibition of the equal protection clause

manifestly relates only to the denial by the state of equal protection to persons "within its jurisdiction."¹⁵

to persons physically present within the jurisdiction of the state the protection of the laws of which they invoke.¹⁶ The words "within its jurisdiction"

are, however, comprehensive.¹⁷ A person, natural or artificial, who has acquired a large amount of property in a state by its authority and in compliance with its laws, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, has

⁹Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 56 L. ed. 215, 32 S. Ct. 92, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1349. A city is not denied the equal protection of the laws by a statute imposing upon it a liability for damage to property within its limits, caused by a mob or riot, because when property damaged under like circumstances is situated in a village or other incorporated town, the liability is imposed upon the county instead of upon such village or town. Ibid.

¹²Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803.

¹³United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. 14 "Observe that the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law is not qualified by the words 'within its jurisdiction' while those words are found in the succeeding clause relating to the equal protection of the laws. The court cannot assume that those words were inserted without any object, nor is it at liberty to eliminate them from the Constitution and to interpret the clause in question as if they were not to be found in that instrument." Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165.

¹⁵Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 S. Ct. 935; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1065, affirmed in 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707,

³³S. Ct. 408. See also State ex rel. Atlantic Horse Ins. Co. v. Blake, 241 Mo. 100,

¹⁴⁴S. W. 1094, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1283. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064, the Supreme Court stated that the equal protection clause is universal in its application "to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction." A nonresident mortgagee is not within the jurisdiction of the state merely because he has a mortgage on property therein, so as to be deprived of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by denying him the right to participate on terms of equality in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign corporation. Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 S. Ct. 935.

¹⁷Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp. 262 U. S. 544, 67 L. ed. 1112, 43 S. Ct. 636.

its jurisdiction for all purposes of such undertaking.¹⁹ A corporation not created in a state or doing business there under conditions that subject it to process issuing from the courts thereof at the instance of suitors is not, under the equal protection clause, within the jurisdiction of that state.²⁰

B. CLASSIFICATION

§ 476. Generally.—

The rule is well settled that a state may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation1 and pass laws applicable only to persons or objects within a designated class,2 for the purpose of obtaining revenue, applying the police power, strictly so-called, or increasing the industries of the state, developing its resources, or adding to its wealth and prosperity.3 As a matter of fact, as some of the courts have remarked, all legislation involves classification;4 from the earliest days classification has been made by legislatures whereby some people have rights or suffer burdens which others do not.5 Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is what is prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.6

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not intend to take from the states the right and power to classify the subjects of legis-

¹⁹Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp. 262 U. S. 544, 67 L. ed. 1112, 43 S. Ct. 636.

¹District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 53 L. ed. 941, 29 S. Ct. 560; Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U. S. 340, 52 L. ed. 822, 28 S. Ct. 533; St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 633, 50 L. ed. 896, 26 S. Ct. 554, 5 Ann. Cas. 909; State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 67; Bon Homme County v. Berndt, 13 S. D. 309, 83 N. W. 333, 50 L.R.A. 351.

²Springfield Gas & E. Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A.L.R. 929, affirmed in 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. ed. 131, 42 S. Ct. 24; People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 46, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 643.

³Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A.1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210.

⁴Ex parte Lewinsky, 66 Fla. 324, 63 So. 577, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1156; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A.L.R. 270; Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A.1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210; Nitka v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 Wis. 105, 135 N. W. 492, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 337, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 863. The greater part of all legislation is discriminatory in the extent to which it operates, the manner in which it applies, or the objects sought to be attained by it. Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A. 1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210.

⁵Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1338; State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L.R.A. 252.

⁶Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 S. Ct. 207; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 S. Ct. 350; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1065, affirmed in 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997; State Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 P. 755, L.R.A.1915E, 675, affirmed in 238 U. S. 611, 59 L. ed. 1488, 35 S. Ct. 792; Van Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce (Del.) 578, 91 A. 385, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 104; Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Bd. 278 Ill. 77, 115 N. E. 822, citing R. C. L.; People v. Gordon, 274 Ill. 462, 113 N. E. 864, citing R. C. L.; Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 Ann. Cas. 487; McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; State v. Latham, 115 Me. 176, 98 A. 578, L.R.A. 1917A, 480; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Baltimore v. Hampton Court Co. 138 Md. 271, 113 A. 850, 15 A.L.R. 304; Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. 211 Mich. 90, 178 N. W. 776, 12 A.L.R. 605; Cameron v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 63 Minn. 384, 65 N. W. 652, 31 L.R.A. 553; State v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. W. 945, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 477; Jones v. Union County, 63 Or. 566, 127 P. 781, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L.R.A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948.

lation.⁷ It does not prohibit8 or prevent classification,⁹ provided such classification of persons and things is reasonable for the purpose of legislation,¹ is

⁷Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 59 L. ed. 364, 35 S. Ct. 167; Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. ed. 1142, 24 S. Ct. 784; Clein v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 529, 139 S. E. 46, 53 A.L.R. 933; Norris v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 658, 142 N. W. 114, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1194.

⁸Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 538, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647.

⁹Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 81 L. ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476, affirming 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 538, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647; Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 73 L. ed. 475, 49 S. Ct. 188; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 64 L. ed. 989, 40 S. Ct. 560; Farmers Irrig. Dist. v. Nebraska, 244 U. S. 325, 61 L. ed. 1168, 37 S. Ct. 630; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Clough, 242 U. S. 375, 61 L. ed. 374, 37 S. Ct. 144; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59 L. ed. 1199, 35 S. Ct. 675, L.R.A.1915E, 953; South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, 59 L. ed. 839, 35 S. Ct. 504; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 59 L. ed. 364, 35 S. Ct. 167; McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Wryn, 70 Okla. 247, 174 P. 230, 11 A.L.R. 859; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584. Diversity in legislation to meet diversities in conditions is permitted under the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Latham, 115 Me. 176, 98 A. 578, L.R.A.1917A, 480.

¹United States.—Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 75 L. ed. 496, 51 S. Ct. 273, 75 A.L.R. 9; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 72 L. ed. 927, 48 S. Ct. 553; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 69 L. ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44 A.L.R. 1454; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 64 L. ed. 989, 40 S. Ct. 560; Farmers Irrig. Dist. v. Nebraska, 244 U. S. 325, 61 L. ed. 1168, 37 S. Ct. 630; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59 L. ed. 1199, 35 S. Ct. 675, L.R.A.1915E, 953; Denver v. New York Trust Co. 229 U. S. 123, 57 L. ed. 1101, 33 S. Ct. 657; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. ed. 1050, 33 S. Ct. 692; Wil- liams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415, 56 L. ed. 253, 32 S. Ct. 137; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 53 L. ed. 941, 29 S. Ct. 560; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & S. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Kane v. Erie R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 133 F. 681, 68 L.R.A. 788. Florida.—Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 126, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234. Illinois.—Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Lueth v. Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N. E. 690, 79 A.L.R. 780; Springfield Gas & E. Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A.L.R. 929, affirmed in 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. ed. 131, 42 S. Ct. 24; Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Bd. 278 Ill. 77, 115 N. E. 822, citing R. C. L.; People v. Gordon, 274 Ill. 462, 113 N. E. 864, citing R. C. L. Indiana.—McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Baldwin v. State, 194 Ind. 303, 141 N. E. 343, citing R. C. L. Iowa.—McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 706. Kentucky.—Sanders v. Com. 117 Ky. 1, 77 S. W. 358, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 111 Am. St. Rep. 219. Louisiana.—State v. Hill, 168 La. 761, 123 So. 317, 69 A.L.R. 574. Massachusetts.—Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867. Nebraska. — State ex rel. Sorensen v. First State Bank, 123 Neb. 502, 240 N. W. 747, 79 A.L.R. 576; Norris v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 658, 142 N. W. 114, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1194; Farmers' etc. Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 62 Neb. 213, 86 N. W. 1070, 97 Am. St. Rep. 624. New Hampshire.—Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 A. 193, 94 A.L.R. 1067. New Jersey.—Wanser v. Hoos, 60 N. J. L. 482, 38 A. 449, 64 Am. St. Rep. 600. North Dakota.—Peterson v. Panovitz, 62 N. D. 328, 243 N. W. 798, 84 A.L.R. 1290; Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1338. Ohio.—Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio St. 253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 726. Oregon.—Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136. Pennsylvania.—Com. use of Titusville v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 46 A. 286, 57 L.R.A. 348, 86 Am. St. Rep. 694, affirmed in 184 U. S. 329, 46 L. ed. 569, 22 S. Ct. 382; Juniata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, 187 Pa. 193, 40 A. 977, 42 L.R.A. 442, 67 Am. St. Rep. 579. South Carolina.—Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1063. Texas. — Ex parte Sepulveda, 108 Tex. Crim. Rep. 533, 2 S. W. (2d) 445, citing R. C. L.; Fletcher v. Bordelon (Tex. Civ. App.) 56 S. W. (2d) 313, citing R. C. L.;

law,² is not clearly arbitrary,³ and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or

Proper classification is distinctly contemplated by other than those guarantees.

designed to accord with superior constitutional requirements with a view to avoid-

sonable. Thus, a classification adopted in a state statute with a view to avoid-

**§ ⁴⁷⁷. Size.**—The general rule is well settled that legislation which, in

²Waid v. Ft. Worth (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 S. W. 114, citing Schnek (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 D. C. R. Co. v. Frazier (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 803, citing R. v. Fisher, 137 Va. 75,

¹¹⁹S. E. 259, citing R. C. L. Virginia.—Roanoke v. R. C. L. Northern P. Washington.—Archibald v. Northern P. R. Co. 108 Wash. 97, 183 P. 95, citing R. C. L.; State v. Bowen, 86 Wash. 23, 149 P. 330, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 625. Wisconsin.—Julien v. Model Bldg. Loan & Invest. Asso. 116 Wis. 79, 92 N. W. 561, 61 L.R.A. 668. Wyoming.—State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819. A constitutional prohibition of class legis- lation does not preclude the making of a reasonable classification of persons or things for the purpose of legislation. Boli- var Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271. The equal protection clause of the Four- teenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and, there- fore, is purely arbitrary. Whitney v. Cali- fornia, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138; New Orleans v. Calamarl, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172, 22 A.L.R. 106; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Witt v. People's State Bank,

¹⁶⁶S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1063; Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S. W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177, writ of error dis- missed in 239 U. S. 453, 60 L. ed. 437, 36 S. Ct. 161; Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah, 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259; Bowman v. Virginia State En- tomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A.L.R. 1121. As to reasonableness of classification, see infra, § 480.

²Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby (C. C. A. 8th) 178 F. 619, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97; Consumers' League v. Colorado & S. R. Co. 53 Colo. 54, 125 P. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1158; People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 46, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1129; Cincin- nati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 65; Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648,

⁹⁵N. E. 114, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 724; Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N. E. 1071, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1190; Dietch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534, citing R. C. L.; Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A.1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio St. 253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 726, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 629; Upham v. Bramwell, Ann. Cas. 597, 209 P. 100, 25 A.L.R. 919; Flem-

¹⁰⁵Or. 597, 209 P. 100, 25 A.L.R. 919; Flem- ing v. L.R.A.(N.S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1086; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co.

¹²⁴Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; Archibald v. Northern P. R. Co. 108 Wash. 97, 183 P. 95, citing R. C. L. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1163. As to proper distinctions for classifica- tion, see infra, § 481.

³Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co. 110 Me. 374, 86 A. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 396.

¹L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 111 Am. St. Rep. 219; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771,

⁴⁵L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201; Brat- berg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1333.

⁷Brewer v. McClelland, 144 Ind. 423, 32 N. E. 299, 17 L.R.A. 845 (constitutional pro- visions classifying qualifications of voters).

⁸State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. 299 U. S. 59, 81 L. ed. 38, 57 S. Ct. 77, rehearing denied in 299 U. S. 623, 81 L. ed. 458, 57 S. Ct. 229 (imposing state li- cense tax for privilege of importing beer).

⁹Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 76 L. ed. 643, 52 S. Ct. 273, 79 A.L.R. 546 (per- mitting tobacco advertising in newspapers and magazines). Annotation: 79 A.L.R. 551.

carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere

of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the

group of persons, and not to others, does not affect its validity, if it is so made

¹⁰United States.—State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219,

⁶¹L. ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 55 L. ed. 229, 31 S. Ct. 246; Wil- liams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 54 L. ed. 673, 30 S. Ct. 493; Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. ed. 1142, 24 S. Ct. 784; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; McPherson v. Black- er, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith,

¹²⁹U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 S. Ct. 207; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 S. Ct. 350; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Cin- cinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky,

¹¹⁵U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 S. Ct. 57; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1065, affirmed in 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; Fidelity & C. Co. v. Freeman (C. C. A. 6th) 109 P. 847, 54 L.R.A. 630. Alabama.—Miller v. Birmingham, 151 Ala. 469, 44 So. 388, 125 Am. St. Rep. 31. Arkansas.—Arkansas Stave Co. v. State,

⁹⁴Ark. 27, 125 S. W. 1001, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 255, 140 Am. St. Rep. 103. California.—Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Ct. 214 Cal. 668, 8 P. (2d) 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217; State Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 P. 755, L.R.A. 1915D, 675, affirmed in 238 U. S. 611, 59 L. ed. 1488, 35 S. Ct. 792. Delaware.—Van Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce, 578, 91 A. 385, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 104. Florida.—Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965. Georgia.—Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588,

¹¹⁰S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105. Illinois.—Lueth v. Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N. E. 690, 79 A.L.R. 780. Indiana.—Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; State v. Richcreek, 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 874, 119 Am. St. Rep. 491, 10 Ann. Cas. 939; Cleve- land, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 33 N. E. 421, 18 L.R.A. 729. Iowa.—State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs. 207 Iowa, 461, 221 N. W. 364, 75 A.L.R. 1, affirmed in 280 U. S. 529, 74 L. ed. 595, 50 S. Ct. 151. Maine.—State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799; State v. Mont- gomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386. Maryland.—Baltimore v. Hampton Court Co. 133 Md. 271, 113 A. 850, 15 A.L.R. 304; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771,

⁴⁵L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201. Massachusetts.—Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407. Michigan.—People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170, 69 A.L.R. 1024; Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge (Smith v. Command) 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140, 40 A.L.R. 515. Minnesota.—Cameron v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 63 Minn. 384, 65 N. W. 652, 31 L.R.A. 553. Missouri.—State v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. W. 945, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 477. North Carolina.—Broadfoot v. Fayette- ville, 121 N. C. 418, 28 S. E. 515, 39 L.R.A. 245, 61 Am. St. Rep. 668. North Dakota.—Peterson v. Panovitz, 62 N. D. 328, 243 N. W. 798, 84 A.L.R. 1290; Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co.

⁶¹N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1333. Oregon.—Jones v. Union County, 63 Or. 566, 127 P. 781, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035. Pennsylvania.—Philadelphia v. Braben- der, 201 Pa. 574, 51 A. 374, 58 L.R.A. 220. South Carolina.—Johnson, L. & Co. v. Spartan Mills, 68 S. C. 339, 47 S. E. 695, 1 Ann. Cas. 409; Porter v. Charleston & S. R. Co. 63 S. C. 169, 41 S. E. 108, 90 Am. St. Rep. 670. Texas.—Ex parte Sizemore, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 232, 8 S. W. (2d) 134, 59 A.L.R. 430. Utah.—Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789; Brim v. Jones, 11 Utah, 200, 39 P. 825, 29 L.R.A. 97, affirmed in 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282. Wisconsin.—State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585,

⁵⁴N. W. 1104, 19 L.R.A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948. Wyoming.—State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819.

¹¹New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmer- man, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282, affirming

¹¹Utah, 200, 39 P. 825, 29 L.R.A. 97; Mc- Pherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 S. Ct. 192; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 29 L. ed. 229, 5 S. Ct. 1086; Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Rich- mond, 96 U. S. 529, 24 L. ed. 734; Foster v. Police Comrs. 102 Cal. 483, 37 P. 763, 41 Am. St. Rep. 194; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Coachman, 59 Fla. 130, 52 So. 377,

³⁴⁵Ill. 197, 177 N. E. 690, 79 A.L.R. 780; McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 706; Gano v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co.

legislative body enacting it, but is applicable only to certain of such persons.

§ 478. Application of Law to All Members.—

affect alike all persons in the same class and under similar conditions.¹⁴ If a

classification in legislation meets the prerequisites indispensable to the estab-

and the purposes sought to be achieved,¹⁶ as long as the law operates alike on

situated, it is not subject to any objections that it is special or class legisla-

tion,¹⁷ and is not a violation of the Federal guaranty as to the equal protection

⁸⁹Am. St. Rep. 393, affirmed in 190 U. S. 557, 47 L. ed. 1183, 23 S. Ct. 854; Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne)

²³⁹Mich. 204, 214 N. W. 316, 53 A.L.R. 273; Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge (Haynes v. Williams) 201 Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938, L.R.A.1918D, 233; State ex rel. Scheffer v. Justus, 85 Minn. 279, 88 N. W. 759, 56 L.R.A. 757, 89 Am. St. Rep. 550; Allen v. Pioneer Press Co. 40 Minn. 117, 41 N. W. 936, 3 L.R.A. 532, 12 Am. St. Rep. 707; O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co. 198 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150, 115 Am. St. Rep. 495, 8 Ann. Cas. 705; Tonn v. Helena, 42 Mont. 127, 111 P. 715, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1136; Peterson v. Parvovitz, 62 N. D. 328, 243 N. W. 798, 94 A.L.R. 1290; Bratberg v. Ad- vance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452,

³⁴S. D. 271, 148 N. W. 20, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 949; Sammarco v. Boysa, 193 Wis. 642, 215 N. W. 446, 55 A.L.R. 370; Maercker v. Mil- waukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A. 1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199. As to classification based upon numbers, see infra, § 491.

¹²Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997.

¹⁴⁵N. E. 550, 35 A.L.R. 1194; Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne)

¹⁴Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 38 L. ed. 485, 14 S. Ct. 570; Roth Drug v. Johnson, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 720, 57 P. (2d) 1022, citing R. C. L.; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588,

¹¹⁰S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171,

¹⁹¹N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa, 36, 126 N. W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 822; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co. 110 Me. 374, 86 A. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 396; Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251,

¹⁸³A. 534, citing R. C. L.; Re French, 315 Mo. 75, 285 S. W. 513, 47 A.L.R. 588; Re Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 P. 1, 65 L.R.A. 47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66; Broadfoot v. Fayetteville,

⁶¹Am. St. Rep. 668; State v. Norval, 245 Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637; State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N. E. 572, 52 L.R.A. 863, 81 Am. St. Rep. 626; Com. use of Titusville v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 46 A. 286, 57 L.R.A. 348, 86 Am. St. Rep. 694, affirmed in 184 U. S. 329, 46 L. ed. 569, 22 S. Ct. 382; Bent v. Weaver, 108 W. Va. 299, 150 S. E. 738, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199; State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1, 1 A.L.R. 955; State v. Sherman,

¹⁸Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819. A law must apply equally to all of the classes affected by it. Re Ten Hour Law,

¹⁷Frazier v. State Tax Commission.— Ala.— 175 So. 402, 110 A.L.R. 1479; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407,

²⁵S. W. 75, 23 L.R.A. 264, 41 Am. St. Rep. 109; Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 813, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475; Roth Drug v. John- son, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 720, 57 P. (2d) 1022, citing R. C. L.; Dell v. Marvin, 41 Fla. 221, 26 So. 188, 45 L.R.A. 201, 79 Am. St. Rep. 171; Lueth v. Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197,

¹⁷⁷N. E. 690, 79 A.L.R. 780; Springfield Gas & E. Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A.L.R. 929, affirmed in 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. ed. 131, 42 S. Ct. 24; Chicago v. Schmidinger, 243 Ill. 167, 90 N. E. 369,

⁴⁴L.R.A.(N.S.) 632, 17 Ann. Cas. 614, af- firmed in 226 U. S. 578, 57 L. ed. 364, 33 S. Ct. 182, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 284; State v. Richcreek, 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 874, 119 Am. St. Rep. 491, 10 Ann. Cas. 899; Richmond v. Dudley (Ind.)

²⁶N. E. 184, 10 L.R.A. 187, rehearing de- nied in 129 Ind. 112, 28 N. E. 312, 13 L.R.A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180; Iowa Motor Ve- hicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs. 207 Iowa, 461, 221 N. W. 364, 75 A.L.R. 1, affirmed in

²⁸⁰U. S. 529, 74 L. ed. 595, 50 S. Ct. 151; Lee v. Hoffman, 182 Iowa, 1216, 166 N. W. 565, L.R.A.1918C, 933; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 153 Iowa, 702, 133 N. W. 895,

of the laws.¹⁸ Hence, while classification is proper, there must always be uni-

R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A.

S. Ct. 32; Arkadelphia Mill. Co. v. St.

S. Ct. 630; Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash-

O. R. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513, 57 L. ed.

R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed.

S. Ct. 1028; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S.

formity within the class. If persons under the same circumstances and conditions are treated differently, there is arbitrary discrimination, and not classification.¹⁹

§ 479. Completeness of Inclusion of Members.—

In order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, such classification must not be persons who naturally belong to the class.20 Such classification must include or embrace all based on existing circumstances only or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class,1 but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.2 Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances relative to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and

¹⁹Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 S. Ct. 207; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 S. Ct. 730; Hale v. State, 217 Ala. 403, 116 So. 369, 58 A.L.R. 1333; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; Barker v. Crum, 177 Ky. 637, 198 S. W. 211, L.R.A.1918F, 673; Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge (Smith v. Command) 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140, 40 A.L.R. 515; Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge (Haynes v. Williams) 201 Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938, L.R.A.1918D, 233; Re French, 315 Mo. 75, 285 S. W. 513, 47 A.L.R. 688; Lige v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 275 Mo. 249, 204 S. W. 508, L.R.A.1918F, 548; Stroll v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. Rep. 611, 255 S. W. 690, 30 A.L.R. 1424; Brimm v. Jones, 11 Utah, 200, 39 P. 825, 29 L.R.A. 97, affirmed in 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282; Hardwick v. Wolcott, 98 Vt. 343, 129 A. 159, 39 A.L.R. 1222; Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N. W. 522, 90 Am. St. Rep. 853.

²⁰Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282, affirming 11 Utah, 200, 39 P. 825, 29 L.R.A. 97; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby (C. C. A. 8th) 178 F. 619, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97; McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471, 91 A.L.R. 1027; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schuler, 182 Ind. 51, 105 N. E. 560, L.R.A.1915A, 884; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 708; Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 724; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 418; Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. 211 Mich. 90, 178 N. W. 776, 12 A.L.R. 605; Murray v. Ramsey County, 81 Minn. 358, 84 N. W. 103, 51 L.R.A. 828, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379; Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Mo.) 192 S. W. 387, L.R.A.1918A, 166; Kreps v. Brady, 37 Okla. 754, 133 P. 216, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 106; Simmons v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 63 S. C. 425, 41 S. E. 521, 57 L.R.A. 607; State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434; Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 489; Servonitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231, 113 N. W. 277, 126 Am. St. Rep. 955. "The classification must embrace all who possess the attributes or characteristics which are the basis of the classification, and their difference from those excluded must be substantial and related to the purpose of the legislation." McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284. An act of class legislation must include all who belong to the class—all who cannot be distinguished from those included in that particular characteristic which justifies the act—but none who do not belong to the class. Sams v. St. Louis & M. River R. Co. 174 Mo. 53, 73 S. W. 686, 61 L.R.A. 475.

¹Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402, 106 N. W. 477, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 327; State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199; Servonitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231, 113 N. W. 277, 126 Am. St. Rep. 955.

²Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 418; State v. Fairmount Creamery Co. 153 Iowa, 702, 133 N. W. 895, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N. E. 572, 52 L.R.A. 863, 81 Am. St. Rep. 626; Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S. C. 62, 55 S. E. 136, 117 Am. St. Rep. 885, 9 Ann. Cas. 1003; State v. Schlitz Brewing Co. 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S. W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941; Henley v. State, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S. W. 352, 1104, 39 L.R.A. 126; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S. W. 697, 33 L.R.A. 589.

treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class.³ It is also settled that no one who does not properly belong to a class may be included therein.⁴

There seems to be one class of cases which, at least under one view, forms an exception to some of the general principles stated in the foregoing paragraph. Where a statute is remedial or curative, the classification therein contained is legal, if it includes all the subjects which are affected by the conditions which it is sought to remedy or the evils it is sought to cure. This type of legislation, in the jurisdiction adopting this position, apparently forms an exception to the general rule that classification cannot be based on existing conditions alone, since the very object of the statute is to remedy a present condition and, if possible, avoid its repetition.⁵

§ 480. Reasonableness.—

The mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 One of the essential requirements as to classification, in order that it may not violate the constitutional guaranty as to equal protection of the laws, is that the classification must not be capricious or arbitrary,7 but

³Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby (C. C. A. 8th) 178 F. 619, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97; Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, 84 N. E. 769, 15 Ann. Cas. 849; Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. 211 Mich. 90, 178 N. W. 776, 12 A.L.R. 605; State ex rel. McCue v. Ramsey County, 48 Minn. 236, 51 N. W. 112, 31 Am. St. Rep. 650; Johnson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. 43 Minn. 222, 45 N. W. 156, 8 L.R.A. 419; Lodi Twp. v. State, 51 N. J. L. 402, 18 A. 749, 6 L.R.A. 56; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S. W. 697, 33 L.R.A. 589; Stroll v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. Rep. 611, 255 S. W. 620, 30 A.L.R. 1424.

⁴Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby (C. C. A. 8th) 178 F. 619, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 126, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234.

⁵Pollock v. Kansas City, 87 Kan. 205, 123 P. 985, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 465; Cole v. Dorr, 80 Kan. 251, 101 P. 1016, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 534; State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402, 106 N. W. 477, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 327.

⁶Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Re Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789, 57 L.R.A. 540, 89 Am. St. Rep. 791.

⁷United States.—Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 81 L. ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476; Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 79 L. ed. 1054, 55 S. Ct. 525, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 768, 79 L. ed. 1709, 55 S. Ct. 525; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 75 L. ed. 1264, 51 S. Ct. 582; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,

²⁷⁸U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 71 L. ed. 1165, 47 S. Ct. 678; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 64 L. ed. 989, 40 S. Ct. 560; McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 241 U. S. 79, 60 L. ed. 899, 36 S. Ct. 498; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A. 1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59 L. ed. 1199, 35 S. Ct. 675, L.R.A. 1915E, 953; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 S. Ct. 612, L.R.A.1915C, 1189; Denver v. New York Trust Co. 229 U. S. 123, 57 L. ed. 1101, 33 S. Ct. 657; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 57 L. ed. 603, 33 S. Ct. 318; Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. 184, 57 L. ed. 180, 33 S. Ct. 47; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 56 L. ed. 350, 32 S. Ct. 192; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 32 S. Ct. 169, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44; Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415, 56 L. ed. 253, 32 S. Ct. 137; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30 S. Ct. 644; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 52 L. ed. 108, 28 S. Ct. 28; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 43 L. ed. 786, 19 S. Ct. 522; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255. Alabama.—Frazier v. State Tax Commission, — Ala. —, 175 So. 402, 110 A.L.R. 1479.

**California.**—Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, ⁸ Cal. (2d) ⁴⁰⁵, ⁶⁵ P. (2d) ⁸⁸⁴, ¹⁰⁹ A.L.R. ⁸⁹⁵; Moore v. Webb, ²¹⁹ Cal. ³⁰⁴, ²⁶ P. (2d) ²², ⁸⁹ A.L.R. ⁹²⁵; Re Stephan, ¹⁷⁰ Cal. ⁴⁸, ¹⁴⁸ P. ¹⁹⁶, Ann. Cas. 1916E, ⁶¹⁷; Deycoe v. Superior Ct. ¹⁴⁰ Cal. ⁴⁷⁶, ⁷⁴ P. ²⁸, ⁹⁸ Am. St. Rep. —; Van Winkle v. State, ⁴ **Delaware.**—Boyce, ⁵⁷⁸, ⁹¹ A. ³⁸⁵, ³ Boyce, ⁵⁴⁹, ⁸³ A. Clendaniel v. Conrad, ³ Boyce, ⁵⁴⁹, ⁸³ A. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915B, ⁹⁶⁸, writ of error dismissed in ²³⁵ U. S. ⁷¹², ⁵⁹ L. ed. ⁴³⁷, ³⁵ S. Ct. ²⁰³.

**Florida.**—State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, ⁷⁰ Fla. ³⁴⁰, ⁷⁰ So. ³⁶⁷, Ann. Cas. 1918A, ¹³⁸; Davis v. Ann. Cas. 1914B, ⁹⁶⁵; Seaboard Air Line ²⁰ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁴⁰, ⁴⁶, ⁴⁶ So. ⁵⁹, ⁵⁹; Co. v. Simon, ⁵⁶ Fla. ⁵⁴⁵, ⁴⁷ So. 1001, ²⁰ L.R.A.(N.S.) ¹²⁶, ¹⁶ Ann. Cas. 1234.

**Georgia.**—Cooper v. Rollins, ¹⁵² Ga. ⁵⁸⁸, ¹¹⁰ S. E. ⁷²⁶, ²⁰ A.L.R. 1105.

**Illinois.**—Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Bd. ²⁷⁸ Ill. ⁷⁷, ¹¹⁵ N. E. ⁸²², citing R. C. L.; People v. Gordon, ²⁷⁴ Ill. ⁴⁶², ¹¹³ N. E. ⁶⁴, citing R. C. L. ⁹⁹⁴, ⁴⁴ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁵⁵⁷ Ill. ³³⁴, ¹⁰⁰, 1914A, 1129; Christy v. El. ⁴⁶, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1129; Christy v. El. Hott, ²¹⁶ Ill. ³¹, ⁷⁴ N. E. 1035, ¹ L.R.A. (N.S.) ²¹⁵, ¹⁰⁸ Am. St. Rep. ¹⁹⁶, ³ Ann. Cas. ⁴⁸⁷.

**Indiana.**—Miles v. Department of Treasury, —, Ind. —, ¹⁹³ N. E. ⁸⁵⁵, ⁹⁷ A.L.R. 1474, superseded but opinion not altered on this point in ²⁰⁹ Ind. ¹⁷², ¹⁹⁹ N. E. ³⁷², ¹⁰¹ A.L.R. 1359; McErlain v. Taylor, ²⁰⁷ Ind. ²⁴⁰, ¹⁹² N. E. ²⁶⁰, ⁹⁴ A.L.R. 1284; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, ²⁰⁷ Ind. ¹⁷¹, ¹⁹¹ N. E. ¹⁵⁸, ⁹⁶ A.L.R. ²⁷¹; Elwood v. State, ²⁰³ Ind. ⁶²⁶, N. E. ⁴⁷¹, ⁸¹ A.L.R. 1027; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, ¹⁹⁹ Ind. ⁹⁵, ¹⁵⁵ N. E. ⁴⁶⁵, ⁵⁰ A.L.R. 1518; Baldwin v. State, ¹⁹⁴ Ind. ³⁰³, ¹⁴¹ N. E. ³⁴³, citing R. C. L.; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, ¹⁹² Ind. ¹⁴⁴, ¹³² N. E. ⁶²⁹, ²¹ A.L.R. ⁵⁵⁷; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, ¹⁷⁶ Ind. ¹, ⁹⁷ N. E. ¹, Ann. Cas. 1914C, ⁷⁰⁸.

**Iowa.**—Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. ¹⁷⁵ Iowa, ²⁴⁵, ¹⁵⁴ N. W. 1037, ¹⁵⁷ N. W. ¹⁴⁵, L.R.A.1917D, ¹⁵, Ann. Cas. 1917E, ⁸⁰³; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. ¹⁵³ Iowa, ⁷⁰², ¹³³ N. W. ⁸⁹⁵, ⁴² L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁸²¹; Hubbell v. Higgins, ¹⁴⁸ Iowa, ³⁶, ¹²⁶ N. W. ⁹¹⁴, Ann. Cas. 1912B, ⁸²².

**Kansas.**—Atkinson v. Woodmansee, ⁶⁸ Kan. ⁷¹, ⁷⁴ P. ⁶⁴⁰, ⁶⁴ L.R.A. ³²⁵.

**Kentucky.**—Campbell v. Com. ²²⁹ Ky. ²⁶⁴, ¹⁷ S. W. (2d) ²²⁷, ⁶³ A.L.R. ⁹³²; Louisville v. Coulter, ¹⁷⁷ Ky. ²⁴², ¹⁹⁷ S. W. ⁸¹⁹, L.R.A.1918A, ⁸¹¹; Stratman v. Com. ¹³⁷ Ky. ⁵⁰⁰, ¹²⁵ S. W. 1094, ²⁷ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁹⁴⁹, ¹³⁶ Am. St. Rep. ²⁹⁹.

**Louisiana.**—State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Co. ¹⁶² La. ¹⁶⁵, ¹¹⁰ So. ¹⁸⁸, ⁵¹ A.L.R. ²⁶¹.

**Maine.**—State v. Latham, ¹¹⁵ Me. ¹⁷⁶, ⁹⁸ A. ⁵⁷⁸, L.R.A.1917A, ⁴⁸⁰; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co. ¹¹⁰ Me. ³⁷⁴, ⁸⁶ A. ³²⁰, Ann. Cas. 1914D, ³⁹⁶; State v. Mitchell, ⁹⁷ Me. ⁶⁶, ⁵³ A. ⁸⁸⁷, ⁹⁴ Am. St. Rep. ⁴⁸¹; State v. Montgomery, ⁹⁴ Me. ¹⁹², ⁴⁷ A. ¹⁶⁵, ⁸⁰ Am. St. Rep. ³⁸⁶.

**Maryland.**—Luman v. Hitchens Bros. Co. ⁹⁰ Md. ¹⁴, ⁴⁴ A. 1051, ⁴⁶ L.R.A. ³⁹³; State v. Broadbelt, ⁸⁹ Md. ⁵⁶⁵, ⁴³ A. ⁷⁷¹, ⁴⁵ State L.R.A. ⁴³³, ⁷³ Am. St. Rep. ²⁰¹.

**Massachusetts.**—Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. ²⁶⁰ Mass. ³³⁵, ¹⁵⁷ N. E. ⁶⁵¹, ⁵³ A.L.R. ⁸⁶⁷.

**Michigan.**—Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne) ²³⁹ Mich. ²⁰⁴, ²¹⁴ N. W. ³¹⁶, ⁵³ A.L.R. ²⁷³.

**Minnesota.**—State v. Bridgeman & R. Co. ¹¹⁷ Minn. ¹⁸⁶, ¹³⁴ N. W. ⁴⁹⁶, Ann. Cas. 1913D, ⁴¹; State v. Brown, ⁹⁷ Minn. ⁴⁰², ¹⁰⁸ N. W. ⁴⁷¹, ⁵ L.R.A.(N.S.) ³²⁷; State v. Justus, ¹⁰³ Am. St. Rep. ⁵²¹, ¹ Ann. L.R.A. ⁵¹⁰; State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, Cas. ⁹¹; State ex rel. ⁸⁹ N. W. ¹⁷⁵, ⁵⁷ L.R.A. ²⁹⁷, ⁸⁵ Minn. St. Rep. ⁵⁷¹; Murray v. Ramsey ⁸⁹ Am. Minn. ³⁵⁹, ⁸⁴ N. W. ¹⁰³, ⁵¹ County, ⁸³ Am. St. Rep. ³⁷⁹.

**Missouri.**—State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, L.R.A. ⁸²⁸, ³⁴ S. W. (2d) ¹²⁴, citing R. ³²⁶ Mo. 1233, ³⁴ French, ³¹⁵ Mo. ⁷⁵, ²⁸⁵ S. W. C. la. Re L.R.A. ⁶⁸²; State v. Missouri Tie & ⁵¹³, ⁴⁷ A.L.R. Co. ¹⁸¹ Mo. ⁵³⁶, ⁸⁰ S. W. ⁹³³, ⁶⁵ Timber Co. ¹⁰³ Am. St. Rep. ⁶¹⁴, ² Ann. Cas. ¹¹⁹; State v. Loomis, ¹¹⁵ Mo. ³⁰⁷, ²² S. W. ³⁵⁰, ²¹ L.R.A. ⁷⁸⁹.

**Montana.**—Hill v. Rae, ⁵² Mont. ³⁷⁸, ¹⁵⁸ P. ⁸²⁶, L.R.A.1917A, ⁴⁹⁵, Ann. Cas. 1917E, ²¹⁰; John v. Northern P. R. Co. ⁴² Mont. ¹⁸, ¹¹¹ P. ⁶³², ³² L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁸⁵.

**Nebraska.**—Rosenbloom v. State, ⁶⁴ Neb. ³⁴², ⁸⁹ N. W. 1053, ⁵⁷ L.R.A. ⁹²².

**New Hampshire.**—Woolf v. Fuller, ⁸⁷ N. H. ⁶⁴, ¹⁷⁴ A. ¹⁹³, ⁹⁴ A.L.R. 1067.

**New York.**—People v. Beakes Dairy Co. ²²² N. Y. ⁴¹⁶, ¹¹⁹ N. E. ¹¹⁵, ³ A.L.R. 1260; Hauser v. North British & M. Ins. Co. ²⁰⁶ N. Y. ⁴⁵⁵, ¹⁰⁰ N. E. ⁵², ⁴² L.R.A.(N.S.) 1139, Ann. Cas. 1914B, ⁴³⁸; Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. ¹⁹⁴ N. Y. ³²⁶, ⁸⁷ N. E. ⁵⁰⁴, ²³ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁴³⁶, ¹²⁸ Am. St. Rep. ⁵⁵⁵, ¹⁶ Ann. Cas. ⁹⁸⁹; Re Pell, ¹⁷¹ N. Y. ⁴⁸, ⁶³ N. E. ⁷⁸⁹, ⁵⁷ L.R.A. ⁵⁴⁰, ⁸⁹ Am. St. Rep. ⁷⁹¹.

**North Dakota.**—Peterson v. Panovitz, ⁶² N. D. ³²⁸, ²⁴³ N. W. ⁷⁹⁸, ⁸⁴ A.L.R. 1290; State ex rel. Fargo v. Wetz, ⁴⁰ N. D. ²⁹⁹, ¹⁶⁸ N. W. ⁸³⁵, ⁵ A.L.R. ⁷³¹.

**Ohio.**—State v. Norval Hotel Co. ¹⁰³ Ohio St. ³⁶¹, ¹³³ N. E. ⁷⁵, ¹⁹ A.L.R. ⁶³⁷; Bronson v. Oberlin, ⁴¹ Ohio St. ⁴⁷⁶, ⁵² Am. Rep. ⁹⁰.

**Oklahoma.**—Trustees' Exrs' & Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, ⁵³ Okla. ⁵³⁰, ¹⁵⁷ P. ²⁹³, L.R.A.1916E, ⁶⁰².

**Oregon.**—Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, ¹³⁹ Or. ⁴³⁴, ⁹ P. (2d) ¹²², ⁸¹ A.L.R. 1136.

**Pennsylvania.**—Com. v. Girard L. Ins. Co. ³⁰⁵ Pa. ⁵⁵⁸, ¹⁵⁸ A. ²⁶², ⁸³ A.L.R. ⁴⁶⁰, affirmed in ²⁸⁷ U. S. ⁵⁷⁰, ⁷⁷ L. ed. ⁵⁰¹, ⁵³ S. Ct. ⁹⁴.

**South Carolina.**—Ex parte Hollman, ⁷⁹ S. C. ⁹, ⁶⁰ S. E. ¹⁹, ²¹ L.R.A.(N.S.) ²⁴², ¹⁴ Ann. Cas. 1105; Laurens v. Anderson, ⁷⁵ S. C. ⁶², ⁵⁵ S. E. ¹³⁶, ¹¹⁷ Am. St. Rep. ⁸⁸⁵, ⁹ Ann. Cas. 1003.

**Tennessee.**—Beasley v. Cunningham, ¹⁷¹ Tenn. ³³⁴, ¹⁰³ S. W. (2d) ¹⁸, ¹¹⁰ A.L.R. ³⁰⁶; State v. McKay, ¹³⁷ Tenn. ²⁸⁰, ¹⁹³ S. W. ⁹⁹, Ann. Cas. 1917E, ¹⁵⁸; Memphis v. State, ¹³³ Tenn. ⁸³, ¹⁷⁹ S. W. ⁶³¹, L.R.A. 1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056; Fleming v. Memphis, ¹²⁶ Tenn. ³³¹, ¹⁴⁸ S. W. 1057, ⁴² L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁴⁹³, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1306; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. ¹²⁴ Tenn. ¹, ¹³⁵ S. W. ⁷⁷³, Ann. Cas. 1912D, ⁸⁰⁵; State v. Cook, ¹⁰⁷ Tenn. ⁴⁹⁹, ⁶⁴ S. W. ⁷²⁰, ⁶² L.R.A. ¹⁷⁴, writ of error dismissed in ¹⁸⁷ U. S. ⁶³⁹, ⁴⁷ L. ed. ³⁴⁴, ²³ S. Ct. ⁸⁴⁷; State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co. ¹⁰⁴ Tenn. ⁷¹⁵, ⁵⁹ S. W. 1033, ⁷⁸ Am. St. Rep. ⁹⁴¹; Sutton v. State, ⁹⁶ Tenn. ⁶⁹⁶, ³⁶ S. W. ⁶⁹⁷, ³³ L.R.A. ⁵⁸⁹; Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants (Dibrell v. La-

must be reasonable8 and natural.⁹ It is often stated that a classification must

**Texas.**—Randolph v. State, ¹¹⁷ Tex. Crim. Rep. ⁸⁰, ³⁶ S. W. (2d) ⁴⁸⁴, citing R. C. L.

**Utah.**—Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, ⁵⁸ Utah, ³¹⁴, ¹⁹⁹ P. ¹⁵², ¹⁸ A.L.R. ²⁵⁹.

**Virginia.**—Buck v. Bell, ¹⁴³ Va. ³¹⁰, ¹³⁰ S. E. ⁵¹⁶, ⁵¹ A.L.R. ⁸⁵⁵, affirmed in ²⁷⁴ U. S. ²⁰⁰, ⁷¹ L. ed. 1000, ⁴⁷ S. Ct. ⁵⁸⁴.

**Washington.**—State v. Walter Bowen & Co. ⁸⁶ Wash. ²³, ¹⁴⁹ P. ³³⁰, Ann. Cas. 1917B, ⁶²⁵; State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, ⁶⁵ Wash. ¹⁵⁶, ¹¹⁷ P. 1101, ³⁷ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁴⁶⁶.

**Wisconsin.**—State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, ¹¹¹ Wis. ⁴³¹, ⁸⁷ N. W. ⁵⁶¹, ⁵⁶ L.R.A. ²⁵².

The equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution is directed only against arbitrary discrimination, that is, such as is without any reasonable basis. Denver v. New York Trust Co. ²²⁹ U. S. ¹²³, ⁵⁷ L. ed. 1101, ³³ S. Ct. ⁶⁵⁷.

8 **United States.**—Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, ³⁰¹ U. S. ⁴⁵⁹, ⁸¹ L. ed. 1223, ⁵⁷ S. Ct. ⁸³⁸; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. ²⁹⁹ U. S. ¹⁸³, ⁸¹ L. ed. ¹⁰⁹, ⁵⁷ S. Ct. ¹³⁹, ¹⁰⁶ A.L.R. 1476; Colgate v. Harvey, ²⁹⁶ U. S. ⁴⁰⁴, ⁸⁰ L. ed. ²⁹⁹, ⁵⁶ S. Ct. ²⁵², ¹⁰² A.L.R. ⁵⁴; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, ²⁸⁸ U. S. ⁵¹⁷, ⁷⁷ L. ed. ⁹²⁹, ⁵³ S. Ct. ⁴⁸¹, ⁸⁵ A.L.R. ⁶⁹⁹; Sproles v. Binford, ²⁸⁶ U. S. ³⁷⁴, ⁷⁶ L. ed. 1167, ⁵² S. Ct. ⁵⁸¹; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, ²⁷⁰ U. S. ²³⁰, ⁷⁰ L. ed. ⁵⁵⁷, ⁴⁶ S. Ct. ²⁶⁰, ⁴³ A.L.R. 1224; Truax v. Corrigan, ²⁵⁷ U. S. ³¹², ⁶⁶ L. ed. ²⁵⁴, ⁴² S. Ct. ¹²⁴, ²⁷ A.L.R. ³⁷⁵; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, ²⁵³ U. S. ⁴¹², ⁶⁴ L. ed. ⁹⁸⁹, ⁴⁰ S. Ct. ⁵⁶⁰; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. ²⁴⁰ U. S. ³⁴², ⁶⁰ L. ed. ⁶⁷⁹, ³⁶ S. Ct. ³⁷⁰, L.R.A.1917A, ⁴²¹, Ann. Cas. 1917B, ⁴⁵⁵; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, ²³⁸ U. S. ⁵⁶, ⁵⁹ L. ed. 1199, ³⁵ S. Ct. ⁶⁷⁵, L.R.A.1915E, ⁹⁵³; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) ¹⁴⁸ F. ⁵¹³, ⁸ Ann. Cas. ⁹⁹⁷; Kane v. Erie R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) ¹³³ F. ⁶⁸¹, ⁶⁸ L.R.A. ⁷⁸⁸.

**California.**—Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, ⁸ Cal. (2d) ⁴⁰⁵, ⁶⁵ P. (2d) ⁸⁸⁴, ¹⁰⁹ A.L.R. ⁸⁹⁵; Moore v. Webb, ²¹⁹ Cal. ³⁰⁴, ²⁶ P. (2d) ²², ⁸⁹ A.L.R. ⁹²⁵; Re Stephan, ¹⁷⁰ Cal. ⁴⁸, ¹⁴⁸ P. ¹⁹⁶, Ann. Cas. 1916E, ⁶¹⁷; Title & D. Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, ¹⁵⁰ Cal. ²⁸⁹, ⁸⁸ P. ³⁵⁶, ⁸ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁶⁸², ¹¹⁹ Am. St. Rep. ¹⁹⁹; Roth Drug v. Johnson, ¹³ Cal. App. (2d) ⁷²⁰, ⁵⁷ P. (2d) 1022, citing R. C. L.

**Delaware.**—Van Winkle v. State, ⁴ Boyce, ⁵⁷⁸, ⁹¹ A. ³⁸⁵, Ann. Cas. 1916D, ¹⁰⁴; Clendaniel v. Conrad, ³ Boyce, ⁵⁴⁹, ⁸³ A. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915B, ⁹⁶⁸, writ of error dismissed in ²³⁵ U. S. ⁷¹², ⁵⁹ L. ed. ⁴³⁷, ³⁵ S. Ct. ²⁰³.

**Florida.**—State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, ⁷⁰ Fla. ³⁴⁰, ⁷⁰ So. ³⁶⁷, Ann. Cas. 1918A, ¹³⁸.

**Illinois.**—Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Bd. ²⁷⁸ Ill. ⁷⁷, ¹¹⁵ N. E. ⁸²², citing R. C. L.; People v. Gordon, ²⁷⁴ Ill. ⁴⁶², ¹¹³ N. E. ⁸⁶⁴, citing R. C. L.

**Indiana.**—McErlain v. Taylor, ²⁰⁷ Ind. ²⁴⁰, ¹⁹² N. E. ²⁶⁰, ⁹⁴ A.L.R. 1284; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, ²⁰⁷ Ind.

171, ¹⁹¹ N. E. ¹⁵⁸, ⁹⁶ A.L.R. ²⁷¹; Elwood v. State, ²⁰³ Ind. ⁶²⁶, ¹⁸⁰ N. E. ⁴⁷¹, ⁸¹ A.L.R. 1027; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, ¹⁹⁹ Ind. ⁹⁵, ¹⁵⁵ N. E. ⁴⁶⁵, ⁵⁰ A.L.R. 1518; Baldwin v. State, ¹⁹⁴ Ind. ³⁰³, ¹⁴¹ N. E. ³⁴³, citing R. C. L.; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, ¹⁸³ Ind. ⁵⁵⁶, ¹⁰⁹ N. E. ²⁰⁶, Ann. Cas. 1917E, ¹⁶⁵, affirmed in ²⁴⁵ U. S. ⁶³², ⁶² L. ed. ⁵²¹, ³⁸ S. Ct. ⁶⁴; Selvage v. Talbott, ¹⁷⁵ Ind. ⁶⁴⁸, ⁹⁵ N. E. ¹¹⁴, ³³ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁹⁷³, Ann. Cas. 1913C, ⁷²⁴; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, ¹⁶⁸ Ind. ⁶⁷¹, ⁸⁰ N. E. ⁵²⁹, ¹⁴ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁴¹⁸.

**Iowa.**—State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, ²¹⁶ Iowa, ⁵⁵³, ²⁴⁶ N. W. ³⁹⁰, ⁸⁸ A.L.R. ²¹⁸; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. ¹⁷⁵ Iowa, ²⁴⁵, ¹⁵⁴ N. W. 1037, ¹⁵⁷ N. W. ¹⁴⁵, L.R.A.1917D, ¹⁵, Ann. Cas. 1917E, ⁸⁰³; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. ¹⁵³ Iowa, ⁷⁰², ¹³³ N. W. ⁸⁹⁵, ⁴² L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁸²¹; Hubbell v. Higgins, ¹⁴⁸ Iowa, ³⁶, ¹²⁶ N. W. ⁹¹⁴, Ann. Cas. 1912B, ⁸²².

**Kentucky.**—Hyman v. Boldrick, ¹⁵³ Ky. ⁷⁷, ¹⁵⁴ S. W. ³⁶⁹, ⁴⁴ L.R.A.(N.S.) 1039; Stratman v. Com. ¹³⁷ Ky. ⁵⁰⁰, ¹²⁵ S. W. 1094, ²⁷ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁹⁴⁹, ¹³⁶ Am. St. Rep. ²⁹⁹; Sanders v. Com. ¹¹⁷ Ky. ¹, ⁷⁷ S. W. ³⁵⁸, ¹ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁹³², ¹¹¹ Am. St. Rep. ²¹⁹.

**Louisiana.**—State v. Barba, ¹³² La. ⁷⁶⁸, ⁶¹ So. ⁷⁸⁴, ⁴⁵ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁵⁴⁶, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1261.

**Maine.**—State v. Latham, ¹¹⁵ Me. ¹⁷⁶, ⁹⁸ A. ⁵⁷⁸, L.R.A.1917A, ⁴⁸⁰; State v. Leavitt, ¹⁰⁵ Me. ⁷⁶, ⁷² A. ⁸⁷⁵, ²⁶ L.R.A.(N.S.) ⁷⁹⁹.

**Maryland.**—State v. Broadbelt, ⁸⁹ Md. ⁵⁶⁵, ⁴³ A. ⁷⁷¹, ⁴⁵ L.R.A. ⁴³³, ⁷³ Am. St. Rep. ²⁰¹.

**Massachusetts.**—Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. ²⁶⁰ Mass. ³³⁵, ¹⁵⁷ N. E. ⁶⁵¹, ⁵³ A.L.R. ⁸⁶⁷; Opinion of Justices, ²²⁰ Mass. ⁶²⁷, ¹⁰⁸ N. E. ⁵⁰⁷, L.R.A.1917B, 1119.

**Michigan.**—Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. ²¹¹ Mich. ⁹⁰, ¹⁷⁸ N. W. ⁷⁷⁶, ¹² A.L.R. ⁶⁰⁵.

**Minnesota.**—State ex rel. Matteson v. Luecke, ¹⁹⁴ Minn. ²⁴⁶, ²⁶⁰ N. W. ²⁰⁶, ⁹⁹ A.L.R. 1053; Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. ¹²⁶ Minn. ²⁸⁶, ¹⁴⁸ N. W. ⁷¹, L.R.A.1916D, ⁴¹².

**Missouri.**—State v. Missouri Tie & Timber Co. ¹⁸¹ Mo. ⁵³⁶, ⁸⁰ S. W. ⁹³³, ⁶⁵ L.R.A. ⁵⁸⁸, ¹⁰³ Am. St. Rep. ⁶¹⁴, ² Ann. Cas. ¹¹⁹; State v. Loomis, ¹¹⁵ Mo. ³⁰⁷, ²² S. W. ³⁵⁰, ²¹ L.R.A. ⁷⁸⁹.

**Montana.**—Hill v. Rae, ⁵² Mont. ³⁷⁸, ¹⁵⁸ P. ⁸²⁶, L.R.A.1917A, ⁴⁹⁵, Ann. Cas. 1917E, ²¹⁰.

**New Hampshire.**—Woolf v. Fuller, ⁸⁷ N. H. ⁶⁴, ¹⁷⁴ A. ¹⁹³, ⁹⁴ A.L.R. 1067.

**New York.**—People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, ²⁴¹ N. Y. ⁴⁰⁵, ¹⁵⁰ N. E. ⁴⁹⁷, ⁴³ A.L.R. ⁹⁰⁹, affirmed in ²⁷⁸ U. S. ⁶³, ⁷³ L. ed. ¹⁸⁴, ⁴⁹ S. Ct. ⁶¹; People v. Beakes Dairy Co. ²²² N. Y. ⁴¹⁶, ¹¹⁹ N. E. ¹¹⁵, ³ A.L.R. 1260; People v. Wilber, ¹⁹⁸ N. Y. ¹, ⁹⁰ N. E. 1140, ²⁷ L.R.A.(N.S.) ³⁵⁷, ¹⁹ Ann. Cas. ⁶²⁶; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co. ¹⁷⁵ N. Y. ⁸⁴, ⁶⁷ N. E. ¹²⁹, ⁶⁵ L.R.A. ³³.

**North Dakota.**—Peterson v. Panovitz, ⁶² N. D. ³²⁸, ²⁴³ N. W. ⁷⁹⁸, ⁸⁴ A.L.R. 1299.

**Ohio.**—Steele, H. & M. Co. v. Miller, ⁹² Ohio St. ¹¹⁵, ¹¹⁰ N. E. ⁶⁴⁸, L.R.A.1916C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917C, ⁹²⁶.

calling it classification.¹¹ This is forbidden by the equal protection demanded

Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293, L.R.A.1916E, 602; Memphis & Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293, 83, 179 S. W. 631, L.R.A. 1916E, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056; State v. State, 133 Tenn. 499, 64 S. W. 720, 62 L.R.A. 174, writ of error dismissed in, 187 U. S. 639, 47 L. ed. 344, 23 S. Ct. 847; State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co. 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S. W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S. W. 697, 33 L.R.A. 589; Dugger v. Mechanics' & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 32 S. W. 5, 28 L.R.A. 796; Stratton v. Morris, 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87, 12 L.R.A. 70; Randolph v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 80, 36 S. W. (2d) 484, citing R. C. L.; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199.

¹⁰American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. ed. 102, 21 S. Ct. 43; Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Bd. 278 Ill. 77, 115 N. E. 822, citing R. C. L.; People v. Gordon, 274 Ill. 462, 113 N. E. 864, citing R. C. L.; Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 Ann. Cas. 487; Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa, 36, 126 N. W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 822; Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L.R.A.1916D, 412; Cameron v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 63 Minn. 384, 65 N. W. 652, 31 L.R.A. 553; Allen v. Pioneer Press Co. 40 Minn. 117, 41 N. W. 936, 3 L.R.A. 532, 12 Am. St. Rep. 707; Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57 L.R.A. 922; Randolph v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 80, 36 S. W. (2d) 484, citing R. C. L. See Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612, 85 N. E. 954, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 711. A valid classification must be grounded upon a reason of a public nature. Kane v. Erie R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 133 F. 681, 68 L.R.A. 788. The classification must be reasonably adapted to secure a legitimate public interest. Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 A. 193, 94 A.L.R. 1067.

¹¹Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 S. Ct. 272; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340, 46 A.L.R. 284; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; Com. v. Interstate Consol. Street R. Co. 187 Mass. 436, 73 N. E. 530, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973, 2 Ann. Cas. 419, affirmed in 207 U. S. 79, 52 L. ed. 111, 28 S. Ct. 26, 12 Ann. Cas. 555; State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S. W. (2d) 124, citing R. C. L.; State v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 262 Mo. 507, 172 S. W. 35, L.R.A.1915C, 778, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 949; Chamberlin v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 106 A.L.R. 1519, affirmed in 299 U. S. 515, 81 L. ed. 380, 57 S. Ct. 122, and rehearing denied in 301 U. S. 714, 81 L. ed. 1365, 57 S. Ct. 926; Re Water Front, 190 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 335, 13 Ann. Cas. 598; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co. 175 N. Y. 84, 67 N. E. 129, 65 L.R.A. 33; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; Randolph v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 80, 36 S. W. (2d) 484, citing R. C. L.

It is frequently difficult to determine whether a particular classification is reasonable or unreasonable,¹³ and no definite rule has or can be laid down whereby this may be determined.¹⁴ The legislature cannot arbitrarily create a class, however, and when thus created make it binding on the courts so that they would be bound to accept such classification as a proper one.¹⁵

Any discrimination is invalid if it is purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made to depend on differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations having no proper connection with the object sought by the legislation.¹⁶ If the classification is not wholly unreasonable and arbitrary, however, so that the statute is uniform in its operation on all the members of the class to which it is made applicable, no one is denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.¹⁷ It is a reasonable ground of classification that the state has the power to legislate with respect to persons in certain situations and not with respect to those in a different one.¹⁸

§ 481. Substantial Differences; Proper Relationship to Object.—

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the persons included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial dis-

L. ed. 111, 28 S. Ct. 26, 12 Ann. Cas. 555; State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S. W. (2d) 124, citing R. C. L.; State v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 262 Mo. 507, 172 S. W. 35, L.R.A.1915C, 778, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 949; Chamberlin v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 106 A.L.R. 1519, affirmed in 299 U. S. 515, 81 L. ed. 380, 57 S. Ct. 122, and rehearing denied in 301 U. S. 714, 81 L. ed. 1365, 57 S. Ct. 926; Re Water Front, 190 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 335, 13 Ann. Cas. 598; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co. 175 N. Y. 84, 67 N. E. 129, 65 L.R.A. 33; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; Randolph v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 80, 36 S. W. (2d) 484, citing R. C. L.

¹²Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 S. Ct. 272; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340, 46 A.L.R. 284; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schuler, 182 Ind. 57, 105 N. E. 567, L.R.A.1915A, 834; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; State v. Barba, 132 La. 768, 61 So. 784, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 546, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1261; Com. v. Interstate Consol. Street R. Co. 187 Mass. 436, 73 N. E. 530, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973, 2 Ann. Cas. 419, affirmed in 207 U. S. 79, 52 L. ed. 111, 28 S. Ct. 26, 12 Ann. Cas. 555; State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S. W. (2d) 124, citing R. C. L.; State v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 262 Mo. 507, 172 S. W. 35, L.R.A.1915C, 778, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 949; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co. 175 N. Y. 84, 67 N. E. 129, 65 L.R.A. 33; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; Randolph v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 80, 36 S. W. (2d) 484, citing R. C. L.

¹³Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 52 L. ed. 108, 28 S. Ct. 28; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 S. Ct. 272; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771, 45 L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201; State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819.

¹⁴Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84; Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 S. Ct. 89; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 153 Iowa, 702, 133 N. W. 895, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821; Trustees' Exrs' & Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293, L.R.A. 1916E, 602.

¹⁵Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53, 66 P. 44, 54 L.R.A. 771; Randolph v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 80, 36 S. W. (2d) 484, citing R. C. L. As to court review of classification, see infra, §§ 519 et seq.

¹⁶American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. ed. 102, 21 S. Ct. 43; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, affirmed in 239 U. S. 637, 60 L. ed. 480, 36 S. Ct. 445; State v. Mitchell, 97 Me. 66, 53 A. 887, 94 Am. St. Rep. 481.

¹⁸Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 76 L. ed. 643, 52 S. Ct. 273, 79 A.L.R. 546.

tinctions.¹⁹ As the rule has sometimes been stated, the classification, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.²⁰ Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and

¹⁹United States.—Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476; Nebbia, 54 S. Ct. 505, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 72 L. ed. 927, 48 S. Ct. 553; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423; Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387, 71 L. ed. 1112, 47 S. Ct. 595, 593; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 70 L. ed. 557, 46 S. Ct. 260, 43 A.L.R. 1224; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59 L. ed. 1199, 35 S. Ct. 675, L.R.A.1915E, 953. South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, 59 L. ed. 839, 35 S. Ct. 504; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30 S. Ct. 644; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247. California.—Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. (2d) 405, 65 P. (2d) 884, 26 P. (2d) 22, 89 A.L.R. 925; Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 P. 946, 62 A.L.R. 1341. Connecticut.—Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, 65 A.L.R. 943, affirmed in 280 U. S. 117, 74 L. ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57, 65 A.L.R. 939. Delaware.—Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce, 549, 83 A. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 968, writ of error dismissed in 235 U. S. 712, 59 L. ed. 437, 35 S. Ct. 203. Florida.—State ex rel. Clarkson v. Phillips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138. Illinois.—Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435, affirmed in 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476; Marsalis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; Lueth v. Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N. E. 690, 79 A.L.R. 780; Springfield Gas & E. Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A.L.R. 929, affirmed in 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. ed. 131, 42 S. Ct. 24; Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 55 N. E. 663, 47 L.R.A. 802, 75 Am. St. Rep. 103. Indiana.—McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471, 81 A.L.R. 1027; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 418. Iowa.—State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218. Kentucky.—Campbell v. Com. 229 Ky. 264, 17 S. W. (2d) 227, 63 A.L.R. 932, 24; Latham, 115 Me. 176, 98 A. 578, L.R.A.1917A, 480. Maine.—State v. Latham, 115 Me. 176, 98 A. 578, L.R.A.1917A, 480. Massachusetts.—Vigeant v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867. Michigan.—Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne), 239 Mich. 204, 214 N. W. 316, 52 A.L.R. 273; Peninsular Stove Co. v. Burton, 220 Mich. 284, 189 N. W. 880, citing R. C. L. Minnesota.—State ex rel. Matteson v. Kinnear, 194 Minn. 246, 260 N. W. 206, 99 A.L.R. 1053. Mississippi.—Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co. 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533, 62 L.R.A. 407, 95 Am. St. Rep. 476. New Hampshire.—Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 A. 193, 94 A.L.R. 1067; Opinion of Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 A. 117, 39 A.L.R. 1023. New York.—Chamberlin v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 106 A.L.R. 1519, affirmed in 299 U. S. 515, 81 L. ed. 380, 57 S. Ct. 122, and rehearing denied in 301 U. S. 714, 81 L. ed. 1365, 57 S. Ct. 926; People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16 A.L.R. 152, writ of error dismissed in 257 U. S. 665, 66 L. ed. 424, 42 S. Ct. 47; People v. Beakes Dairy Co. 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115, 1 A.L.R. 1260. North Dakota.—Peterson v. Panovitz, 62 N. D. 328, 243 N. W. 798, 84 A.L.R. 1290; Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1338. Ohio.—State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637. Oregon.—Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136. South Carolina.—Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1053. Tennessee.—State v. Columbia, G. & S. F. Turnp. Co. 133 Tenn. 446, 181 S. W. 682, citing R. C. L.; Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056. Vermont.—Hardwick v. Wolcott, 98 Vt. 343, 129 A. 159, 39 A.L.R. 1222. Virginia.—Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co. — Va. —, 190 S. E. 318, 110 A.L.R. 1195. Washington.—Austin v. Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P. (2d) 646, 93 A.L.R. 2033; Aberdeen Sav. & L. Asso. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536, 290 P. 697, 71 A.L.R. 232. Wisconsin.—State ex rel. Kempinger v. Whyte, 177 Wis. 541, 188 N. W. 607, 23 A.L.R. 67; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199. Wyoming. — State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1, 1 A.L.R. 955.

²⁰Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54. See Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 A. 861, 50 L.R.A. 86.

other individuals to which it does not apply1 and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended.² In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural reason for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges.³ A law is not general because it operates on all within a class unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all.⁴

The standard by which the sufficiency of those differences which form a valid basis for classification may be measured has been repeatedly stated by the courts in many formulas which vary slightly in detail but contain substantially the same elements.⁵ The precept most often employed states that a classification to be valid must always rest on a difference which bears a fair, substantial, natural, reasonable, and just relation to the object, act, or persons in respect to which it is proposed.⁶ It has been stated many times that a

¹Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 52 L. ed. 108, 28 S. Ct. 28; Deyoe v. Superior Ct. 140 Cal. 476, 74 P. 28, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73; State v. Crosson, 33 Idaho, 140, 190 P. 922, citing R. C. L.; Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E. 695, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 994; Peninsular Stove Co. v. Burton, 220 Mich. 284, 189 N. W. 880, citing R. C. L.; Nitka v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 Wis. 106, 135 N. W. 492, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 337, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 863. Annotation: 113 Am. St. Rep. 243.

³Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby (C. C. A. 8th) 178 F. 619, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97; McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 418; Davidson v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. 211 Mich. 90, 178 N. W. 776, 12 A.L.R. 605; State v. Bridgeman & R. Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 114 Minn. 122, 130 N. W. 545, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 494, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1030; Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 A. 193, 94 A.L.R. 1067; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah, 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 696; State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819.

⁴Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 44 P. 803, 32 L.R.A. 664; State v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W. 592, 90 Am. St. Rep. 430.

⁶United States.—Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. ed. 1245, 57 S. Ct. 868, 109 A.L.R. 1327; Great Atlantic & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 81 L. ed. 1193, 57 S. Ct. 772, 112 A.L.R. 293; Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U. S. 258, 81 L. ed. 632, 57 S. Ct. 447; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476; Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54; Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 533, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647; United States Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, 293 U. S. 232, 79 L. ed. 299, 55 S. Ct. 168; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 74 L. ed. 775, 50 S. Ct. 310; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 72 L. ed. 927, 48 S. Ct. 553; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423; Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387, 71 L. ed. 1112, 47 S. Ct. 595; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 70 L. ed. 557, 46 S. Ct. 260, 43 A.L.R. 1224; Air-way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 69 L. ed. 169, 45 S. Ct. 12; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 66 L. ed. 166, 42 S. Ct. 42; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 64 L. ed. 989, 40 S. Ct. 560; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 62 L. ed. 763, 38 S. Ct. 323; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. ed. 755, 37 S. Ct. 298; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59 L. ed. 1199, 35 S. Ct. 675, L.R.A. 1915E, 953; Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U. S. 41, 59 L. ed. 1192, 35 S. Ct. 671; Waugh v. University of Mississippi, 237 U. S. 589, 59 L. ed. 1131, 35 S. Ct. 720; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385, 59 L. ed. 632, 35 S. Ct. 345; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 58 L. ed. 1312, 34 S. Ct. 829; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 55 L. ed. 229, 31 S. Ct. 246; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 572, 54 L. ed. 1155, 31 S. Ct. 134; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30 S. Ct. 644; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 883, 30 S. Ct. 578; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287; Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419, 10 Ann. Cas. 525, affirming 74 Neb. 757, 105 N. W. 298, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079, 121 Am. St. Rep. 754; Bown v. Walling, 204 U.

classification must be based upon some reasonable ground, some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification.⁷ It has

S. Ct. 292; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 51 L. ed. 499, 27 S. Ct. 289; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; W. W. Cargill Co. 51 S. Ct. 433, 180 U. S. 452, 45 L. ed. 612; Matthews v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Magoun, 96 U. S. 93, 43 L. ed. Sav. Bank, 70 U. S. 283, v. Illinois Trust & S. Bank, 38 179 F. 461, 42 L. R.A.(N.S.) 1065, 32 S. Ct. 31, ed. 701, 33 S. Ct. (C. C. A. 8th) 133 F. cago, M. & St. F. 619, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 97; Kane v. Erie R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 133 F. 681, 68 L.R.A. Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 575. Alabama.—Buenemann v. Santa Barbara, Cal. 109 A.L.R. 8 Calif. (2d) 405, 65 P. (2d) 834, 139 A.L.R. Cal. 159, 203; Veterans' Welfare Bd. 1531; Re Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 P. 678, 22 A.L.R. 343, L.R.A. 1915F, 850, 31 Cal. 619, 150 Gay, 155 Cal. 30, 109 P. 880, 28 L.R.A.(N.S.) Ann. Cas. 1912A, 690. Delaware.—Van Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce, 578, 91 A. 385, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 104; Clem-Connell v. Boyce, 549, 83 A. 1036, daniel v. Connell, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 968, writ of error dismissed in 235 U. S. 712, 59 L. ed. 437, 35 S. Ct. 203. Florida.—Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226, Harper v. L.R.A.(N.S.) 794, 19 Ann. Cas. 235. 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 783. Georgia.—Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105. Illinois—Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929, 106 A.L.R. 1435, affirmed in 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Lueth v. Goodknecht, 345 Ill. 197, 177 N. E. 690, 79 A.L.R. 780; Springfield Gas & E. Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A.L.R. 929, affirmed in 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. ed. 131, 42 S. Ct. 24; People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 46, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1129; Starne v. People, 222 Ill. 139, 78 N. E. 61, 113 Am. St. Rep. 389; Re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L.R.A. 519. Indiana.—Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268. Iowa.—State v. Bair, 112 Iowa, 466, 84 N. W. 532, 51 L.R.A. 776; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524. Louisiana.—State v. Barba, 132 La. 768, 61 So. 784, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 546, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1261. Maine.—State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386. Maryland.—Luman v. Hitchens Bros. Co. 90 Md. 14, 44 A. 1051, 46 L.R.A. 393; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771, 45 L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201. Massachusetts.—Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Ashley v. Three Justices (Ash- ley v. Wait), 228 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A.L.R. 1463, writ of error dismissed in 250 U. S. 652, 63 L. ed. 1190, 40 S. Ct. 56; Opinion of Justices, 220 Mass. 627, 108 N. E. 807, L.R.A.1917B, 1119. Minnesota.—State v. Brown, 97 Minn. W. 477, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 327; Murray v. 103, 51 L.R.A. 823, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379. Mississippi. — Lowry v. Clarksdale, 154 Miss. 155, 122 So. 195, citing R. C. L. Missouri.—Re French, 315 Mo. 75, 285 S. W. 513, 47 A.L.R. 688; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789. Nebraska.—Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57 L.R.A. 922. New Hampshire.—Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 A. 193, 94 A.L.R. 1067. New York.—W. H. Chamberlin v. Andrews, 1915, affirmed in 299 U. S. 515, 81 L. ed. 380, 57 S. Ct. 122, and rehearing denied in 301 Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas W. 552, 71 A.L.R. 1338. North Dakota. — Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1338. Pennsylvania.—Com. v. Girard L. Ins. Co. 305 Pa. 558, 158 A. 262, 83 A.L.R. 460, affirmed in 287 U. S. 570, 77 L. ed. 501, 53 S. Ct. 94; Juniata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, 187 Pa. 193, 40 A. 977, 42 L.R.A. 442, 67 Am. St. Rep. 579. South Carolina.—Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S. C. 62, 55 S. E. 136, 117 Am. St. Rep. 85, 9 Ann. Cas. 1003; Simmons v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 63 S. C. 425, 41 S. E. 521, 57 L.R.A. 607. Tennessee. — Fleming v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 331, 148 S. W. 1057, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1306; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805. Vermont.—State v. Clement Nat. Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 A. 944, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 22; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825. Washington.—Aberdeen Sav. & L. Asso. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536, 260 P. 697, 71 A.L.R. 232. Wisconsin.—Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1198, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199. Wyoming.—State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819. Annotation: 113 Am. St. Rep. 243, 294; Ann. Cas. 1914B, 975.

⁷Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 81 L. ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 71 L. ed. 1165, 47 S. Ct. 678; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287; Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114; Halter v. Ne-

also frequently been said that a classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences and are germane to the purposes of the law.⁸ Another oft-quoted group of canons is to the effect that the reason for a classification must inhere in the subject matter, must be natural and substantial,⁹ and must be one suggested by necessity due to such a difference in the situation and circumstances of the subjects placed in different classes as suggests the necessity or propriety of different legislation with respect to them.¹⁰ It is only when such distinctions exist that differentiate in important particulars persons or classes of persons from the body of the people that laws having operation only upon such particular persons or classes of persons are upheld as valid enactments.¹¹

braska, 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 S. Ct. 272; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 265; Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. 211 Mich. 90, 178 N. W. 776, 12 A.L.R. 605; Re Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789, 57 L.R.A. 540, 89 Am. St. Rep. 791; Hardwick v. Wolcott, 98 Vt. 343, 129 A. 159, 39 A.L.R. 1222.

⁸Deyoe v. Superior Ct. 140 Cal. 476, 74 P. 28, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 126, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234; McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471, 81 A.L.R. 1027; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; State v. Mitchell, 97 Me. 66, 53 A. 887, 94 Am. St. Rep. 481; Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne) 239 Mich. 204, 214 N. W. 316, 53 A.L.R. 273; Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge (Smith v. Command) 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140, 40 A.L.R. 515; Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge (Haynes v. Williams) 201 Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938, L.R.A.1918D, 233; Lowry v. Clarksdale, 154 Miss. 155, 122 So. 195, citing R. C. L.; Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 A. 193, 94 A.L.R. 1067; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; Sammarco v. Boysa, 193 Wis. 642, 215 N. W. 446, 55 A.L.R. 370; State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199; Borgnis v. Falk Co. 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 489; Servonitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231, 113 N. W. 277, 126 Am. St. Rep. 955; Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N. W. 522, 90 Am. St. Rep. 853; State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L.R.A. 252. Where the legislature makes a departure from the common-law classification, the legislative classification thus resorted to must be germane to the enactment. Riccio v. Hoboken, 69 N. J. L. 649, 55 A. 1109, 63 L.R.A. 485.

⁹Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, — Ind. — 193 N. E. 855, 97 A.L.R. 1474, superseded but not on this point in 209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 101 A.L.R. 1359; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465,

⁵⁰A.L.R. 1518; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schuler, 182 Ind. 57, 105 N. E. 567, L.R.A. 1915A, 884; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 708; Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 724; Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. 71, 74 P. 640, 64 L.R.A. 325; State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah, 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 696; Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 52 P. 333, 40 L.R.A. 302; State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1, 1 A.L.R. 955; State v. LeBarron, 24 Wyo. 519, 162 P. 265, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 993.

¹⁰McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 418; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 153 Iowa, 702, 133 N. W. 895, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821; Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa, 36, 126 N. W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 822; State v. Bridgeman & R. Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 114 Minn. 122, 130 N. W. 545, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 494, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1030; State v. Ramsey County, 48 Minn. 236, 51 N. W. 112, 31 Am. St. Rep. 650; Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57 L.R.A. 922; Moody v. Hagen, 36 N. D. 471, 162 N. W. 704, L.R.A.1918F, 947, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 933, affirmed in 245 U. S. 633, 62 L. ed. 522, 38 S. Ct. 133; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792, 140 Am. St. Rep. 909; Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 98 P. 755, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 263, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1100; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199; State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1, 1 A.L.R. 955. Annotation: 93 Am. St. Rep. 111. The differences which will support class legislation must be such as in the nature of things furnish a reasonable basis for separate laws and regulations. State v. Missouri Tie & Timber Co. 181 Mo. 536, 80 S. W. 933, 65 L.R.A. 588, 103 Am. St. Rep. 614, 2 Ann. Cas. 119.

¹¹Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 43 N. E. 624, 32 L.R.A. 445, 52 Am. St. Rep. 344.

property, the state cannot make one in favor of some persons.¹² A classification based merely on the circumstance of day and night work in some factories

and day or night work in others, not affecting hours of labor, rests on an arbitrary distinction.¹³

**§ ⁴⁸². Nature of Differences.**—The Supreme Court has held that, generally

practical differences that are best met by corresponding differences of treatment.¹⁵ The classification must, however, regard real resemblances and real

the legislature has the power to enact laws which, by reason of peculiar circumstances, may affect some persons or classes of persons only, in such instances the class of persons on whom the law is to operate must possess some

marking them as proper objects for the operation of special or class legislation.¹⁷ The legislature cannot take what might be termed "a natural class of

persons," split that class in two, and then arbitrarily designate the dissevered

⁴⁶A.L.R. 284; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557; Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa, 36, 126 N. W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 822; State v. Latham, 115 Me. 176, 98 A. 578, L.R.A.1917A, 480; State v. Mitchell, 97 Me. 66, 53 A. 887, 94 Am. St. Rep. 481.

¹⁴International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 58 L. ed. 1135, 34 S. Ct. 678; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212, 33 S. Ct. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 56 L. ed. 1229, 32 S. Ct. 697, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 153; Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, 55 L. ed. 815, 31 S. Ct. 709; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369,

³¹S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 55 L. ed. 290, 31 S. Ct. 275; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151,

³¹S. Ct. 132; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 45 L. ed. 186, 21 S. Ct. 128; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89,

⁴⁵L. ed. 102, 21 S. Ct. 43; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. ed. 725, 20 S. Ct. 633; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 44 L. ed. 716, 20 S. Ct. 666; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 S. Ct. 284; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank,

¹⁷⁰U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594. "It is the province of the legislature to determine what differences or peculiarities of condition or of business, furnish a sufficient basis for applying a different rule to those engaged in such business or those affected by such condition, than is applied to the remainder of the community. It is also the province of the legislature to draw the line marking the boundary between one class and another, and between the several classes and the general public." Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L.R.A.1916D, 412. Whether the differences in the use of commercial vehicles operated for hire and those transporting the property of their owners are such as to afford a sufficient basis for legislative classification is primarily a matter of legislative discretion. Interstate Trucking Co. v. Dammmann, 208 Wis. 116, 241 N. W. 625, 82 A.L.R. 1080. As to the discretion of the legislature in classification, see infra, § 520.

¹⁵Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 S. Ct. 583; Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U. S. 413, 54 L. ed. 817, 30 S. Ct. 543.

⁶⁸L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375. See also infra, § 520.

¹⁷Standidge v. Chicago R. Co. 254 Ill. 524, 98 N. E. 963, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 529, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 65; Off v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184, 14 Ann. Cas. 434; Jones v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 231 Ill. 302, 83 N. E. 215, 121 Am. St. Rep. 313; Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Laboratory Co. 205 Ill. 497, 68 N. E. 938, 98 Am. St. Rep. 254; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95,

factions of the original unit as two classes and thereupon enact different rules

particulars.¹⁹ Things may have very diverse qualities, and yet be united in a

classes.²⁰ Differences which would serve for a classification for some purposes furnish no reason whatever for a classification for other purposes.¹

reason of their redness, with disregard of all other resemblances or of distinctions. Such classification would be logically appropriate. Apply it further; make a rule of conduct depend upon it, and distinguish in legislation

men shall be subjected to the payment of attorneys' fees of parties successfully

suing them, and all black men not. It may not say that all men beyond a certain age or all men possessed of a certain wealth shall be alone thus subjected.

to classify, for the characteristics which thus serve as the basis of a classification must be of such a nature as to mark the objects so designated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legislation.⁴

**§ ⁴⁸³. Exactness.**—In a classification for governmental purposes there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things.⁵ Classification

¹⁸Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge (Haynes v. Williams)

²⁰¹Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938, L.R.A.1918D, 233; State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561, 125 S. W. 507, 135 Am. St. Rep. 597. State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112, 35 L.R.A. 231; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443; Bent v. Weaver, 108 W. Va. 299, 150 S. E. 738, citing R. C. L.; State v. LeBarron, 24 Wyo. 519, 162 P. 265, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 998.

²⁰Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 60 L. ed. 691, 36 S. Ct. 379; Billings v. Illinois,

¹Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 274 Pa. 448, 118 A. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1215, affirmed in 260 U. S. 246, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 S. Ct. 83; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1,

¹³⁵S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L.R.A. 252. See International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859,

³Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386.

⁴McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N. E. 260, 94 A.L.R. 1284; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Alexander v. Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. 71, 28 A. 51, 23 L.R.A. 525; Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N. D. 270, 50 N. W. 970,

¹⁴L.R.A. 725; State v. Columbia, G. & S. F. Turnp. Co. 133 Tenn. 446, 181 S. W. 682, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170 P. 1, 1 A.L.R. 955.

⁵Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 S. Ct. 89.

so long as there is no substantial and fair ground to say that the statute makes

reasonable is a question of practical details into which fiction cannot enter.⁸

It has been said that it is of the essence of a classification that on one class

and that the very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that the mere

mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.¹⁰ The

⁶Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 60 L. ed. 691, 36 S. Ct. 379; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 S. Ct. 272.

⁷Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 S. Ct. 89. "It is generally the case that a classifi- cation cannot be made so as to make a definite line within which may be seen all the dangers to be guarded against and without which there are no such dangers. The best that can be done is to keep with- in the clearly reasonable and practicable. That is accomplished where there are such general characteristics of the members of the class as reasonably to call for special legislative treatment. That may be true, generally, and yet some of such charac- teristics sometimes be found to exist out- side of the boundaries of the class. Ex- actness in division is impossible and never looked for in applying the legal test, and that is required is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis on general lines for the division." Mehlos v. Mil- waukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1009, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1102.

⁸Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 47 L. ed. 669, 23 S. Ct. 401. "Classification is not to be condemned because there may be occasional instances in which it does not fit the situation; it is proper if the great mass of situations to which the law applies justifies the formation of a class and the application of some special or different legislative provisions to that class." Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 778, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1040.

¹⁷⁶U. S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 S. Ct. 284; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; Peo- ple v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771,

⁴⁵L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201; Brat- berg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1338.

¹⁰Great Atlantic & P. Tea Co. v. Gros- jean, 301 U. S. 412, 81 L. ed. 1193, 57 S. Ct. 772, 112 A.L.R. 293; Phelps v. Board of Ed- ucation, 300 U. S. 319, 81 L. ed. 674, 57 S. Ct. 483; Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry,

²⁹⁷U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Miller v. Wilson,

²³⁶U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mon- dou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 32 S. Ct. 169, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921,

²⁰⁷U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 S. Ct. 89; Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593,

⁵⁰L. ed. 322, 26 S. Ct. 159; Cotting v. Kan- sas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. God- dard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 633,

⁶²L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, affirmed in 239 U. S. 537,

⁶⁰L. ed. 480, 36 S. Ct. 445; Baird v. Wich- ita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Vigeant v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Kempner v. Ramsey County, 160 Minn. 69, 199 N. W. 442, citing R. C. L.; State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637; Steele, H. & M. Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St.

The crudities or even the injustice of state laws are not redressed by it.¹³ The

ties,¹⁴ and classification is not invalid because it does not depend on scientific

exclusion of objects or persons involved in a classification.¹⁶ Hence, if a class

115, 110 N. E. 648, L.R.A.1916C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 926; Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S. W. 177, L.R.A.1916P, 177, writ of error dismissed in 239 U. S. 653, 60 L. ed. 487, 36 S. Ct. 161; Salt Lake City v. In- dustrial Commission, 58 Utah, 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584. "Classification can rarely be mathemat- ically exact." Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 778, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1040.

⁶³L. ed. 735, 39 S. Ct. 357; Dominion Hotel Co. v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 265, 63 L. ed. 597,

¹²Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 280,

²²⁸U. S. 680, 57 L. ed. 1022, 33 S. Ct. 715; Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 230, 193 S. W. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 158.

¹⁴Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. 776, 36 S. Ct. 443; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552,

¹⁹S. Ct. 281; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Re Hunter, 97 Colo. 279, 49 P. (2d) 1009, 101 A.L.R. 1202; State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138; Kocsis v. Chi- cago Park Dist. 362 Ill. 24, 198 N. E. 847,

¹⁰³A.L.R. 141; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Kein- ingham v. Blake, 135 Md. 320, 109 A. 65,

⁸A.L.R. 1066; State v. Fairmont Cream- ery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548; Strauss v. State, 36 N. D. 594,

¹⁶³N. W. 908, L.R.A.1917E, 909; State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637; Steele, H. & M. Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N. E. 648, L.R.A.1916C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 926; Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; Cav- ender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A.L.R. 755; Salt Lake City v. Indus- trial Commission, 58 Utah, 314, 199 P. 152,

¹⁵Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 538, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647; Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. ed. 1155, 52 S. Ct. 595, 81 A.L.R. 1402; Salmon v. State Tax Commission, 278 U. S. 484, 73 L. ed. 443, 49 S. Ct. 192; Metropo- lis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 57 L. ed. 730, 33 S. Ct. 441; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 53 L. ed. 941, 29 S. Ct. 560; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank,

¹⁷⁰U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A.1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210; State ex rel. Ev- ans v. Kozer, 116 Or. 581, 242 P. 621, citing R. C. L.; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 274 Pa. 448, 118 A. 394, 22 A.L.R. 1215, affirmed in 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 S. Ct. 83; Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83,

¹⁷⁹S. W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056; State v. Schlitz Brewing Co.

¹⁰⁴Tenn. 715, 58 S. W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941; State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466; State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan,

¹⁹⁰Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434. A classification having a basis in prac- tical convenience is not unconstitutional because it is lacking in purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Continental Bak- ing Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. ed. 1155, 52 S. Ct. 595, 81 A.L.R. 1402.

¹⁶Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst,

²⁰⁷U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; Cin- cinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A. 1918B, 374; State ex rel. Evans v. Kozer,

¹¹⁶Or. 581, 242 P. 621, citing R. C. L.; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 274 Pa. 448,

¹¹⁸A. 394, 22 A.L.R. 1215, affirmed in 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 S. Ct. 83; Mem- phis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056.

in the law.¹⁷ It is also unquestioned that legislative classification may in many

with the subject at which measures are aimed, a classification, however logical,

appropriate, or scientific, will not be sustained. If such authority does exist,

§ 484. Completeness of Regulation of Evils.—

not require that all state laws shall be perfect1 or that state laws shall cover

unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing,⁴ and does not include

legislation may pick out the objects to which it is addressed, the rule is funda-

actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses.⁶ This rule

⁶¹L. ed. 480, 37 S. Ct. 217, L.R.A.1917F, 514, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 643; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A.1918B, 374; Longbrake v. State, 112 Ohio St. 13, 146 N. E. 417, 41 A.L.R. 925; Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 402.

¹⁸German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 S. Ct. 612, L.R.A. 1915C, 1189; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395,

¹⁰⁸N. E. 639, L.R.A.1918A, 1124, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1059, writ of error dismissed in 242 U. S. 618, 61 L. ed. 530, 37 S. Ct. 214; In- surance Co. of N. A. v. Welch, 49 Okla. 620, 154 P. 48, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 471; Laugh- ney v. Maybury, 145 Wash. 146, 259 P. 17,

²⁰Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 60 L. ed. 691, 36 S. Ct. 379. An act aimed not against individuals or classes, but against certain acts, is not dis- criminating or partial in character. Halter v. State, 74 Neb. 757, 105 N. W. 298, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079, 121 Am. St. Rep. 754, affirmed in 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419, 10 Ann. Cas. 525.

¹Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 57 L. ed. 1022, 33 S. Ct. 715; Ros- enthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212, 33 S. Ct. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71.

²Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Co. 249 U. S. 152, 63 L. ed. 527, 39 S. Ct. 227; Chi- cago Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 57 L. ed. 1022, 33 S. Ct. 715; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212,

³³S. Ct. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548. Legislation cannot be all-comprehensive and there may be practical grouping of objects which will as a whole fairly pre- sent a class of itself, although there may be exceptions in which the evil aimed at is deemed not so flagrant. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. 776, 36 S. Ct. 443. There may be degrees of danger and a difference in degree may justify classifica- tion in safety legislation. Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 57 L. ed. 1022, 33 S. Ct. 715.

⁴Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 67 L. ed. 194, 43 S. Ct. 24; Masonic Cemetery Asso. v. Gamage (C. C. A. 9th) 38 F. (2d) 950, 71 A.L.R. 1027, writ of certiorari denied in 282 U. S. 852, 75 L. ed. 755, 51 S. Ct. 30; Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne)

⁵National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & L. Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893,

⁶Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Whit-

is particularly applicable to police regulations.⁷ The legislature is not bound,

in order to support the constitutional validity of a regulation, to extend it to

failure to include other matters within the scope of its operation.¹⁰ The state

ney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641; James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L. ed. 569, 47 S. Ct. 308; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.

²⁴²U. S. 539, 61 L. ed. 480, 37 S. Ct. 217, L.R.A.1917F, 514, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 643; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. ed. 539, 34 S. Ct. 281; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A. 1918B, 374; Campbell v. Com. 229 Ky. 264,

¹⁷S. W. (2d) 227, 63 A.L.R. 932; Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne)

²³⁹Mich. 204, 214 N. W. 316, 53 A.L.R. 273; Holsman v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N. E. 750, 39 A.L.R. 760; Longbrake v. State,

¹¹²Ohio St. 13, 146 N. E. 417, 41 A.L.R. 925; Yee Bow v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 N. E. 132, 12 A.L.R. 1424, writ of error dismissed in 255 U. S. 578, 65 L. ed. 794, 41 S. Ct. 320; Wessell v. Timberlake,

⁷James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L. ed. 569, 47 S. Ct. 308; Farmers & M. Bank v. Federal Re- serve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 67 L. ed. 1157,

⁴³S. Ct. 651, 30 A.L.R. 635; Miller v. Wil- son, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205,

²⁶N. D. 304, 144 N. W. 661, L.R.A.1918B, 975, writ of error dismissed in 245 U. S. 676,

⁶²L. ed. 542, 38 S. Ct. 13; Grown v. Cleve- land, 125 Ohio St. 455, 181 N. E. 897, 84 A.L.R. 708; Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 402.

⁸National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & L. Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893,

⁵⁷S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63,

⁷³L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641; James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L. ed. 569, 47 S. Ct. 308; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 67 L. ed. 194, 43 S. Ct. 24; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. ed. 539,

³⁴S. Ct. 281; Masonic Cemetery Asso. v. Gamage (C. C. A. 9th) 38 F. (2d) 950, 71 A.L.R. 1027, writ of certiorari denied in 282 U. S. 852, 75 L. ed. 755, 51 S. Ct. 30; Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A.L.R. 51.

⁹West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; Silver v. Silver,

⁶⁵A.L.R. 939; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A. 1915F, 829; Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227, 58 L. ed. 1288, 1239, 34 S. Ct. 856; Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A.L.R. 51; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne) 239 Mich. 204, 214 N. W. 316, 53 A.L.R. 273; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714,

⁴²A.L.R. 548. An ordinance is not void because it reg- ulates public dances alone, although the same objectionable conduct which it seeks to prevent might also occur at private dances. Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591,

¹⁰Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 74 L. ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57, 65 A.L.R. 939; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212,

²⁰⁷U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 S. Ct. 89; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 47 L. ed. 323, 23 S. Ct. 168; Re Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 86 P. 896, 117 Am. St. Rep. 137, 9 Ann. Cas. 1105; State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693, 88 P. 235, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1259; Booth v. People,

¹⁸⁶Ill. 43, 57 N. E. 798, 50 L.R.A. 762, 78 Am. St. Rep. 229; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A.1918B, 374; State v. Phillips, 109 Miss. 22, 67 So. 651, L.R.A. 1915D, 530; Thorne v. Casale, 101 N. J. L. 418, 128 A. 174, citing R. C. L.; Thorne v. Kearny, 100 N. J. L. 223, 126 A. 613, cit- ing R. C. L.; People ex rel. Bryant v. Zim- merman, 241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497, 43 A.L.R. 909, affirmed in 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395,

¹⁰⁸N. E. 639, L.R.A.1918A, 1124, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1059, writ of error dismissed in 242 U. S. 618, 61 L. ed. 530, 37 S. Ct. 214; State v. Olson, 26 N. D. 304, 144 N. W. 661, L.R.A. 1918B, 975, writ of error dismissed in 245 U. S. 676, 62 L. ed. 542, 38 S. Ct. 13; Phila- delphia v. Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 51 A. 374, 58 L.R.A. 220; Johnston, L. & Co. v. Spartan Mills, 68 S. C. 339, 47 S. E. 695, 1 Ann. Cas. 409; State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819. [12 Am. Jur.]—11 161

in kind from those that are allowed,¹¹ because it is free to recognize degrees

only to those who form the evil-producing group, without violating a constitutional prohibition of class legislation,¹⁴ moreover, the Federal Constitution

embodies no prohibition of laws directed against evils experienced in particular branches of business.¹⁵ If the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the evil is to be feared,

⁶¹L. ed. 480, 37 S. Ct. 217, L.R.A.1917F, 514, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 643; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A.1918B, 374. Where an evil exists in a variety of cases, it is a sufficient ground for classification in legislation so as to include some and exclude others, that in the former the evil can be remedied and in the latter it cannot be. State v. Smith, 58 Minn. 35, 59 N. W. 545, 25 L.R.A. 759.

¹²West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Masonic Cemetery Asso. v. Gamage (C. C. A. 9th) 38 F. (2d) 950, 71 A.L.R. 1027, writ of certiorari denied in 282 U. S. 852, 75 L. ed. 755, 51 S. Ct. 30; Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A.L.R. 51; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548. A statute regulating a product which is injurious to the community will not be held unconstitutional because there are other products, equally as injurious, which are not regulated or forbidden. State v. Olson, 26 N. D. 304, 144 N. W. 661, L.R.A. 1918B, 978, writ of error dismissed in 245 U. S. 676, 62 L. ed. 542, 38 S. Ct. 13. A statute prohibiting only those employed for a consideration to act as legislative counsel or agents, to go upon the floor of either house of the legislature while in session, except upon the invitation of such house, is not unconstitutional as making an arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious classification. Campbell v. Com.

¹³New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Radice v. New York,

²⁶⁴U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. ed. 539, 34 S. Ct. 281; Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A.L.R. 51; Campbell v. Com. 229 Ky. 264, 17 S. W. (2d) 227,

⁶³A.L.R. 932. A state statute prohibiting, during the closed period for salmon fishing, the transportation through the protected waters of salmon caught outside the jurisdiction of the state does not, in precluding transportation to market, by water, of fish which may lawfully be transported to the same market by a land route, violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson v. Gentry, 220 Cal. 17, 30 P. (2d) 400, 92 A.L.R. 1264.

²²⁰U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 55 L. ed. 229, 31 S. Ct. 246; Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co.

¹⁹⁹U. S. 401, 50 L. ed. 246, 26 S. Ct. 66; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A.1918B, 374; Freadrich v. State, 89 Neb. 443, 131 N. W. 618, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 650; State v. Olson, 26 N. D. 304, 144 N. W. 661, L.R.A.1918B, 978, writ of error dismissed in 245 U. S. 676, 62 L. ed. 542, 38 S. Ct. 13; Spicer v. Benefit Asso. R. E.

¹⁴²Or. 588, 21 P. (2d) 187, 90 A.L.R. 517. The equal protection of the laws is not denied by a municipal ordinance for the prevention of the emission of dense smoke in portions of the city, where it applies to all coming within its terms, although other businesses might have been, but were not, included. Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486, 60 L. ed. 396, 36 S. Ct. 206.

¹⁶New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. ed. 539, 34 S. Ct. 281. Members of the Ku Klux Klan are not deprived of the equal protection of the laws by being required to file their constitution, bylaws, rules, regulations, and oath of membership, and roster of membership, when members of labor unions, Masonic fraternities, Odd Fellows, Grand Army of the Republic, and Knights of Columbus are not required to do so. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785.

specially experienced.¹⁸ Legislation is addressed to evils as they appear.¹⁹

not helpless because of the forms of the evils.²⁰ It may "proceed cautiously,

§ 485. Generally.—

The contention that a state statute violates the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is to be tested by considering whether there is a basis for the classification made by the statute.5

The question always is whether there is any reasonable ground for a classification or whether it is only and simply arbitrary, based upon no real distinction.⁶

⁷⁶L. ed. 643, 52 S. Ct. 273, 79 A.L.R. 546; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,

²⁴⁹U. S. 510, 63 L. ed. 735, 39 S. Ct. 357; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas,

²⁴⁰U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. 776, 36 S. Ct. 443; Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 60 L. ed. 771, 36 S. Ct. 440, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 548; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33,

⁶⁰L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 59 L. ed. 1400, 35 S. Ct. 892; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 58 L. ed. 1288, 34 S. Ct. 856; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,

²³³U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 S. Ct. 612, L.R.A.1915C, 1189; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 55 L. ed. 128, 31 S. Ct. 190; Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789,

¹⁶⁸P. 679, L.R.A.1918B, 374; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Welch, 49 Okla. 620, 154 P. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 471; State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 280, 193 S. W. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 158; Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wash. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393. The legislature may recognize degrees of evil and adapt its legislation accordingly, but underlying the classification must be the authority to deal with that at which the legislation is aimed. Truax v. Raich,

²³⁹U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283.

¹⁸Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U. S. 510, 63 L. ed. 735, 39 S. Ct. 357; Dominion Hotel Co. v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 265, 63 L. ed. 597, 39 S. Ct. 273; Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 60 L. ed. 771,

¹⁹German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 S. Ct. 612, L.R.A.1915C, 1189; Laughney v. Maybury,

¹National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & L. Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893,

⁵⁷S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 199 U. S. 401, 50 L. ed. 246, 26 S. Ct. 66; Masonic Cemetery Asso. v. Gamage (C. C. A. 9th) 38 F. (2d) 950, 71 A.L.R. 1027, writ of certiorari denied in 282 U. S. 852, 75 L. ed. 755, 51 S. Ct. 30; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548.

²West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 199 U. S. 401, 50 L. ed. 246, 26 S. Ct. 66.

a classification may validly rest must be reasonable7 and founded on material differences and substantial distinctions which bear a proper relation to the matters or persons dealt with by the legislation and to the purpose sought to be accomplished.⁸

Considering bases for classification concretely, it is apparent that such differences as time,⁹ ability and experience,¹⁰ place,¹¹ population,¹² size, amount13 or number14 including graduated scales15 and exemption of minima,¹⁶ and choice or selection by certain officials17 have often been sought to be used as the foundation upon which a classification may stand, and that in a majority of cases the legislative selection of such factors as a basis for classification has been upheld.¹⁸

**§ ⁴⁸⁶. Time.**—The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning, and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.¹⁹ Frequently, changes in statutory regulations must be made so as to take effect after a given date without applying rigorously to previously established conditions.²⁰ For example, a law permitting the use of docked horses registered within a certain time after its passage and forbidding the use of all other docked horses has been held not to be void as objectionable class legislation.¹

In some cases a statute cannot be given effect as to transactions and matters already existing without impairing the obligation of contracts.² Hence, a law which operates alike on all persons similarly situated is not necessarily invalid because it excepts from its operation all instances in which contract rights had been acquired prior to its adoption.³ It is also generally held that considera-

¹⁹Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415, 56 L. ed. 253, 32 S. Ct. 137; Sperry & H. Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U. S. 502, 55 L. ed. 561, 31 S. Ct. 490; People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L.R.A.1915D, 538. See also Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593, 50 L. ed. 322, 26 S. Ct. 159. A statute relieving uncompensated sureties on bonds of public depositories designated as such after a stated date, and the heirs, devisees, and personal representatives of such sureties, of liability on such bonds, upon judgments obtained thereon, and upon any evidence of indebtedness given in lieu of such liability and authorizing the refunding of payments which may have been made on account of such liability, to the extent that deposits represent the funds raised by general taxation, is not class legislation in that it does not release sureties on bonds of depositories designated as such prior to a date fixed, where the purpose in fixing such date is to deal with a situation occasioned by a financial crisis, or in that it does not release compensated sureties, and furthermore does not violate a constitutional prohibition of the grant to a class of citizens of privileges and immunities which on the same terms do not equally belong to all citizens. Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271.

²⁰Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415, 56 L. ed. 253, 32 S. Ct. 137; Sperry & H. Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U. S. 502, 55 L. ed. 561, 31 S. Ct. 490. An express company is not denied the equal protection of the laws by reason of the fact that it is subject to a penalty for beginning business over any road before paying the privilege tax, while persons and corporations already in business when the taxing day arrives are granted a number of days in which to pay the tax. Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Miller, 264 U. S. 535, 68 L. ed. 836, 44 S. Ct. 421.

³Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415, 56 L. ed. 253, 32 S. Ct. 137 (holding that an exception in favor of existing contracts, contained in a statute making it criminal to sell or deliver black powder for use in any coal mines in the state except in original sealed packages did not vitiate the statute); J. Burton Co. v. Chicago, 236 Ill. 383, 86 N. E. 93, 15 Ann. Cas. 965; Re Ten Hour Law for Street R. Corporations, 24 R. I. 603, 54 A. 602, 61 L.R.A. 612, holding that the exemption of existing written contracts from the operation of a statute limiting the hours of labor of employees of a public service corporation did not render it unconstitutional.

tion for existing property rights furnishes a legitimate basis for classification in legislation of a regulatory nature.⁴ An ordinance prohibiting the keeping of automobiles in wooden buildings is not invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws because it excepts the owners of existing garages.⁵

As a general rule, it may be stated that it is not an improper classification to make a law depend on a fact without which it would have been invalid, as, for instance, an inheritance tax which excepts from the operation all successions which had been fully administered at the time the law took effect.⁶

Unless a statute is curative or remedial and, therefore, temporary, a classification must not be based on existing conditions only, but provision must be made for future acquisitions to the class as other subjects acquire the characteristics which form the basis of the classification.⁷ This principle is of considerable importance when attempts are made to draw distinctions based on time, putting in one class all the instances existing on a designated date, and placing all others in another class. Under certain circumstances, where such a procedure would discriminate unwarrantably in favor of establishments, things, or persons existing or engaged in particular occupations on a given date, the courts have held that the classification is in denial of the equal protection of the laws.⁸ Thus, a statute containing a classification which attempts to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date is not a regulation of a business in the interest of the public, and, unless otherwise shown to affect the public welfare in a manner which will create some reasonable basis for the distinction, is arbitrary and unreasonable.⁹ If a statute requires undertakers to have embalmers' licenses, a provision in it that such licenses shall be issued to all undertakers in business on a specified date is invalid.¹⁰ An ordinance making it unlawful to establish, extend, or enlarge any cemetery within the limits of a county, but impliedly permitting burials in cemeteries already established, has been held to be unequal in its operation, in assuming to limit the unrestricted privilege of burial to one class of citizens and to deny it to another class within the same district.¹¹ A classification of public utilities, for the purpose of regulation, into those in existence before and those created after a specified date is purely arbitrary, without reason, and invalid.¹² In order for a statute regulating a business or profession to make distinctions based on time as to the persons to whom it relates, there must be a reasonable basis for the distinctions relating to those engaged in the business at a certain time and those engaged at a later time.¹³ The rule is that statutes which enact conditions and qualifications for those persons enter-

⁶Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U. S. 543, 51 L. ed. 310, 25 S. Ct. 174, 8 Ann. Cas. 215; Levy's Succession, 115 La. 377, 39 So. 37, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1180, 5 Ann. Cas. 871, affirmed in 203 U. S. 543, 51 L. ed. 310, 27 S. Ct. 174.

⁸Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266, 80 L. ed. 675, 56 S. Ct. 457; Los Angeles County v. Hollywood Cemetery Asso. 124 Cal. 344, 57 P. 153, 71 Am. St. Rep. 75; Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696, 43 A.L.R. 1086; Fulton v. Norteman, 60 W. Va. 562, 55 S. E. 658, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1196; Pabst Corp. v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 349, 208 N. W. 493, 45 A.L.R. 1164; State ex rel. Kempinger v. Whyte, 177 Wis. 541, 188 N. W. 607, 23 A.L.R. 67.

⁹Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266, 80 L. ed. 675, 56 S. Ct. 457 (milk business).

¹⁰State ex rel. Kempinger v. Whyte, 177 Wis. 541, 188 N. W. 607, 23 A.L.R. 67.

¹¹Los Angeles County v. Hollywood Cemetery Asso. 124 Cal. 344, 57 P. 153, 71 Am. St. Rep. 75; Fulton v. Norteman, 60 W. Va. 562, 55 S. E. 658, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1196. See CEMETERIES, Vol. 10, p. 496, § 15.

ing into a business after a certain time but do not impose such conditions and qualifications on persons previously engaged therein are not on that account unconstitutional. Such exceptions proceed on the theory that those who have acceptably followed the profession in the community for a period of years may be assumed to have the qualifications which others are required to manifest as a result of an examination.¹⁴ Exemptions if applied to persons already engaged in an occupation, however, must apply equally to all similarly situated and cannot be based upon a time limit which will operate arbitrarily.¹⁵ A statute which discriminates against businesses, persons, or establishments already in existence is unreasonable and unconstitutional.¹⁶

§ 487. Capacity and Equipment.—

Classification of persons may be made according to their personal fitness to carry on particular businesses. This is characteristic of all license laws, and so far as they provide that all persons desiring to engage in a particular occupation shall be examined as to fitness or otherwise show that they possess proper qualifications, such laws have usually been held valid.17 It is an unconstitutional exception, however, to permit members of a partnership or of a corporation to pursue a particular calling without a license, provided any member of the partnership or corporation shall have procured a license.18 The courts have also held that the making of appointments to public office depend on fitness, to be ascertained by competitive examination as far as possible, does not create an unconstitutional discrimination between different classes of citizens in regard to the right to enter upon and continue in the public service.19

¹⁴Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30 S. Ct. 644 (physicians and surgeons); New Orleans v. Smythe, 116 La. 685, 41 So. 33, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 722, 114 Am. St. Rep. 566 (liquor dealers); State v. Randolph, 23 Or. 74, 31 P. 201, 17 L.R.A. 470, 37 Am. St. Rep. 655 (physicians and surgeons); State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 71 P. 737, 96 Am. St. Rep. 893 (barbers); State v. Currens, 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L.R.A. 252 (physicians and surgeons). Compare State v. Hinman, 65 N. H. 103, 18 A. 194, 23 Am. St. Rep. 22 (dentists); Harmon v. State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 64 N. E. 117, 58 L.R.A. 618 (steam engineers), holding particular statutes unconstitutional. See also State ex rel. Ebert v. Loden, 117 Md. 373, 83 A. 564, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 193, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1300 (moving picture machine operators). A statute having for its general purpose the regulation of the undertaking business is not unfair and discriminatory, and so in violation of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution because it limits membership on the state board of embalming authorized to enforce the provisions of the act, to citizens and residents of the state who have been actually engaged for at least five years in the undertaking business in the state as embalmers and funeral directors on their own account. Prata Undertaking Co. v. State Bd. of Embalming, — R. I. —, 182 A. 808, 104 A.L.R. 389. A provision in a statute for the licensing of dentists preserving the rights of those licensed and registered at the time of its passage does not affect the constitutional rights of one licensed at the time in another state, who, under the statute, must comply with its terms to secure a license to practice in the state after the passage of the act. People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L.R.A.1915D, 538.

¹⁵Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696, 43 A.L.R. 1086 (statute regulating accountants).

¹⁶State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Co. 162 La. 165, 110 So. 188, 51 A.L.R. 261. A statute regulating gas wells, which discriminates against existing establishments, is unreasonable and unconstitutional. Ibid.

¹⁷Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 56 L. ed. 439, 32 S. Ct. 286 (osteopaths); Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997 (laundrymen); Moler v. Whisman, 243 Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 629, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 392 (barbers); People v. Warden, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E. 686, 27 L.R.A. 718 (plumbers); Servonitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231, 113 N. W. 277, 126 Am. St. Rep. 955 (peddlers). Requiring journeyman plumbers to secure a certificate of competency after examination before they can work at their trade while not requiring master plumbers to secure such certificate is not unlawful discrimination. Louisville v. Coulter, 177 Ky. 242, 197 S. W. 819, L.R.A.1918A, 811. As to police regulations protecting the public from incapacity, see Vol. 11, p. 1032, § 275.

¹⁸Henry v. Campbell, 133 Ga. 882, 57 S. E. 390, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 283, 18 Ann. Cas. 173; Vicksburg v. Mullane, 106 Miss. 199, 63 So. 412, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 421; State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599, 51 N. E. 136, 41 L.R.A. 689, 65 Am. St. Rep. 785.

A statute granting liens to attorneys is not assailable as special legislation because it applies only to attorneys at law. Those who follow the legal profession constitute a class, and laws may be passed applicable only to members of such a class, where the classification rests upon some attribute or distinction marking them as proper objects for the operation of such special legislation, in any case wherein such local or special legislation is not expressly forbidden by the state Constitution.²⁰ This rule has frequently been applied to laws pertaining only to persons following a particular profession or occupation requiring skill and special training, including physicians, architects, pharmacists, and other persons engaged in similar occupations.¹

§ 488. Location and Territory.—

The rule is well settled that the Constitution of the United States in securing the equal protection of the laws does not prohibit legislation which is limited as to the territory within which it is to operate.2 In the absence of restrictions contained in state Constitutions the legislature may determine within broad limits whether particular laws shall extend to the whole state or be limited in their operation to particular portions of the state. All that the Federal Constitution requires is that they shall be general in their application within the territory in which they operate.3 In some of the states, however, there are provisions in the state Constitutions which require that laws should have a uniform operation throughout the state. Such provisions have been interpreted to mean universal operation as to all persons and things in the same condition or category, so that whenever a law is available in every part of the state as to all persons and things in the

²⁰Standidge v. Chicago R. Co. 254 Ill. 524, 98 N. E. 963, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 529, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 65.

²Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387, 71 L. ed. 1112, 47 S. Ct. 595; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91, 58 L. ed. 1231, 34 S. Ct. 712; Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. 184, 57 L. ed. 180, 33 S. Ct. 47; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 55 L. ed. 137, 31 S. Ct. 171; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 S. Ct. 350; Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1065, affirmed in 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799; Woolley v. Mears, 226 Mo. 41, 112 S. W. 1112, 136 Am. St. Rep. 637; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112, 35 L.R.A. 231; Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; People v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 195, 43 N. E. 541, 31 L.R.A. 689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 707, writ of error dismissed in 170 U. S. 408, 42 L. ed. 1087, 18 S. Ct. 631; State v. Hanlon, 77 Ohio St. 19, 82 N. E. 662, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 539, 122 Am. St. Rep. 472; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584; Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 588, 66 N. W. 805, 32 L.R.A. 380. The constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws does not require territorial uniformity. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91, 58 L. ed. 1231, 34 S. Ct. 712. A statute in relation to the grading and packing of potatoes which exempts those shipped during the months of July, August, and September from regulations otherwise applicable does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment upon the ground that it discriminates as between different sections of the state, there being no reference in the statute to different sections, although it appears that certain portions of the state, by reason of soil, climate, or other conditions, are more suitable to the growing of varieties of potatoes that mature earlier than varieties best suited for production in other sections. Detweiler v. Welch (C. C. A. 9th) 46 F. (2d) 75, 73 A.L.R. 146. The discrimination between the district of Honolulu and other districts in the amount of the fee imposed by Hawaii Rev. Laws, § 1343, for a license to make sales at auction, which is $600 for the district of Honolulu, and $15 for each other taxation district, is not so arbitrary or unreasonable as to render the statute unconstitutional, as denying the equal protection of the laws. Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. 184, 57 L. ed. 180, 33 S. Ct. 47.

³People v. Gordon, 274 Ill. 462, 113 N. E. 864, citing R. C. L.; Atkinson v. Southern Exp. Co. 94 S. C. 444, 78 S. E. 516, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 349; Bon Homme County v. Berndt, 13 S. D. 309, 83 N. W. 333, 50 L.R.A. 351.

specified territories or which require licenses or other special conditions before

A classification is not illegal because certain cities are included while others

are omitted from the operation of a statute.¹⁰ Thus, the constitutional guaran-

⁵See discussion of many types of cases in Barker v. State Fish Commission, 88 Wash. 73, 152 P. 537, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 810. A state may classify its territory as to hunting and fishing. Barker v. State Fish Commission, 88 Wash. 73, 152 P. 537, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 810.

⁸School City v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471, 81 A.L.R. 1027; State v. Bair, 112 Iowa, 466, 84 N. W. 532, 51 L.R.A. 776.

²³⁹U. S. 486, 60 L. ed. 396, 36 S. Ct. 206. The Fourteenth Amendment contem- plates persons and classes of persons and does not relate to local or municipal regu- lations that do not injuriously affect or discriminate between persons or classes of persons within the places or municipalities for which they are made. Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis), 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989. The exemption from the operation of statute providing for the licensing and bonding of wholesale produce dealers, of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the grain and warehouse commission, who by the terms of the statute is located in only one city, does not create an unconstitu- tional discrimination where, on request, other dealers in grain may be brought within the jurisdiction of such commission. State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434. As to classification upon a basis of popu- lation, see infra, § 489.

¹⁸³N. Y. 223, 76 N. E. 11, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 859, 8 Ann. Cas. 325; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743, L.R.A.1917C, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 217, affirmed in 243 U. S. 629,

⁶⁰L. ed. 348, 36 S. Ct. 143, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 927, affirming 165 Cal. 416, 132 P. 584, L.R.A. 1916B, 1248; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 59 L. ed. 900, 35 S. Ct. 511; Re Montgomery, 163 Cal. 457, 125 P. 1070, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 130. See Vol. 11, p. 1049, § 287.

basis as to whether they are conducted within or without the limits of a munici-

pality.¹⁵ While the cases are not in accord,¹⁶ a majority of those passing

§ 489. Population.—

for classification, making distinctions applicable to people of different local-

tional guaranties of equality.²⁰ Legislation affecting only certain cities, its

operation based upon population or, similarly, upon the fact that they are cities

belonging to a particular class, has repeatedly been held to be valid as against the

¹⁴Walls v. Midland Carbon Co. 254 U. S. 300, 65 L. ed. 276, 41 S. Ct. 118. See also Milliron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S. E. 231, 84 A.L.R. 1142.

¹⁵Annotation: 109 A.L.R. 903. As to the equality required generally in municipal license laws, see MUNICIPAL COR- PORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 955, §§ 255 et seq.].

¹⁷Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. (2d) 405, 65 P. (2d) 884, 109 A.L.R. 895 (laundry and dry cleaning); Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, 174 Ga. 99, 162 S. E. 497, 87 A.L.R. 507, appeal dismissed in 286 U. S. 526, 76 L. ed. 1269, 52 S. Ct. 495 (laundry); Ideal Tea Co. v. Salem, 77 Or. 182, 150 P. 852, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 684. Annotation: 109 A.L.R. 903 et seq.

¹⁸Annotation: 109 A.L.R. 907. Some of the decisions following the mi- nority view may be distinguishable on the facts, but in others it seems that the theory on which the court sustained the tax in question might logically have been applied in cases reaching the opposite con- clusion. Annotation: 109 A.L.R. 907. In Standard Chemical & Oil Co. v. Troy,

²⁰¹Ala. 89, 77 So. 383, L.R.A.1918C, 522, which involved an ordinance imposing a license tax on manufacturing establish- ments located outside a city but maintain- ing an office within the city, it was held that the ordinance could not be held dis- criminatory as not applying equally to es- tablishments so located but not maintain- ing an office in the municipality, in the absence of proof of the existence of any such manufactories.

²⁰Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 248; State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; State ex rel. White v. Kansas City, 134 Kan. 157, 4 P. (2d) 422,

⁷⁸A.L.R. 507; Louisville v. Coulter, 177 Ky. 242, 197 S. W. 519, L.R.A.1918A, 811; Ashley v. Three Justices (Ashley v. Wait),

²²⁸Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A.L.R. 1463, writ of error dismissed in 250 U. S. 652, 63 L. ed. 1190, 40 S. Ct. 53; Randolph v. Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257 S. W. 449, 31 A.L.R. 612; Admiral Realty Co. v. New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1054; Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla. Crim. Rep. 457, 209 P. 228, 27 A.L.R. 1008; State v. Kincaid, 133 Or. 95, 285 P. 1105,

¹⁵⁵Tenn. 476, 295 S. W. 469, 54 A.L.R. 725; McKnight v. Hodge, 55 Wash. 289, 104 P. 504, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1207, writ of error dis- missed in 223 U. S. 748, 56 L. ed. 640, 32 S. Ct. 534; Pabst Corp. v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 349, 208 N. W. 493, 45 A.L.R. 1164. See also People ex rel. Hatfield v. Grover,

²⁵⁸Ill. 124, 101 N. E. 216, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 212. Annotation: 15 Ann. Cas. 856.

objections that it violates state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity

upwards,² or to cities of a definite class, such as of the first3 or second class.⁴

If no such relation and differences exist, the classification is invalid.⁹ For

is invalid.¹⁰ Similarly, an act requiring stores to close at ⁶ o'clock P. M. in

cities of ten thousand or more population has been held invalid.¹¹ A classifica-

tion based upon merely trivial differences in population is likewise invalid.¹²

better view that a statute which classifies cities or other localities to be gov-

state having less than a specified number of inhabitants according to a particu-

²Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 45 L. ed. 214, 21 S. Ct. 125; Budd v. New York,

¹⁴³U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 12 S. Ct. 468; Millron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S. E. 231, 84 A.L.R. 1142; Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105; Doug- las v. People, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N. E. 341, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162; People v. Brazee, 183 Mich. 259, 149 N. W. 1053, L.R.A.1916E, 1146, affirmed in 241 U. S. 340, 60 L. ed. 1034, 36 S. Ct. 561, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 522; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L.R.A. 385. Annotation: 45 A.L.R. 1170 (water com- panies). A statute authorizing any city, village, or town having a population of forty thou- sand or over to require by ordinance the resident owners of motor vehicles to sub- mit them to inspection, not more often than semiannually, at public expense, to determine whether they conform to the statutory requirement as to equipment for safe operation and an ordinance adopted thereunder do not unreasonably discrim- inate against residents of the city. Evans- ton v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 4 N. E. (2d) 78,

³Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 68 L. ed. 596, 44 S. Ct. 257; Louisville v. Coulter, 177 Ky. 242, 197 S. W. 819, L.R.A. 1918A, 811.

¹³³Tenn. 446, 181 S. W. 682, citing R. C. L.; Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah, 495, 151 P. 51, L.R.A.1916A, 651, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 198.

¹⁰Randolph v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 80, 36 S. W. (2d) 484, citing R. C. L.

¹¹Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah, 495, 151 P. 51, L.R.A.1916A, 651, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 198 (statute also held invalid on other grounds).

¹⁵Fleming v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 331, 148 S. W. 1057, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1306.

into the same situation and circumstances for the reason that the classification

is based solely upon the Federal census of a particular year.¹⁶ An act limited

existing conditions which are made a basis of classification are of such a char-

acter as fairly to suggest the propriety of different legislation as to the cities

§ 490. Size and Amount.—

basis for a legislative discrimination between the large and the small.²⁰ For

restriction to secure larger loans.¹ This is due to the fact that the practice of

exacting oppressive rates of interest has been deemed to be very largely, if not

²⁰Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 55 L. ed. 128, 31 S. Ct. 190; Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho, 380, 263 P. 45, citing R. C. L.; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 86 N. E. 916, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 746, 128 Am. St. Rep. 446, affirmed in 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co. 34 Utah, 38, 95 P. 523, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898.

¹Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 86 N. E. 916, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 746, 128 Am. St. Rep. 446, affirmed in 222 U. S. 225,

²State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819.

³Summerville v. Pressley, 33 S. C. 56, 11 S. E. 545, 8 L.R.A. 854, 26 Am. St. Rep. 659.

⁴Com. v. Hazel, 155 Ky. 30, 159 S. W. 673, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1078 (tax sales of $500 or over made taxable).

⁵Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio St. 283, 95 N. E. 829, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 611. As to degrees of larceny, see LARCENY [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 6, § 3].

The law cannot discriminate between great and small where size is not an index to an admitted evil.⁶ If a state may regulate one who does much business, while not regulating another engaged in the same enterprise, but doing less business, it denies the equal protection of the laws.⁷ Hence, a gross sales tax which classifies vendors for the imposition of a varying rate of taxation solely by reference to the volume of their transactions8 or by the identical method of levying the tax on an accumulative graduated scale based on gross receipts9 violates the equal protection clause.

**§ ⁴⁹¹. Number.**—Classification based on numbers is not necessarily unreasonable. There are many instances in which it has been sustained.¹⁰ A statute prohibiting, under penalty, membership in a secret, oath-bound organization which has not filed its constitution, bylaws, rules, regulations, and oath of membership, and roster of membership is not invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws because it is made applicable only to societies having a membership of twenty or more persons.¹¹ A statute requiring a $⁵⁰⁰ fee for each additional agent of a foreign insurance company beyond a prescribed number does not deny the equal protection of the laws to one seeking appointment as such agent.¹² Statutes classifying hotels for the purposes of inspection, sanitary measures, and protection from fires according to the number of rooms contained therein13 and exempting hotels having one hundred rooms or more from special restrictions against the sale of intoxicating liquors14 have been held not to be invalid as class legislation.

If the mere factor of numbers can form no reasonable basis for a classification, considering the matters dealt with and the purpose of the law, discriminations based solely upon numbers are invalid.¹⁵ An occupation tax imposed on the business of operating one of a chain of five or more stores which is not imposed on the same kind of business where the number of chain stores is less than five is violative of the equal protection clauses of the state and Federal Constitutions.¹⁶

**§ ⁴⁹². Graduated Amounts.**—Taxes and fees may under certain circumstances be graduated so that a different burden is placed on one class from that on another where the differences between the classes depend solely on quantity and amount. The courts of this country with substantial uniformity have upheld the progressive features of such laws as not violating the gen-

⁷McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315, 29 S. Ct. 206; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard), 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997; Com. v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 46 A. 286, 57 L.R.A. 348, 86 Am. St. Rep. 694.

⁸Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 79 L. ed. 1054, 55 S. Ct. 525, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 768, 79 L. ed. 1709, 55 S. Ct. 652.

⁹Valentine v. Great Atlantic & P. Tea Co. 299 U. S. 32, 81 L. ed. 22, 57 S. Ct. 56.

¹⁰New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785.

¹²Herbring v. Lee, 280 U. S. 111, 74 L. ed. 217, 50 S. Ct. 49, 64 A.L.R. 1430, affirming 126 Or. 588, 269 P. 236, 60 A.L.R. 1165. Annotation: 60 A.L.R. 1172, s. 64 A.L.R. 1434.

¹³Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 60 L. ed. 364, 36 S. Ct. 147; State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792, 140 Am. St. Rep. 909. Singling out hotels having more than fifty rooms as proper subjects for regulations respecting the duty of hotelkeepers towards guests and inmates in case of fire does not render a statute repugnant to the equal protection clause. Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 60 L. ed. 364, 36 S. Ct. 147. As to fire regulations relating to various types of structures, see BUILDINGS, Vol. 9, p. 213, §§ 17 et seq.

¹⁵Douglas v. South Georgia Grocery Co. 180 Ga. 519, 179 S. E. 768, 99 A.L.R. 700.

eral guaranties of equality and equal protection of the laws contained in the various state Constitutions and in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.¹⁷ Thus, a graduated income tax which exempts incomes under a specified amount and increases the tax as the income reaches stated amounts above that sum is usually held to be valid as not denying taxpayers the equal protection of the laws.¹⁸ The same conclusion has been reached with respect to a law imposing a legacy and inheritance tax where the rate progresses according to the amount of beneficial interest acquired.¹⁹ Legislation imposing a license tax on merchants by which they are divided into classes according to the amount of their sales, each class including all whose sales range between a certain minimum and maximum amount, does not violate the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the result is to make persons in different classes pay different rates and to make those in the same class pay at a different ratio if the amounts of their sales differ.²⁰ Under the same principles as those involving license cases, graduated chain store taxes have been held not to invalidate the equal protection clause.¹ Grading a municipal license fee for theaters according to the price asked for the highest priced seats other than box seats, rather than according to revenue, has also been upheld as not being in violation of the guaranty as to the equal protection of the laws.²

**§ ⁴⁹³. Exemption of Minima.**—A form of classification which is generally upheld, although it depends to a large extent on value and amount, is that which recognizes the validity of exemption statutes. These may be of various kinds, and the courts of the country abound in decisions which uphold statutes exempting property from execution and attachment, such as the homestead of the debtor, the books and library of the professional man, the surgical implements of the physician, or the household furniture, horses, cows, and other articles belonging to ordinary debtors.³ Such acts when based on proper classification are generally sustained.⁴ It has been held that an inheritance tax does not deny to anyone the equal protection of the laws because it ex-

¹⁷Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 121, 9 Ann. Cas. 711. As to the application of the principle of taxation by graduated scale to excise taxes, see TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 261, § 230].

¹⁸Alderman v. Wells, 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 864, 21 Ann. Cas. 193. Annotation: 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 864. See INCOME TAXES [Also TAXATION, 26 R. C. L. p. 143, § 117].

¹⁹Keeney v. Comptroller, 222 U. S. 525, 56 L. ed. 299, 32 S. Ct. 105, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1139; Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 46 L. ed. 196, 22 S. Ct. 213; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N. W. 522, 90 Am. St. Rep. 853. Annotation: 46 L. ed. 569; 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 898, s. 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 955. See INHERITANCE, ESTATE, AND SUCCESSION TAXES [Also TAXATION, 26 R. C. L. p. 200, § 170].

²⁰Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 46 L. ed. 569, 22 S. Ct. 382; Louisville v. Schnell, 131 Ky. 104, 114 S. W. 742, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 637; Wayne Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Olive, 161 N. C. 121, 76 S. E. 690, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 954; Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 A. 861, 50 L.R.A. 86 (sales tax). See Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 57 L. ed. 603, 33 S. Ct. 318. See LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 511, § 32]. As to classifications in sales tax laws, see TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L., 1937 Supp. § 213a].

¹Great Atlantic & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 81 L. ed. 1193, 57 S. Ct. 772, 112 A.L.R. 293; Fox v. Standard Oil Co. 294 U. S. 87, 79 L. ed. 780, 55 S. Ct. 333, rehearing denied in 294 U. S. 732, 79 L. ed. 1261, 55 S. Ct. 511; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 A.L.R. 699 (recognizing rule); State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co. — Va. —, 190 S. E. 318, 110 A.L.R. 1195.

²Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 57 L. ed. 730, 33 S. Ct. 441.

³Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 32 L. ed. 491, 9 S. Ct. 134; Williams v. Donough, 65 Ohio St. 499, 63 N. E. 84, 56 L.R.A. 766. See EXEMPTIONS [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 490, § 2]; HOMESTEAD [Also 13 R. C. L. p. 543, § 4; p. 549, § 9].

certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries,

classes of creditors over other classes.⁷ A statute reducing or abolishing the

classes of claims is generally held to be invalid as class legislation in contra-

§ 494. Discretion of Officials.—

protection of the laws consists of those in which in certain instances the choice

is so, power to choose the persons or place must also exist.¹⁰ A case of this

²⁰Mont. 299, 51 P. 267, 39 L.R.A. 170; Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N. W. 1019, 90 Am. St. Rep. 853. Annotation: 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 598. See INHERITANCE, ESTATE, AND SUCCESSION TAXES [Also TAXATION, 26 R. C. L. p. 199, § 170; p. 228, § 198].

⁶See infra, § 518. As to exemptions in taxation and rules of equality in general, see TAXATION [Also

²⁶R. C. L. p. 252, §§ 223 et seq.]; as to ex- emption of charitable property, see TAXA- TION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 316, §§ 27 et seq.]; as to exemption of churches, see TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 32, § 283]; as to ex- emption of libraries and educational insti- tutions, see TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 320, §§ 281, 282].

⁸Annotation: 6 A.L.R. 1140 et seq. Classification of creditors so as to de- prive debtors of the benefit of the Exemp- tion Laws with respect to certain classes of debts is prohibited by a constitutional provision that no law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens. O'Leary v. Croghan, 42 S. D. 210,

⁸²Am. Dec. 108, a question was raised as to the constitutionality of an act which provided for a homestead exemption, but excepted from the operation of the exemp- tion debts for wages due clerks, laborers, and mechanics. The court held that the part of the act which excluded the specific class of debts mentioned from its operation was unconstitutional and void, as it erect- ed a distinction as to particular classes of debts.

⁹Annotation: 6 A.L.R. 1143. In Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, 32 Utah, 74, 88 P. 896, 125 Am. St. Rep. 828, wherein it appeared that a home- stead exemption to the value of $1,500 was created by the Constitution, with no ex- ceptions (Const. Art. 22, § 1), the court held that the homestead statute (Rev. Stat. 1898, § 1156) which provided that a home- stead was subject to execution in satisfac- tion of judgments obtained on debts se- cured by mechanics' or laborers' liens was invalid, as the legislature did not have the power to make the homestead subject to sale for a particular debt, in contraven- tion to the constitutional exemption stated above.

¹⁰Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997 (carefully analyzing the various decisions). See also Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 80 L. ed. 138, 56 S. Ct. 159, 101 A.L.R. 853; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Louis v. Fischer, 167 Mo. 654, 67 S. W. 872,

a consideration of cases of this type the conclusion seems to be inevitable that

of the legislative body or of administrative officers to whom the matter is com-

and yet this will have no effect upon the validity of classification. This power

to select in such cases has been likened to the power to appoint to office. Since

fication in such cases has a real and substantial relation to the public welfare.

The touchstone of the validity of legislation in all cases of this kind seems to

be the public welfare. If the classification has a real and substantial relation

permits in the discretion of officials has been upheld as against the contention

the city council, or, in his absence, of a councilor, before any person shall move

tection of the laws.¹⁵ The possibility that the comptroller may refuse a license

business.¹⁶ In any case, however, where it is sought to confer a discretion as

in 194 U. S. 361, 48 L. ed. 1018, 24 S. Ct. 673. An order of a state department of agri- culture requiring the use of containers of a certain type, form, and dimensions in marketing strawberries and raspberries does not deny the equal protection of the law to manufacturers of other types of containers where the type prescribed is not protected by patent or trademark and its manufacture is not a trade secret so that all persons are free to manufacture it. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White,

¹⁰¹A.L.R. 853. The delegation to the state secretary of agriculture of power to prescribe reason- able tolerances or variations in excess of, but not under, the weight specified by stat- ute for loaves of bread made for sale in the state and the time during which such weight shall be maintained does not vio- late the equal protection clause where the prescribed tolerances are not shown to be such as bakers may not readily comply with. P. F. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan,

¹¹Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394, discussed in Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997.

⁴⁴L. ed. 899, 20 S. Ct. 788, discussed in Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997.

¹³Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997. See Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U. S. 414,

⁷¹L. ed. 714, 47 S. Ct. 363; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, 59 L. ed. 900, 35 S. Ct. 511.

not always clear and is not in all cases the basis of decision. It is significant,

officer.²⁰ Furthermore, such ordinances placing restrictions upon lawful con-

duct or the lawful use of property must, to be valid, specify the rules and con-

tion of the laws merely because the official board having final jurisdiction over

salaries of his assistants, which power is not conferred upon the heads of other

§ 495. Generally.—

¹⁰⁰Neb. 864, 161 N. W. 569, L.R.A.1917D, 310. As to discrimination in the administra- tion of laws, see infra, § 566.

²⁰Elkhart v. Murray, 165 Ind. 304, 75 N. E. 593, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 940, 112 Am. St. Rep. 228, 6 Ann. Cas. 748.

¹Montgomery v. West, 149 Ala. 311, 42 So. 1000, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 659, 123 Am. St. Rep. 33, 13 Ann. Cas. 651; St. Louis v. Allen, 275 Mo. 501, 204 S. W. 1083, L.R.A. 1918F, 1110.

that particular qualities of a group form a reasonable basis for different treat-

quite diversified, including sex,⁵ minority,⁶ alienage,6a race and color,⁷ mili-

tary service,⁸ membership in labor unions,⁹ and employing of labor.¹⁰ Age

limits may be fixed as a qualification for such public duties as military or jury

§ 496. Women.—

ties of liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness to earn a living.¹⁴ The

⁴As to personal differences which relate to the purpose of legislation forming a proper basis for classification, see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. ed. 551, 28 S. Ct. 324, 13 Ann. Cas. 957. See infra, §§ 496-503.

¹¹Thurston County v. Tenino Stone Quarries, 44 Wash. 351, 87 P. 634, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 306, 12 Ann. Cas. 314. See JURY [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 225, § 41]; MILITARY [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 1045, § 33]; PUBLIC OFFICERS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 406, § 47].

¹²Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 56 L. ed. 350, 32 S. Ct. 192. Exempting steam laundries and women engaged in the laundry business, where not more than two women are employed, from a license tax imposed by law upon the laundry business, does not deny the equal protection of the laws to a man operating a hand laundry. Ibid.

¹⁵West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385, 59 L. ed. 632, 35 S. Ct. 345; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373,

⁵⁹L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. ed. 551, 28 S. Ct. 324, 13 Ann. Cas. 957, af- firming 48 Or. 252, 85 P. 855, 120 Am. St. Rep. 805, 11 Ann. Cas. 88; State v. Crowe,

¹³⁰Ark. 272, 197 S. W. 4, L.R.A.1918A, 567, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 460; People v. Elerding,

²⁵⁴Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 893; Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E. 695, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 994; Com. v. Riley, 210 Mass. 387, 97 N. E. 367, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 388; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504, L.R.A. 1918F, 542; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394,

⁹¹N. W. 421, 58 L.R.A. 825; People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395,

¹⁰⁸N. E. 639, L.R.A.1918A, 1124, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1059, writ of error dismissed in 242 U. S. 618, 61 L. ed. 530, 37 S. Ct. 214; State v. Ehr, 57 N. D. 310, 221 N. W. 883, citing R. C. L.; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743, L.R.A.1917C, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 217, affirmed in 243 U. S. 629, 61 L. ed. 937,

³⁷S. Ct. 403. See First Wisconsin Nat. Bank v. Jahn, 179 Wis. 117, 190 N. W. 822,

²⁶A.L.R. 349. Since healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public in- terest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race and so jus- tifies a difference in legislation between the sexes and upholds that which is de- signed to compensate for some of the bur- dens which rest upon her. Muller v. Ore- gon, 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. ed. 551, 28 S. Ct. 324, 113 Ann. Cas. 957. As to maximum hour laws for women, see LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 485, § 60]; as to minimum wage laws for women, see LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 499, § 68]. [12 Am. Jur.]—12 177

trol, direction, and dismissal of the employer.¹⁶ The general trend of authority is to hold that labor legislation affecting women only is not class legislation,¹⁷ and does not contain an arbitrary discrimination because it does not extend to men.¹⁸

Labor legislation affecting women may ordinarily make classifications according to the type of work in which they are engaged, prescribing different hours and working conditions for different occupations, if there is a reasonable basis for the distinctions made.¹⁹

Classification in labor legislation on a basis of sex may not be completely unlimited. As one court has pointed out, sex alone will not in all cases serve as a proper basis for the exercise of the police power, for in the invasion of the right of liberty and property, there must be some reasonable connection between the limitation upon the hours females may work and the public health, safety, and welfare proposed to be secured by the limitation.²⁰

§ 497. —

Discrimination against.—It is settled that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates fully to include women within its protective scope. Discriminations against women as such are invalid.1

Discriminations against women in matters relating to intoxicating liquors have consistently been upheld by the courts.² Withholding from women permits to sell intoxicating liquors, while granting such permits to other persons, does not deprive women of any constitutional right of equal protection or uniform operation of laws or violate any provision against the granting of special privileges or immunities.³ Such laws rest on the theory that as a rule retail dealing in intoxicants by women is opposed to sound public policy and that so long as the state chooses to exercise its right to regulate the traffic and minimize its admitted evils, it may constitutionally deny liquor licenses to women.⁴ In recognition of this same principle, the courts have held that no unconstitutional discrimination against women is made by a statute forbidding their entering wine rooms for the purpose of being supplied with liquor5 or even prohibiting keepers of saloons where intoxicating liquors are sold from permitting women to be in or about their places of business.⁶

¹⁶People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 893; People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639, L.R.A.1918A, 1124, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1059, writ of error dismissed in 242 U. S. 618, 61 L. ed. 530, 37 S. Ct. 214; State v. Ehr, 57 N. D. 310, 221 N. W. 883, citing R. C. L.; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 70 P. 52, 59 L.R.A. 342, 92 Am. St. Rep. 930.

¹⁷Quong Wong v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 56 L. ed. 350, 32 S. Ct. 192; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N. W. 421, 58 L.R.A. 825; State v. Ehr, 57 N. D. 310, 221 N. W. 883, citing R. C. L.

¹⁸West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330; Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E. 695, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 994.

¹⁹Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385, 59 L. ed. 632, 35 S. Ct. 345; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 893; W. C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E. 695, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 994; Withey v. Bloem, 163 Mich. 419, 128 N. W. 913, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 628.

¹Carrithers v. Shelbyville, 126 Ky. 769, 104 S. W. 744, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 421; State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S. W. (2d) 124, citing R. C. L.

³Re Carragher, 149 Iowa, 225, 128 N. W. 352, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 321, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 972. Annotation: 49 L.R.A. 111.

⁴Re Carragher, 149 Iowa, 225, 128 N. W. 352, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 321, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 972; People v. Case, 153 Mich. 98, 116 N. W. 558, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 657. Annotation: 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 657.

⁵Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108, 48 L. ed. 365, 24 S. Ct. 219, affirming 29 Colo. 488, 69 P. 590, 63 L.R.A. 61.

⁶Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108, 48 L. ed. 365, 24 S. Ct. 219, affirming 29 Colo. 488, 69 P. 590, 63 L.R.A. 61; People v. Case, 153 Mich. 98, 116 N. W. 558, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 657; State v. Baker, 50 Or. 381, 92 P. 1076, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1040. Annotation: 48 L. ed. 365; 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 657.

A provision in a state Constitution that no person shall on account of sex be disqualified from entering on or pursuing any lawful business, vocation, or profession has been held not to be violated by an ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors in dance cellars or other places where musical and theatrical entertainments are given and where women attend as waitresses.⁷ On the other hand, it is an undue interference with personal liberty to make it a misdemeanor for a woman to go into any building where liquor is sold or to stand within a given distance of such building.⁸ It has likewise been held that a statute rendering the proprietor of a Chinese restaurant criminally liable for permitting a woman under the age of twenty-one years to enter it or be served with food or drink there was unconstitutional as denying him the equal protection of the laws.⁹

Work in some types of business or industry is injurious to women. In such instances it is proper to recognize distinctions that exist in the nature of things, and regulations recognizing the impropriety of permitting women to engage in certain occupations and forbidding them to do so are open to no reasonable objection.¹⁰

Before leaving the subject of the right of women to the equal protection of the laws, it may be mentioned that the courts have decided that a statute permitting the annexation to municipalities of property belonging to women, without giving them an opportunity, such as the statute gives to voters, to make defense to the proceedings, does not deprive them of the equal protection of the laws.¹¹

§ 498. Minors.—

Minors are peculiarly entitled to legislative protection and form a class to which legislation may be exclusively directed without falling under the constitutional prohibition of special legislation and unfair discrimination.12 Statutes may regulate and forbid the employment and laboring of children under designated ages13 and in so doing may exempt agricultural and domestic labor, since these kinds are generally carried on at home and under the care and supervision of parents or those occupying the place of parents.14 Such statutes may contain special provisions relating to those who are unable to read and write English and may forbid their employment until

⁸Gastineau v. Com. 108 Ky. 473, 56 S. W. 705, 49 L.R.A. 111, 94 Am. St. Rep. 386. Annotation: 49 L.R.A. 111.

⁹Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 604. Annotation: 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 604.

¹⁰State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 70 P. 52, 59 L.R.A. 342, 92 Am. St. Rep. 930.

¹²Re Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 86 P. 896, 117 Am. St. Rep. 137, 9 Ann. Cas. 1105; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 58 P. 1071, 47 L.R.A. 52, 77 Am. St. Rep. 269. See INFANTS [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 276, § 47].

¹³Sturges & B. Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 58 L. ed. 245, 34 S. Ct. 60, L.R.A.1915A, 1196; Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S. W. 887, 12 A.L.R. 1208; Re Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 86 P. 896, 117 Am. St. Rep. 137, 9 Ann. Cas. 1105; State v. Erle, 210 Iowa, 974, 232 N. W. 279, 72 A.L.R. 137; Com. v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, 5 Ann. Cas. 92. The state may prohibit the employment of persons under fourteen years of age in defined occupations which are deemed dangerous either to the life or limb or injurious to the morals or the future welfare of children of tender years. State v. Erle, 210 Iowa, 974, 232 N. W. 279, 72 A.L.R. 137. The employment of children under the age of sixteen years in hazardous occupations may be prohibited without contravening the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. Sturges & B. Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 58 L. ed. 245, 34 S. Ct. 60, L.R.A.1915A, 1196. As to prohibition of child labor, see LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 477, § 54]; as to limitation of hours of labor for children, see LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 485, § 59]; as to minimum wages for children, see LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 499, § 68].

¹⁴Re Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 86 P. 896, 117 Am. St. Rep. 137, 9 Ann. Cas. 1105. Exceptions to defined prohibition of child labor may be made when rested upon a reasonable and proper basis. State v. Erle, 210 Iowa, 974, 232 N. W. 279, 72 A.L.R. 137.

place in question.¹⁶ It has been held that the constitutional guaranty of equal

equal protection of the laws because it makes an exception in favor of children certified by a registered physician to be unfit for vaccination, but does

§ 499. Aliens.—

difference of race, color, or nationality.²⁰ The power of the state to make reasonable classification in legislating to promote the health, safety, morals, and

welfare of those within its jurisdiction does not go so far as to make it possible

for the state to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood.¹ It is a denial of the equal

¹⁵Re Spencer, 149 Cal. 396, 86 P. 896, 117 Am. St. Rep. 137, 9 Ann. Cas. 1105.

¹⁶People v. Wilbur, 198 N. Y. 1, 90 N. E. 1140, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 357, 139 Am. St. Rep. 809, 19 Ann. Cas. 626.

¹⁷State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N. W. 1068, 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 331, 137 Am. St. Rep. 557. See THEATERS, SHOWS, EXHIBITIONS, AND PUBLIC RESORTS [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 701, § 6].

¹⁹Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 49 L. ed. 643, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765; Com. v. Pear, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719, 67 L.R.A. 935. See Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 67 L. ed. 194, 43 S. Ct. 24.

²⁰Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 41 L. ed. 140, 16 S. Ct. 977; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 115 A. 33, 20 A.L.R. 1515; State v. Montgomery,

⁹⁴Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262,

⁸¹N. E. 149, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514; People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, L.R.A. 1916D, 550, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254, affirmed in 239 U. S. 195, 60 L. ed. 218, 36 S. Ct. 85; Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio St. 253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 726, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 629; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367,

⁵⁴P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789. Annotation: 68 L. ed. 256; 14 L.R.A. 553. Chinese merchants in the Philippine Islands who are chiefly affected by the statute requiring account books to be kept in English, Spanish, or Philippine dialects are thereby denied the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Philippine Bill of Rights as enacted by Congress. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500, 70 L. ed. 1059, 46 S. Ct. 619. See ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 468, § 10.

¹Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064.

²Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514; Wright v. May,

¹²⁷Minn. 150, 149 N. W. 9, L.R.A.1915B, 151; People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, L.R.A.1916D, 550, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254, affirmed in 239 U. S. 195, 60 L. ed. 218, 36 S. Ct. 85. Annotation: 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 287. A discrimination against aliens lawfully resident in the state, caused by a law providing that every employer of more than five workers at any one time, "regardless of kind or class of work or sex of workers shall employ not less than 80 per cent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision

foreign born, unnaturalized male persons for each day that each of such persons may be employed and authorizing the deduction of that sum from the

a state between citizens and aliens resident therein.⁴ Although the Fourteenth

race and allegiance may bear such relation to a legitimate object of legislation

the right to obtain licenses to pursue ordinary callings.⁶ If a calling is one,

however, that a state, in the exercise of its police power, may prohibit absolutely or conditionally by the exaction of a license,⁷ as in cases where the calling or occupation is one which, though lawful, is subject to abuse and likely

obtain licenses to sell intoxicating liquors,¹¹ to operate poolrooms,¹² or to

authorize the legislature to refuse peddlers' licenses to aliens.¹⁴ As to peddlers,

valid.¹⁶ The rule established by Congress on the subject of naturalization of

aliens in and of itself furnishes a reasonable basis for such a classification in

thereof," renders the statute invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131,

³State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Juniata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, 187 Pa. 193, 40 A. 977,

⁴Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 69 L. ed. 944, 45 S. Ct. 490; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15.

⁵Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115, 47 S. Ct. 630.

⁶Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610; George v. Portland, 114 Or. 418, 235 P. 681,

⁷People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, L.R.A.1916D, 550, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254, affirmed in 239 U. S. 195, 60 L. ed. 218,

¹⁰Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149 N. W. 9, L.R.A.1915B, 151. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 349.

¹¹Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905, 9 L.R.A. 730, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587; Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio St. 253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 726, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 629. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 348.

¹²Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115, 47 S. Ct. 630. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 347.

¹⁴Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514; Bloomfield v. State,

⁸⁶Ohio St. 253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 726, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 629. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 347, 348.

¹⁵State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386. See Sayre v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 482, 24 A. 76, 16 L.R.A. 49, 33 Am. St. Rep. 842. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 347, 348; 16 L.R.A. 49.

⁶⁸L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15. No violation of the constitutional provision guaranteeing equal protection of the laws is effected by a statute denying aliens who have not declared an intention to become citizens the right to hold land, while permitting citizens and aliens who have so declared in good faith to do so. Ibid. As to statutory regulation of the right of aliens to hold real property, see ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 477, § 30.

a state law.¹⁷ Similarly, the classification of aliens with respect to the right to hold land within the state into those eligible to citizenship and those not so eligible, giving the former the right to hold land and denying it to the latter, is not unreasonable,¹⁸ and a statute limiting the privilege of ineligible aliens to acquire real property within the state to that prescribed by treaty is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁹ Forbidding aliens ineligible to citizenship to acquire stock in a corporation holding land for agricultural purposes does not deny the equal protection of the laws.²⁰

The equal protection of the laws is not unconstitutionally denied to an alien parent seeking appointment as guardian of his American-born child, or to the child, by a statute denying the right of guardianship to an alien, where the estate consists in part of real property, although the child is born in this country.¹ Elsewhere, the opposite view has been taken, and such a statute has been held to deny to an alien the equal protection of the laws.²

The right to the equal protection of the laws does not give to aliens the right to participate in the administration of the laws, to hold public offices, or to discharge any duties of a public trust.³ Just as the state may confine to citizens the right to hold public office, on the same ground, it may confine to citizens the right to serve the state in any way, whenever there is a relation between the exclusion of aliens and the promotion of efficiency.⁴ It is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws when the government, in its capacity as proprietor, issuing a mandate to its own agents, bars the alien from the right to share in the property which it holds for its own citizens.⁵ Forbidding the employment of aliens on public work does not unconstitutionally deny them the equal protection of the laws.⁶

Imposing a greater penalty on ownership or possession by a resident alien of a firearm capable of being concealed on the person than is imposed generally for carrying such weapons without a license does not unconstitutionally deny aliens the equal protection of the laws. The legislative assumption that unnaturalized foreign-born residents are peculiarly a source of danger to wild life cannot be said to be so unwarranted as to invalidate a statute prohibiting the killing of any wild bird or animal by any foreign-born person except in defense of person or property and to that end making it unlawful for any such person to own or be possessed of a shotgun or rifle.⁷

**§ ⁵⁰⁰. Race and Color.**—While the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily to secure to the negro race equality of civil rights, it was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color or to enforce social as distinguished from political equality or a commingling of the two races on terms

¹⁸Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225, 68 L. ed. 278, 44 S. Ct. 21. See Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 69 L. ed. 944, 45 S. Ct. 490. A statute providing for escheat of land transferred to an alien ineligible to hold it, which raises a presumption of an intent to evade the statute where land is taken in the name of a person eligible to hold it, and the consideration is paid by a person ineligible to do so, does not violate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 69 L. ed. 944, 45 S. Ct. 490.

¹See ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 471, § 15; GUARDIAN AND WARD [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 1115, § 16].

³State v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667. See ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 473, §§ 20 et seq.

⁴People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, L.R.A.1916D, 550, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254, affirmed in 239 U. S. 195, 60 L. ed. 218, 36 S. Ct. 85.

⁶See ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 471, § 17; PUBLIC WORKS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 635, § 38].

unsatisfactory to either.⁸ Therefore, race and color have been recognized as a proper basis for classification for certain purposes, as in the case of laws requiring negroes to be provided with separate accommodations in the vehicles of common carriers9 and in the public schools,¹⁰ and in the case of various other segregation laws.¹¹

**§ ⁵⁰¹. War Veterans.**—In several states laws have been passed conferring special privileges and immunities on honorably discharged veterans either in exemption from burdens, such as the payment of license fees, or in giving them a preference in appointments to public office. Such statutes have been subjected to attack on the theory that military service as a basis for classification violates constitutional guaranties of equality.¹²

There is no complete unanimity of authority in the cases dealing with military service as a basis of a discrimination in legislation relating to taxation or licenses.¹³ In a majority of instances in which the question has been presented, exemption from the payment of occupation or license taxes solely on a basis of war service has been held to violate equality guaranties of the Federal and state Constitutions.¹⁴ In a few cases, however, such an exemption has been upheld as valid.¹⁵ Statutes exempting veterans from the payment of poll taxes,¹⁶ property taxes,¹⁷ and various other types of taxes or licenses18 have occasionally been sustained.

As to the second class of statutes mentioned above—namely, those preferring veterans for appointments in the civil service of the state—their validity seems to depend on the character of the preference as follows: If an absolute right to appointment is given, regardless of the competency of the applicant to perform the duties of the position sought by him, the statute is viewed as giving an unlawful preference; but if it requires veterans to demonstrate their qualifications the same as other applicants and merely prefers them for appointment over all other qualified persons, the statute is usually sustained.¹⁹

Legislation creating miscellaneous privileges or preferences available to veterans has been repeatedly sustained.²⁰ Among the laws which have withstood attack are: Statutes providing for the purchase, subdivision, and sale

⁹See CARRIERS, Vol. 9, p. 487, § 84; Vol. 10, p. 86, § 1079; CIVIL RIGHTS, Vol. 10, p. 907, § 13.

¹⁰See CIVIL RIGHTS, Vol. 10, p. 904, §§ 11, 12; SCHOOLS [Also 24 R. C. L. p. 652, § 110 et seq.].

¹²Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Shaw v. Marshalltown, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; Goodrich v. Mitchell, 68 Kan. 765, 75 P. 1034, 64 L.R.A. 945, 104 Am. St. Rep. 429, 1 Ann. Cas. 288; Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 N. E. 1005, 32 L.R.A. 253, 55 Am. St. Rep. 357; State ex rel. Hilton v. Independent School Dist. 164 Minn. 66, 204 N. W. 572, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Boyd v. Matson, 155 Minn. 137, 193 N. W. 30, citing R. C. L.; Barthelmess v. Cukor, 231 N. Y. 435, 132 N. E. 140, 16 A.L.R. 1404; Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S. C. 62, 55 S. E. 136, 117 Am. St. Rep. 885, 9 Ann. Cas. 1003; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825.

¹⁴Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222 (hawkers' and peddlers' licenses); State v. Garbroskie, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524 (peddler's license); Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514 (peddler's license); Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S. C. 62, 55 S. E. 136, 117 Am. St. Rep. 885, 9 Ann. Cas. 1003 (license for carrying on of any business or profession); State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825 (peddler's license). Annotation: 83 A.L.R. 1233 et seq.; 117 Am. St. Rep. 890 et seq. See LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 522, § 43].

of land which give a preference to soldiers in the right to purchase;¹ statutes giving war veterans preference in state loans for land purchased, if other persons are given the same rights when no soldiers apply;² statutes for the sustenance of students, confined in operation to veterans of the World War;³ and statutes limiting the use of a building erected as a memorial to soldiers to organizations of veterans.⁴ Imposing a surtax upon incomes of a particular year to raise a bonus for soldiers has also been held not to be invalid as special legislation.⁵

§ 502. Labor Unions.—

In some states laws favoring labor unions have been enacted; and it has been held that the constitutional provisions as to special privileges and the equal protection of the laws are not violated by a statute authorizing a union or an association of workmen to adopt a trademark or label to be used only on goods prepared by its members,6 by a law which requires employers advertising for help during the existence of a strike to mention its existence,7 or by a law which excepts organizations of laboring men for the purpose of raising wages from the operation of a statute prohibiting combinations and conspiracies to prevent competition and regulate prices.8 On the other hand, it has been held that an unconstitutional discrimination in favor of union workmen is made in violation of such constitutional provisions by statutes making it a misdemeanor to discharge an employee because of his connection with any lawful labor organization.9 In this connection it may be mentioned that it has been held that a municipal corporation has no power to require its work to be performed only by union labor and that a municipality, in letting contracts for public printing, cannot discriminate in favor of union labor.10

§ 503. Employers.—

Employers, as distinguished from employees, do not constitute a class within the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.11 A statute applying to all employers similarly situated is not open to such objection.12 Hence, if a statute subjects all employers engaged in hazardous or dangerous businesses to the same legal obligations, it is valid and does not deny the equal protection of the laws because it is directed against employers of labor.13 The validity of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 is not affected by the fact that it subjects the employer to supervision

¹State ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Clausen (State ex rel. Chase v. Clausen) 110 Wash. 525, 188 P. 538, 14 A.L.R. 1133.

²Whedon v. South Dakota Land Settlement Bd. 43 S. D. 551, 181 N. W. 359, 14 A.L.R. 1145.

⁷Com. v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, 103 N. E. 923, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 879, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 659. See LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 475, § 52].

⁸Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N. W. 306, 96 N. W. 212, 98 N. W. 1075, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 136.

⁹Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007, 52 L.R.A. 283, 80 Am. St. Rep. 176. As to right of discharge generally, see Vol. 11, p. 1172, § 346.

¹⁰Fiske v. People, 188 Ill. 206, 58 N. E. 985, 52 L.R.A. 291 (ordinance); Miller v. Des Moines, 143 Iowa, 409, 122 N. W. 226, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 815, 21 Ann. Cas. 207 (ordinance); Wright v. Hoctor, 95 Neb. 342, 145 N. W. 704, 146 N. W. 997, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 728, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 967 (statute). Annotation: 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 815; 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 728. An ordinance providing that all municipal printing be given to union printers is void as tending to encourage monopoly and defeat competition, although there may be no charter requirement for letting such contracts to the lowest bidders. Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36 S. E. 932, 51 L.R.A. 335. See LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 426, § 11].

¹¹State ex rel. Scheffer v. Justus, 85 Minn. 279, 88 N. W. 759, 56 L.R.A. 757, 89 Am. St. Rep. 550.

¹²Com. v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, 103 N. E. 923, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 879, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 659.

and restraint and leaves untouched the abuses for which employees may be responsible.¹⁴

Legislation which singles out particular employers—such as owners and operators of mines and manufacturers of every kind—and provides that they shall bear burdens not imposed on other owners of property or employers of labor, and prohibits them from making contracts which it is competent for such other owners of property or employers of labor to make, is unconstitutional and class legislation.¹⁵ A statute establishing free employment agencies to be maintained at public expense, which forbids those in charge of such agencies to furnish help to persons whose employees are on strike or locked out or to permit such employers to have access to the names of applicants for service, while expressly entitling other employers to the services of such applicants, is void as discriminating between two classes of employers.¹⁶

A classification based on the relation of an employer not to an employee, but to one who has ceased to be such, in respect of torts thereafter committed by such employee on the business and property right of the employer, is not sufficient to relieve a statute from condemnation under the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.¹⁷

§ 504. Generally.—

Since the establishment of regulations of a particular trade or business essential to the public health and safety is within the legislative capacity of the state in the exercise of its police power,18 the classification of the subjects of such legislation, so long as it has a reasonable basis and is not merely an arbitrary selection without real difference between the subjects included and those omitted from the law, does not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.19 Legislation affecting alike all persons pur-

¹⁴National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & L. Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352.

¹⁵State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 10 S. E. 288, 6 L.R.A. 359, 25 Am. St. Rep. 891; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285, 6 L.R.A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863. A statute prohibiting persons and corporations engaged in mining and manufacturing and interested in selling merchandise and supplies from selling any merchandise to their employees at a greater per cent profit than they sell to others not employed by them is unconstitutional and void because it is class legislation and an unjust interference with private contract and business. State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 10 S. E. 288, 6 L.R.A. 359, 25 Am. St. Rep. 891.

¹⁶Mathews v. People, 202 Ill. 389, 67 N. E. 28, 63 L.R.A. 73, 95 Am. St. Rep. 241 (also invalidating statute on other grounds).

¹⁷Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375.

¹⁹Semler v. Oregon State Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 79 L. ed. 1086, 55 S. Ct. 570; Merchants Exch. v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365, 63 L. ed. 300, 39 S. Ct. 114; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486, 60 L. ed. 396, 36 S. Ct. 206; Booth v. Indiana, 237 U. S. 391, 59 L. ed. 1011, 35 S. Ct. 617, affirming 179 Ind. 405, 100 N. E. 563, L.R.A. 1915B, 420, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 987; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, 35 S. Ct. 342, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 58 L. ed. 1312, 34 S. Ct. 829; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 S. Ct. 612, L.R.A. 1915C, 1189; Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U. S. 334, 58 L. ed. 627, 34 S. Ct. 439; Sturges & B. Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 58 L. ed. 245, 34 S. Ct. 60, L.R.A.1915A, 1196; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. ed. 1050, 33 S. Ct. 692; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212, 33 S. Ct. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71, affirming 197 N. Y. 394, 90 N. E. 991, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 31; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 56 L. ed. 1229, 32 S. Ct. 697, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 153; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 55 L. ed. 128, 31 S. Ct. 190; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30

suing the same business under the same conditions is not class legislation.²⁰ If some persons engaged in a calling or business, however, are subjected to special burdens or favored by special privileges while other persons engaged in the same calling or business are not so treated, the legislation is based upon unconstitutional discrimination.¹

It is primarily for the state to select the kinds of business which shall be the subject of regulation.² There is no prohibition in the Federal Constitution against the making of different regulations for different kinds of businesses or occupations by the state.³ If a business is subject to regulation by the state,⁴ specific regulations for that one kind of business, which may be necessary for the protection of the public, can never constitute a just ground of complaint because similar restrictions are not imposed upon other business of a different kind.⁵

The equal protection of the laws does not mean that all occupations which are called by the same name must be treated in the same way.⁶ Any substantial difference between particular businesses may serve as a reasonable basis

S. Ct. 644; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. ed. 688, 30 S. Ct. 496; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 54 L. ed. 673, 30 S. Ct. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865; Heath & Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114; Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 S. Ct. 89; Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446, 50 L. ed. 1099, 26 S. Ct. 671; New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, L. ed. 305, 26 S. Ct. 144; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 S. Ct. 730; Sedalia ex rel. Bauman v. Standard Oil Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 66 F. (2d) 757, A.L.R., writ of certiorari denied in 290 U. S. 706, 78 L. ed. 607, 54 S. Ct. 374; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997; Berk v. State, 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832, 84 A.L.R. 740; Milliron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S. E. 231, 84 A.L.R. 1142; Clein v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 529, 139 S. E. 46, 53 A.L.R. 933; Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N. E. 667, 49 A.L.R. 499; Springfield Gas & E. Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A.L.R. 929, affirmed in 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. ed. 131, 42 S. Ct. 24; Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E. 695, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 994; Hyman v. Boldrick, 153 Ky. 77, 154 S. W. 369, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1039; State v. Hill, 168 La. 761, 123 So. 317, 69 A.L.R. 574; Louisiana State Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58, 54 A.L.R. 594, affirmed in 274 U. S. 720, 71 L. ed. 1324, 47 S. Ct. 590; State v. Weinstein, 141 La. 1085, 76 So. 208, L.R.A.1917F, 706; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co. 110 Me. 374, 86 A. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 396; People v. Lewis, 233 Mich. 240, 206 N. W. 553, 42 A.L.R. 1337; State v. Murray, 104 Neb. 51, 175 N. W. 666, 8 A.L.R. 563; Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 280, 193 S. W. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 158; Barlin v. Knox County, 136 Tenn. 238, 188 S. W. 795, 2 A.L.R. 112; Kirk v. State, 126 Tenn. 7, 150 S. W. 83, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1239; State v. Walter Bowen & Co. 86 Wash. 23, 149 P. 330, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 625. See Crane v. Johnson, 242 U. S. 339, 61 L. ed. 348, 37 S. Ct. 176, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 796. Annotation: 21 L.R.A. 790 et seq. Forbidding persons to solicit employment in personal injury actions, while permitting it in actions for injury to property, is not unconstitutional class legislation. Kelley v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. (Kelley v. Boyne) 239 Mich. 204, 214 N. W. 316, 53 A.L.R. 273.

²⁰Schoolcraft v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co.) 92 Ky. 233, 17 S. W. 567, 14 L.R.A. 579; Crowley v. Ellsworth, 114 La. 308, 38 So. 199, 69 L.R.A. 276, 108 Am. St. Rep. 353; State v. Schlemmer, 42 La. Ann. 1166, 8 So. 307, 10 L.R.A. 135; Churchill v. Albany, 65 Or. 422, 133 P. 632, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1094; Re Oberg, 21 Or. 406, 28 P. 130, 14 L.R.A. 577; State v. Scougal, 3 S. D. 55, 51 N. W. 858, 15 L.R.A. 477, 44 Am. St. Rep. 756; Ex parte Luna, 98 Tex. Crim. Rep. 458, 266 S. W. 415, citing R. C. L. See also Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 98 P. 755, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 263, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1100.

²New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 50 L. ed. 305, 26 S. Ct. 144.

³Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co. 110 Me. 374, 86 A. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 396; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 28 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799.

⁵New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 50 L. ed. 305, 26 S. Ct. 144; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 S. Ct. 730; Simmons v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 63 S. C. 425, 41 S. E. 521, 57 L.R.A. 607. A law may be limited to the prevention of the dangers peculiar to a particular industry without denying to any person the equal protection of the law. State v. Holden (Holden v. Hardy) 14 Utah, 71, 46 P. 756, 37 L.R.A. 103, affirmed in 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 333. A statute prohibiting unfair commercial discriminations between different sections, communities, or localities is not unconstitutional as class legislation. State v. Drayton, 82 Neb. 254, 117 N. W. 768, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1287, 130 Am. St. Rep. 671.

for a classification and be sufficient.⁷ Classification is proper when differences exist in the business classified which have a reasonable relation to the object of the statute in question.⁸

§ 505. Equality of Right.—

It is a general rule that legislation which affects alike all persons pursuing the same business under the same conditions is not such class legislation as is prohibited by constitutional provisions.9 The discriminations which are open to objection are those in which persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions.10 Part of the liberty of a citizen consists in the enjoyment, upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances, of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding, and selling property.11 The constitutional guaranty as to the equal protection of the laws, moreover, requires that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by others under similar circumstances and that no greater burdens in engaging in a calling should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition.12

A statute may amount to an arbitrary classification denying the equal protection of the laws if it violates a citizen's right to engage in business pursuits for a reason which does not have relationship to the public need. Hence, a statute which seeks to restrict the right to engage in an insurance brokerage business to such persons as make that their principal business contains an unreasonable discrimination.¹³

§ 506. Particular Classes.—

The practical application of the general principle of classification in accordance with the constitutional requirements as to equal protection of the laws is illustrated in the case of banks and bankers. The courts have recognized that the banking business may properly form a

⁷Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co. 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533, 62 L.R.A. 407, 95 Am. St. Rep. 476.

⁸Nitka v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 Wis. 106, 135 N. W. 492, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 337, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 863.

¹⁰Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 S. Ct. 207; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 S. Ct. 730; Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P. (2d) 72, 96 A.L.R. 1492; Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340, 46 A.L.R. 284; People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809, 16 A.L.R. 703; Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 Ann. Cas. 487; Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62 N. E. 215, 56 L.R.A. 558; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co. 110 Me. 374, 86 A. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 396; Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 75 P. 521, 104 Am. St. Rep. 698; Philadelphia v. Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 51 A. 374, 58 L.R.A. 220; Simmons v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 63 S. C. 425, 41 S. E. 521, 57 L.R.A. 607; Ex parte Luna, 98 Tex. Crim. Rep. 458, 266 S. W. 415, citing R. C. L.; State v. Holden, 14 Utah, 71, 46 P. 756, 37 L.R.A. 103, affirmed in 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 333.

¹²Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Chaires v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 139 S. E. 559, 55 A.L.R. 230; Re Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 604; Vicksburg v. Mullane, 106 Miss. 199, 63 So. 412, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 421; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804, 8 Ann. Cas. 717; State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, 18 A. 878, 5 L.R.A. 709; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L.R.A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948. The provisions of a statute which in effect deny the right to carry on the business of the manufacture, sale, and delivery of ice at any point where existing facilities are sufficient to meet the public needs, prescribe the procedure to that end, and authorize the purchase, by one party engaged in the business, of the property of others or the consolidation of their businesses violate the provisions of the state Constitution which prohibit the grant of special privileges, monopolies, and perpetuities. Cap F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utilities Co. 180 Ark. 770, 22 S. W. (2d) 993, 68 A.L.R. 1018. As to equality of burdens, see infra, § 526.

¹³Hauser v. North British & M. Ins. Co. 206 N. Y. 455, 100 N. E. 52, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1139, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 263.

bankers themselves, different classes may very properly exist.¹⁵ While nation-

banks created under the laws of the state,¹⁶ it has been held that a national

for the security of depositors.¹⁷ A state statute limiting the rights of stock-

distinctions and all members of each class are treated alike.¹ A constitutional

¹⁴Youngblood v. Birmingham Trust & Sav. Co. 95 Ala. 521, 12 So. 579, 20 L.R.A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245; Rainey v. Michel,

⁶Cal. (2d) 259, 57 P. (2d) 932, 105 A.L.R. 148; Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L.R.A.1915C, 716, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 80; State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299,

²⁷L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819. A statute making it a misdemeanor for any banker to discount commercial paper at more than a certain rate per cent is not unconstitutional legislation because it ap- plies to bankers only. Youngblood v. Bir- mingham Trust & Sav. Co. 95 Ala. 521, 12 So. 579, 20 L.R.A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245. As to power to regulate the business of banking, see BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 30, §§ 9 et seq. As to the constitutionality of statutes sanctioning preferences to certain classes of depositors in the distribution of the as- sets of insolvent banks, see BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 533, § 747.

¹⁵Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 55 L. ed. 899, 31 S. Ct. 661, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1129; Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 55 L. ed. 128, 31 S. Ct. 190; As- saria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U. S. 121,

⁵⁵L. ed. 123, 31 S. Ct. 189; Bachtel v. Wil- son, 204 U. S. 36, 51 L. ed. 357, 27 S. Ct. 243. Savings banks are not unconstitutional- ly discriminated against where statutory provisions that deposits which have re- mained inactive and unclaimed for thirty years, where the claimant is unknown or the depositor cannot be found, shall be paid to the treasurer and receiver general, to be held by him as trustee for the true owner or his legal representatives are made ap- plicable to them alone. Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 55 L. ed. 899,

¹⁶State v. Thomas Cruse Sav. Bank, 21 Mont. 50, 52 P. 733, 45 L.R.A. 760. As to the nature of national banks gen- erally, see BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 601, §§ 834 et seq.

¹⁷Abilene Nat. Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409, affirming (C. C. A. 8th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1065. See also Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont,

²³¹U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 S. Ct. 31; Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U. S. 121, 55 L. ed. 123, 31 S. Ct. 189. The Federal reserve bank in a particular district is not deprived of the equal pro- tection of the laws by a statute of a state within such district permitting banks of the state to pay checks by draft, although competing banks may possibly demand cash in their collections. Farmers & M. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 67 L. ed. 1157, 43 S. Ct. 651, 30 A.L.R. 635.

¹⁸State ex rel. Powell v. State Bank, Mont. 539, 4 P. (2d) 717, 80 A.L.R. 1494.

¹Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas.

for classification in dealing with usurious loans.⁴ A statute relating to loans

greater than that allowed by the general law is unconstitutional,⁶ statutes ex-

proper subject of independent legislation.⁷ This distinction will not, however,

justify the legislature in conferring special privileges on such associations.⁸

1913B, 529; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 572, 54 L. ed. 1155, 31 S. Ct. 134; Grif- fith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132; Re Stephan, 170 Cal. 48, 148 P. 196, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 617; Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N. E. 1071, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1190; State v. Hill, 168 La. 761, 123 So. 317, 69 A.L.R. 574; Norris v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 658, 142 N. W. 114, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1194; Wessell v. Timberlake,

⁹⁵Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 402. See Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co. 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332, 43 A.L.R. 1. The exemption of banks or trust com- panies and bona fide mortgages from the operation of a statute prohibiting the ex- acting of more than 15 per cent interest on loans or the accepting of a note for an amount greater than that actually loaned with intent to evade this provision does not render such statute repugnant to the equal protection of the laws clause of the Federal Constitution; such classification has a reasonable basis. Griffith v. Con- necticut, 218 U. S. 572, 54 L. ed. 1155, 31 S. Ct. 134; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132. Annota- tion: 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 635. As to chattel loans or small loans gen- erally, see SMALL LOAN ACTS.

³Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 815, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475.

⁵Cowan v. Security Life & T. Co. 211 N. C. 18, 188 S. E. 812, 110 A.L.R. 338. Annotation: 110 A.L.R. 343.

⁶Gordon v. Winchester Bldg. & Accumu- lating Fund Asso. 12 Bush (Ky.) 110, 23 Am. Rep. 713.

⁸Henderson Bldg. & L. Asso. v. John- son, 88 Ky. 191, 10 S. W. 787, 3 L.R.A. 289.

¹⁰Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 76 L. ed. 643, 52 S. Ct. 273, 79 A.L.R. 546. Annotation: 79 A.L.R. 551.

pamphlets, etc., on which shall be printed representations of the national flag,

the use of representations of the national flag for advertising articles of merchandise does not make such statute repugnant to the equal protection of the

§ 507. —

based on numerous and different factors. Consideration may be had of matters personal to the individuals engaging in certain occupations—such, for

example, as sex, since it is recognized that some employments may be admissible for males and improper or injurious for females. Hence, regulations recognizing the impropriety of and forbidding women's engaging in certain occupations may be open to no reasonable objection,¹² while in other occupations,

legislation on the theory that it effects an arbitrary classification by applying

to women and not to men.¹³ Minors also may be classified for their best interests and the public welfare, and statutes may very properly forbid their employment under a designated age.¹⁴

Classification of certain occupations may be made on the basis of their dangers or perils, as, for example, work in underground mines, in smelters,¹⁵ in

foundries,¹⁶ in hazardous occupations in which machinery is employed,¹⁷ or in

the business of operating railroads.¹⁸ This power to classify is in many cases

closely allied with that consideration for the public welfare which finds expression in the very general movement for so-called eight-hour laws, and accordingly statutes providing for an eight-hour working day have been upheld,

is not arbitrary or unreasonable.² Similar classification affecting the financial

¹¹Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419, 10 Ann. Cas. 525, affirming 74 Neb. 757, 105 N. W. 298, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079, 121 Am. St. Rep. 754. Contra.—Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133,

⁶⁵L.R.A. 47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66. See LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 488, § 61]; MINES AND MINERALS [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 1233, §§ 131 et seq.].

¹⁶State v. Scullin-Gallagher Iron & Steel Co. 268 Mo. 178, 186 S. W. 1007, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 620.

¹⁷State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466. See also infra, note 6, this section.

¹⁸Jensen v. South Dakota C. R. Co. 25 S. D. 506, 127 N. W. 650, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1015, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 700. As to classification of railroads, see infra, § 512.

¹⁹Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 61 L. ed. 830, 37 S. Ct. 435, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1043, affirming 71 Or. 259, 139 P. 731, L.R.A. 1917C, 1162, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1003 (mills); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383; Johnson, L. & Co. v. Spartan Mills, 68 S. C. 339, 47 S. E. 695, 1 Ann. Cas. 409. See LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 488, § 61]; MINES AND MINERALS [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 1233, § 131].

²⁰Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 61 L. ed. 830, 37 S. Ct. 435, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1043, affirming 71 Or. 259, 139 P. 731, L.R.A. 1917C, 1162, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1003, § 64; See LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 491, § 64.

from considerations of their quasi-public nature or their relation to the police

The fact that legislative exercise of the police power applies alike to all persons and all corporations engaging in a dangerous or hazardous calling or

exists, the classification is not rendered invalid because it happens to include

The legislature may not, under the guise of classification, impose discriminatory or burdensome measures upon a particular industry or business, which

have no vital or reasonable relation to the objects sought by a just and permissible classification.⁹

⁵⁹L. ed. 364, 35 S. Ct. 167; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315, 29 S. Ct. 206; St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 46 L. ed. 872, 22 S. Ct. 616; Consumers' League v. Colorado & S. R. Co. 53 Colo. 54, 125 P. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1158; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell,

¹⁸¹Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, affirmed in 239 U. S. 637, 60 L. ed. 480,

³⁶S. Ct. 445; State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 280, 193 S. W. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 153; State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792, 140 Am. St. Rep. 909; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L.R.A. 385; Borgnis v. Falk, Co.

¹⁴⁷Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 489. As to classification based upon numbers generally, see supra, § 491.

³Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. ed. 1245, 57 S. Ct. 868, 109 A.L.R. 1327; Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal. (2d) 744, 62 P. (2d) 1037, 63 P. (2d) 810, 108 A.L.R. 595; W. H. H. Chamberlin v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22,

⁸¹L. ed. 380, 57 S. Ct. 122, which has rehearing denied in 301 U. S. 714, 81 L. ed. 1365, 57 S. Ct. 926. Annotation: 106 A.L.R. 1531; 108 A.L.R. 613, s. 109 A.L.R. 1346.

⁴⁷L.R.A. 369; State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627, 48 L.R.A. 265, 77 Am. St. Rep. 765.

⁶R. E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U. S. 371, 68 L. ed. 1061, 44 S. Ct. 548, 35 A.L.R. 1056; Arizona Employers' Liability Cases (Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer) 250 U. S. 400, 63 L. ed. 1058, 39 S. Ct. 553, 6 A.L.R. 1537; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, affirming 75 Wash. 581, 135 P. 645, L.R.A.1917D, 10; New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. ed. 667, 37 S. Ct. 247, L.R.A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629; Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 57 L. ed. 966, 33 S. Ct. 581; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 32 S. Ct. 169, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Bailey, 220 U. S. 608, 55 L. ed. 607, 31 S. Ct. 725; New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Schrain, 220 U. S. 606, 55 L. ed. 606, 31 S. Ct. 722; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Richardson, 220 U. S. 601, 55 L. ed. 603,

¹⁹⁹U. S. 593, 50 L. ed. 322, 26 S. Ct. 159; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 S. Ct. 136; Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209,

³⁹L. ed. 675, 15 S. Ct. 585; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109, 8 S. Ct. 1176; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 S. Ct. 1161; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co. 110 Me. 374, 86 A. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 396; Jensen v. South Dakota C. R. Co. 25 S. D. 506, 127 N. W. 650, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1015, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 700; Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah, 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259; State ex rel. DavisSmith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 466. See also Martin v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co. 203 U. S. 284,

⁵¹L. ed. 184, 27 S. Ct. 100, 8 Ann. Cas. 87; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 119 U. S. 566, 30 L. ed. 477, 7 S. Ct. 1366. As to the validity of legislation classifying what employees may recover and what employers are liable for injuries received in employment, see MASTER AND SERVANT [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 833, § 288]; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS [Also 28 R. C. L. p. 747, § 42].

²¹⁹U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463.

⁸Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Accid. Bd. 52 Mont. 6, 155 P. 268, L.R.A. 1916D, 628.

⁹Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; Starne v. People, 222 Ill. 189, 78 N. E. 61, 113 Am. St. Rep. 389; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171,

§ 508. Methods of Selling.—

Regulations, licenses, and taxes imposed upon persons whose business consists of selling merchandise often provide for classifications based upon the factor that the businesses so sought to be regulated are a particular kind or technique of selling. It is generally held that legislation providing for classifications based upon the type of selling done by the persons sought to be regulated by it is constitutional, if the particular manner of selling so classified is substantially different from other selling and forms a rational basis for legislative distinction, and if all persons so engaged and regulated are treated alike.10 Many well-settled principles of regulation attest the validity of classification of businesses of selling in which the manner of sale involves material differences from other kinds of selling.11 Thus, one exception to the principle that size alone should not be recognized as a means of distinguishing classes of legislative regulation12 is to be found in the acquiescence by the courts in the inherent differences between wholesale and retail dealers.13 There is a clear distinction in principle between persons engaged in selling at retail and those engaged in selling by wholesale. For years it has been the custom of Congress to impose a special license tax upon wholesale dealers different from that imposed upon retail dealers. A like distinction is observed between brewers and rectifiers, wholesale and retail dealers in liquors, manufacturers of tobacco and manufacturers of cigars, as well as peddlers of tobacco.14 The difference between regular dealers or merchants and transients—such as peddlers, hawkers, and itinerant vendors—is likewise a reasonable basis for classification.15 On the other hand, legislation which attempts to regulate or tax particular businesses, chiefly the selling of various kinds of merchandise, not on a basis that a different kind of selling is employed in one field of endeavor from that employed in another, but solely on the theory that in the same kind of selling different methods are used, is generally held to be unconstitutional and discriminatory. Such a classification in reality attempts to treat differently persons in the same position, being based upon a subclassification which is unreasonable.16 For example, as far as an ordinary trade or business of selling is concerned, details connected with credit and delivery alone are not enough to afford a reasonable basis for license purposes, and different burdens cannot be directed at persons engaged in selling the same type of goods, because one operator sells for credit instead of for cash, or because he delivers or fails to deliver the goods which he sells.17

³¹N. E. 395, 16 L.R.A. 492; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 59 P. 340, 47 L.R.A. 369; People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Sperry & H. Co. 197 Mich. 532, 164 N. W. 503, L.R.A.1918A, 797; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285, 6 L.R.A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863.

¹³State v. Foster, 22 R. I. 163, 46 A. 833, 50 L.R.A. 339; State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434. The fact that the producers of, and small dealers in, produce are chiefly protected by a statute regulating the licensing and bonding of wholesalers does not render the statute void as class legislation. State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434.

¹⁴Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. ed. 688, 30 S. Ct. 496; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261, 49 L. ed. 471, 25 S. Ct. 233. Annotation: 62 A.L.R. 109 (tobacco). See LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 512, § 33].

¹⁵See LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 513, § 33]; PEDDLERS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 193, §§ 15 et seq.].

¹⁶Annotation: 43 A.L.R. 594 et seq., s. 99 A.L.R. 703 et seq. For detailed discussion of the principles discussed in the text rule, see LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. Perm. Supp. p. 4301, and 1937 Supp. § 38].

¹⁷Douglas v. South Georgia Grocery Co. 180 Ga. 519, 179 S. E. 768, 99 A.L.R. 700 (grocery); Danville v. Quaker Maid, 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98, 43 A.L.R. 590 (grocery).

§ 509. Articles Sold.—

Statutes which in the exercise of the police power impose restrictions or limitations on sales of a particular commodity or on all sales under certain circumstances which call for special regulation are generally upheld as valid and as not amounting to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The sales so classified cover a wide variety of transactions.18 Such laws place under the same restrictions and subject to like penalties and burdens all who manufacture or sell the articles embraced by their prohibitions, thus recognizing and preserving the principle of equality among those engaged in the same business.19

Equal protection of the laws is not denied by a municipal ordinance which, in prohibiting the sale, offering or exposing for sale, or soliciting to purchase any articles on any street, alley, or public place in certain defined districts, makes an exception of daily newspapers.²⁰

§ 510. Agriculturists.—

¹⁸Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U. S. 283, 77 L. ed. 306, 87 A.L.R. 285 (farm machinery); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co. 242 U. S. 568, 61 L. ed. 498, 37 S. Ct. 227 ("blue sky laws"); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co. 242 U. S. 559, 61 L. ed. 493, 37 S. Ct. 224 ("blue sky laws"); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. 242 U. S. 539, 61 L. ed. 480, 37 S. Ct. 217 ("blue sky laws"); Sanders Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U. S. 153, 61 L. ed. 222, 37 S. Ct. 30 (ice cream); Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U. S. 153, 61 L. ed. 217, 37 S. Ct. 28 (ice cream); Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 60 L. ed. 771, 36 S. Ct. 440, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 548 (lard); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 59 L. ed. 1400, 35 S. Ct. 892 (food containing boric acid); Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U. S. 331, 58 L. ed. 985, 34 S. Ct. 596 (oleomargarin); Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 700, 58 L. ed. 803, 34 S. Ct. 464 (liquor to be sold by druggists only); Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U. S. 334, 58 L. ed. 627, 34 S. Ct. 439 (drugs); Kidd, D. & P. Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co. 217 U. S. 461, 54 L. ed. 839, 30 S. Ct. 606 (Bulk Sales Act); Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 53 L. ed. 295, 29 S. Ct. 174 (Bulk Sales Act); Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114 (mixed paints); Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 47 L. ed. 323, 23 S. Ct. 168 (stocks on margin); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 46 L. ed. 171, 22 S. Ct. 120 (oleomargarin); Boise Assoc. of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho, 438, 144 P. 6, L.R.A.1915E, 917 (Bulk Sales Act); G. S. Johnson Co. v. Beloosky, 263 Ill. 363, 105 N. E. 287, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 411 (Bulk Sales Act); People v. Freeman, 242 Ill. 373, 90 N. E. 366, 17 Ann. Cas. 1098 (oleomargarin); Cities Serv. Co. v. Koeneke, 137 Kan. 7, 20 P. (2d) 460, 87 A.L.R. 16 ("blue sky laws"); Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1338 (agricultural machinery); State v. Olson, 26 N. D. 304, 144 N. W. 661, L.R.A.1918B, 975, writ of error dismissed in 245 U. S. 676, 62 L. ed. 542, 38 S. Ct. 13 (snuff); Noble v. Ft. Smith Wholesale Grocery Co. 34 Okla. 662, 127 P. 14, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 455 (Bulk Sales Act); Williams v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 15 Okla. 477, 82 P. 496, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 334, 6 Ann. Cas. 970 (Bulk Sales Act); State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 280, 193 S. W. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 158 (agricultural seeds); Neas v. Borches, 109 Tenn. 398, 71 S. W. 50, 97 Am. St. Rep. 851 (Bulk Sales Act); Motor Car Dealers' Asso. v. Fred S. Haines Co. 128 Wash. 267, 222 P. 611, 36 A.L.R. 493 (sale of personal property on Sunday forbidden, sale of real estate allowed); McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co. 30 Wash. 549, 71 P. 37, 60 L.R.A. 947, 94 Am. St. Rep. 889 (Bulk Sales Act). Excepting books and prints, art work, animals, farm products, and goods sold in original packages, from a statute forbidding auction sales at night, is not such discrimination as to render the act unconstitutional. Biddles v. Enright, 239 N. Y. 354, 146 N. E. 625, 39 A.L.R. 766. The complicated and costly character of tractors, gas or steam engines, and harvesting and threshing machinery, the need of tests to determine their fitness, the fact that their fitness for use is partly dependent upon local conditions, and the serious losses that result if, in actual use, they prove unfit, warrant their separate classification by a statute providing that any person purchasing such machinery for his own use shall have reasonable time to inspect and test it, and, if it does not prove to be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was purchased, may rescind the sale by giving notice within a reasonable time after delivery, and that any contract provision to the contrary shall be void. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U. S. 283, 77 L. ed. 306, 87 A.L.R. 285; Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. 61 N. D. 452, 238 N. W. 552, 78 A.L.R. 1338. Forbidding the use of secondhand material in making for sale any mattress, quilt, or bed comforter, while permitting it in the making of pillows for sale, is unconstitutional class legislation. People v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 74, 110 N. E. 870, L.R.A. 1916C, 775, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1065. As to restriction of sales under the police power, see Vol. 11, p. 1040, § 281.

¹⁹Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253, 8 S. Ct. 992, 1257. See also Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721 (sale of intoxicating liquors).

²⁰Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N. E. (2d) 905, 105 A.L.R. 1045. [12 Am. Jur.]—13 193

the limits allowed by the Federal Constitution securing to all the equal protec-

trusts for the purpose of fixing the price or regulating the production of arti-

not invalid in classification, or discriminatory in nature, because it may affect

¹Kellyville Coal Co. v. Harrier, 207 Ill. 624, 69 N. E. 927, 99 Am. St. Rep. 240.

²Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Brown v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co. 115 Ga. 429, 41 S. E. 553, 57 L.R.A. 547, 90 Am. St. Rep. 126; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804,

³Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690, citing R. C. L.; State v. Schlitz Brew- ing Co. 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S. W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941.

real estate is not unconstitutional as class legislation or a denial of the equal

§ 511. Milk Dealers.—

¹⁰Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 S. Ct. 284; Kansas City v. Un- ion P. R. Co. 59 Kan. 427, 53 P. 468, 52 L.R.A. 321.

¹¹Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A.1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210. Annotation: 92 A.L.R. 776.

¹²State ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Clausen (State ex rel. Chase v. Clausen)

¹³Payne v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 112, 63 L. ed. 153, 39 S. Ct. 32; State ex rel. Beek v. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 80 N. W. 633, 778, 1134, 46 L.R.A. 442, 77 Am. St. Rep. 681, writ of error dismissed in State ex rel. Mohler v. Megaarden (U. S.)

⁴⁶L. ed. 1263, 22 S. Ct. 931; State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434. The distinctions between wholesale and retail dealers in farm produce is sufficient to form the basis of a legislative classifica- tion so as to support a law requiring the licensing and bonding of the wholesaler to which the retailer is not made subject. State ex rel. Hickey v. Levitan, 190 Wis. 646, 210 N. W. 111, 48 A.L.R. 434. An exception of dealers in grain, live- stock, and dressed meats from a statute requiring commission merchants in cities of more than 50,000 population to be li- censed is not unconstitutional as an ar- bitrary discrimination, since the classifica- tion in this case is a natural one, as the commission merchants subject to the act deal in the small products of the farm, while other laws provide for the inspec- tion of grain, livestock, and dressed meats. Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 55 N. E. 663,

¹⁴People ex rel. Valentine v. Berrien Cir- cuit Judge (People ex rel. Valentine v. Coolidge) 124 Mich. 664, 83 N. W. 594, 50 L.R.A. 493, 83 Am. St. Rep. 352.

¹⁵Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 295 U. S. 285,

⁷⁹L. ed. 1439, 55 S. Ct. 709; Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. ed. 1155, 52 S. Ct. 595, 81 A.L.R. 1402; Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corp. Commission, 154 Okla. 121, 7 P. (2d) 123,

⁸⁰A.L.R. 561; Public Serv. Commission v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P. (2d) 1, 109 A.L.R. 534. See also Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 78 L. ed. 247, 54 S. Ct. 142. Annotation: 81 A.L.R. 1146; 109 A.L.R. 570 et seq. Compare Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553,

⁷⁵L. ed. 1264, 51 S. Ct. 582, in which a stat- ute which gave relief from its exactions of a bond or insurance policy to any trans- port company engaged exclusively in the carriage of agricultural products, whether for the producer or anyone else, was held invalid. In such a case the distinction favored the agricultural goods merely, and not the agricultural producer, and was in- valid.

conducting milk gathering stations to give an approved bond to secure the prompt payment of all amounts due producers or in lieu thereof to satisfy the licensing authority of their ability to pay probable creditors is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁸ A statute, however, requiring, under penalty, that dealers in milk pay for their purchases of that commodity twice a month has been held to be unconstitutional class legislation.¹⁹

Regulations made either by the state or by municipalities concerning the purity of milk, the care of milch cattle, and the cleanliness or wholesomeness of milk products have been sustained practically with unanimity.²⁰ Singling out the milk business in the city of New York as a proper subject for regulation does not deny the equal protection of the laws where all milk dealers in the city are equally affected by such regulation.¹ Similarly, equal protection of the laws is not denied to persons who supply milk to cities, towns, and villages for consumption by a statute compelling them to register their herds or cattle with the livestock sanitary board, where it applies to all persons of that class, although it does not apply to every person who may occasionally sell milk in the country.² Milk drawn from cows outside a city is not unconstitutionally discriminated against by a municipal ordinance prohibiting its shipment into the city unless the cows shall first have been subjected to the tuberculin test and an official certificate of their freedom from tuberculosis or other contagious diseases filed with the health officer, while the regulations relative to cows within the city forbid the sale of milk from sick or diseased cows and contemplate inspection by the health officer, and the application by him of any known test to determine whether the animal inspected is afflicted with tuberculosis, and the removal by him of any diseased animal to a place where it will not spread infection.³ Likewise, nonproducing vendors of milk are not denied the equal protection of the laws because they are not given the privilege accorded to producing vendors of exempting themselves from actions or penalties for violations of a law to prevent the sale of adulterated milk, by showing that the milk sold or offered for sale by them is in the same condition as when it left the herd of the producer.⁴

Laws requiring standards of purity and richness in milk have always been regarded as valid police regulations.⁵ Equal protection of the laws is not denied to milk dealers by requiring them to furnish samples for analysis.⁶ An ordinance imposing a penalty on all who sell milk or cream in glass jars for having in possession, with intent to use them, jars of less capacity than they are purported to contain is not special legislation, although it does not apply to all milk dealers or to all persons who vend substances in liquid form.⁷ A provision in a statute the general purpose of which is to protect dairy products from contamination and adulteration, placing the duty upon every person who finds or receives any container marked with a brand regis-

¹New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 50 L. ed. 305, 26 S. Ct. 144.

²State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771, 45 L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201.

³Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 57 L. ed. 971, 33 S. Ct. 610, affirming 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1066.

⁴St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 633, 50 L. ed. 896, 26 S. Ct. 554, 5 Ann. Cas. 909.

⁶State v. Dupaquier, 46 La. Ann. 577, 15 So. 502, 26 L.R.A. 162, 49 Am. St. Rep. 334.

⁷Chicago v. Bowman Dairy Co. 234 Ill. 294, 84 N. E. 913, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 684, 123 Am. St. Rep. 100, 14 Ann. Cas. 700.

tered under the act, to make diligent effort to find the owner and return the same, does not violate a constitutional requirement that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation, or a constitutional prohibition of laws granting special privileges or immunities.⁸

The recent tendency has been to uphold milk price regulations as against the contention that constitutional equality guaranties are violated by them.⁹ A difference in the price fixed for the sale of milk by a grocer and the price fixed for sales by distributors delivering milk to consumers is based on a valid distinction between the two sorts of merchants, and does not deny a grocer the equal protection of the laws.¹⁰ While the constitutionality, under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, of a provision of a milk control act establishing a differential of ¹ cent a quart in minimum prices in favor of milk dealers not having a "well-advertised trade name" was at first doubted,¹¹ it was later upheld where it was disclosed by evidence that such a differential was essential to allow dealers of unadvertised milk to dispose of their product through retail in competition with well-advertised milk.¹²

§ 512. Classification among Corporations.—

Corporations as creatures of the law may, within reasonable limits, be divided into classes, and each class given such rights, capacities, and powers as the legislature may see fit. For this reason a corporation may not necessarily have the right to complain of a discrimination in favor of other classes of corporations or that all or any of the rights of natural persons have not been given to it.13 Generally

⁸Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Ct. 214 Cal. 668, 8 P. (2d) 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217.

¹⁰Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469. A grocer who may, if he desires, purchase milk from a producer is not deprived of the equal protection of the laws by an order of a state milk control board requiring retailers purchasing from dealers to pay certain prices and to resell at certain fixed prices, while dealers may purchase from producers at lower prices and sell milk, delivered to consumers, at the same fixed price per pint and one cent more a quart. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469.

¹¹Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187.

¹²Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 80 L. ed. 669, 56 S. Ct. 453.

¹³Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 538, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647; Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Ct. 289 U. S. 361, 77 L. ed. 1256, 53 S. Ct. 624, 89 A.L.R. 653; Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 75 L. ed. 482, 51 S. Ct. 228; Aluminum Co. v. Ramsey, 222 U. S. 251, 56 L. ed. 185, 32 S. Ct. 76; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 53 L. ed. 81, 29 S. Ct. 33; St. Mary's Franco-American Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia, 203 U. S. 183, 51 L. ed. 144, 27 S. Ct. 132; Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593, 50 L. ed. 322, 26 S. Ct. 159; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co. 192 U. S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406, 24 S. Ct. 241; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 46 L. ed. 298, 22 S. Ct. 95; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 S. Ct. 418; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41 L. ed. 853, 17 S. Ct. 418; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 S. Ct. 198; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 35 L. ed. 1051, 12 S. Ct. 255; Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 35 L. ed. 1035, 12 S. Ct. 250; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83, 40 S. W. 705, 37 L.R.A. 504, 62 Am. St. Rep. 154; Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 P. 832, 64 L.R.A. 918, 100 Am. St. Rep. 130; Davis v Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Crom v. Frahm, 33 Idaho, 314, 193 P. 1013, citing R. C. L. (recognizing rule); Meyer v. Building & Realty Serv. Co. 209 Ind. 125, 196 N. E. 250, 100 A.L.R. 1442; Pennington v. Sumner, —— Iowa, ——, 270 N. W. 629, 109 A.L.R. 355; McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 706, affirmed in 219 U. S. 549, 55 L. ed. 328, 31 S. Ct. 259, and later appeal in 138 Iowa, 664, 116 N. W. 801; Wood v. Detroit, 188 Mich. 547, 155 N. W. 592, L.R.A.1916C, 388; State ex rel. Simpson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 118 Minn. 380, 137 N. W. 2, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 524, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 494; New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 199 N. Y. 108, 92 N. E. 404, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 549, 139 Am. St. Rep. 850; Lawrence v. Rutland R. Co. 80 Vt. 370, 67 A. 1091, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 350, 13 Ann. Cas. 475; State v. St. Mary's Franco-American Petroleum Co. 58

speaking, the action of the state in so classifying corporations and in conferring different powers upon them is not in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.¹⁴

Legislation which applies equally to all corporations in like circumstances and which makes a natural and reasonable classification is not vicious class legislation.¹⁵ Hence, if a classification of corporations for the purpose of legislation is natural and reasonable and based on some distinctive difference in the business of the several classes, a difference peculiar to, and inhering in, its very nature, it is valid and will be sustained.¹⁶ In order, however, to justify diversity of treatment of corporations, the classification must be founded on differences either defined by the Constitution or such as are natural or intrinsic17 and reasonable.¹⁸ A statute imposing upon certain corporations a confiscatory and unreasonable penalty for failure to pay the wages due an employee leaving their employment, which is not made applicable to other corporations of similar character, is unconstitutional class legislation.¹⁹

Railroads may be placed in a class by themselves for some legislative purposes but only for such purposes as have to do with duties peculiar to them as carriers or with the dangers peculiar to their operation.²⁰ Many duties and dangers peculiar to railroads as such have been recognized by the legislature with subsequent approval by the courts of the legislative distinction. Hence, there are a great many instances involving liability for fires, killing livestock, hazardous employment and similar situations in which legislation applicable to railway companies only, although vigorously assailed as a de-

W. Va. 108, 51 S. E. 865, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 558, 112 Am. St. Rep. 951, 6 Ann. Cas. 38, affirmed in 203 U. S. 183, 51 L. ed. 144, 27 S. Ct. 132. Annotation: 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 558, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 350; 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 549; 62 Am. St. Rep. 168 et seq.; Ann. Cas. 1914B, 985.

¹⁴Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1065, affirmed in 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; Crom v. Frahm, 33 Idaho, 314, 193 P. 1013, citing R. C. L. (recognizing rule).

¹⁵Knoxville & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 S. W. 115, 53 L.R.A. 921.

¹⁶Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. Co. 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 S. Ct. 136; Consumers' League v. Colorado & S. R. Co. 53 Colo. 54, 125 P. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1158; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805. A state may single out for separate regulation under "blue sky laws" all corporations organized for investment purposes. Ex parte Taylor, 68 Fla. 61, 66 So. 292, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 701. The legislature may raise a prima facie presumption of fraud against the president and directors upon proof of the insolvency of a bank without making the presumption apply to other corporations. Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L.R.A.1915C, 716, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 50. Exempting farmers' mutual insurance companies, organized and doing business under the laws of the state and insuring only farm property, from the regulation of fire insurance rates does not necessarily render such legislation invalid as to other insurance companies, as denying the equal protection of the laws. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 S. Ct. 612, L.R.A.1915C, 1189. A statute empowering a commission to fix the rates charged by public service corporations is not necessarily invalid as denying to the corporations affected the equal protection of the laws. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1917C, 60.

¹⁷Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 52 L. ed. 327, 28 S. Ct. 178, 12 Ann. Cas. 658; Arkansas Stave Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S. W. 1001, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 255, 140 Am. St. Rep. 103; Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 P. 1040, 70 P. 1083, 59 L.R.A. 581, 92 Am. St. Rep. 188; Johnson v. Goodyear Min. Co. 127 Cal. 4, 59 P. 304, 47 L.R.A. 338, 78 Am. St. Rep. 17; Crom v. Frahm, 33 Idaho, 314, 193 P. 1013, citing R. C. L.; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 418; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 59 P. 340, 47 L.R.A. 369.

¹⁸Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 S. Ct. 565; Reagan v. Farmers Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 14 S. Ct. 1047; Crom v. Frahm, 33 Idaho, 314, 193 P. 1013, citing R. C. L.; Shelton v. Erie R. Co. 73 N. J. L. 558, 66 A. 403, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 727, 118 Am. St. Rep. 704, 9 Ann. Cas. 883; Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co. 191 N. Y. 123, 18 N. E. 693, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 713, 14 Ann. Cas. 606. See Interstate Consol. Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79, 52 L. ed. 111, 28 S. Ct. 26, 12 Ann. Cas. 555.

²⁰Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schuler, 182 Ind. 57, 105 N. E. 567, L.R.A. 1915A, 884.

nial of the equal protection of the laws, has been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the states.¹ For a specific example, statutes making railroad corporations answerable for injuries to their employees resulting from the negligence of coemployees do not deny to such railroad companies the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the state and Federal Constitutions and are therefore constitutional.² Railroads cannot be classified separately, however, or subjected to different burdens, unless there is a rational basis for treatment of railroads different from that of other corporations arising from the nature of the railroad business. Hence, such companies are deprived of the equal protection of the laws and special privileges are conferred upon their employees by forbidding the discharge of a railroad employee upon information furnished by any person without giving him an opportunity to be heard in the presence of the informer.³

§ 513. Classification among Corporations and Individuals.—

For many purposes corporations may be put into one classification and individuals into another without violating constitutional guaranties of equality.4 This principle has been applied in a great variety of factual situations.5 Thus, the inherent difference between corporations and natural persons is sufficient to sustain a classification making restrictions upon the right of nonresidents to do business in the state applicable to corporations alone.6 Corporations are

¹Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502, 77 L. ed. 457, 53 S. Ct. 249; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Watson, 287 U. S. 86, 77 L. ed. 180, 53 S. Ct. 32, 36 A.L.R. 174; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. McWhirt, 243 U. S. 422, 61 L. ed. 826, 37 S. Ct. 392; Chicago, T. H. & S. E. R. Co. v. Anderson, 242 U. S. 283, 61 L. ed. 302, 37 S. Ct. 124; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 59 L. ed. 1204, 35 S. Ct. 678; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541, 56 L. ed. 875, 32 S. Ct. 606; Aluminum Co. v. Ramsey, 222 U. S. 251, 56 L. ed. 185, 32 S. Ct. 76; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 55 L. ed. 328, 31 S. Ct. 259, affirming 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 706, and later appeal 138 Iowa, 664, 116 N. W. 801; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 48 L. ed. 971, 24 S. Ct. 638; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 43 L. ed. 746, 19 S. Ct. 419; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 S. Ct. 1114; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109, 8 S. Ct. 1176; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 S. Ct. 1161; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639; Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612, 85 N. E. 954, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 711; State v. Indiana & I. S. R. Co. 133 Ind. 69, 32 N. E. 817, 18 L.R.A. 502; Gano v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 114 Iowa, 713, 87 N. W. 714, 55 L.R.A. 263, 89 Am. St. Rep. 393; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 31 Minn. 11, 16 N. W. 413, 47 Am. Rep. 771; Venning v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 78 S. C. 42, 58 S. E. 983, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1217; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L.R.A. 385. A statute requiring common carriers to furnish adequate telephone connections between their offices, buildings, and grounds and the local telephone exchange is not unconstitutional as denying carriers the equal protection of the laws. State ex rel. Nebraska State R. Commission v. Missouri P. R. Co. 100 Neb. 700, 161 N. W. 270, L.R.A.1918E, 346. An exception of all railroads chartered before a certain date from the provisions of a statute of limitations does not deny them the equal protection of the laws. Narron v. Wilmington & W. R. Co. 122 N. C. 856, 29 S. E. 356, 40 L.R.A. 415.

²Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 57 L. ed. 966, 33 S. Ct. 581; Aluminum Co. v. Ramsey, 222 U. S. 251, 56 L. ed. 185, 32 S. Ct. 76; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Bailey, 220 U. S. 608, 55 L. ed. 607, 31 S. Ct. 725; New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Schradin, 220 U. S. 606, 55 L. ed. 606, 31 S. Ct. 722; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Richardson, 220 U. S. 601, 55 L. ed. 603, 31 S. Ct. 715; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 S. Ct. 136; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 49 N. E. 582, 69 L.R.A. 875, 71 Am. St. Rep. 301.

³Opinion of Justices, 220 Mass. 627, 108 N. E. 807, L.R.A.1917B, 1119. Annotation: L.R.A.1917B, 1122.

⁴Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Perry, 259 U. S. 548, 66 L. ed. 1056, 42 S. Ct. 524; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 S. Ct. 516, 27 A.L.R. 27; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 66 L. ed. 166, 42 S. Ct. 42; Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U. S. 413, 54 L. ed. 817, 30 S. Ct. 543; Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co. 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332, 43 A.L.R. 1; State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589, 7 A.L.R. 1617.

⁶Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 66 L. ed. 166, 42 S. Ct. 42.

not denied the equal protection of the laws by statutes under which corporations alone may be compelled to produce before a court or grand jury material, books, and papers in their custody or control;⁷ by anti-trust statutes to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers which may be construed to be confined to corporations and joint-stock associations;⁸ by anti-trust statutes providing that corporate violators of the act may be proceeded against; by bills in equity on relation of the United States Attorney General, while natural persons offending against their provisions cannot be tried without a preliminary investigation by a grand jury, indictment, or presentment, and a trial by jury, with the right to an acquittal unless their guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt and to the benefit of a statute of limitations of one year;⁹ by statutes requiring from managing officers of corporations an affidavit setting forth the nonparticipation of the corporation in pools, trusts, agreements, combinations, etc., because individuals, partnerships, and associations of individuals, although equally within the law against monopolies, are not required to make similar exculpatory affidavits;¹⁰ or by statutes requiring that an employing corporation, domestic or foreign, furnish through its superintendent or manager to an employee who, after serving it for at least ninety days, is discharged or voluntarily quits the service, a letter setting forth the nature, character, and duration of the service rendered and truly stating for what cause, if any, he left the service.¹¹ Another illustration of valid legislation which distinguishes between separate classes and subjects one class to burdens and restrictions not imposed on others is a statute which establishes one gas rate for a municipality and another for individual customers.¹²

Corporations may not arbitrarily be selected in order to be subjected to a burden to which individuals would as appropriately be subject.¹³ Legislation which is directed solely to corporations or a particular class of corporations and which eliminates from its operation individuals where there is no basis for discrimination is unconstitutional as denying to corporations the equal protection of the laws.¹⁴ Thus, a statute making all corporations

⁷Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 52 L. ed. 327, 28 S. Ct. 178, 12 Ann. Cas. 658.

⁸Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 S. Ct. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645.

¹⁰Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U. S. 41, 59 L. ed. 1192, 35 S. Ct. 671.

¹¹Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 S. Ct. 516, 27 A.L.R. 27. Making applicable to public service corporations and contractors working for them, to the exclusion of other corporations, individuals, and partnerships employing labor under similar circumstances, the requirement of the Oklahoma Service Letter Act that a public service corporation shall furnish, through its superintendent or manager, to any employee who is discharged or voluntarily quits its service, a letter setting forth the nature and duration of the service rendered by him and truly stating for what cause he was discharged from or quit the service does not render the statute invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Perry, 259 U. S. 548, 66 L. ed. 1056, 42 S. Ct. 524.

¹²Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 382, 29 S. Ct. 192, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; State ex rel. Simpson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 118 Minn. 380, 137 N. W. 2, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 524, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 494.

¹³Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U. S. 41, 59 L. ed. 1192, 35 S. Ct. 671.

¹⁴Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 A.L.R. 699; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 72 L. ed. 927, 48 S. Ct. 553; Slocum v. Bear Valley Irrig. Co. 122 Cal. 555, 55 P. 403, 68 Am. St. Rep. 68; Chamberlain v. Missouri P. R. Co. 107 Kan. 341, 191 P. 261, 12 A.L.R. 224; Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co. 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 433, 62 L.R.A. 407, 95 Am. St. Rep. 476; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805; Com. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 106 Va. 61, 55 S. E. 572, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1086, 117 Am. St. Rep. 983, 9 Ann. Cas. 1124. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1912D, 808. A statute forbidding any corporation or association to discharge any employee or threaten to do so for voting or not voting

liable for injuries to employees through defective machinery, notwithstanding the employees had knowledge of the defect, when the same liability is not placed on private individuals and there is no distinctive difference in the business which will warrant the classification, denies to the corporations the equal protection of the laws.¹⁵

A classification which arbitrarily favors a corporation as against an individual is invalid under the Federal Constitution.¹⁶ For example, an individual owner of a cotton gin who cannot do business without a franchise based on public necessity is unconstitutionally deprived of the equal protection of the laws by a statute permitting the securing of a franchise, without such necessity, by a corporation organized with capital stock which may be subscribed by anyone, and which can do business for anyone, make profits, and declare dividends, although it is required to divide the profits above a certain amount among its members and others who do business with it.¹⁷ Usually, however, legislation granting corporations privileges not conferred upon natural persons or subjecting natural persons to different burdens from those to which corporations are subjected has been sustained because of a rational and material basis for the classification.¹⁸ An individual is not denied the equal protection of the laws because he is forbidden to receive deposits in sums less than a certain amount for relending to depositors upon the chance of forfeiture for default in payments or for sharing in profits at maturity of the contract, although corporations are permitted to do so.¹⁹ No denial of the equal protection of the laws results from the provisions of foreign attachment laws under which a nonresident individual defendant is debarred from appearing and defending without first giving special security, while a foreign corporate defendant may appear and answer without giving any security except for the lien of the process upon the property attached.²⁰

§ 514. Classification among Individuals and Partnerships.—

The legislature cannot discriminate among individuals and partnerships without a proper and rational basis for classification. Thus, a statute which undertakes to impose a tax on the privilege of doing business in the state as a partnership while leaving individuals in the same line of business untaxed makes a classification which is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of a state constitutional provision that no one shall be in any manner deprived of his liberty or property except by judgment of his peers or by the law of the land, and of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal

at any election, etc., is in violation of Tenn. Const. Art. 11, § 8, forbidding any special grant of privileges, immunities, or exemptions; since the failure to include partnerships and individuals within the scope of the statute amounts to a discrimination against corporations, etc., and the statute is also invalid as denying corporations the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805.

¹⁵Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co. 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533, 62 L.R.A. 407, 95 Am. St. Rep. 476.

¹⁶Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235.

¹⁹Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370, 68 L. ed. 742, 44 S. Ct. 362. Annotation: 68 L. ed. 742. A state may confine to corporations the business of collecting money in instalments from small investors and reletting it to them in order of priority, with a chance to forfeit the contract for nonpayment of instalments or to mature it by continued payments with a possibility of sharing in profits of the transaction. Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370, 68 L. ed. 742, 44 S. Ct. 362.

²⁰Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873. Annotation: 17 A.L.R. 884.

Constitution.¹ Similar acts have, however, been held valid. Thus, a statute providing for payment of license fees by persons, copartnerships, or corporations engaged in the business of undertaking or embalming, and providing for one class embracing corporations, one class embracing partnerships, one class embracing individuals engaged in business for themselves, and one class embracing assistants and helpers, under which a corporation pays nothing for a license and one license suffices for a copartnership, provided it is issued in the firm name, while every individual in order to secure a license must pay the sum of $²⁰, has been held valid. The court took the position that there was no discrimination as between those embraced within a class and that the regulations of the statute operated alike upon all persons and property, under the same circumstances and conditions, every individual being on a footing of equality, and the opportunity to form a corporation or a copartnership being open to all.²

It is not an unconstitutional discrimination to require a license for the sale of partnership securities where none is required for the sale of securities issued by individuals. The public requires protection against the indiscriminate sale of partnership securities in somewhat the same measure in which it requires protection against a similar sale of corporate securities.³

§ 515. Horse Racing and Pool Selling.—

The detailed particularity with which a statute may classify the subject matter of legislation enacted in the exercise of the police power without denying to anyone the equal protection of the laws is well illustrated by the decided cases dealing with statutes regulating horse racing and pool selling.4 The equal protection clause and similar state provisions are not violated by statutes authorizing the licensing of race meets and legalizing pari-mutuel betting at licensed meets;5 prohibiting bookmaking or pool selling at all places except on grounds where the races are to be run and by all except licensed persons;6 prohibiting making books or selling pools on events to occur beyond the limits of a state, but not prohibiting it on events within the state;7 prohibiting the operation of tracks for running races without a license from a commission, while permitting trotting races and fairs at which races are held without such licenses.8 A statute allowing licenses for racecourses, however, in the counties, towns, and cities in which such racecourses already exist, in the discretion of the local authorities, but requiring a three-fourths vote for a decla-

¹Corn v. Fort, 170 Tenn. 377, 95 S. W. (2d) 620, 106 A.L.R. 647. Annotation: 106 A.L.R. 663.

⁴People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; Com. v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 38 S. W. (2d) 987, citing R. C. L.; State v. Williams (State v. Thompson) 160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L.R.A. 950, 83 Am. St. Rep. 468; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112, 35 L.R.A. 231. As to horse racing, bookmaking, and pool selling generally, see GAMING [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 713, §§ 17-19; p. 735, § 37].

⁵People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605. A statute providing for the licensing of horse-racing meets and legalizing pari-mutuel betting at such meets is not rendered unduly discriminatory by a provision that it shall not apply to agricultural fairs. People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605. No unconstitutional classification is involved in permitting wagering on horse races while forbidding it on dog races. People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605.

⁶State v. Williams (State v. Thompson) 160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L.R.A. 950, 83 Am. St. Rep. 468; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112, 35 L.R.A. 231; State v. Loomis, 75 Mont. 88, 242 P. 344, citing R. C. L.

⁸State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agri. Asso. 136 Ky. 173, 123 S. W. 681, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 905.

ration that it is a public necessity, in order to license any new racecourse, is unconstitutional as granting exclusive privileges, immunities, and franchises.⁹

A statute which empowers a commission to license and regulate horse racing and which provides that every unlicensed race meeting shall be a public nuisance has been upheld as not violative of the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although the statute discriminates between running and trotting meetings in that it does not subject the latter to regulation and between the owners of running tracks in that it enables the racing commission to grant or withhold licenses at its pleasure, and has resulted in material pecuniary loss to persons owning running race tracks before the passage of the act who were unable to procure licenses from the racing commission.¹⁰

The lessee in possession of a racecourse is not denied the equal protection of the laws by a state statute under which it is compelled to recognize its own tickets of admission in the hands of persons who are not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, boisterous in conduct, or of lewd or immoral character, where the statute is applicable alike to all persons, corporations, or associations conducting places of public amusement or entertainment.¹¹

§ 516. Vehicles.—

For the purpose of classification and regulation without destroying the equal protection of the laws, the legislature may put in separate classes almost all of the major types of vehicles seen today on the public highways of this country.12

Many classifications in the regulation of motor vehicles generally have been sustained.¹³ In the first place valid exceptions or exemptions to regulations may be based upon the type of business in which the owner of the motor vehicle is engaged, such as agriculture;¹⁴ upon the ownership of their own trucks by shippers;¹⁵ upon the fact that persons are transporting their own commodities under substantially similar conditions to common or contract carriers in whose favor the exception is not made, where it is not shown that as administered all provisions relating to contract carriers which are germane to persons transporting their own goods are not applied to such persons;¹⁶ upon the fact that persons engaged in the business of transporting certain named commodities are so engaged upon such terms, conditions, and restrictions as the railroad commission may deem proper, where it is not clear that persons operating under such exception permits either as con-

⁹State, Alexander, Prosecutor, v. Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. 71, 28 A. 51, 23 L.R.A. 525.

¹⁰Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997.

¹¹Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 S. Ct. 384.

¹²Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 295 U. S. 285, 79 L. ed. 1439, 55 S. Ct. 709; Stanley v. Public Utilities Commission, 295 U. S. 76, 79 L. ed. 1311, 55 S. Ct. 628; Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 78 L. ed. 247, 54 S. Ct. 142; Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission, 289 U. S. 92, 77 L. ed. 1053, 53 S. Ct. 577, 85 A.L.R. 1131; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. ed. 288, 53 S. Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. ed. 1155, 52 S. Ct. 595, 81 A.L.R. 1402; Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. Police Ct. 251 U. S. 22, 64 L. ed. 112, 40 S. Ct. 79; Re Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 P. 348, L.R.A.1915F, 850; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio St. 283, 95 N. E. 829, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 611. See also Jones v. Union County, 63 Or. 566, 127 P. 781, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035.

¹³Annotation: 109 A.L.R. 551 et seq. See infra, notes 12-14, this section. For detailed discussion of the matters treated herein, see AUTOMOBILES, Vol. 5, p. 525, §§ 15 et seq.; MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.

¹⁵Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission, 289 U. S. 92, 77 L. ed. 1053, 53 S. Ct. 577, 85 A.L.R. 1131.

¹⁶Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. ed. 288, 53 S. Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721. See also Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corp. Commission, 154 Okla. 121, 7 P. (2d) 123, 80 A.L.R. 561.

tract or common carriers are not subject to the provisions of the act applicable to such carriers, and it does not appear that the provision has been applied as exempting them from the requirements imposed upon other carriers;¹⁷ upon the fact that the operators engaged in motor transportation make no direct charge for the services which they render;¹⁸ upon the fact of the hauling of implements of husbandry, including drilling machinery and highway building and maintenance equipment;¹⁹ upon the determination of whether operation of the business is within a city or town or within a specified distance thereof;²⁰ upon the fact that a state from which exempted foreign motor vehicles come in turn exempts similar vehicles of the state enacting the regulations and creating the instant exemption;¹ and upon many miscellaneous characteristics.² Classification of motor vehicles may also be based upon the size,³ width,⁴ height,⁵ or weight of a vehicle,⁶ weight of load carried,⁷ length of vehicle or trailer,⁸ or the length of a combination of vehicles.⁹ Classification may likewise rest upon the nature of the business in which motor vehicles are used. Thus, a municipal corporation having full legislative power to limit and regulate the use of vehicles kept for hire may classify them for purposes of regulation; and an ordinance dealing fully with one class of such vehicles, as determined by the nature of their business and the prices they charge, is not discriminative because of its lack of provision for the regulation of other distinct classes of vehicles kept for hire.¹⁰ Jitneys may be subject to different regulations from privately owned automobiles and street railways.¹¹ Passenger traffic may be classified distinctly from freight.¹² No unconstitutional discrimination is made against persons engaging in the motor vehicle junk business by subjecting it to regulations and restrictions other than those to which dealers in general junk are subjected.¹³ Requiring one desiring to do business as a common carrier by autobus to obtain indemnity insurance from a corporation authorized to do business in the state does not unconstitutionally deny the operator the equal protection of the laws14 or grant an unconstitutional privilege and immunity to local insurance companies.¹⁵ Permitting property owners to operate motor vehicles on the highway without securing indemnity insurance, however, and denying others the right to furnish indemnity bonds with individual

¹⁷Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. ed. 288, 53 S. Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721.

¹⁸Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136. Annotation: 81 A.L.R. 1145.

¹⁹Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; State v. Wetzel, 208 Wis. 603, 243 N. W. 768, 86 A.L.R. 274.

²⁰Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136.

¹Interstate Trucking Co. v. Dammann, 208 Wis. 116, 241 N. W. 625, 82 A.L.R. 1080.

⁴Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691, 87 A.L.R. 534.

⁶Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 74 L. ed. 704, 50 S. Ct. 204, 68 A.L.R. 194.

⁷Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N. E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997.

⁸Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691, 87 A.L.R. 534.

¹¹Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056.

¹⁴Sprout v. South Bend, 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504, 154 N. E. 369, 49 A.L.R. 1198, reversed on grounds of violation of commerce clause in 277 U. S. 163, 72 L. ed. 833, 48 S. Ct. 502, 62 A.L.R. 45.

surety is a discrimination which renders the sustaining of the statute doubtful.¹⁶

The automobile may be placed in a class by itself, so that a statute limiting speed on the highways applying only to motor vehicles is not unconstitutional as making an unjust discrimination against the manufacturers and owners of such vehicles.¹⁷ A statute releasing owners of motor vehicles from responsibility for injuries to guests in cases of accident occasioned by ordinary negligence18 and a practically identical statute exonerating the owner or operator of an automobile from liability to such guests unless caused by gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct19 do not deny the equal protection of the laws in discriminating between gratuitous and paying passengers in automobiles or between passengers in the vehicles enumerated and those in other classes of vehicles.²⁰ The legislature may, without impairing the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, authorize a municipal corporation to close to automobiles dangerous streets the use of which by such machines may endanger the lives of their occupants or of those driving horses on the streets,¹ and the limitation of the use of a street to the purposes of a pleasure driveway has been said to be in no sense class legislation.²

An ordinance requiring bicycle riders to carry lamps is not unconstitutional because not applying to other silently running vehicles.³ An ordinance prohibiting any person operating a motorcycle from carrying another person on it in front of the operator has been upheld as based on a reasonable classification.⁴ The courts have also generally recognized that there is a difference between ordinary vehicles and cars propelled by electricity, which may be recognized by the state in the exercise of its police power and accordingly they may be placed in separate classes.⁵ Wagons and vehicles may be classified so as to distinguish those used for business purposes and those used for advertising purposes.⁶ On the other hand, in regulating and licensing vehicles the legislature cannot arbitrarily fix a tax of a considerable amount on vehicles used for transportation of one commodity and a tax of a markedly smaller amount on vehicles of the same kind, size, and capacity used for other purposes.⁷

¹⁸Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 74 L. ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57, 65 A.L.R. 939.

²⁰A statute providing that no person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action against such owner or operator for accidental injury, death, or loss, unless the accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others, makes a proper distinction between the degree of care to be exercised by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle toward a guest and that to be exercised toward one who pays for his transportation, and such guest is not thereby deprived of the equal protection of the laws, in violation of constitutional guaranties. Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, 65 A.L.R. 943, affirmed in 280 U. S. 117, 74 L. ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57, 65 A.L.R. 939. A guest in an automobile is not deprived of the equal protection of the law, in violation of constitutional guaranties, by a statute varying the duty owed to him by the owner or operator from the duty owed to a guest in any other conveyance or in any other place. Ibid.

²Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L.R.A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155.

⁵Detroit, Ft. W. & B. I. R. Co. v. Osborn, 189 U. S. 383, 47 L. ed. 860, 23 S. Ct. 540.

⁶Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, 55 L. ed. 815, 31 S. Ct. 709; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509, 109 S. W. 293, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035.

⁷Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509, 109 S. W. 293, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.)

ice," so-called, and defined as including, among other things, bail bond service

§ 517. Buildings.—

of the police powers.¹⁰ Permitting public service corporations to erect build-

1035. See also Re Hoffert, 34 S. D. 271, 148 N. W. 20, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 949. A license fee of from $5 to $15 for a two- horse dray or express wagon, while only $1 is charged for a two-horse hack carry- ing passengers, is invalid because of the unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination. State v. Finch, 78 Minn. 118, 80 N. W. 856,

⁴⁶L.R.A. 437. A license tax on a four-horse wagon used for hauling freight for hire, which is near- ly three times as much as that imposed on three-horse wagons, is void for discrim- ination. Fiscal Ct. v. P. & A. Cox Co. 132 Ky. 738, 117 S. W. 296, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 83. The invalidity of a provision in an ordi- nance levying a tax for the privilege of using vehicles on its streets, which dis- criminated in favor of one using more than five buggies, does not defeat the whole ordinance so as to relieve one using only two vehicles from payment of the tax. Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 69 S. W. 679, 58 L.R.A. 921, 91 Am. St. Rep. 100.

⁸Moore v. Webb, 219 Cal. 304, 26 P. (2d) 22, 89 A.L.R. 925. Annotation: 89 A.L.R. 930.

¹⁰People ex rel. M. Wineburgh Adv. Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 735. The equal protection of the laws is not denied by a statute requiring the substi- tution of water closets for school sinks in tenement houses only, and then only when they are located in cities of the first class. Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 72 N. E. 231, 70 L.R.A. 704, 103 Am. St. Rep. 910, 1 Ann. Cas. 439, affirmed in

§ 518. Taxation.—

ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property, such as church-

¹⁵Hoopes v. Creighton, 100 Neb. 510, 160 N. W. 742, L.R.A.1917C, 1146, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 847.

¹⁶People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 46, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1129; Bailey v. People, 190 Ill. 28, 60 N. E. 98, 54 L.R.A. 838, 83 Am. St. Rep. 116.

¹⁷See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 53 L. ed. 923, 29 S. Ct. 567. See BUILDINGS, Vol. 9, p. 208, § 12.

¹⁸Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70 A. 113, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1163, 129 Am. St. Rep. 432, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048.

²⁰Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 71 L. ed. 1228, 47 S. Ct. 675, 53 A.L.R. 1210.

³United States.—Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 81 L. ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838; Colgate v.

Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 L. ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252, 102 A.L.R. 54, 4 Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 78 L. ed. 1109, 54 S. Ct. 599; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464; Miller, 283 U. S. 96, 75 L. ed. 78 A.L.R. 1464; Miller, 283 U. S. 96, 75 L. ed. & G. R. Co. v. Miller; Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 57, 75 L. ed. 861, 51 S. Ct. 75 L. ed. 839, 75 L. ed. 839, 75 L. ed. 496, 51 S. Ct. 273, 23 A.L.R. 99; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 74 L. ed. 775, 50 S. Ct. 281 U. S. 66, 74 L. ed. Snook, 68 A.L.R. 194; Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 73 L. ed. 475, 49 S. Ct. 188; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 72 L. ed. 48 S. Ct. 553; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 L. ed. 32 S. Consol. Iron Mines v. Ct. 627; Roberts & S. Co. v. Emmerston, 71 U. S. 50, 827, 45 Ct. 375, 45 A.L.R. 1495; Stebbins 827, 45 Ct. 63 L. ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 69 L. ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44 A.L.R. 1464; New York, P. & N. Teleg. Co. v. Dolan, Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. King County, 264 U. S. 22, 68 L. ed. 541, 44 S. Ct. 261; Oliver Iron Min. Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43 S. Ct. 526; Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122, 65 L. ed. 170, 41 S. Ct. 43; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 62 L. ed. 1025, 38 S. Ct. 444; Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U. S. 184, 60 L. v. 594, 36 S. Ct. 265; Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U. S. 331, 58 L. ed. 985, 34 S. Ct. 596; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304, 58 L. ed. 974, 34 S. Ct. 493; Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 S. Ct. 31; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 56 L. ed. 350, 32 S. Ct. 192; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389, 31 S. Ct. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 883, 30 S. Ct. 578; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. ed. 688, 30 S. Ct. 496; Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U. S. 340, 52 L. ed. 822, 28 S. Ct. 533; New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 51 L. ed. 415, 27 S. Ct. 188, 9 Ann. Cas. 736; Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553, 51 L. ed. 314, 27 S. Ct. 171, 8 Ann. Cas. 157; Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226, 50 L. ed. 451, 26 S. Ct. 232; Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87, 50 L. ed. 382, 26 S. Ct. 182; New York ex rel. Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. New York State Tax Comrs. 199 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 65, 25 S. Ct. 705, 4 Ann. Cas. 381; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 49 L. ed. 663, 25 S. Ct. 403; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261, 49 L. ed. 471, 25 S. Ct. 233; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 47 L. ed. 669, 23 S. Ct. 401; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 46 L. ed. 233, 22 S. Ct. 176; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. ed. 102, 21 S. Ct. 43; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 S. Ct. 829; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Sedalia ex rel. Bauman v. Standard Oil Co. C. A. 8th) 66 F. (2d) 757, 95 A.L.R. 1514, writ of certiorari denied in 290 U. S. 706, 78 L. ed. 607, 54 S. Ct. 374. Alabama. — Frazier v. State Tax Com. — Ala. —, 175 So. 402, 110 A.L.R. 1479. Georgia. — Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S. E. 58, 70 A.L.R. 449. Illinois. — Koesis v. Chicago Park Dist. 362 Ill. 24, 198 N. E. 847, 103 A.L.R. 141. Indiana. — Miles v. Department of Treasury. — Ind. —, 193 N. E. 855, 97 A.L.R. 1474, superseded, but not on this point, in 209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 101 A.L.R. 1359; State v. Smith, 158 Ind. 543, 63 N. E. 25, 63 L.R.A. 116. Iowa. — Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Iowa Comrs. 207 Iowa, 461, 221 N.W. 364, 75 A.L.R. 1, affirmed in 280 U. S. 529, 74 L. ed. 595, 50 S. Ct. 151. Mississippi. — Magnolia Bank v. Pike County, 111 Miss. 857, 72 So. 697, 3 A.L.R. 1365, writ of error dismissed in 248 U. S. 546, 63 L. ed. 414, 39 S. Ct. 135. North Carolina. — Dalton v. George C. Brown & Co. 159 N. C. 175, 75 S. E. 40, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 506. Oklahoma. — Exrs' & Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293, L.R.A.1916E, 602. Oregon. — Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; State v. Standard Oil Co. 61 Or. 438, 123 P. 40, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 179. Pennsylvania. — Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 274 Pa. 448, 118 A. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1215, affirmed in 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 S. Ct. 83; Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 A. 861, 50 L.R.A. 86. Tennessee. — Barlin v. Knox County, 136 Tenn. 238, 188 S. W. 795, 2 A.L.R. 112. Vermont. — Hardwick v. Wolcott, 98 Vt. 343, 129 A. 159, 39 A.L.R. 1222; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825. Virginia. — Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co. — Va. —, 190 S. E. 318, 110 A.L.R. 1195. Washington. — Casco Co. v. Thurston County, 163 Wash. 666, 2 P. (2d) 677, 77 A.L.R. 622. Wisconsin. — State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589, 7 A.L.R. 1617; Ebeling's Estate, 169 Wis. 432, 172 N. W. 734, 4 A.L.R. 1519; State ex rel. Bolens v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673, 135 N. W. 164, L.R.A.1915B, 569, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1147, writ of error dismissed in 231 U. S. 616, 58 L. ed. 400, 34 S. Ct. 212. The taxation of membership in an incorporated chamber of commerce does not deny the members the equal protection of the laws because of the exemption from taxation of such organizations as the associated press, lodges, fraternal orders, churches, etc. Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U. S. 184, 60 L. ed. 594, 36 S. Ct. 265.

as against another of the same class.⁸ Clear and hostile discriminations against

448, 118 A. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1215, affirmed in 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 S. Ct. 83.

⁵Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 295 U. S. 285, 79 L. ed. 1439, 55 S. Ct. 709; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304, 58 L. ed. 974, 34 S. Ct. 493; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 57 L. ed. 603, 33 S. Ct. 318; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 883, 30 S. Ct. 578; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. ed. 688, 30 S. Ct. 496; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 49 L. ed. 663, 25 S. Ct. 403; Million v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S. E. 231, 84 A.L.R. 1142; Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; Com. v. Girard L. Ins. Co. 305 Pa. 558, 158 A. 262, 83 A.L.R. 460, affirmed in 287 U. S. 570, 77 L. ed. 501, 53 S. Ct. 94; Casco Co. v. Thurston County, 163 Wash. 666, 2 P. (2d) 677, 77 A.L.R. 622; Interstate Trucking Co. v. Dammann, 208 Wis. 116, 241 N. W. 625, 82 A.L.R. 1080.

⁶Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 A.L.R. 699; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536.

⁸United States. — Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. ed. 1245, 57 S. Ct. 868, 109 A.L.R. 1327; Great Atlantic & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 81 L. ed. 1193, 57 S. Ct. 772, 112 A.L.R. 293; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 78 L. ed. 1141, 54 S. Ct. 575; Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 76 L. ed. 1102, 52 S. Ct. 556, 87 A.L.R. 374; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 74 L. ed. 775, 50 S. Ct. 310; International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429, 73 L. ed. 781, 49 S. Ct. 380; New York v. Latrobe, 279 U. S. 421, 73 L. ed. 776, 49 S. Ct. 377, 65 A.L.R. 1341; Leonard v. Earle, 279 U. S. 392, 73 L. ed. 754, 49 S. Ct. 372; Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 73 L. ed. 475, 49 S. Ct. 188; Salomon v. State Tax Commis- sion, 278 U. S. 484, 73 L. ed. 464, 49 S. Ct. 192; Swiss Oil Corp. v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407, 71 L. ed. 709, 47 S. Ct. 393; Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577, 70 L. ed. 1093, 46 S. Ct. 627; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 69 L. ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44 A.L.R. 1454; J. E. Raley & Bros. v. Richardson, 264 U. S. 157, 68 L. ed. 615, 44 S. Ct. 256; Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. King County, 264 U. S. 22, 68 L. ed. 541, 44 S. Ct. 261; Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545, 68 L. ed. 437, 44 S. Ct. 186; Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137, 68 L. ed. 212, 44 S. Ct. 40; Oliver Iron Min. Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43 S. Ct. 526; Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99, 66 L. ed. 149, 42 S. Ct. 15; Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 65 L. ed. 489, 41 S. Ct. 219; Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122, 65 L. ed. 170, 41 S. Ct. 43; Branson v. Bush, 251 U. S. 182, 64 L. ed. 215, 40 S. Ct. 113; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 62 L. ed. 1025, 38 S. Ct. 444; Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1, 62 L. ed. 547, 38 S. Ct. 267; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 59 L. ed. 265, 35 S. Ct. 99; Ohio River & W. R. Co. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576, 58 L. ed. 737, 34 S. Ct. 372; Keeney v. Comptroller, 222 U. S. 525, 56 L. ed. 299, 32 S. Ct. 105, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1139; Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285, 55 L. ed. 219, 31 S. Ct. 238; Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 55 L. ed. 137, 31 S. Ct. 171; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 883, 30 S. Ct. 578; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 54 L. ed. 688, 30 S. Ct. 496; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245, 50 L. ed. 744, 26 S. Ct. 459; New York ex rel. Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. New York State Tax Comrs. 199 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 65, 25 S. Ct. 705, 4 Ann. Cas. 381; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 46 L. ed. 233, 22 S. Ct. 176; Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 46 L. ed. 196, 22 S. Ct. 213; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 S. Ct. 829; American Exp. Co. v. Indiana, 165 U. S. 255, 41 L. ed. 707, 17 S. Ct. 991; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. [12 Am. Jur.]—14 209

constitutional prohibition as to the equal protection of the laws.⁸ If the dis-

S. Ct. 604; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S.

H. Hunt, 132 La. 1073, 162 So. 777, 103

S. Ct. 556, 87 A.L.R. 374.

U. S. 550, 79 L. ed. 1054, 55 S. Ct. 525, re-

S. Ct. 830, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85

U. S. 517, 77; Hoeper v. Tax Commission,

S. Ct. 423; Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Harding

U. S. 421, 65 L. ed. 1029, 41 S. Ct. 571; F. S.

R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed.

S. W. (2d) 620, 106 A.L.R. 647; Hardwick v.

required by Article ¹, § ⁸, of the Constitution.¹¹ Even if it is conceded that

§ 519. Generally.—

question ¹⁴ reviewable by the courts.¹⁵ If a classification is clearly fanciful,

phases of constitutional law.¹⁷ The authorities state with unanimity that the

question of classification is primarily for the legislature and that it can never

given situation, whether the legislative action is clearly unreasonable.¹⁸ It

company, or association, or owned by an individual—is arbitrary. Gamble-Robin- son Fruit Co. v. Thoresen, 53 N. D. 28, 204 N. W. 861, 42 A.L.R. 1039.

²⁵⁶U. S. 377, 65 L. ed. 998, 41 S. Ct. 528. See also Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269, 70 L. ed. 270, 46 S. Ct. 110; Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 69 L. ed. 703, 45 S. Ct. 135, 348. The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not apply to prevent collection of taxes in case of a classifica- tion of taxpayers which is reasonable, and not merely arbitrary and capricious. Bar- clay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 69 L. ed. 703, 45 S. Ct. 135, 348.

¹⁴People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 46, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1129.

¹⁵People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 46, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1129; Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, 84 N. E. 769, 15 Ann. Cas. 849.

¹⁸Williams v. State, 85 Ark. 464, 108 S. W. 838, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 482, 122 Am. St. Rep. 47; Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal. (2d) 744, 62 P. (2d) 1037, 63 P. (2d) 810, 108 A.L.R. 595; Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal. (2d) 259, 57 P. (2d) 932, 105 A.L.R. 148; Re Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 P. 348, L.R.A. 1915F, 850; Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 P. 356,

is subject to judicial revision only to the extent of seeing that it is founded on real distinctions in the subjects classified, and not on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of evading the constitutional prohibition.¹⁹ Therefore, unless a classification is arbitrary and not founded on any substantial distinction or apparent natural reason which suggests the necessity or propriety of different legislation, a court has no right to interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion.²⁰ Furthermore, the courts cannot require the legislature to specify its reasons for a classification.¹

Great liberality has always been indulged in the matter of classification.² The Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to prevent all exercise of judgment by a state legislature of what the interests of the state require and to compel it to run all its laws in the channels of general legislation.³ In the determination of whether or not a basis of classification is reason-

⁸L.R.A.(N.S.) 632, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199; Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P. (2d) 1098, citing R. C. L.; Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, 65 A.L.R. 943, affirmed in 57 S. Ct. 65 A.L.R. 939; Big ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57; Chapman, 45 Idaho, 380, Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho, 380, 263 P. 45, citing R. C. L.; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Baldwin v. C. L.; Baird 303, 141 N. E. 343, citing R. C. 77, citing v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Festervand v. Laster, C. L.; App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N. W. 545, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 494, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1030; State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175, 57 L.R.A. 297, 89 Am. St. Rep. 571; Ex parte Kolasky, 319 Mo. 810, 5 S. W. (2d) 22, 62 A.L.R. 95; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584; Interstate Trucking Co. v. Dammann, 208 Wis. 116, 241 N. W. 625, 82 A.L.R. 1080; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199. As to the function of the courts, see infra, § 521.

¹⁹Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405, 100 N. E. 563, L.R.A.1915B, 420, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 987, affirmed in 237 U. S. 391, 59 L. ed. 1011, 35 S. Ct. 617; State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402, 106 N. W. 477, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 327; Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57 L.R.A. 922.

²⁰Hauge v. Chicago, 299 U. S. 387, 81 L. ed. 297, 57 S. Ct. 241, — A.L.R. —; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109, 57 S. Ct. 139, 106 A.L.R. 1476; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629, 80 L. ed. 43, 56 S. Ct. 611, rehearing denied in 298 U. S. 691, 80 L. ed. 1409, 56 S. Ct. 745; Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 80 L. ed. 669, 56 S. Ct. 453; Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297 U. S. 119, 80 L. ed. 513, 56 S. Ct. 386; United States Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, 293 U. S. 232, 79 L. ed. 299, 55 S. Ct. 168; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527,

⁷⁵L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 74 L. ed. 704, 50 S. Ct. 204, 68 A.L.R. 194; Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 74 L. ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57, 65 A.L.R. 939; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U. S. 325, 71 L. ed. 1074, 47 S. Ct. 594; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425, 71 L. ed. 331, 47 S. Ct. 122; Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Miller, 264 U. S. 535, 68 L. ed. 836, 44 S. Ct. 421; Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432, 67 L. ed. 1065, 43 S. Ct. 613; Springfield Gas & E. Co. v. Springfield, 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. ed. 131, 42 S. Ct. 24; Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Bd. 255 U. S. 144, 65 L. ed. 555, 41 S. Ct. 252; Sedalia ex rel. Baumman v. Standard Oil Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 66 F. (2d) 757, 95 A.L.R. 1514, writ of certiorari denied in 290 U. S. 706, 78 L. ed. 607, 54 S. Ct. 374; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, affirmed in 239 U. S. 637, 60 L. ed. 480, 36 S. Ct. 445; Keiningham v. Blake, 135 Md. 320, 109 A. 65, 8 A.L.R. 1066; Ashley v. Three Justices (Ashley v. Wait) 228 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A.L.R. 1472, writ of error dismissed in 250 U. S. 652, 63 L. ed. 1199, 40 S. Ct. 53; Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L.R.A.1916D, 412; State ex rel. Hoffman v. Justus, 91 Minn. 447, 98 N. W. 325, 64 L.R.A. 510, 103 Am. St. Rep. 521, 1 Ann. Cas. 91; Ivens v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Wessel v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 402; Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; American Baseball Club v. Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 311, 167 A. 891, 92 A.L.R. 356, appeal dismissed in 290 U. S. 595, 78 L. ed. 524, 54 S. Ct. 128.

¹Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; Nitka v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 Wis. 106, 135 N. W. 492, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 337, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 863.

²State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 153 Iowa, 702, 133 N. W. 895, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821.

able, it must be looked at from the standpoint of the legislature enacting it.⁴ The deference due to the judgment of a state legislature on the matter of statutory classifications alleged to deny equal protection of the laws is especially to be observed when local conditions that the court cannot know may affect the answer to the crucial question whether the court can say, on its judicial knowledge, that the legislature could not have had any reasonable ground for believing that there were such public considerations as to justify the distinction made.⁵

§ 520. Discretion of Legislature.—

One of the basic principles involved in considering the validity of legislation assailed under equality provisions of the Federal and state Constitutions is that in the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion.6 Therefore, whenever the power to regulate exists, the details of the

⁴Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271.

⁵Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115, 47 S. Ct. 630; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 68 L. ed. 366, 44 S. Ct. 153, 30 A.L.R. 532; Dominion Hotel Co. v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 265, 63 L. ed. 597, 39 S. Ct. 273; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. ed. 539, 34 S. Ct. 281; Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 57 L. ed. 971, 33 S. Ct. 610; Re Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A.L.R. 51.

⁶United States. — Borden's Farm Products Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581; Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. ed. 1155, 52 S. Ct. 595, 81 A.L.R. 1402; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 75 L. ed. 1264, 51 S. Ct. 582; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 75 L. ed. 482, 51 S. Ct. 228; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641; Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 69 L. ed. 944, 45 S. Ct. 490; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 69 L. ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44 A.L.R. 1454; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225, 68 L. ed. 278, 44 S. Ct. 21; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15; Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R. Commission, 261 U. S. 379, 67 L. ed. 705, 43 S. Ct. 387; Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 66 L. ed. 1033, 42 S. Ct. 529, 28 A.L.R. 1207; Arizona Employers' Liability Cases (Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer) 250 U. S. 400, 63 L. ed. 1058, 39 S. Ct. 553, 6 A.L.R. 1537; Chicago, T. H. & S. E. R. Co. v. Anderson, 242 U. S. 283, 61 L. ed. 302, 37 S. Ct. 124; Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U. S. 41, 59 L. ed. 1192, 35 S. Ct. 671; Booth v. Indiana, 237 U. S. 391, 59 L. ed. 1011, 35 S. Ct. 617; Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 58 L. ed. 1288, 34 S. Ct. 856; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 58 L. ed. 1135, 34 S. Ct. 678; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, 34 S. Ct. 612, L.R.A.1915C, 1189; Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 57 L. ed. 730, 33 S. Ct. 441; Toyota v. Hawall, 226 U. S. 184, 57 L. ed. 180, 33 S. Ct. 47; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 32 S. Ct. 169, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 53 L. ed. 941, 29 S. Ct. 560; Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 52 L. ed. 236, 28 S. Ct. 114; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 47 L. ed. 669, 23 S. Ct. 401; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 S. Ct. 272; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 44 L. ed. 716, 20 S. Ct. 666; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 S. Ct. 284; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 S. Ct. 136; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 31 L. ed. 841, 8 S. Ct. 1028. **Alabama.** — Hale v. State, 217 Ala. 403, 116 So. 369, 58 A.L.R. 1333. **California.** — Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal. (2d) 259, 57 P. (2d) 932, 105 A.L.R. 148. **Colorado.** — Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P. (2d) 1098, citing R. C. L. **Florida.** — State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138. **Georgia.** — Clein v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 529, 139 S. E. 46, 53 A.L.R. 933. **Idaho.** — Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho, 380, 263 P. 45, citing R. C. L.; State v. Calloway, 11 Idaho, 719, 84 P. 27, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 109, 114 Am. St. Rep. 285. **Illinois.** — People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N. E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997. **Indiana.** — Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521,

§ 521. Presumptions and Burden of Proof.—

²¹⁶Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 38 A.L.R. 218; Lee v. Hoffman, 182 Iowa, 1216, 166 N. W. 565, L.R.A.1918C, 933; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803. Kansas. — Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A. 1918B, 374; Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. 71, 74 P. 640, 64 L.R.A. 325, 15 Kan. 71, 74 P. 640, 64 L.R.A. 325. Louisiana. — Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L. Maryland. — Keinigsham v. Blake, 135 Md. 320, 109 A. 65, 8 A.L.R. 1066. Massachusetts. — Ashley v. Three Jus- tices (Ashley v. Wait) 228 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 5 A.L.R. 1472, writ of error dis- missed in 250 U. S. 652, 63 L. ed. 1190, 40 S. Ct. 53. Michigan. — Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189. Minnesota. — State v. Fairmont Cream- ery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548; State v. Bridgeman & R. Co.

¹¹⁷Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41. Missouri. — State v. Scullin-Gallagher Iron & Steel Co. 268 Mo. 178, 186 S. W. 1007, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 620. North Carolina. — State v. Davis, 157 N. C. 648, 73 S. E. 130, 39 L.R.A.(N.S.) 136. Ohio. — State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637. Oklahoma. — Trustees', Exrs. & Securi- ties Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293, L.R.A.1916E, 602. Oregon. — Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; State ex rel. Evans v. Kozer, 116 Or. 581, 242 P. 621, citing R. C. L. Pennsylvania.—Heissler v. Thomas Col- liery Co. 274 Pa. 448, 118 A. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1215, affirmed in 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237,

⁴³S. Ct. 83. South Carolina. — Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1068. Tennessee. — Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A.L.R. 755; State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 280, 193 S. W. 99, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 158; Motlow v. State,

¹²⁵Kan. 547, 145 S. W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177, writ of error dismissed in 239 U. S. 653, 60 L. ed. 487, 36 S. Ct. 161; State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co. 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S. W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941. Washington. — Laughney v. Maybury,

¹⁴⁵Wash. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393; State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen,

⁶⁵Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 466. Wisconsin. — Maercker v. Milwaukee,

²⁵⁵U. S. 144, 65 L. ed. 555, 41 S. Ct. 252; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. ed. 1050, 33 S. Ct. 692; Griffith v. Connecticut,

²¹⁸U. S. 572, 54 L. ed. 1155, 31 S. Ct. 134; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 S. Ct. 132; Watson v. Mary- land, 218 U. S. 173, 54 ed. 987, 30 S. Ct. 644; Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 44 L. ed. 897, 20 S. Ct. 819; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; Mathison v. Minne- apolis Street R. Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L.R.A.1916D, 412; Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N. W. 1053, 57 L.R.A. 922; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 274 Pa. 448, 118 A. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1215, affirmed in 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 S. Ct. 83; Re Snyder, 93 Wash. 59, 160 P. 12, 3 A.L.R. 1230. The selection of the exempted classes is within the legislative power, subject only to the restriction that it be not arbitrary or oppressive and that it apply equally to all persons similarly situated. Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105. As to the discretion of the legislature with reference to the nature of differences underlying classification, see supra, § 482.

⁶⁰So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Fester- vand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L. See also Crescent Cot- ton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 66 L. ed. 166, 42 S. Ct. 42. The legislature has a broad discretion in making classifications for police regula- tion. People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; Laughney v. May- bury, 145 Wash. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393.

unconstitutional,¹⁰ in those cases in which laws are attacked as violating the

sumption in favor of a legislative classification,¹¹ of the reasonableness and

fairness of legislative action,¹² and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if

tion in favor of a classification is not conclusive and is rebuttable,¹⁵ courts

¹¹Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Bald- win, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187; Corporation Commission v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431, 74 L. ed. 945, 50 S. Ct. 397; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 57 L. ed. 603, 33 S. Ct. 318; Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. ed. 176, 29 S. Ct. 50; Erb v. Morasch,

¹⁷⁷U. S. 584, 44 L. ed. 897, 20 S. Ct. 819; Re Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 P. 348, L.R.A. 1915F, 850; Martin v. Com. 126 Va. 603,

¹⁹⁵Cal. 548, 234 P. 398, 38 A.L.R. 1186; Re Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 P. 348, L.R.A.1915F, 850; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Fi- nance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Commissioners, 207 Iowa, 461, 221 N. W. 364, 75 A.L.R. 1, affirmed in

²⁸⁰U. S. 529, 74 L. ed. 595, 50 S. Ct. 151; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 534.

⁷⁵L. ed. 276, 51 S. Ct. 92; Arkansas Natur- al Gas Co. v. Arkansas R. Commission,

²⁶¹U. S. 379, 67 L. ed. 705, 43 S. Ct. 387; Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Co. 249 U. S. 152, 63 L. ed. 527, 39 S. Ct. 227; State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171,

¹⁷⁵Ind. 241, 93 N. E. 1071, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1190; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Festervand v. Laster,

¹⁵La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136; Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1009, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1102; Mercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199; Nitka v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 Wis. 106, 135 N. W. 492,

⁴⁹L.R.A.(N.S.) 337, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 863. "There is a strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly ap- preciates the needs of its own people; that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience; and that its discriminations are based upon ade- quate grounds." Ward v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 66 L. ed. 1033, 42 S. Ct. 529, 28 A.L.R. 1207, quoting Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Co. 249 U. S. 152, 63 L. ed. 527, 39 S. Ct. 227; Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N. W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548.

¹⁴Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. ed. 1245, 57 S. Ct. 868, 109 A.L.R. 1327; Metropolitan Casual- ty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 538, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647; Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Bald- win, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187; Lawrence v. State Tax Commission,

⁸⁷A.L.R. 374; State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, son, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1536; Cres- cent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 66 L. ed. 166, 42 S. Ct. 42; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Lindsley v. Natural Car- bonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369,

³¹S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171,

¹⁹¹N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Baldwin v. State, 194 Ind. 303, 141 N. E. 343, citing R. C. L.; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100,

¹⁰¹Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A.1918B, 374; Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; Vigant v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 402; Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056; Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S. W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177, writ of error dismissed in 239 U. S. 653, 60 L. ed. 487, 36 S. Ct. 161; Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah, 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584; State v. Walter Bowen & Co. 86 Wash. 23,

¹⁵Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Bald- win, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187.

of the legislators.¹⁶ All reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of a classification made by the legislature,¹⁷ and it is the duty of the court to sustain it if any reasonable distinction can be found.¹⁸

One who assails the classification in a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest on any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.¹⁹ Invalid discrimination must be proved or admitted; it is not presumed.²⁰ The courts need not be ingenious in searching for grounds of distinction to sustain a classification that may be subjected to criticism.²¹

The authorities cumulatively establish the rule that the assailant of a classification must clearly establish invalidity, not permitting logically disputable contentions in behalf of the legislative judgment to persist, in order to prevail.¹ To strike down an act as class legislation requires the strongest of showings.² It has been variously stated that a discrimination must be shown to be invalid with convincing clarity,³ not merely possibly, but clearly and

¹⁶Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 538, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647.

¹⁷Corporation Commission v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431, 74 L. ed. 945, 50 S. Ct. 397; Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U. S. 41, 59 L. ed. 1192, 35 S. Ct. 671; Consumers' League v. Colorado & S. R. Co. 53 Colo. 54, 125 P. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1153; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; State v. Bridgeman & R. Co. 117 Minn. 186, State v. Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41; Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1009, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1103; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199; Servonitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231, 113 N. W. 277, 126 Am. St. Rep. 955; State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 P. 299, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 819.

¹⁸Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 77 L. ed. 929, 53 S. Ct. 481, 85 A.L.R. 699; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271.

¹⁹Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 80 L. ed. 138, 56 S. Ct. 159, 101 A.L.R. 853; Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. ed. 1070, 55 S. Ct. 538, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 767, 79 L. ed. 1708, 55 S. Ct. 647; Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187; Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 76 L. ed. 1102, 52 S. Ct. 556, 87 A.L.R. 374; Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 75 L. ed. 482, 51 S. Ct. 228; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641; Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Road Improv. Dist. 266 U. S. 379, 69 L. ed. 335, 45 S. Ct. 136; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 57 L. ed. 603, 33 S. Ct. 318; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 51 L. ed. 357, 27 S. Ct. 243; Standard Chemical & Oil Co. v. Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383, L.R.A.1918C, 522; Denson v. Alabama Fuel & I. Co. 198 Ala. 383, 73 So. 525, citing R. C. L.; Ruth Drug v. Johnson, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 720, 57 P. (2d) 1022, citing R. C. L.; Consumers' League v. Colorado & S. R. Co. 53 Colo. 54, 125 P. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1153; State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138; Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho, 380, 263 P. 45, citing R. C. L.; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs. 207 Iowa, 461, 221 N. W. 364, 75 A.L.R. 1, affirmed in 280 U. S. 529, 74 L. ed. 595, 50 S. Ct. 151; New Orleans v. Calamari, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172, 22 A.L.R. 106; Vigeant v. Postal Telege. Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189; Witt v. People's State Bank, 166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 306, 83 A.L.R. 1608; State v. Reininger, 59 S. D. 336, 239 N. W. 849, citing R. C. L.; Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056; Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S. W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177, writ of error dismissed in 239 U. S. 653, 60 L. ed. 487, 36 S. Ct. 161; Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah, 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259; Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co. — Va. —, 190 S. E. 318, 110 A.L.R. 1195; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584. See also McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U. S. 344, 61 L. ed. 352, 37 S. Ct. 178, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 801. A classification not shown to be unreasonable or arbitrary cannot be said to be obnoxious to the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432, 67 L. ed. 1065, 43 S. Ct. 613. A corporation claiming that legislation applicable to corporations but not to individuals in a similar situation denies the equal protection of the laws has the burden of establishing the fact. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 75 L. ed. 482, 51 S. Ct. 228.

²¹Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Co. 249 U. S. 152, 63 L. ed. 527, 39 S. Ct. 227.

actually unreasonable;⁴ that it must be clear that there is no fair reason or basis for the classification;⁵ that a classification is not reviewable unless palpably6 or manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, inequitable, and unjust,⁷ purely fanciful,⁸ plainly without warrant in the facts,⁹ and not justifiable on any reasonable grounds.¹⁰ A claim of repugnancy to the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be supported by mere speculation or conjecture.¹¹ Furthermore, it is not enough to show that the question is fairly debatable12 or that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of serious strength.¹³ Before a court can interfere with the legislative judgment, it must be able to say that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched.¹⁴ When properly attacked, however, a classification must dis-

⁴Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432, 67 L. ed. 1065, 43 S. Ct. 613; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 51 L. ed. 357, 27 S. Ct. 243; State v. Reininger, 59 S. D. 336, 239 N. W. 849, citing R. C. L.

⁵Ex parte Lewinsky, 66 Fla. 324, 63 So. 577, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1156; Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N. E. 667, 49 A.L.R. 499; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, affirmed in 239 U. S. 637, 60 L. ed. 480, 36 S. Ct. 445. The legislative judgment as to what is a sufficient distinction cannot be overthrown by the courts unless it is, beyond rational doubt, erroneous. Re Stephan, 170 Cal. 48, 148 P. 196, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 617.

⁶Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513; Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 S. Ct. 325; Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S. Ct. 684; Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R. Commission, 261 U. S. 379, 67 L. ed. 705, 43 S. Ct. 387; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525; Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 57 L. ed. 730, 33 S. Ct. 441; Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. 184, 57 L. ed. 180, 33 S. Ct. 47; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 44 L. ed. 716, 20 S. Ct. 666; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 S. Ct. 136; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal. (2d) 259, 57 P. (2d) 932, 105 A.L.R. 148; People v. Monterey Fish Products Co. 195 Cal. 548, 234 P. 398, 38 A.L.R. 1186; Ex parte Lewinsky, 66 Fla. 324, 63 So. 577, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1156; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho, 380, 263 P. 45, citing R. C. L.; People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N. E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs. 207 Iowa, 461, 221 N. W. 364, 75 A.L.R. 1, affirmed in 280 U. S. 529, 74 L. ed. 595, 50 S. Ct. 151; Lee v. Hoffman, 182 Iowa, 1216, 166 N. W. 565, L.R.A.1918C, 933; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A. 1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210; Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A.L.R. 755; Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056.

⁷Baldwin v. State, 194 Ind. 303, 141 N. E. 343, citing R. C. L.; Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; State v. Bridgeman & R. Co. 117 Minn. 136, 134 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41; State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792, 140 Am. St. Rep. 909.

⁸Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L.R.A.1916D, 412.

¹⁰Ex parte Asotsky (Asotsky v. Beach) 319 Mo. 810, 5 S. W. (2d) 22, 62 A.L.R. 95.

¹¹Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 76 L. ed. 323, 52 S. Ct. 144.

¹²Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U. S. 325, 71 L. ed. 1074, 47 S. Ct. 594; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U. S. 365, 71 L. ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114, 54 A.L.R. 1016.

¹³Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Bd. 255 U. S. 144, 65 L. ed. 555, 41 S. Ct. 252; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679, L.R.A.1918B, 374; Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 402.

¹⁴International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 34 S. Ct. 859, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 525; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. ed. 1050, 33 S. Ct. 692; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30 S. Ct. 644; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 54 L. ed. 673, 30 S. Ct. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 48 L. ed. 971, 24 S. Ct. 638; Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P. (2d) 1098, citing R. C. L.; Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105; Big Wood Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho, 380, 263 P. 45, citing R. C. L.; People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N. E. 361, 72 A.L.R. 997; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Baird v. Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 P. 77, citing R. C. L.; Festervand v. Laster, 15

fanciful conjecture ¹⁵ and cannot stand as reasonable if it offends the plain

in the absence of such showing, the courts have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination.¹⁷

§ 522. Matters Considered by Courts.—

character, extent, and purpose of the regulation, the classes of persons legally and naturally affected by the regulation, and the particular classification and regulation adopted by the statute should be considered.¹⁸ Difficulty

legally and naturally affected by the regulation are included in the classification made or whether any are illegally excluded from the particular classification adopted by the statute.¹⁹ The inquiry should be whether the distinctive characteristics upon which it is proposed to found different treatment are such as in the nature of things will denote in some reasonable degree

In the determination of what classification is within the range of discretion and what is arbitrary, regard must be had to the particular subject of

action,¹ the characteristics of the class as a whole must be looked to,² and the

in other states is an indication that the classification is reasonable.⁴ Moreover, the constitutional validity of the statute assailed is not dependent solely

La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; Keiningham v. Blake, 135 Md. 320, 109 A. 65, 8 A.L.R. 1066; Vigeant v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867; Com. v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356,

¹⁰³N. E. 923, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 879; People v. Metz, 193 N. Y. 148, 85 N. E. 1070, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 201; State v. Pioneer Oil & Ref. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 292 S. W. 869, citing R. C. L.

¹⁵Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 81 L. ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838; Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187.

¹⁶Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 81 L. ed. 1223, 57 S. Ct. 838.

¹⁸Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 126,

¹⁶Ann. Cas. 1234; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants (Dibrell v. Lanier) 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87, 12 L.R.A. 70.

¹⁹Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 126, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234; Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants (Dibrell v. Lanier) 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87, 12 L.R.A. 70.

³Pasadena City High School Dist. v. Upjohn, 206 Cal. 775, 276 P. 341, 63 A.L.R. 408.

⁵Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 76 L. ed. 1232, 52 S. Ct. 631, 84 A.L.R. 831.

necessity, and policy of legislation ⁶ applies with particular emphasis to statutes assailed as unequal. The courts cannot set aside a statute merely because in their view it may have been unwise or unnecessary to apply certain

rules to one class of cases ⁷ or because they deem it to be impolitic.⁸ In determining whether a classification is such as to deny the equal protection

of the laws, the courts must consider only whether the difference does injustice to the class generally, even though it bears hard in the particular case.⁹

state courts allows the judiciary more leeway in considering such legislation. It is held that while in determining the reasonableness of a classification set up by the legislature, the court will not concern itself with the

§ 523. Technique of Judicial Investigation.—

passed upon the question have determined with unanimity that in considering the validity of a classification, the courts will take judicial notice of all

facts relevant to the question.¹² Matters of common knowledge and of common report are, therefore, taken into consideration in passing upon the reasonableness of a classification.¹³ Such procedure is in accord with the method

employed by the courts in ascertaining the validity of legislation generally.¹⁴

⁷Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 P. 356, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 682, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. State, 113 Tex. 570, 261 S. W. 996, 33 A.L.R. 367; Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co. — Va. —, 190 S. E. 318, 110 A.L.R. 1195. Since the wisdom of legislation is not a matter for judicial consideration, the courts are bound to assume that the legislature in imposing an occupation tax has paid due heed to all economic considerations affecting classification and to yield full effect to the statute unless it is impossible to discern any substantial differences between the occupations separately classified. Portland Van & Storage Co. v. Hoss, 139 Or. 434, 9 P. (2d) 122, 81 A.L.R. 1136.

¹⁷⁰U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594. When the validity of class legislation is in question, the courts will look into the nature of the class to see if it possesses peculiar features which might reasonably call for legislative action, but beyond that they will not interfere with the policy of the legislature. Sams v. St. Louis & M. River R. Co. 174 Mo. 53, 73 S. W. 686, 61 L.R.A. 475.

¹¹State ex rel. Matteson v. Luecke, 194 Minn. 246, 260 N. W. 206, 99 A.L.R. 1053.

¹²State v. Bridgeman & R. Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41. See Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187.

¹³Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire,

²¹⁹U. S. 549, 55 L. ed. 328, 31 S. Ct. 259, affirming 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 706, 117 Am. St. Rep. 425, and later appeal in 138 Iowa, 664, 116 N. W. 801; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 153 Iowa, 702, 133 N. W. 895, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821.

outside the sphere of judicial notice, they are properly the subject of evidence and of finding. With the notable expansion of the scope of governmental regulations and the consequent assertion of violation of constitutional rights, it is increasingly important that when it becomes necessary

for the Supreme Court to deal with the facts relating to particular commercial or industrial conditions, they should be presented concretely with appropriate determination upon evidence, so that conclusions shall not be reached

generally, on the other hand, without qualifying its language as to the economic situation which may be involved, that if a statute on its face is general

§ 524. Construction of State Statutes.—

discrimination upon arbitrary distinctions.² A mere characterization, however, of a state statute, such as a taxing statute, by the court of last resort

of the state is not binding upon the Federal Supreme Court, which will determine for itself the effect of the statute under the equal protection clause.³

C. SPECIAL BURDENS AND PRIVILEGES

§ 525. Generally.—

be treated alike, both as to privileges conferred and as to liabilities or burdens imposed.⁴ Any statute which imposes special restrictions or burdens

United States, no distinction is to be observed between the effect of privileges conferred and the effect of burdens imposed. A privilege conferred

upon one class is a discrimination in favor of that class and against all others

¹⁸Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187. See also Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266, 80 L. ed. 675, 56 S. Ct. 467.

¹⁹Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 79 L. ed. 281, 55 S. Ct. 187.

¹Consumers' League v. Colorado & S. R. Co. 53 Colo. 54, 125 P. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1158.

²⁴²U. S. 375, 61 L. ed. 374, 37 S. Ct. 144; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 58 L. ed. 1135, 34 S. Ct. 678; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304, 58 L. ed. 974, 34 S. Ct. 493; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531,

⁵⁸L. ed. 713, 34 S. Ct. 359; Adams v. Russell, 229 U. S. 353, 57 L. ed. 1224, 33 S. Ct. 846; Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 51 L. ed. 357, 27 S. Ct. 243.

²⁷⁷U. S. 389, 72 L. ed. 927, 48 S. Ct. 553; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423.

⁴⁶A.L.R. 284; State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599, 51 N. E. 136, 41 L.R.A. 689, 65 Am. St. Rep. 785; State v. Wright, 53 Or. 344,

classification is legally permissible and, if so, whether the classification is a

§ 526. Generally.—

no one may be subject to any greater burdens and charges than are imposed on others in the same calling or condition ⁹ or in like circumstances.¹⁰

classes.¹¹ Thus, a statute imposing absolute liability upon telegraph companies for injuries caused by their poles, wires, and apparatus, while not

⁶Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826, L.R.A.1917A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 210.

⁸Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godair) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30. In enacting provisions necessary for the protection of the public health, conditions may exist that make it necessary to impose upon some persons greater burdens than upon others not similarly situated. Scholle v. State, 90 Md. 729, 46 A. 326, 50 L.R.A. 411.

⁹Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Connolly v. Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godair)

¹⁸³U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 126, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in

²⁴⁵U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; State v. Richcreek, 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 874, 119 Am. St. Rep. 49, 10 Ann. Cas. 899; Opinion of Justices,

²⁰⁷Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 604; Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 12 Am. Rep. 375; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804,

⁸Ann. Cas. 717; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.; Jones v. Union County, 63 Or. 566, 127 P. 781, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035; Steed v. Harvey,

¹⁸Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104,

¹⁰Santa Clara County v. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 S. Ct. 1132; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610; State v. Standard Oil Co. 61 Or. 438, 123 P. 40, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 179.

¹¹Boone v. State, 170 Ala. 57, 54 So. 109, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1065; State v. Northwestern Electric Co. 183 Wash. 184, 49 P. (2d) 8, 101 A.L.R. 189.

¹²Vigeant v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 260 Mass. 335, 157 N. E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867.

¹³Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 S. Ct. 198; Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 420, 38 L. ed. 1014, 1031,

an appropriate class15 and imposes on them burdens or obligations or subjects them to rules from which others are exempt.¹⁶ Under the guise of the

the laws;¹⁹ if, however, under such a classification all persons affected by a

¹⁶Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 79 L. ed. 1054, 55 S. Ct. 525, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 768, 79 L. ed. 1709, 55 S. Ct. 525; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 8 S. Ct. 737; Beveridge v. Lewis,

¹³⁷Cal. 619, 67 P. 1040, 70 P. 1083, 59 L.R.A. 581, 92 Am. St. Rep. 188; Davis v. Florida Powder Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Re Mallon, 16 Idaho, 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123; Off v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184, 14 Ann. Cas. 434; Jones v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 231 Ill. 302, 83 N. E. 215, 121 Am. St. Rep. 313; Braceville Coal Co. v. People,

¹⁴⁷Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62, 22 L.R.A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206; Armstrong v. State, 170 Ind. 188, 84 N. E. 3, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 646; Chamberlain v. Missouri P. R. Co. 107 Kan. 341, 191 P. 261, 12 A.L.R. 224; Re Gardner,

⁸⁴Kan. 264, 113 P. 1054, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 956; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875,

⁹⁴Me. 194, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112,

¹⁷McGuire v. District of Columbia, 24 App. D. C. 22, 65 L.R.A. 430. A statute enacted in a state in which cotton gins are required to be licensed and are subject to regulation as public utilities, which exempts from such requirement and regulation gins ginning cotton of their owners or stockholders, is unconstitutional as denying to licensed gin owners the equal protection of the laws. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Cotton County Gin Co. (C. C. A. 10th) 40 F. (2d) 846, 74 A.L.R. 1070.

¹⁹Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants (Dibell v. Lanier) 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87, 12 L.R.A. 70; Nitka v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 Wis. 160, 135 N. W. 492,

²⁰Staten Island Rapid Transit R. Co. v. Phoenix Indem. Co. 281 U. S. 98, 74 L. ed. 726, 50 S. Ct. 242; Turner, D. & L. Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 271 U. S. 259, 70 L. ed. 934, 46 S. Ct. 530; Durham Pub. Serv. Co. v. Durham, 261 U. S. 149, 67 L. ed. 580, 43 S. Ct. 290; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. 218 U. S. 406,

⁵⁴L. ed. 1088, 31 S. Ct. 59, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 220, 21 Ann. Cas. 815; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 52 L. ed. 108, 28 S. Ct. 28; Wilmington Star Min. Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60, 51 L. ed. 708, 27 S. Ct. 412; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 46 L. ed. 298, 22 S. Ct. 95; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana,

¹⁷⁹U. S. 89, 45 L. ed. 102, 21 S. Ct. 43; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York,

¹⁶⁵U. S. 628, 41 L. ed. 853, 17 S. Ct. 418; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 41 L. ed. 611, 17 S. Ct. 243; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 S. Ct. 437; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364,

³⁷L. ed. 769, 13 S. Ct. 870; Charlotte, C. & A. P. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 35 L. ed. 1051, 12 S. Ct. 255; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L.

jects persons coming within its classifications to burdens or duties not imposed upon individuals outside such classes, provided such classifications operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and

§ 527. Special Burdens or Liabilities.—

districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than

restrictions upon anyone, but to promote with as little individual inconvenience as possible the general good.²

the constitutional requirements. Under this principle the courts have sustained statutes which impose on telegraph companies a liability for mental

persons in other states, although express companies and other common carriers may, by contract, limit their liability in this respect.⁴ Making an ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of leaky water pipes in a street apply

purely arbitrary classification.⁶ Carriers are not unconstitutionally deprived

ed. 109, 8 S. Ct. 1176; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 S. Ct. 1161; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 29 L. ed. 229, 5 S. Ct. 1086; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 S. Ct. 730; Arkansas Stave Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S. W. 1001, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 255, 140 Am. St. Rep. 103; Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist. 362 Ill. 24, 198 N. E. 847, 103 A.L.R. 141; Buckler v. Hilt, 209 Ind. 541, 200 N. E. 219, 103 A.L.R. 901; Com. v. Watson, 223 Ky. 427, 3 S. W. (2d) 1077, 58 A.L.R. 212; New Orleans v. Calamari, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172,

²²A.L.R. 106; Wood v. Detroit, 188 Mich. 547, 155 N. W. 592, L.R.A.1916C, 388; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610; State v. Murray, 104 Neb. 51, 175 N. W. 666, 8 A.L.R. 563; Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 86 Tex. 654, 26 S. W. 982, 24 L.R.A. 504; Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L.R.A.1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199. The obligation imposed by statute upon the owners or occupants of lands bordering on the public highway to remove therefrom weeds, brush, or other obstructions operates alike upon all persons similarly situated, and is not discriminatory. Com. v. Watson, 223 Ky. 427, 3 S. W. (2d) 1077,

²⁴³U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 S. Ct. 609; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357.

³Nitka v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 149 Wis. 106, 135 N. W. 492, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 337, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 863. See Simmons v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 63 S. C. 425, 41 S. E. 521, 57 L.R.A. 607.

⁴Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. 218 U. S. 406, 54 L. ed. 1088, 31 S. Ct. 59, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 220, 21 Ann. Cas. 815.

⁵Crumpler v. Vicksburg, 89 Miss. 214, 42 So. 673, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 476, 10 Ann. Cas. 1098.

of the equal protection of the laws by the imposition of a penalty for failure promptly to settle a claim for loss of property in transit.⁷ An act requiring them to adjust and pay intrastate freight loss claims or adjustments within a specified time after filing of a claim, under a reasonable penalty for each failure or refusal, where there can be no award of a penalty unless there is a recovery of the full amount claimed, is valid.⁸ The same result has been reached under a very similar statute, although the amount finally recovered is less than the claim presented.⁹

§ 528. Generally.—

Under the Federal Constitution, if statutes arbitrarily confer on one class benefits from which others in a like situation are excluded, the courts usually hold that the equal protection of the laws has been denied to those not included.10 Thus, a statute which directly or by implication grants a special privilege to persons engaged in substantially the same business, under the same conditions, is class legislation and an infringement of the equal rights guaranteed to all.11 Every citizen should share the common benefits of a government the common burden of which he is required to bear.12 The constitutional mandate is satisfied, however, if there is no manifest intent to discriminate and if the provisions of the restrictive act are in fact open alike to all citizens who may bring themselves within its terms.13 A statute does not conflict with the guaranty of equal protection of the laws merely because it is special in character and certain persons or interests derive special benefit from its operation if all persons subject to it are treated alike under the same conditions.14

§ 529. Prohibitive State Constitutional Provisions.—

In the Constitutions of some of the states there are inserted provisions which, although varying slightly in terminology, have the general effect of prohibiting the granting of special privileges or immunities.15 Such guaranties in the state Consti-

⁷Beckler Produce Co. v. American R. Exp. Co. 156 Ark. 296, 246 S. W. 1, 26 A.L.R. 1197. For a general discussion of penalties assessed against carriers for nonpayment of claims for loss or damage to freight, see CARRIERS, Vol. 9, p. 912, § 794.

⁸Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 52 L. ed. 108, 28 S. Ct. 28. Annotation: 26 A.L.R. 1205.

⁹Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co. 226 U. S. 217, 57 L. ed. 193, 33 S. Ct. 40; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Brandon, 98 Miss. 461, 53 So. 957, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 106.

¹⁰State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805.

¹¹Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454, 29 L.R.A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; Jones v. Union County, 63 Or. 566, 127 P. 781, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035; State v. Wright, 53 Or. 344, 100 P. 296, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 349.

¹²Hickman v. Kansas City, 120 Mo. 110, 25 S. W. 225, 23 L.R.A. 658, 41 Am. St. Rep. 684.

¹³State v. Bichcreek, 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 874, 119 Am. St. Rep. 491, 10 Ann. Cas. 899.

¹⁴Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, 65 A.L.R. 943, affirmed in 280 U. S. 117, 74 L. ed. 221, 50 S. Ct. 57, 65 A.L.R. 939; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A.L.R. 1121.

¹⁵State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1530 (Indiana Constitution); Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 74 L. ed. 704, 50 S. Ct. 204, 68 A.L.R. 194 (California Constitution); Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co. 265 U. S. 215, 68 L. ed. 985, 44 S. Ct. 517 (Alabama Constitution); Tipton County v. Rogers Locomotive & Mach. Works, 103 U. S. 523, 26 L. ed. 340 (Tennessee Constitution); Frazier v. State Tax Commission, — Ala. —, 175 So. 402, 110 A.L.R. 1479; Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340, 46 A.L.R. 284; Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 P. 946, 62 A.L.R. 1341; Allied Architects' Asso. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431, 221 P. 209, 30 A.L.R. 1029; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; People ex rel. Mather v. Marshall Field & Co. 266 Ill. 609, 107 N. E. 864, L.R.A.1915F, 937, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 743; Storen v. Sexton, 209 Ind. 589, 200 N. E. 251, 104 A.L.R. 1359; Miles v. Department of Treasury, — Ind. —, 193 N. E. 855, 97 A.L.R. 1474, superseded but not on this point in 209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 101 A.L.R. 1359; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471, 81 A.L.R. 1027; Fountain

tutions are in nature simply a protection of those fundamental or inherent rights which are common to all citizens.¹⁶ These provisions have been described as being the antithesis of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, since the latter operates to prevent abridgment by the states of constitutional rights of citizens of the United States and the former prevents the state from granting privileges or immunities and exemptions from otherwise common burdens which do not equally belong to all citizens. One prevents the curtailment of the constitutional rights of citizens, and the other prohibits the enlargement of the right of some in discrimination against others.¹⁷

The general principle involved in constitutional equality guaranties forbidding special privileges or immunities seems to be that if legislation, without good reason and just basis, imposes a burden on one class which is not imposed on others in like circumstances or engaged in the same business, it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to those subject to the burden and a grant of an immunity to those not subject to it.¹⁸ So long as all are treated alike under like circumstances, however, neither the Federal nor the state provisions are violated.¹⁹ Such provisions of the state Constitutions permit classification, if it is not arbitrary, is reasonable, and has a substantial basis and a proper relation to the objects sought to be accomplished.²⁰

Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 724; Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 795, 140 Am. St. Rep. 248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034; Hays v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516, 173 S. W. 676, L.R.A. 1915D, 595; People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L.R.A.1915D, 538; State ex rel. Atkins v. Lawler, 53 N. D. 278, 205 N. W. 880, citing R. C. L.; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.; O'Leary v. Croghan, 42 S. D. 210, 173 N. W. 844, 6 A.L.R. 1134; Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A.L.R. 755; McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp. 152 Va. 1, 145 S. E. 425, 61 A.L.R. 1033; State ex rel. Lathrop v. Hauptly, 86 Wash. 199, 149 P. 705, L.R.A.1915F, 920.

¹⁷Miles v. Department of Treasury, — Ind. —, 193 N. E. 855, 97 A.L.R. 1474, superseded but not on this point in 209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 101 A.L.R. 1359; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 35 S. Ct. 64; Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 795, 140 Am. St. Rep. 248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034; State ex rel. Atkins v. Lawler, 53 N. D. 278, 205 N. W. 880, citing R. C. L.; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.

¹⁸Tipton County v. Rogers Locomotive & Mach. Works, 103 U. S. 523, 26 L. ed. 340; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.; Fleming v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 331, 148 S. W. 1057, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1306; State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 805.

¹⁹Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa (Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts) 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. ed. 94 (Iowa Constitution); Frazier v. State Tax Commission, — Ala. —, 175 So. 402, 110 A.L.R. 1479; Mammina v. Alexander Auto Serv. Co. 333 Ill. 158, 164 N. E. 173, 61 A.L.R. 649; Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N. E. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1165, affirmed in 245 U. S. 632, 62 L. ed. 521, 38 S. Ct. 64; Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 724; Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 795, 140 Am. St. Rep. 248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034; State ex rel. Atkins v. Lawler, 53 N. D. 278, 205 N. W. 880, citing R. C. L.; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.; Churchill v. Albany, 65 Or. 442, 133 P. 632, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1094; Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Frazier (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 808, citing R. C. L.

²⁰Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A.L.R. 270; Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 68; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs. 207 Iowa, 461, 221 N. W. 364, 75 A.L.R. 1, affirmed in 280 U. S. 529, 74 L. ed. 595, 50 S. Ct. 51; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.; Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A.L.R. 755; Fleming v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 331, 148 S. W. 1057, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1306. [12 Am. Jur.]—15 225

legislature are the acts of the state, the state cannot assert that its own activi-

¹Louisville R. Co. v. Louisville Fire & Life Protection Asso. 151 Ky. 644, 152 S. W. 799, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 600, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 89.

²State Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A.L.R. 1464, 75 A.L.R. 1530.

³Milton v. Bangor R. & Electric Co. 103 Me. 218, 68 A. 826, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 203, 125 Am. St. Rep. 293.

⁴Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Savage v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.

⁵Benjamin Rose Inst. v. Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N. E. 924, L.R.A.1916D, 1170.

⁶Hays v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516, 173 S. W. 676, L.R.A.1915D, 595. See Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co. 265 U. S. 215, 68 L. ed. 985, 44 S. Ct. 517.

⁷State ex rel. Lathrop v. Hauptly, 86 Wash. 199, 149 P. 705, L.R.A.1915F, 920.

immunities shall ever be granted to any citizen or class of citizens which shall

not be granted upon the same terms to all citizens, it is not available to aliens

§ 530. Classification Creating Special Privileges.—

natural and reasonable grounds, the grant of rights to one class will not neces-

benefit.⁹ Under the Federal Constitution distinctions in rights and privileges

islation, since they grant a right which in no wise conflicts with the constitu-

funerals, fire companies, state militia, and political parties from general pro-

§ 531. Illustrations of Valid Special Privileges and Immunities.—

⁸Moody v. Hagen, 36 N. D. 471, 162 N. W. 704, L.R.A.1918F, 947, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 933, affirmed in 245 U. S. 633, 62 L. ed. 522,

⁹Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claim- ants (Dibrell v. Lanier) 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87, 12 L.R.A. 70. See People ex rel. Mather v. Marshall Field & Co. 266 Ill. 609,

¹⁰Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 43 N. E. 624, 32 L.R.A. 445, 52 Am. St. Rep. 344.

¹³State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L.R.A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948. A salvage corps maintained by private insurance companies does not render such a public service that it may be accorded a preference in the use of the streets. Louis- ville R. Co. v. Louisville Fire & Life Pro- tection Asso. 151 Ky. 644, 152 S. W. 799, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 600, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 89. An- notation: Ann. Cas. 1915A, 93.

¹⁵Perkins v. Heert, 158 N. Y. 306, 53 N. E. 18, 43 L.R.A. 858, 70 Am. St. Rep. 483. See FRANCHISES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 196, § 22].

cities,¹⁶ to erect slaughterhouses,¹⁷ to dispense intoxicating liquors,¹⁸ to supply

ordinance is not invalid as unconstitutionally granting special privileges which

§ 532. Illustrations of Invalid Special Privileges and Immunities.—

are other general classes situated in all respects like the class benefited by a

the other class or classes in like situations, it cannot stand.⁴ Thus, a statute

³⁴L.R.A. 279; Jansen Farms v. Indian- apolis, 202 Ind. 138, 171 N. E. 199, 72 A.L.R. 514; Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 97 N. E. 402, 39 N. E. 869, 28 L.R.A. 679, 48 Am. St. Rep. 222; O'Neal v. Harrison, 96 Kan. 339, 150 P. 551, L.R.A.1915F, 1069, overruling Re Lowe, 54 Kan. 757, 39 P. 710,

²⁷L.R.A. 545; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 A. 874, 4 Ann. Cas. 275; Wheeler v. Bos- ton, 233 Mass. 275, 123 N. E. 684, 15 A.L.R. 275; Tiger River Ranch Co. v. Plage- mann, 282 Mo. 1, 220 S. W. 1, 15 A.L.R. 266; Iler v. Ross, 64 Neb. 710, 90 N. W. 869,

⁵⁷L.R.A. 895, 97 Am. St. Rep. 676; Smiley v. MacDonald, 42 Neb. 5, 60 N. W. 355, 27 L.R.A. 540, 47 Am. St. Rep. 684; Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N. Y. 309, 105 N. E. 483, L.R.A.1915D, 209, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 53; Riggins v. District Ct. 89 Utah, 183, 51 P. (2d) 645, citing R. C. L.; Utah Mfrs.' Asso. v. Stewart, 82 Utah, 198, 23 P. (2d) 229, citing R. C. L. See also Schoen v. Atlanta, 97 Ga. 697, 25 S. E. 380, 33 L.R.A. 804; Landberg v. Chicago, 237 Ill. 112, 86 N. E. 638, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 830, 127 Am. St. Rep. 319; State v. Hill, 126 N. C. 1139, 36 S. E. 326, 50 L.R.A. 473. Annotation: 15 A.L.R. 293, s. 72 A.L.R. 523; 97 Am. St. Rep. 688; 4 Ann. Cas. 281;

¹⁹Ann. Cas. 1222; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 487. For a detailed discussion see MONOPOLIES, COMBINATIONS, AND RESTRAINTS OF TRADE [Al- so 19 R. C. L. p. 23, § 16]; MUNICIPAL COR- PORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 824, § 128].

¹⁸Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S. E. 759, 42 L.R.A. 181; Riggins v. District Ct. 89 Utah, 183, 51 P. (2d) 645, citing R. C. L.; Utah Mfrs.' Asso. v. Stewart, 82 Utah, 198, 23 P. (2d) 229, citing R. C. L. See INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 267, §§ 21 et seq.; p. 291 § 45].

¹⁹Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 33 Am. Rep. 450; Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500,

⁵³S. W. 962, 48 L.R.A. 167; Riggins v. District Ct. 89 Utah, 183, 51 P. (2d) 645, citing R. C. L.; Utah Mfrs.' Asso. v. Stew- art, 82 Utah, 198, 23 P. (2d) 229, citing R. C. L. See Schools [Also 24 R. C. L. p. 635, § 93].

⁶⁷N. W. 1040, 33 L.R.A. 536; Nixon v. Reid, 8 S. D. 507, 67 N. W. 57, 32 L.R.A. 315; Riggins v. District Ct. 89 Utah, 183,

⁵¹P. (2d) 645, citing R. C. L.; Utah Mfrs.' Asso. v. Stewart, 82 Utah, 198, 23 P. (2d) 229, citing R. C. L. See FERRIES [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 923, § 14].

¹Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. 240 U. S. 30, 60 L. ed. 507, 36 S. Ct. 234; Con- sumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. 1062, 15 L.R.A. 505; Riggins v. District Ct. 89 Utah, 183, 51 P. (2d) 645, citing R. C. L.; Utah Mfrs.' Asso. v. Stew- art, 82 Utah, 198, 23 P. (2d) 229, citing R. C. L. "Railroad companies and telephone com- panies and other public service corpora- tions, although they are private corpora- tions, as distinguished from public corpora- tions are granted special privileges, such as the right of eminent domain, because they are in a measure public corporations and subject to public control. They are chargeable with certain duties to the pub- lic and are answerable to public author- ity for a failure to perform them." Louis- ville R. Co. v. Louisville Fire & Life Pro- tection Asso. 151 Ky. 644, 152 S. W. 799,

⁴³L.R.A.(N.S.) 600, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 89. See EMINENT DOMAIN [Also 10 R. C. L. p. 195, § 167].

³Mader v. Topeka, 106 Kan. 867, 189 P. 969, 15 A.L.R. 340; McFall v. St. Louis, 232 Mo. 716, 135 S. W. 51, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 471.

creating a preference in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent employer

cause of war conditions;⁹ and a statute making failure of a convict discharged

within a specified time,¹⁰ have all been held invalid as granting special privi-

privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens which shall not be-

companies and benefit societies, in violation of constitutional inhibitions.¹²

⁶Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 587, 58 N. E. 616, 52 L.R.A. 287, 79 Am. St. Rep. 238.

⁸State v. Santee, 111 Iowa, 1, 82 N. W. 445, 53 L.R.A. 763, 82 Am. St. Rep. 489. Annotation: 53 L.R.A. 763.

⁹Davis Constr. Co. v. Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629, 21 A.L.R. 557. Annotation: 21 A.L.R. 568.

²¹N. E. 274, 4 L.R.A. 65; Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267, 4 L.R.A. 93.

⁶³N. E. 84, 56 L.R.A. 766. Annotation: 1 A.L.R. 758 et seq. Contra: Brown v. Steckler, 40 N. D. 113,

¹⁶⁸N. W. 670, 1 A.L.R. 753, in which it was held that a statute providing that "the money or other benefit . . . provided or rendered by any" fraternal beneficiary so- ciety "shall not be liable to attachment" or garnishment, either against the association or beneficiary was constitutional.

¹⁴Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518. Conferring the power of eminent domain upon voluntary incorporated associations maintaining a religious Chautauqua, which have been in existence and operation for fifteen years with an annual program of not less than sixteen days each year, which have held a lease of timberland for such period, and acquired the land so held, not exceeding 40 acres, creates an arbitrary and unconstitutional classification. Ibid.

terms, do not equally belong to all citizens, since the university, for such considerations, occupies a unique position which permits separate classification.¹⁵

**§ ⁵³³. Discriminatory Political Qualifications.**—Wherever qualifications for public office are fixed, there is necessarily a division into classes, since there is a class which may serve, and another which may not.¹⁶ While the validity of such classifications is subject to attack on constitutional grounds as denying the equal protection of the laws or granting special privileges, the right of the legislature to make such classifications as may be needed to provide for the qualifications of public officers for statutory offices is generally recognized and unquestioned.¹⁷ One class of statutes which is, however, peculiarly subject to attack on such grounds consists of those making eligibility for appointment dependent upon political qualifications. The decisions are not harmonious on the question as to whether statutes providing for diverse political qualifications of persons to be appointed to public office are or are not unconstitutional as denying the equal protection of the laws or as granting illegal special privileges. The weight of authority seems to uphold the validity of legislation of this character. Some courts take the broad position that there is no such thing as a right to hold office, that in the absence of special constitutional limitations this is a mere privilege at all times within the control of the legislature,¹⁸ and that there can be no valid objection to the right of the legislature to fix the qualifications of public officers or to provide that they shall be appointed from the two principal political parties, although the effect would be that an elector who does not ally himself with their parties could not be appointed to office.¹⁹ Other courts, without manifesting any willingness to concede the correctness of the foregoing reasoning, have upheld statutes which provide that where a particular board of public officers is to consist of several members, not more than a designated number of them shall be members of the same political party. The position is taken that instead of prescribing political qualifications as a requisite for membership in these boards, the statutes permit them to be filled by persons who belong to no political party and who have no political affiliations;²⁰ that the equal right of every man to be eligible to hold office is fully recognized when he stands on an equal footing with others of his class, all of whom are eligible; that where there are two offices which members of the same party may fill, if one, being a member of such party, is equally eligible with any other member of that party to fill either, his constitutional privilege to hold office is fully recognized and vindicated; and that where a person has been a member of the eligible class from which the two persons were selected, he has had his constitutional chance of appointment equally with all others of that class, so that it cannot be said that eligibility

¹⁶State ex rel. Jones v. Sargent, 145 Iowa, 298, 124 N. W. 339, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 719, 139 Am. St. Rep. 439.

¹⁸State ex rel. Jones v. Sargent, 145 Iowa, 298, 124 N. W. 339, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 719, 139 Am. St. Rep. 439.

¹⁹Render v. Louisville, 142 Ky. 403, 134 S. W. 458, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 530. Annotation: 138 Am. St. Rep. 588. A statute requiring the members of a commission to be appointed from the two dominant political parties is not void as granting special privileges or immunities. State ex rel. Jones v. Sargent, 145 Iowa, 298, 124 N. W. 339, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 719, 139 Am. St. Rep. 439.

²⁰People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229, 41 L.R.A. 775; Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 A. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 102; McCarter v. McKelvey, 78 N. J. L. 3, 74 A. 316, 138 Am. St. Rep. 583; Rogers v. Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 173, 25 N. E. 274, 9 L.R.A. 579.

to hold office depends upon party affiliation.¹ In other jurisdictions it has been held that a provision that certain officers shall be selected equally from the two leading political parties is unconstitutional as granting special privileges and immunities.²

A statute conferring on the central committee of one political party only the power to name certain persons from whom the governor must appoint an election commissioner has been held to be in violation of a constitutional prohibition against passing any local or special law granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity, on the ground that such statute confers a special privilege on the committee of one political party and withholds it from the committees of all other parties.³

A constitutional provision against the granting of special privileges and immunities is not violated by a statute providing a commission or city manager plan of city government, in making the commission judge of the election and qualification of its members, subject to review by the courts in case of conflict, or in providing for ballots without political party mark or designation, or in making the filing of an acceptance of nomination within five days a condition of printing a candidate's name on the ballots, or in providing that the city manager need not, when appointed, be an inhabitant of the city or state, or in prohibiting active participation by city employees in party politics, or in providing that the commission may fix the salary of the city manager.⁴

**§ ⁵³⁴. Officers of Private Organizations.**—Constitutional attacks have been occasionally made on statutes providing for the establishment of official boards and commissions appointed by private associations and organizations. The argument has been made that such laws amount to the granting of special privileges and to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The trend of judicial authority is to sustain such legislation. For example, the courts have sustained statutes establishing boards of medical examiners to be composed of members appointed by the several medical associations within the state and even permitting one society to name more members than others were permitted to name,⁵ and also a statute providing for a municipal plans commission, the members of which were to be appointed by various enumerated organizations.⁶ Similarly, the members of a charitable corporation are not deprived of the equal protection of the laws by a statute making the board of trustees of such corporation a self-perpetuating body, by transferring the right to vote for the trustees from such members to the board itself.⁷ On the other hand, in some jurisdictions statutes of this general type have been held to be invalid as violating constitutional clauses inhibiting the granting to any corporation,

²State ex rel. Holt v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274, 4 L.R.A. 65 (fire department); Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267, 4 L.R.A. 93 (fire department). See also Rathbone v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459, 45 N. E. 15, 34 L.R.A. 408 (police commissioners). Annotation: 138 Am. St. Rep. 588.

⁴Sarlls v. State, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N. E. 270, 67 A.L.R. 718. A statute forbidding active participation by city employees in party politics, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, does not violate a state constitutional provision that the legislature shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens, or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Ibid.

⁷Re Mt. Sinai Hospital (Goldman v. Emsheimer) 250 N. Y. 103, 164 N. E. 871, 62 A.L.R. 564.

§ 535. Generally.—

One form of special privilege, with regard to the constitutional validity of which a difference of opinion exists, is found in statutes which provide for the payment of fees and taxes under special circumstances into the coffers of semipublic corporations or into funds devoted towards designated appropriate objects. For example, it has been held that a statute requiring the agents of insurers doing business in a particular city, but not incorporated under the laws of the state in question, to pay a percentage on the gross premiums received by them for insurance on property in that city, to an exempt firemen's benevolent fund, is not unconstitutional as granting an exclusive privilege or as giving money of the state to a private undertaking.9 In other jurisdictions the courts adhere to a different rule and hold that the state cannot require insurance companies doing business in cities to pay a portion of their earnings to firemen's relief associations for the benefit of disabled firemen and their families.10 It has been held that where a statute providing for the incorporation of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals permits the incorporation of only one society in a county, the state cannot constitutionally empower such society to appropriate and keep dogs without paying license fees while every other citizen is obliged to pay such a license fee.11 A statute imposing a tax on dogs to indemnify the owners of sheep killed by them has been upheld as not violating a constitutional prohibition of the granting of exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges.12

D. DISCRIMINATIONS BASED ON RESIDENCE

§ 536. Against Nonresidents.—

In considering the application of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to legislation discriminating between residents and nonresidents of a state, it must be kept in mind that the clause cannot be invoked unless the action of a state denies the equal protection of the laws to persons "within its jurisdiction."13 If persons are, however, in the purview of this clause within the jurisdiction of a state, the clause guarantees to all so situated, whether citizens or residents of the state or not, the protection of its laws equally with its own citizens.14 The limitations on

⁸Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 55 N. E. 663, 47 L.R.A. 802, 75 Am. St. Rep. 103.

⁹Exempt Firemen's Benev. Fund v. Roome, 93 N. Y. 313, 45 Am. Rep. 217. 10 Ætna F. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 78 S. C. 445, 59 S. E. 148, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1147, 125 Am. St. Rep. 818. Annotation: 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1147.

¹¹Fox v. Mohawk & H. R. Humane Soc. 165 N. Y. 517, 59 N. E. 353, 51 L.R.A. 681, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767.

¹²McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 855; State v. Anderson, 144 Tenn. 564, 234 S. W. 768, 19 A.L.R. 180.

¹⁴Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 S. Ct. 919; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165; State v. Mallory, 73 Ark. 236, 83 S. W. 955, 67 L.R.A. 773, 3 Ann. Cas. 852; McGuire v. District of Columbia, 24 App. D. C. 22, 65 L.R.A. 430; Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 794, 19 Ann. Cas. 235; Re Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 122 Kan. 33, 250 P. 1056, 1057, 61 A.L.R. 332; State v. Standard Oil Co. 61 Or. 438, 123 P. 40, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 179; State v. Higgins, 51 S. C. 51, 28 S. E. 15, 38 L.R.A. 561; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah, 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 Am. St. Rep. 789. A citizen of another state receives the equal protection of the laws of a state when the state law is impartially administered, with its benefits and obligations, in a matter which is within the state control. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452, 40 L. ed. 490, 16 S. Ct. 345. Nonresident landowners may be called upon to share the public burden, and property rights in some instances must yield to the public demands; but the burden must rest equally upon all and no discrimination in this respect can be made

the right of one state to establish preferences in favor of its own citizens do not depend solely on the guaranty of the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as to the equal protection of the laws which does not protect persons not within the jurisdiction of such a state. Such limitations are broader, and nonresidents of a state who are noncitizens are also—even though they are not within the jurisdiction of a state, as that phrase is employed in the equal protection clause—protected from discriminations by Article ⁴, § ², of the Federal Constitution which secures equal privileges and immunities in the several states to citizens of each state. Moreover, any citizen of the United States, regardless of residence or whether he is within the jurisdiction of a state, is protected in the privileges and immunities which arise from his United States citizenship by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁵ Laws creating preferences in favor of the citizens of a state may also be violative of provisions in the state Constitution forbidding special legislation.¹⁶

There is much authority which recognizes the right of the state under certain circumstances to classify residents and nonresidents.¹⁷ Without denying the equal protection of the laws regulations may be based upon the fact that persons or property dealt with are not within the territorial jurisdiction of the regulating authority.¹⁸ Limiting the dower right of a nonresident to the lands of which the husband died seised, while residents are entitled to dower in any lands of which the husband was seised during coverture, does not deny the equal protection of the laws.¹⁹

When a nonresident observes laws that are enacted with a view to regulate the conduct and action of the citizens of a state, it is his right and privilege to have his property, situated in such state, protected under the law as effectually as the property of a resident; and if his property is subject to taxation, burdens, and diminutions that a resident's property, under the same circumstances, is exempt from, his property is not thus protected and he is denied the equal protection of the laws.²⁰ Thus, denying tax exemptions to nonresidents which are allowed to residents denies such nonresidents the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.¹ Many license and tax laws which discriminate against nonresidents have been held to violate the equal protection clause.² An exception to the general rule that such

against nonresidents as such. State v. Mallory, 73 Ark. 236, 83 S. W. 955, 67 L.R.A. 773, 3 Ann. Cas. 852. The mere organization of a partnership under the laws of another state is not sufficient to justify the imposition of conditions upon its doing business within the state not required of local partnerships. State v. Cadigan, 73 Vt. 245, 50 A. 1079, 57 L.R.A. 666, 87 Am. St. Rep. 714.

¹⁷District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 53 L. ed. 941, 29 S. Ct. 560; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 S. Ct. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. ed. 461, 27 S. Ct. 261; Central Loan & T. Co. v. Campbell Commission Co. 173 U. S. 84, 43 L. ed. 623, 19 S. Ct. 346; Taylor v. Crawford, 72 Ohio St. 560, 74 N. E. 1065, 69 L.R.A. 805; De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059. In State v. De Verges, 153 La. 349, 95 So. 805, 27 A.L.R. 1526, it was held that a statute fixing the fee for certificates of a certified public accountant was not void for discrimination in charging $10 to all who apply within ninety days after passage of the act, while it charged nonresidents $25 for a certificate, without examination, on presentation of their credentials in the state of their residence.

¹⁸Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 S. Ct. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645.

¹⁹Ferry v. Spokane P. & S. R. Co. 258 U. S. 314, 66 L. ed. 635, 42 S. Ct. 358, 20 A.L.R. 1326. Annotation: 66 L. ed. 635.

¹Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56, 11 A.L.R. 300.

²Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 65 L. ed. 1029, 41 S. Ct. 571; Re Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 122 Kan. 33, 250 P. 1056, 1057, 61 A.L.R. 332 (recognizing rule); State v. Williams, 158 N. C. 610, 73 S. E. 1000, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 279. See also Brown-

not exacted of residents of the territory, is not unconstitutional.⁴ The equal

operation of their vehicles within the state,⁹ and such legislation does not vio-

⁴⁹L.R.A. 446. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 337 et seq.; 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 279 et seq. A state act imposing a license tax upon all manufacturers or persons or corpora- tions engaged in selling automobiles in the state unconstitutionally discriminates against nonresident manufacturers doing business in the state through local sales agents, where it reduces the tax to one fifth of its normal amount if the manu- facturer of the automobiles has three fourths of his assets invested in the bonds of the state or of some of its municipalities, or in other property situated therein and returned for taxation. Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 65 L. ed. 1029,

⁴¹S. Ct. 571. For detailed discussion, see LICENSES [Al- so 17 R. C. L. p. 513, § 34].

³See LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 514, § 34]. No constitutional right of a dentist who has practiced many years in one state is infringed by requiring him, upon seeking a license in another state, to comply with educational qualifications much higher than were required when he first began to practice. People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L.R.A.1915D, 538.

⁵Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226, 50 L. ed. 451, 26 S. Ct. 232; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60, 49 L. ed. 663, 25 S. Ct. 403.

⁸Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. ed. 222, 37 S. Ct. 30; Wallace v. Pfost, — Idaho, — 65 P. (2d) 725, 110 A.L.R. 613; State v. Chandler, 131 Me. 262, 161 A. 148, 82 A.L.R. 1339. The fact that the fees collected under the New Jersey Automobile Law exceed the amount required to defray the expense of maintaining the regulation and inspec- tion department, which excess, under the law, is to be applied to the maintenance of improved highways, does not render in- valid as to nonresidents, under the Four- teenth Amendment, the requirements of that law for the registration of automo- biles and the licensing of drivers. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. ed. 222,

³⁷S. Ct. 30. The absence from the New Jersey Auto- mobile Law of any reciprocal provision by which nonresidents whose cars are duly registered in their home state are given for a limited period free use of the high- ways in return for similar privileges grant- ed to residents of New Jersey does not in- volve an unconstitutional discrimination against nonresidents, where the annual fees prescribed are not so large as to be unreasonable and where any resident own- er would be subjected to the full annual charge for the use of the highways for any period, however brief. Ibid.

the laws.¹² The limitation of the time period for which nonresident defendants

defendants rests solely in the discretion of the court, is unconstitutional.¹³

with, the business of that office or agency, is not, as applied to a nonresident

lature to divide debtors into two classes—nonresident and resident—and, when

so classified, to prescribe different modes of proceeding against each class.¹⁸

§ 537. Against Residents.—

residents in favor of nonresidents violates the equal protection clause.¹⁹ There

¹³State ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916, 214 N. W. 460, 57 A.L.R. 1218.

¹⁷Central Loan & T. Co. v. Campbell Commission Co. 173 U. S. 84, 43 L. ed. 623,

¹⁹S. Ct. 346. See also Ownbey v. Mor- gan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433,

¹⁷A.L.R. 873. The attachment conformably to local law, at the instance of a foreign creditor, of bonds of a foreign corporation for a debt of their nonresident owner, does not deny such owner the equal protection of the laws, where such bonds had been de- posited with a custodian in the state un- der the direction of the state court in the exercise of admittedly lawful powers and could not be removed therefrom without obtaining the authority of the state court,—an authority which was unaffected by the fact that the bonds were registered in the name of the attachment debtor's minor children, since they were so regis- tered solely because of the previous ac- tion of the state court. De Bearn v. Safe Deposit & T. Co. 233 U. S. 24, 58 L. ed. 833,

¹⁸Central Loan & T. Co. v. Campbell Com. Co. 173 U. S. 84, 43 L. ed. 623, 19 S. Ct. 346; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771, 45 L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201.

**§ ⁵³⁸. Against Nonresidents of Particular Portions of State.**—The constitu-

part of the state,⁴ such as a particular municipality,⁵ violate equality provisions

be apparent discriminations, however, if a statute treats all persons alike under

²Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 69 S. W. 679, 58 L.R.A. 921, 91 Am. St. Rep. 100.

³Carrollton v. Bazette, 159 Ill. 284, 42 N. E. 837, 31 L.R.A. 522; Graffty v. Rush- ville, 107 Ind. 502, 8 N. E. 609, 57 Am. Rep. 128; Re Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 122 Kan. 33, 250 P. 1056, 1057, 61 A.L.R. 332; McGraw v. Marin, 98 Ky. 673, 34 S. W. 18, 47 L.R.A. 593; Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 14 S. W. 369, 9 L.R.A. 556, 29 Am. St. Rep. 398; State v. Mitchell, 97 Me. 66, 53 A. 887, 94 Am. St. Rep. 481; Pearson v. Portland, 69 Me. 278, 31 Am. Rep. 276; Brooks v. Man- gan, 86 Mich. 576, 49 N. W. 633, 24 Am. St. Rep. 137; State v. Williams, 158 N. C. 610, 73 S. E. 1000, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 279; Ideal Tea. Co. v. Salem, 77 Or. 182, 150 P. 852, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 684; Sayre v. Phil- lips, 148 Pa. 482, 24 A. 76, 16 L.R.A. 49, 33 Am. St. Rep. 842. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 343 et seq.; 16 L.R.A. 49; 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 280 et seq.

⁶Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514.

⁸Taggart v. Claypool, 145 Ind. 590, 44 N. E. 18, 32 L.R.A. 586; Crosswell & Co. v. Bishopville, 172 S. C. 26, 172 S. E. 698, cit- ing R. C. L.

a statute imposing a higher license fee for the privilege of hunting in a certain

that county,¹³ have variously been held to violate constitutional guaranties of

law treats all counties alike, gives no privileges to residents of certain coun-

E. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AS TO SPECIAL AND LOCAL LEGISLATION

**§ ⁵³⁹. Generally.**—It is a well-recognized principle that under the Federal

privileges, is the aim of the law.¹⁶ Efforts are not infrequently made by in-

terested parties to procure legislation in their own behalf against other classes

the state or municipal legislatures.¹⁷ In general every partial or private law

lation.¹⁹ Where, however, there is no express constitutional restriction against

¹³Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 794, 19 Ann. Cas. 235. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 339.

¹⁴State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138.

¹⁵Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 S. Ct. 1161; Otf v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184, 14 Ann. Cas. 434; Mathews v. People,

²⁰²Ill. 389, 67 N. E. 28, 63 L.R.A. 73, 95 Am. St. Rep. 241; Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007, 52 L.R.A. 283, 80 Am. St. Rep. 176; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459,

⁴³N. E. 624, 32 L.R.A. 445, 52 Am. St. Rep. 344; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 49 N. E. 582, 69 L.R.A. 875, 71 Am. St. Rep. 301; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 59 P. 340, 47 L.R.A. 369; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112, 35 L.R.A. 231; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443.

¹⁶Gustafson v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 67, 45 S. W. 717, 48 S. W. 518, 43 L.R.A. 615.

¹⁷Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 537, 42 N. W. 977, 4 L.R.A. 809, 13 Am. St. Rep. 468.

¹⁸Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Jones v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 231 Ill. 302, 83 N. E. 215, 121 Am. St. Rep. 313; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 7 N. E. 631, 57 Am. Rep. 869; State v. Womble, 112 N. C. 862, 17 S. E. 491, 19 L.R.A. 827; Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S. C. 62, 55 S. E. 136, 117 Am. St. Rep. 885, 9 Ann. Cas. 1003; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285, 6 L.R.A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863.

laws void for want of constitutional authority to enact them,²⁰ unless they are

prohibit legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is direct-

ed2 or by the territory within which it is to operate.³ It merely requires that

**§ ⁵⁴¹. State Constitutional Provisions as to Local or Special Legislation.**—

lature is forbidden to treat specially. Since the construction of statutes is the

²⁰Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 794, 19 Ann. Cas. 235. Annotation: 4 Ann. Cas. 659.

²Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Cen- tral Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

¹⁵³U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 S. Ct. 3; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 S. Ct. 350; Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 5th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1065, affirmed in 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 799; Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; Woolley v. Mears, 226 Mo. 41, 125 S. W. 1112, 136 Am. St. Rep. 687; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112, 35 L.R.A. 231; State v. Hanlon, 77 Ohio St. 19, 82 N. E. 662, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 539, 122 Am. St. Rep. 472; State v. Savage,

⁹⁶Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427, citing R. C. L.; State v. Haskell, 84 Vt. 429, 79 A. 852, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 286; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, af- firmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584; Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 588, 66 N. W. 805, 32 L.R.A. 380. Annotation: 25 Am. St. Rep. 883.

⁴Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387, 71 L. ed. 1112, 47 S. Ct. 595; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.

¹⁸⁴U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana,

¹⁷⁹U. S. 89, 45 L. ed. 102, 21 S. Ct. 43; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 S. Ct. 284; Brown v. New Jer- sey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557,

⁴³L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Magoun v. Illi- nois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 S. Ct. 594; Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209, 39 L. ed. 675, 15 S. Ct. 585; Marchant v. Pennsyl- vania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 38 L. ed. 485, 14 S. Ct. 570; McPher- son v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869,

¹³S. Ct. 3; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109, 8 S. Ct. 1176; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 S. Ct. 1161; Hays v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 S. Ct. 350; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Dolley v. Abi- lene Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8th) 179 F. 461, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1065, affirmed in 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409; State v. Leav- itt, 105 Me. 76, 72 A. 875, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 799; Leavitt v. Canadian P. R. Co. 90 Me. 153, 37 A. 886, 38 L.R.A. 152; Universal Ad- justment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; Stone v. Jefferson, 317 Mo. 1, 293 S. W. 780, 52 A.L.R. 879; Woolley v. Mears, 226 Mo. 41, 125 S. W. 1112, 136 Am. St. Rep. 637; State v. Walsh,

¹³⁶Mo. 400, 37 S. W. 1112, 35 L.R.A. 231; State v. Hanlon, 77 Ohio St. 19, 82 N. E. 662, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 539, 122 Am. St. Rep. 472; State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567,

⁸⁴Vt. 429, 79 A. 852, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 286; Lawrence v. Rutland R. Co. 80 Vt. 370, 67 A. 1091, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 350, 13 Ann. Cas. 475; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200,

tion of which is confined within territorial limits other than those of the whole

tutional sense and yet, in its application, only affect one person or one place.

upon all persons in like circumstances, it is general in a constitutional sense.

constitutional provisions forbidding local or special laws, provided not only the

rule is settled that a statute relating to persons or things as a class is a gen-

as a special law, is that it rests upon a false and deficient classification and

**§ ⁵⁴². Miscellaneous State Constitutional Provisions; Uniformity of Opera-

tion.**—In several of the state Constitutions there are clauses requiring that all

⁶Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa (Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts) 94 U. S. 155,

²⁴L. ed. 94 (Iowa Constitution); Peirce v. Van Dusen (C. C. A. 6th) 78 F. 693, 69 L.R.A. 705; State v. Pitts, 160 Ala. 133, 49 So. 441, 686, 135 Am. St. Rep. 79; Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal. (2d) 259, 57 P. (2d) 932, 105 A.L.R. 148; Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Ct. 214 Cal. 668, 8 P. (2d) 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217; Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 P. 946, 62 A.L.R. 1341; Dougherty v. Aus- tin, 94 Cal. 601, 28 P. 834, 29 P. 1092, 16 L.R.A. 161; Bainbridge v. Jester, 157 Ga. 505, 121 N. E. 798, 33 A.L.R. 1406; Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105; State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; Peterson v. Panovitz, 62 N. D. 328, 243 N. W. 798, 84 A.L.R. 1290; Davis v. Wiemeyer,

¹²⁴Ohio St. 103, 177 N. E. 37, 77 A.L.R. 1280; State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637; State ex rel. Schwartz v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314,

⁵²Ohio St. 88, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L.R.A. 317; Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla. Crim. Rep. 457,

⁷Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 77 L. ed. 1015, 53 S. Ct. 431 (Maryland Consti- tution); Missouri & N. A. R. Co. v. State,

⁹²Ark. 1, 121 S. W. 930, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 861, 135 Am. St. Rep. 164; Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Ct. 214 Cal. 668, 8 P. (2d) 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217; State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138; Bainbridge v. Jester, 157 Ga. 505, 121 N. E. 798, 33 A.L.R. 1406; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp.

¹⁴²Ga. 841, 83 S. E. 946, L.R.A.1916E, 358, affirmed in 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. ed. 309, 39 S. Ct. 117, 9 A.L.R. 1420; Sanitary Dist. v. Ray, 199 Ill. 63, N. 64 N. E. 1048, 93 Am. St. Rep. 102; Knopf v. People, 185 Ill. 20, 57 N. E. 22, 76 Am. St. Rep. 17; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Szroka v. Northwest- ern Bell Teleph. Co. 171 Minn. 57, 213 N. W. 557, 59 A.L.R. 404; State v. Baskowitz,

²⁵⁰Mo. 82, 156 S. W. 945, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 477; Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 P. 640, 35 A.L.R. 872; Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla. Crim. Rep. 457, 209 P. 228, 27 A.L.R. 1008; Kucker v. Sunlight Oil & Gasoline Co. 230 Pa. 528, 79 A. 747, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 503. See STATUTES [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 820, § 68; p. 824, § 73].

many instances the granting of special privileges to any citizen or classes of citizens on terms not equally applicable to all citizens8 or the enacting of special legislation relating to any one of a list of enumerated subjects is expressly forbidden.⁹ The general effect of all of such provisions is to prohibit class legislation of the character inhibited by the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution securing the equal protection of the law.¹⁰

A provision requiring uniformity of legislation does not mean that all laws must embrace all persons, since a law is said to be general and uniform, not because it operates alike upon every person in the state, but because it operates alike upon every person in the state who is brought within the conditions and circumstances prescribed by the law.¹¹ As the rule is sometimes stated, it is sufficient if a law operates the same in all parts of the state under the

⁸Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Ct. 214 Cal. 668, 8 P. (2d) 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217; Sarlis v. State, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N. E. 270, 67 A.L.R. 718; State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; State v. Hill, 98 Miss. 142, 53 So. 411, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 490; State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N. E. 22, 26 L.R.A. 317; Gustafson v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. Rep. 67, 45 S. W. 717, 43 S. W. 518, 43 L.R.A. 615. As to similar state constitutional provisions forbidding generally the granting of special privileges or immunities, see supra, § 529.

⁹Knopf v. People, 185 Ill. 20, 57 N. E. 22, 76 Am. St. Rep. 17. Annotation: 7 L.R.A. 194. For a detailed discussion of the specific matters in which special or local legislation is forbidden, see STATUTES [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 826, §§ 74-81].

¹⁰Peirce v. Van Dusen (C. C. A. 6th) 78 F. 693, 69 L.R.A. 705; People v. Gordon, 274 Ill. 462, 113 N. E. 864, citing R. C. L.; State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 56 L.R.A. 570, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524; State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637; Spicer v. Benefit Asso. R. E. 142 Or. 574, 17 P. (2d) 1107, 21 P. (2d) 187, 90 A.L.R. 517. State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 466.

¹¹Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa (Chicago, B. & Q. Co. v. Cutts) 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. ed. 94 (Iowa Constitution); Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal. (2d) 259, 57 P. (2d) 932, 105 A.L.R. 148; Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 813, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475; Van Harlinger v. Doyle, 134 Ca.. 33, 66 P. 44, 54 L.R.A. 771; Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105; Waugh v. Glos, 246 Ill. 604, 92 N. E. 974, 138 Am. St. Rep. 259; Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E. 695, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 994; Chicago v. Schmidinger, 243 Ill. 167, 90 N. E. 369, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 632, 17 Ann. Cas. 614, affirmed in 226 U. S. 578, 57 L. ed. 364, 33 S. Ct. 182, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 284; Chicago v. Hulbert, 234 Ill. 321, 84 N. E. 922, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 684, 123 Am. St. Rep. 100; Jones v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 231 Ill. 302, 83 N. E. 215, 121 Am. St. Rep. 313; Douglas v. People, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N. E. 341, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162; Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851, 58 L.R.A. 277, 85 Am. St. Rep. 357; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wallace, 136 Ill. 87, 26 N. E. 493, 11 L.R.A. 787; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 50 Am. Rep. 610; Armstrong v. State, 170 Ind. 188, 84 N. E. 3, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 646; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind. 607, 62 N. E. 492, 92 Am. St. Rep. 319; Morris v. Stout, 110 Iowa, 659, 73 N. W. 843, 50 L.R.A. 97; State ex rel. West v. Des Moines, 96 Iowa, 521, 65 N. W. 818, 31 L.R.A. 186, 59 Am. St. Rep. 381; McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127, 83 Am. Dec. 401; Festerand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634, citing R. C. L.; State v. Bridgeman & R. Co. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 41; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 114 Minn. 122, 130 N. W. 545, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 494, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1030; Murray v. Ramsey County, 81 Minn. 359, 84 N. W. 103, 51 L.R.A. 828, 83 Am. St. Rep. 379; State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S. W. 483, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 601, 120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 725; Alexander v. Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. 71, 28 A. 51, 23 L.R.A. 525; State v. Norval Hotel Co. 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A.L.R. 637; Steele, H. & M. Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N. E. 648, L.R.A.1916C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 926; Cramer v. C. athern Ohio Loan & T. Co. 72 Ohio St. 25, 74 N. E. 200, 69 L.R.A. 415, 2 Ann. Cas. 990; State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N. E. 572, 52 L.R.A. 863, 81 Am. St. Rep. 626; State ex rel. Richards v. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 419, 40 N. E. 508, 27 L.R.A. 737; Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla. Crim. Rep. 457, 209 P. 228, 27 A.L.R. 1008; Re Oberg, 21 Or. 406, 28 P. 130, 14 L.R.A. 577; Winston v. Moore, 244 Pa. 447, 91 A. 520, L.R.A.1915A, 1190, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 498; De Walt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. 529, 24 A. 185, 15 L.R.A. 771, 28 Am. St. Rep. 814; Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants (Dibrell v. Lanier) 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87, 12 L.R.A. 70; Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S. E. 3, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1073. The constitutional requirement of uniformity in the operation of Federal laws is not intrinsic, but geographic. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. ed. 239, 51 S. Ct. 58. The provision of the Ohio Const. Art. 2, § 26, that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state, does not guarantee the general protection of all the inhabitants of the state, but only that such laws shall be in force in all parts of the state. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314, 41 N. E. 579, 30 L.R.A. 218. See STATUTES [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 816, § 66].

same circumstances.¹² The word "uniform" in such constitutional provisions does not mean "universal,"¹³ and, therefore, the uniform operation required by them does not mean universal operation.¹⁴ A law may be constitutional within the purview of such constitutional provisions, and yet operate in fact only upon a very limited number of persons or things or within a limited territory.¹⁵ Classification made by statute meets a constitutional requirement that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation, however, if based upon something which distinguishes one class from another in such a way as to suggest the reasonable necessity for legislation based upon such classification.¹⁶

F. EQUALITY IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

§ 543. Generally.—

Generally speaking, equal protection of the laws is not denied by a course of procedure which is applied to legal proceedings in which a particular person is affected if such a course also would be applied to any other person in the state under similar circumstances and conditions.17

Equal protection of the laws of a state is extended to persons within its jurisdiction, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, when its courts are open to them on the same condition as to others in like circumstances, with like rules of evidence and modes of procedure, for the security of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts.¹⁸ The Supreme Court

¹³Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 813, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475.

¹⁴Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 538, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A.L.R. 1105; Peterson v. Panovitz, 62 N. D. 328, 243 N. W. 798, 84 A.L.R. 1296; State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L.R.A.1918B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 583, writ of error dismissed in 245 U. S. 627, 62 L. ed. 518, 38 S. Ct. 60.

¹⁵Re Martin, 157 Cal. 51, 106 P. 235, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 242; State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L.R.A. 1918B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 583, writ of error dismissed in 245 U. S. 627, 62 L. ed. 518, 38 S. Ct. 60.

¹⁶State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling, 216 Iowa, 553, 246 N. W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218.

¹⁷Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 43 L. ed. 91, 18 S. Ct. 805; Ashley v. Three Justices (Ashley v. Wait) 228 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A.L.R. 1463, writ of error dismissed in 250 U. S. 652, 63 L. ed. 1190, 40 S. Ct. 53.

¹⁸Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 536, 30 S. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Jones v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 231 Ill. 302, 83 N. E. 215, 121 Am. St. Rep. 313; State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407; Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 N. E. 853, L.R.A.1916F, 831; Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 604; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610; State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 336 Mo. 1233, 84 S. W. (2d) 124, citing R. C. L.; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804, 8 Ann. Cas. 717; State v. Shedrol, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L.R.A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948. See also State ex rel. Woods-Young Co. v. Tedder, 103 Fla. 1033, 138 So. 643, writ of certiorari denied in 285 U. S. 557, 76 L. ed. 946, 52 S. Ct. 458, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 585; 23 Am. St. Rep. 25; 25 Am. St. Rep. 877. It is an essential element of equal protection of the laws that each person shall possess the unhampered right to assert in the courts his rights, without discrimination, by the same process against those who wrong him as is open to every other person. The courts must be open to all upon the same terms. No obstacles can be thrown in the way of some which are not interposed in the path of others. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 N. E. 853, L.R.A. 1916F, 831. As to the validity of legislation granting attorneys' fees as costs to particular litigants in certain types of proceedings, or against certain classes of litigants, such as railroads and insurance companies, see COSTS.

at an early date recognized the rule that an act of the legislature which in terms would give to one individual certain rights and the benefit of certain modes of procedure and would deny to another similarly situated the same rights could be challenged successfully on the ground of unjust discrimination and denial of the equal protection of the laws.¹⁹ Thus, a statute which denies to the laboring man equal access to the courts denies the equal protection of the laws. Whatever may be his social and economic condition outside, when he enters the court, the law can permit no rule to fetter him in the prosecution of his claims or the preservation of his rights which does not apply equally to all others respecting the same kinds of claims and rights.²⁰

The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to deprive the states of their power to establish and regulate judicial proceedings, and its provisions therefore only restrain acts which so transcend the limits of classification as to cause them to conflict with the fundamental conceptions of just and equal legislation.¹ The equal protection of the laws guaranteed by this amendment in respect of legal proceedings does not require that every person in the land shall possess the same rights and privileges as every other person, and hence does not forbid proper and reasonable classifications in the field of court proceedings.² This amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies,³ whether as between states4 or as between different sections of the same state.⁵ A provision in a state Constitution, however, to the effect that the legislature shall not pass any local or special law regulating the practice or jurisdiction of the courts is a specific limitation, and because of it the practice or jurisdiction as prescribed by statute cannot be different in the courts of such a state in any class of localities from what it is elsewhere in the state.⁶ The reason for the

¹⁹Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 853, 18 S. Ct. 445. A legislature may not prescribe one rule for one suitor or class of suitors and another for all others under like circumstances. Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 P. 354, 48 L.R.A. 340, 83 Am. St. Rep. 49. The legislature has no power to discriminate between persons or classes respecting the right to invoke the arbitration of the courts in the adjustment of their respective rights. Hocking Valley Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio St. 12, 41 N. E. 263, 29 L.R.A. 386, 53 Am. St. Rep. 622.

¹Missouri P. R. Co. v. Larabee, 234 U. S. 459, 58 L. ed. 1398, 34 S. Ct. 979; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 S. Ct. 1114; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989.

²Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771, 45 L.R.A. 433, 73 Am. St. Rep. 201.

³Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 45 L. ed. 1015, 21 S. Ct. 730; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383, affirming 14 Utah, 71, 46 P. 756, 37 L.R.A. 103; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 S. Ct. 1114; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 S. Ct. 350; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736, citing R. C. L.; People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N. E. 31, L.R.A. 1917B, 1075; Saylor v. Duel, 236 Ill. 429, 86 N. E. 119, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 377; Taggart v. Claypole, 145 Ind. 590, 44 N. E. 18, 32 L.R.A. 586; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 33 N. E. 421, 18 L.R.A. 729; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171; People ex rel. Armstrong v. Warden, 183 N. Y. 223, 76 N. E. 11, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 859, 5 Ann. Cas. 325.

⁴Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736, citing R. C. L.; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171.

⁵Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 S. Ct. 583; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383, affirming 14 Utah, 71, 46 P. 756, 37 L.R.A. 103; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736, citing R. C. L.

rule is that the right to redress of any wrong in the courts is a personal one unaffected by the place of residence.⁷

§ 544. Jurisdiction.—

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by any diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts of a state as to subject matter, amount, or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of the respective jurisdictions of such courts have an equal right, in like cases and under like circumstances, to resort to them for redress.8

§ 545. Venue.—

As a general proposition the venue of civil actions is a matter within legislative discretion.9 In relation to the guaranty of equal right of access to the courts, it is fundamental rights which the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards, and not the mere forum which a state may see proper to designate for the enforcement and protection of such rights. Given, therefore, a condition where fundamental rights are equally protected and preserved, it is impossible to say that the rights which are thus protected and preserved have been denied because the state has deemed best to provide for a trial in one forum or another. It is not, under any view, the mere tribunal into which a person is authorized to proceed by a state which determines whether the equal protection of the laws has been afforded, but whether in the tribunals which the state has provided equal laws prevail.10 The mere direction of the state law that a cause, under given circumstances, shall be tried in one forum instead of another or may be transferred and brought from one forum to another can have no tendency to violate the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws where, in both the forums, equality of law governs and equality of administration prevails.11 A provision that election contests shall be brought and may be heard in one particular county while prosecutions for criminal violations of the election laws must be conducted in the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed does not violate the inhibition against inequality.12 A discrimination without any reasonable and adequate basis against particular persons in venue statutes, however, which is arbitrary and burdensome, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.13

§ 546. —

Corporate Nature of Litigants.—The cases in general recognize that the nature of a litigant as corporate or otherwise may serve as a ground of reasonable discrimination as to the place of trial,14 although doubtless every statute presents its own problem as to whether, in view of its terms and opera-

⁷Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 P. 640, 35 A.L.R. 872; Re Ruan Street, 132 Pa. 257, 19 A. 219, 7 L.R.A. 193.

⁸Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist. 281 U. S. 74, 74 L. ed. 710, 50 S. Ct. 228, 66 A.L.R. 1460; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91, 58 L. ed. 1231, 34 S. Ct. 712; Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U. S. 325, 50 L. ed. 212, 26 S. Ct. 106; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 S. Ct. 350; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 S. Ct. 57; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989.

¹⁰Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 75 L. ed. 482, 51 S. Ct. 228; Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell, 193 U. S. 30, 48 L. ed. 604, 24 S. Ct. 319; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 177 Okla. 539, 61 P. (2d) 184, 107 A.L.R. 858. Annotation: 107 A.L.R. 863.

¹¹Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell, 193 U. S. 30, 48 L. ed. 604, 24 S. Ct. 319.

¹²Ashley v. Three Justices (Ashley v. Wait) 228 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A.L.R. 1463, writ of error dismissed in 250 U. S. 652, 63 L. ed. 1190, 40 S. Ct. 53.

¹³See Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 71 L. ed. 1165, 47 S. Ct. 678. Annotation: 107 A.L.R. 863, 866 et seq.

¹⁴Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 75 L. ed. 482, 51 S. Ct. 228. Annotation: 107 A.L.R. 863 et seq.; 75 L. ed. 482.

tion as a whole and the sort of actions to which it relates, a conceivable reasonable basis of classification exists.¹⁵

A statute which allows suits against private corporations to be brought in any county in which the cause of action arose does not deny the equal protection of the laws, although unincorporated individuals are not subject to suit outside their domiciliary counties in a similar situation.¹⁶ On the other hand, it has been decided, overruling earlier authorities,¹⁷ that a statute entitling a natural person to be sued in the county where he or the plaintiff resides, but authorizing suit against a corporation in the county in which the cause of action accrues, denies to such a corporate defendant the equal protection of the laws.¹⁸ A statute which provides that suit against a corporation may be brought in any county where the cause of action accrued or where the corporation has or usually keeps an office or agent for the transaction of its usual and customary business does not deny to corporations the equal protection of the laws in that other sections of the venue statutes provide that suits generally are required to be brought "either in the county within which the defendant resides or in the county in which the plaintiff resides and the defendant may be found."¹⁹

It has been held that in actions concerning the title to real estate, a corporation cannot be denied the right to have an action tried in the county where the land is situated if natural persons are granted such right.²⁰

In some cases statutes pertaining to venue which discriminate among foreign and domestic corporations have been held to be invalid.¹ Thus, a statute permitting a domestic corporation to be sued in any county in the state in which any part of the alleged cause of action arose, without making like provision as to foreign corporations and individuals, violates the equal protection clause.² A statute which permits a foreign corporation doing business in the state and having an office in one county to be sued in any county of the state, without regard to its place of business or the location of its property or officers, but which requires a domestic corporation to be sued at its place of business or where its chief officer resides, and entitles a natural person to be sued at his residence, unconstitutionally discriminates against foreign corporations.³ A statute which provides that "any foreign corporation doing business in the state . . . and any person . . . having any cause of action against such corporation, arising on contract, tort, or otherwise, may file suit in any county . . . where the plaintiff resides or where said corporation has its principal place of business, or has property, or . . . has an agent appointed upon whom service of . . . process may be had" is unconstitutional.⁴ Elsewhere, statutes very similar in import have been sustained.⁵ Thus, a statute authorizing a suit against a foreign corporation in any county where it may be "found," while a domestic corporation is entitled to be sued "in the county in which such corporation is domiciled, or in the county in

¹Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 71 L. ed. 1165, 47 S. Ct. 678. Annotation: 107 A.L.R. 866 et seq.; 75 L. ed. 487, 488.

³Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 71 L. ed. 1165, 47 S. Ct. 678. Annotation: 107 A.L.R. 867, 868.

⁴Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 177 Okla. 539, 61 P. (2d) 184, 107 A.L.R. 858.

which the cause of action may occur or accrue," which is construed to mean that a foreign corporation is "found" in a county in which it had its business localized, has been held valid.⁶

Statutes classifying corporations or associations for purposes of venue according to the particular purpose or specific business in which they are engaged have generally been held not to violate the equal protection of the laws.⁷ A statute, however, which permits actions for injuries to persons or property to be brought against trucking or bus companies, railroads, or mail stage operators in any county through or into which the line or road passes, is unconstitutional in singling out such particular firms engaged in vehicular traffic.⁸

§ 547. —

Miscellaneous Bases.—Classifications as to venue have often been made not on the basis of the nature of litigants as corporate or natural, but on the basis of the nonresidence of a party. Such statutes have been held in some instances to violate the equal protection clause. In other cases similar legislation has been declared valid.9

Classifications as to venue based upon the type of action involved have been variously adjudged. A statute expressly authorizing libel suits against corporations to be brought in the county in which the defendant is located or in the county in which the plaintiff resides, while suits against individuals under the general venue statutes must be brought in the county where the defendant resides or where the plaintiff resides and the defendant may be found, is invalid in discriminating for no good reason between corporate libelers and individual libelers.¹⁰ On the other hand, a statute providing that actions for injuries caused by the negligence of the owner of any automobile may be brought by the party injured against such owner in the county in which the injured party resides and that a summons may be issued to the sheriff of any county in the state wherein the defendant resides has been held not to deny the equal protection of the laws.¹¹

Classification making venue dependent upon the place of the transaction out of which the cause of action arises has been held valid.¹² Similarly, a venue classification based upon the fact that a cause of action arose outside the state has been sustained.¹³

§ 548. Removal of Causes.—

The plenary power of Congress over the privilege of granting jurisdiction affecting the removal of causes to the Federal courts manifestly includes discretion to classify remedies as well as the rights thereby intended to be enforced. Hence, a Federal statute which prohibits removal on the ground of diversity of citizenship in such cases as arise under the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not deny the equal protection of the laws because other statutes do not prohibit removal of causes in other types of cases.14

A state constitutional provision which requires a foreign public service corporation to become incorporated under the laws of the state as a condition of obtaining authority to carry on intrastate business therein does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because an effect of local incorporation will be

¹⁴Teel v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 204 F. 918, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 21.

§ 549. Conditions Precedent to Suit.—

for loss of crops through deficient fertilizers are sufficiently distinguishable

§ 550. Procedure.—

of procedure for one class and a different type for another.¹⁹ Moreover, this

to be reasonable and to rest upon a sufficient basis have been consistently sus-

itself sufficient basis for the exercise of the legislative judgment in providing

¹⁵Railway Exp. Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440, 75 L. ed. 450, 51 S. Ct. 201, 72 A.L.R. 102.

¹⁶Jones v. Union Guano Co. 264 U. S. 171, 68 L. ed. 623, 44 S. Ct. 280. Annotation: 68 L. ed. 623.

¹⁷Jones v. Union Guano Co. 264 U. S. 171, 68 L. ed. 623, 44 S. Ct. 280. Annotation: 68 L. ed. 623.

¹⁸Worthington v. District Ct. 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230, L.R.A.1916A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1097. Annotation: L.R.A.1916A, 710.

¹⁹Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434.

²⁰A. Backus Jr. & Sons v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 853, 18 S. Ct. 445. See also Northern P. R. Co. v. Meese, 239 U. S. 614, 60 L. ed. 467, 36 S. Ct. 223.

²⁹³U. S. 232, 79 L. ed. 299, 55 S. Ct. 168; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507. The equal protection of the laws is not denied by a statute providing that during the period of emergency therein declared the remedy afforded by a statute author- izing a summary and ex parte decree of mortgage foreclosure and sale shall not be available to the holder or holders of less than 25 per cent of the entire unpaid mortgage debt. United States Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, 293 U. S. 232, 79 L. ed. 299, 55 S. Ct. 168.

ers, despite the defect in the publication of notice in the original proceeding,

§ 551. —

laws.⁹ Denying a tenant the right to a setoff, counterclaim, or cross complaint

ments.¹² The legislative discretion to grant or withhold equitable relief in any

⁵Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. ed. 678, 37 S. Ct. 255, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637.

⁶Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, L.R.A.1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803.

⁷St. Louis & K. C. Land Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U. S. 419, 60 L. ed. 1072, 36 S. Ct. 647.

¹²Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873.

¹³Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375.

the strike, denouncing the employer as unfair to union labor, appealing to customers to withdraw their patronage, and circulating handbills containing abusive and libelous charges against employers, employees, and patrons, and intimations of injury to future patrons.¹⁴ If the conduct against which a statute forbids injunctions, however, is in and of itself lawful and authorized by statute, there is no denial of the equal protection of the laws in such statute forbidding injunctions, because no one has in the first instance a constitutional right to a "remedy" against conduct of another person which is lawful.¹⁵ Similarly, it has been held that constitutional inhibitions of grants of special privileges and immunities and of arbitrary and unlawful discrimination between different classes of persons and litigants are not violated by a statute forbidding the granting of injunctions against acts of peaceful picketing and peaceable persuasion in connection with labor disputes.¹⁶

§ 552. Evidence; Witnesses.—

It is the province of the legislature to provide the nature and extent of the legal presumption to be deduced from a given state of facts, and the creation by law of such presumptions comes within the power to classify.17 Statutory prima facie rules of evidence in general do not deny the equal protection of the laws.18 In order that a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of the equal protection of the laws, it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.19 If a presumption created by legislation has no relation in experience to general facts and no foundation except with tacit reference to one particular person against whom it has the effect to declare a presumption of guilt of a criminal offense because of the carrying on of a particular business, the statute upon which such presumption is based denies the equal protection of the laws.20

Equal protection of the laws is not denied by legislation under which in actions against railway companies for damage done to persons or property proof of injury inflicted by the running of the locomotives or cars is made prima facie evidence of negligence,¹ by a statutory presumption that failure of a railroad company to give the prescribed crossing signals is the proximate cause of a crossing accident,² by a statute declaring that a railroad company shall be liable for any damage done by its operations or employees unless the railroad shall make it appear that its agents have exercised reasonable care and diligence and that the presumption in all cases shall be against the

¹⁴Ibid. Annotation: 27 A.L.R. 412, s. 35 A.L.R. 460, 97 A.L.R. 1336, and 106 A.L.R. 363.

¹⁵Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 81 L. ed. 1229, 57 S. Ct. 857. Annotation: 106 A.L.R. 364.

¹⁶Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112, 97 A.L.R. 1318, writ of certiorari denied in 295 U. S. 734, 79 L. ed. 1632, 55 S. Ct. 645. Annotation: 97 A.L.R. 1336, s. 106 A.L.R. 364.

¹⁷Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 42 L. ed. 1002, 18 S. Ct. 573; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282. See also Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U. S. 531, 51 L. ed. 305, 27 S. Ct. 167. For a detailed discussion of the validity of statutes creating presumptions, see EVIDENCE.

¹⁹Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 69 L. ed. 904, 45 S. Ct. 470; McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 241 U. S. 79, 60 L. ed. 899, 36 S. Ct. 498; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463.

²⁰McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 241 U. S. 79, 60 L. ed. 899, 36 S. Ct. 498.

¹Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463.

²Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502, 77 L. ed. 457, 53 S. Ct. 249.

company,³ or by a statutory presumption of fraud from nonperformance of a promise which applies only to transactions involving the purchase of real estate and of stock in a corporation or joint-stock company.⁴

Although, in so far as is necessary to equal access to the courts, litigants are entitled to equality in the legislative or judicially declared competency of witnesses or the use or production of them, it has been held that the exclusion of Chinese as witnesses in favor of or against a white man does not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.⁵

§ 553. Trial.—

Miscellaneous matters relating to the trial of lawsuits arising from conduct of the legislative or judicial departments of the state or both have been held not to violate constitutional rights to equality guaranteed to litigants.6 For example, a statute providing for a short-cause calendar on which the plaintiff may have a cause placed under certain circumstances, but denying the same right to the defendant, is not unconstitutional as being unequal, partial, or special legislation.7 In the trial of a cause a person is not entitled, under the equal protection clause, to a jury of his own race, in the absence of any discrimination against qualified persons of that race.8 Furthermore, a jury of mixed races is not necessary to fulfil the constitutional requirements.9 The equal protection of the laws is likewise not denied by a state statute abridging the right of trial by jury in the courts of a city without making a similar provision for the counties of the state.10 Refusal of a trial court to give a defendant's requested instructions concerning contributory negligence in a negligence action against a railroad company, though erroneous, does not deprive the defendant of the equal protection of the laws.11

The power of a state to make classifications in judicial or administrative proceedings carries with it the right to make such a classification as will give to parties belonging to one class two hearings before their rights are finally determined and to parties belonging to a different class only a single hearing.¹² A statute forbidding the granting of more than two new trials in the same cause on the facts, but allowing more for errors of law, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.¹³

A taxpayer, since he cannot sue the state without its consent to recover back a tax voluntarily paid, is not in a position to complain that while he is given a right to appeal only, the state is given a right to a rehearing as well as to an appeal.¹⁴ Hence, a statute giving to the state tax commissioner, and not to the taxpayer, the right to apply for rehearing in the trial court, in addition to the right of appeal accorded the taxpayer, in an action for refund of taxes, is not invalid as discriminating against the taxpayer or as violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, since the separate classification of the state and the taxpayer is not arbitrary or unreasonable.¹⁵

³Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Watson, 287 U. S. 86, 77 L. ed. 180, 53 S. Ct. 32, 86 A.L.R. 174.

⁴James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L. ed. 569, 47 S. Ct. 308.

⁷Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wallace, 136 Ill. 87, 26 N. E. 493, 11 L.R.A. 787.

⁸Annotation: 14 L.R.A. 584. As to racial discriminations in the selection of jurors, see JURY.

¹⁰Chappell Chemical & Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co. 172 U. S. 474, 43 L. ed. 520, 19 S. Ct. 268.

¹¹Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Watson, 287 U. S. 86, 77 L. ed. 180, 53 S. Ct. 32, 86 A.L.R. 174.

¹²Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 S. Ct. 1114.

¹³Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Woodson, 134 U. S. 614, 33 L. ed. 1032, 10 S. Ct. 628.

§ 554. Appeal.—

It is part of the general rule relating to the application of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to legislation which classifies in fixing the jurisdiction of courts that among the matters in which diversity may validly be effected is diversity respecting the finality of decision.16 Thus, the equal protection of the laws is not denied by a state statute which establishes a separate appellate court for certain counties, with exclusive final appellate jurisdiction in certain cases which, if arising in the courts of other counties, would be appealable to the highest state court.17 Moreover, the equal protection clause does not require an appeal in a particular type of proceeding or in some particular situation, if all persons within a class are treated alike, although an appeal may be allowed to persons differently situated.18

§ 555. Decisions.—

The rule is well settled that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure uniformity of judicial decisions.19 Thus, the fact that a court departs from the precedent established by its earlier decisions does not deprive the complaining party of the equal protection of the laws.20 For example, if the courts of a state have construed a statute as prescribing one form of procedure and parties have acted under that construction, and subsequently the same court holds that the statute was theretofore misconstrued and really provides a different mode of procedure, the last adjudication cannot be set aside in the Federal courts on the ground of unjust discrimination or denial of the equal protection of the laws.1 Furthermore, one against whom a judicial decision has been rendered can base no rights under the equal protection clause upon a later decision between strangers which is asserted to be irreconcilable on a matter of law with such earlier decision.2

The Federal Constitution does not require a state to adopt a unifying method of appeals which will insure to all litigants within the state the same decisions on particular questions which may arise.³ A state constitutional provision that no law shall be held unconstitutional by the supreme court of the state without a concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment declaring a law unconstitutional, does not deny the equal protection of the laws, even though it may so operate that a statute will be held constitutional in one case and unconstitutional in another.⁴

§ 556. Penalties.—

A denial of the right to the equal protection of the laws may be occasioned by statutes which directly or indirectly limit the right of litigants to have access to the courts. Illustrations of a denial of right by indirection may be found in some of those statutes which impose a penalty as a condition or as a deterrent where one seeks to exercise a constitutional

¹⁸Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 S. Ct. 57; Saylor v. Duel, 236 Ill. 429, 86 N. E. 119, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 377. Annotation: 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 378, s. 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1210. For a discussion of the right to a review, see APPEAL AND ERROR, Vol. 2, p. 933, §§ 146 et seq.

¹⁹Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 100, 64 L. ed. 476, 40 S. Ct. 306, 10 A.L.R. 892.

²⁰Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 62 L. ed. 145, 38 S. Ct. 40, L.R.A.1918C, 124; Lombard v. West Chicago Park, 181 U. S. 33, 45 L. ed. 731, 21 S. Ct. 507.

¹A. Backus, Jr. & Sons v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 853, 18 S. Ct. 445.

²Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 100, 64 L. ed. 476, 40 S. Ct. 306, 10 A.L.R. 892.

³Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist. 281 U. S. 74, 74 L. ed. 710, 50 S. Ct. 228, 66 A.L.R. 1460.

right.⁵ A statute which operates upon all alike situated is not taken out of the constitutional inhibition against denial of equal protection of the laws if it subjects an individual to an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the powers of government by assessing penalties greatly out of proportion to the actual damages sustained, whereby he may be unduly oppressed.⁶ For example, while the freedom of the courts may be ostensibly granted to a suitor or litigant, if the legislature, in an effort to prevent any inquiry of the validity of a particular statute, so encumbers any challenge thereof in the courts by such excessive penalties that the party affected is necessarily intimidated and constrained to submit to the law rather than risk the penalties in testing it, it is often held that the party is deprived of the equal protection of the laws.⁷ In some instances the courts have held that the penalties provided by the statutes are not so severe as to preclude access to the courts and that consequently the equal protection clause is not violated.⁸

§ 557. Generally.—

The powers of states in dealing with crime within their borders are not limited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, except for the important qualification that no state can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law.9 The Fourteenth Amendment operates to forbid discrimination by the states against persons or classes in criminal cases.10 The state, therefore, cannot enact valid criminal laws if such laws make an act done by one penal and impose no penalty upon another for the same act done under like circumstances,11 or confer the right upon one class of citizens to do an act which is a

⁷Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahoma, 252 U. S. 339, 64 L. ed. 600, 40 S. Ct. 341; Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 64 L. ed. 596, 40 S. Ct. 338; Wadley S. R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 59 L. ed. 405, 35 S. Ct. 214; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 16 Ann. Cas. 764; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Superior Laundry Co. v. Rose, 193 Ind. 138, 137 N. E. 761, 139 N. E. 142, 26 A.L.R. 1392; State ex rel. Dushek v. Watland, 51 N. D. 710, 201 N. W. 680, 39 A.L.R. 1169. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 1181 et seq.; 59 L. ed. 608. A statute providing for the establishment of rates for railroad transportation without giving the corporation an opportunity to be heard, which fixes penalties for disobedience of its provisions by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the corporations and their officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the rates, is unconstitutional, as depriving the corporations of the equal protection of the laws. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764. As to such statutes as violating the guaranty of due process, see infra, §§ 617, 666.

⁸Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 58, 62 L. ed. 574, 38 S. Ct. 236; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. 776, 36 S. Ct. 443; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, 59 L. ed. 607, 35 S. Ct. 359. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 1182; 59 L. ed. 609. The penalties of $1,000 fine, or six months' imprisonment, for violations of a statute against the sale without payment of a specified license fee, of merchandise accompanied by coupons, profit-sharing certificates, or other evidences of indebtedness, or other liability redeemable in premiums, are not so severe as to intimidate against a contest of the validity of such statute, and thus deny the equal protection of the laws. Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, 36 S. Ct. 370, L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455.

¹⁰Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481, 52 L. ed. 582, 28 S. Ct. 372; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 691, 34 L. ed. 816, 11 S. Ct. 224.

¹¹Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395, 16 L.R.A. 492; Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 98 P. 755, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 263, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1100. A statute which makes it a misdemeanor for persons in one branch of industry to do what is lawful for those in another branch of industry, in like relation and under like conditions, is unconstitutional. Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395, 16 L.R.A. 492.

criminal offense if done by any other class.¹² It is not an objection to a penal

personal solicitation to seek employment to prosecute or collect claims, includ-

§ 558. Preliminary Examination.—

inal cases without violating fundamental guaranties of equality.²⁰ Denying to

providing that in cases triable only in the court of first instance in the city of

§ 559. Venue.—

¹²Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Labora- tory Co. 205 Ill. 497, 68 N. E. 938, 98 Am. St. Rep. 254; Com. v. International Har- vester Co. 131 Ky. 551, 115 S. W. 703, 133 Am. St. Rep. 256; State v. Schmuck, 77 Ohio St. 438, 83 N. E. 797, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1128, 122 Am. St. Rep. 527; Ex parte Holl- man, 79 S. C. 9, 60 S. E. 19, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 242, 14 Ann. Cas. 1105.

¹³State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N. E. 572, 52 L.R.A. 863, 81 Am. St. Rep.

¹⁶Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 445, 48 L. ed. 1062, 24 S. Ct. 703.

¹⁹Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573, 64 S. E. 676, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 959, 131 Am. St. Rep. 218, 16 Ann. Cas. 1203, affirmed in 217 U. S. 284, 54 L. ed. 768, 30 S. Ct. 514.

hand, the constitutional provision against the granting of special privileges is

§ 560. Trial.—

ordinary jury, does not constitute a denial of the equal protection of the laws,

state, is not a denial to a person adjudged guilty of crime, by the state, of the

§ 561. Appeal.—

state from the court of one district, but not from another district of the state

³State ex rel. Lathrop v. Hauptly, 86 Wash. 199, 149 P. 705, L.R.A.1915F, 920. Annotation: L.R.A.1915F, 920.

in case of the grant of a new trial to an accused person, is not a denial of the

event such a demurrer should be overruled, has been held to violate no constitutional rights of the accused.¹⁴

by the fact that a writ of error in a murder case was denied by a state court.¹⁵

precluded by a statute of the state does not deny the accused the equal protection of the laws, if such was the construction given that section by prior

**§ ⁵⁶². Punishment.**—Equality of protection of the laws implies that in the

subjected.¹⁷ Hence, statutes are unconstitutional which provide different degrees of punishment for different persons for the same act.¹⁸ Equality of

very great latitude in classifying the same, still, such classification should be

natural, and not arbitrary, and should be made with reference to the heinousness or gravity of the act or acts made the crime, and not with reference to

matters disconnected with the crime.²⁰ Therefore, as a rule the line of demarcation between permitted and forbidden legislation relating to punishment in

⁵⁴L. ed. 1139, 31 S. Ct. 98, 21 Ann. Cas. 834. See also United States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393, 52 L. ed. 543, 28 S. Ct. 396.

¹⁷Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 S. Ct. 30; Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U. S. 262, 42 L. ed. 461, 18 S. Ct. 80; Moore v. Missouri,

¹⁵⁹U. S. 673, 40 L. ed. 301, 16 S. Ct. 179; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 S. Ct. 191; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 S. Ct. 930; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

¹¹⁸U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583, 27 L. ed. 207, 1 S. Ct. 637; Re Mallon, 16 Idaho, 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123; Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A.L.R. 1222; Armstrong v. State, 170 Ind. 188, 84 N. E. 3, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 646; Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 604; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804, 8 Ann. Cas. 717; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081, 63 L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104,

¹⁸Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 813, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 483, 39 Am. Dec. 189.

¹Finley v. California, 222 U. S. 28, 56 L. ed. 75, 32 S. Ct. 13; Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481, 52 L. ed. 582, 28 S. Ct. 372; Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440,

¹⁷⁵Ind. 241, 93 N. E. 1071, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1190; People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151, 57 N. W. 1094, 22 L.R.A. 696, 41 Am. St. Rep. 589; Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811, 66 L.R.A. 648; State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N. E. 572, 52 L.R.A. 863, 81 Am. St. Rep. 626. A statute providing for punishment of criminal syndicalism does not violate the

unconstitutional2 in so far as it is based upon valid or invalid classifications,

Where several different acts are prohibited by law, a difference in the penalties for violations of such several acts cannot be said to constitute a breach

of the constitutional provisions intended to secure equal rights to all citizens.³

The equal protection of the laws is not denied to a person sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment for the crime of perjury under a statute which

greater gravity and of more injurious consequences than perjury.⁴ Furthermore, the equal protection clause does not require the courts to impose sentences for exactly the same length of time under statutes permitting discretion

in the length of sentence imposed.⁵ Equal protection of the laws is not denied

to two or three persons convicted of conspiracy to defraud because their sentence was for ten years' imprisonment, while that of their codefendant was for

been upheld, as against the contention that unequal penalties are thus imposed.⁷ The legislature may also determine that women convicted of crime

is, however, some authority to the contrary, holding that a classification allowing male offenders to be punished in a different manner from females is

to the county or district within a state in which the offense is committed or the

person committing it is put upon his trial is unconstitutional as an unjust discrimination and a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws.¹⁰ A statute

which limits the punishment for an offense to a fine if the offense is committed

equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution because its penalties are confined to those who advocate a resort to violent and unlawful methods as a means of changing industrial and political conditions, without including those who advocate a resort to such methods as a means of maintaining such conditions. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 641.

²Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431; Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 813, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475; Bailey v. People, 190 Ill. 28,

⁶⁰N. E. 98, 54 L.R.A. 838, 83 Am. St. Rep. 116; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395, 16 L.R.A. 492; Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah, 387, 76 P. 22, 65 L.R.A. 308, 101 Am. St. Rep. 971, 1 Ann. Cas. 550; Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 98 P. 755, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 263, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1100.

³State v. Hogreiver, 152 Ind. 652, 53 N. E. 921, 45 L.R.A. 504; People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151, 57 N. W. 1094, 22 L.R.A. 696, 41 Am. St. Rep. 589; State v. Murray, 104 Neb. 51, 175 N. W. 666, 8 A.L.R. 563; Stanford v. State, 78 Ohio St. 24, 84 N. E. 419,

¹⁴Ann. Cas. 138. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 566 (different penalties for different violations of Sunday laws); 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 646 (different penalties for different violations of Sunday laws).

⁷People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 36 N. E. 76, 23 L.R.A. 139; Com. v. Pear, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719, 67 L.R.A. 935, affirmed in 197 U. S. 11, 49 L. ed. 643, 25 S. Ct. 58, 3 Ann. Cas. 765. Annotation: 3 A.L.R. 1614, s. 8 A.L.R. 854.

¹⁰⁵Kan. 139, 181 P. 630, 8 A.L.R. 848. Annotation: 3 A.L.R. 1618, s. 8 A.L.R. 854.

¹⁰Ex parte Sizemore, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 232, 8 S. W. (2d) 134, 59 A.L.R. 430. Annotation: 59 A.L.R. 433.

committed in other counties, violates the constitutional guaranty of equality.¹¹

a credit of ⁵⁰ cents a day for road work, is invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws, where a general law applicable in other portions of the

§ 563. —

rule that corporations and individuals may be classified differently if there is

a proper basis for different treatment,¹³ the legislature may impose a different

punishment on a corporation for a criminal offense than is imposed on an individual for the same offense if the distinction in punishment is based upon

same act, however, when performed by officers of a particular class of corporations than when performed by other offenders violates a constitutional

§ 564. —

the laws,¹⁶ since the fact of a prior conviction in such cases is considered as

§ 565. —

offenses against custody officers.¹⁹ Similarly, singling out convicts serving

¹²Ex parte Sizemore, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 232, 8 S. W. (2d) 134, 59 A.L.R. 430.

¹⁴State v. Central Lumber Co. 24 S. D. 136, 123 N. W. 504, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 804, affirmed in 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 S. Ct. 66.

¹⁵Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 P. 956, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 813, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475.

¹⁶Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51, 58 L. ed. 843, 34 S. Ct. 576; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 45 L. ed. 542, 21 St. 389; Moore v. Missouri,

¹⁵⁹U. S. 673, 40 L. ed. 301, 16 S. Ct. 179; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,

¹²³Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994. Annotation: 45 L. ed. 542. Equal protection of the laws is not denied by a statute requiring the punishment on conviction of a second offense to be greater than it would be on a first offense. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673,

⁴⁰L. ed. 301, 16 S. Ct. 179. The equal protection of the laws is not denied by a statute imposing a heavier penalty upon a person convicted of a felony if he has twice before been sentenced for crime to three years' imprisonment or more. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 45 L. ed. 542, 21 S. Ct. 389. Bringing a convict after judgment before the court of another county in a separate proceeding instituted conformably to a statute by information charging him with prior convictions which were not alleged in the indictment on which he was last tried and convicted, and, on the finding of the jury that he was the former convict, sentencing him to the additional punishment in such cases prescribed, does not deny him the equal protection of the laws. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 S. Ct. 583. For detailed discussion of statutes relating to second or habitual offenders, see SECOND AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENDERS.

original term for which a convict was sentenced has been held unconstitutional.¹

of the laws, notwithstanding his conviction deprives him of the right to vote.²

G. DISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS

§ 566. Generally.—

The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is to secure every person within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,

whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.³ An actual discrimination arising from

the method of administering a law is as potential in creating a denial of equality of rights as a discrimination made by law.⁴ The validity of a state statute

under the equal protection clause, therefore, often depends on how it is construed and applied.⁵

while its just interpretation is consistent with the Constitution, it is unfaithfully administered by those who are charged with its execution,⁶ it is, nevertheless, an equally well-established principle that a provision not objectionable on its face may be adjudged unconstitutional because of its effect in operation.⁷ A law, though fair on its face and impartial in appearance, which

applies and administers with an evil eye and unequal hand so as to make unjust and illegal discrimination is within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution.⁸ Hence, in a consideration of the classification embodied in a statute, regard should be given not only to its final purpose, but, likewise, to the

¹Re Mallon, 16 Idaho, 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123. Annotation: 56 L. ed. 76. A statute making it a crime for a state prisoner to escape from a state prison and fixing the punishment at a term equal in length to that which he is serving at the time of his escape by exempting from its operation Federal prisoners confined in such prison, who are, by Federal statute, rendered subject to the same discipline as state prisoners, is rendered special and discriminatory legislation. Re Mallon, 16 Idaho, 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123.

²Ex parte Schatz, 307 Mo. 67, 269 S. W. 383, 38 A.L.R. 1032. Annotation: 38 A.L.R. 1036.

⁴Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 48 L. ed. 417, 24 S. Ct. 257; Tarrance v. Florida,

⁵Concordia F. Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535, 78 L. ed. 1411, 54 S. Ct. 830.

⁶Reagan v. Farmers Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 14 S. Ct. 1047; Cummings v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 25 L. ed. 903; People ex rel. Mechameus v. Warden, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E. 686, 27 L.R.A. 718.

⁵²L. ed. 754, 28 S. Ct. 475; State v. Clement Nat. Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 A. 944, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 22, affirmed in 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 S. Ct. 31.

⁸Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 79 L. ed. 1074, 55 S. Ct. 579; Bailey v. Alabama,

²¹⁹U. S. 219, 55 L. ed. 191, 31 S. Ct. 145; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 42 L. ed. 1012, 18 S. Ct. 583; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Cutsinger v. Atlanta, 142 Ga. 555, 83 S. E. 263, L.R.A.1915B, 1097, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 280. See also Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 550. The ordinances of the supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco providing that it shall be unlawful to engage in the laundry business within the corporate or county limits "without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone" does not prescribe a rule and conditions for the regulation of the use of laundry property, to which all similarly situated may conform, but it confers a naked, arbitrary power upon the board to give or withhold consent, makes all engaged in the business the tenants at will under the board of supervisors as to their means of living, and is therefore invalid. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064.

⁹Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 57 L. ed. 971, 33 S. Ct. 610, affirming 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1066. See also St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. [12 Am. Jur.]—17 257

the administrative authorities arbitrary power and, without regard to discretion in the legal sense of that term, permits unjust discriminations, founded on differences of race or other unjustifiable basis, between persons otherwise in similar circumstances.¹⁰

Mere errors of judgment by officials will not support a claim of discrimination.¹¹ Moreover, it is not enough to show that a law or ordinance has not been enforced against other persons as it is sought to be forced against the person claiming discrimination.¹² To establish arbitrary discrimination inimical to constitutional equality there must be something more, something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity.¹³ Some of the state courts have taken the position that in the absence of facts properly pleaded showing a fixed and continuous policy of unjust discrimination on the part of a municipality, they will not enter on a consideration of the question whether its administration is in violation of the guaranties as to the equal protection of the laws.¹⁴

A. IN GENERAL

§ 567. Generally.—

The guaranty of due process found in the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution declares that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The Fifth Amendment is a limitation upon the powers of Congress, while the Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the powers of the states.15

¹⁰Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. ed. 725, 20 S. Ct. 633; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L.R.A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155; Elkhart v. Murray, 165 Ind. 304, 75 N. E. 593, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 940, 112 Am. St. Rep. 228, 6 Ann. Cas. 748; State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Ct. 113 Wash. 296, 193 P. 845, 12 A.L.R. 1428; Fulton v. Norteman, 60 W. Va. 562, 55 S. E. 658, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1196. An ordinance requiring drivers of vehicles at all times to comply with any directions of the police force as to stopping, starting, approaching, or departing from any place, and as to the manner of taking up or setting down passengers, is unconstitutional as depriving persons of the equal protection of the laws. St. Louis v. Allen, 276 Mo. 501, 204 S. W. 1083, L.R.A. 1918F, 1110. As to discretion as a basis for classification, see supra, § 494. As to arbitrary administration as a denial of due process, see infra, § 576.

¹¹Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp. 247 U. S. 350, 62 L. ed. 1154, 38 S. Ct. 495.

¹²Mackay Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U. S. 94, 63 L. ed. 863, 39 S. Ct. 428.

¹³Mackay Teleg. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U. S. 94, 63 L. ed. 863, 39 S. Ct. 428; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp. 247 U. S. 350, 62 L. ed. 1154, 38 S. Ct. 495.

¹⁴Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 787, 120 Am. St. Rep. 386.

¹⁵Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 281 U. S. 464, 74 L. ed. 999, 50 S. Ct. 369; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 878, 40 S. Ct. 499; Jones v. Buffalo Creek Coal & Coke Co. 245 U. S. 328, 62 L. ed. 325, 38 S. Ct. 121; Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co. 240 U. S. 1, 60 L. ed. 493, 36 S. Ct. 236, L.R.A. 1917D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 48 L. ed. 195, 24 S. Ct. 88; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 46 L. ed. 171, 22 S. Ct. 120; Lombard v. West Chicago Park, 181 U. S. 33, 45 L. ed. 731, 21 S. Ct. 507; Bolin v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 44 L. ed. 382, 20 S. Ct. 287; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383, affirming 14 Utah, 71, 46 P. 756, 37 L.R.A. 103; Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490, 37 L. ed. 252, 13 S. Ct. 394; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 36 L. ed. 986, 13 S. Ct. 105; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Alabama Pub. Serv. Commission v. Mobile Gas Co. 213 Ala. 50, 104 So. 538, 41 A.L.R. 872; Moses v. United States, 16 App. D. C. 428, 50 L.R.A. 532; Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L.R.A.1915C, 716, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 80; Windfall City v. Somerville, 181 Ind. 463, 104 N. E. 859, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 661; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738; Wichita Council, S. B. A. v. Security Ben. Asso. 138 Kan. 841, 28 P. (2d) 976, 94 A.L.R.

The same meaning is usually given to the guaranty in both amendments.¹⁶ In fact, it is said that the restraint imposed upon legislation by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the same.¹⁷ It has been suggested, however, that different constructions and applications of the provisions may be proper in appropriate cases.¹⁸ The phrase as used in the Fifth Amendment refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the common law; and as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, by parity of reason, the phrase refers to the law of the land in each state, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.¹⁹

The Fourteenth Amendment did not invest, and did not attempt to invest, Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of state legislation.²⁰ Neither does it enable the Supreme Court of the United States to revise decisions of the state courts on questions of state law.¹ Nor does it raise a Federal question in every case to test the justice of a decision.²

Many of the state Constitutions contain guaranties securing due process.³ A state adopting the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution in its own Bill of Rights adopts with it the interpretation it has received.⁴ However, the Federal question and the state question are not necessarily the same.⁵ The due process clause as embodied in the Bill of Rights of a state Constitution has no purpose other than to check the legislature, as representing the majority for the time being, from encroaching upon this reserved right of the minority or of the individual.⁶

The guaranty of due process adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.⁷ The Fourteenth Amendment, while furnishing additional guaranties, did not introduce any new principle into the administration of our constitutional system; it was merely declaratory of a rule which previously existed.⁸ It is a prohibition applicable to the acts of the state, and does not,

629; Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581, 74 A.L.R. 241; State v. Buente, 256 Mo. 227, 165 S. W. 340, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 879; State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 P. 574, 52 A.L.R. 454; State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523; Heavner v. Elkins, 69 W. Va. 255, 71 S. E. 184, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 653, affirmed in 231 U. S. 743, 58 L. ed. 463, 34 S. Ct. 318.

¹⁶Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 48 L. ed. 195, 24 S. Ct. 88; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 36 L. ed. 986, 13 S. Ct. 105; Ex parte Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 S. Ct. 930; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111; Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Serv. Commission, 88 Mont. 180, 293 P. 294, citing R. C. L.

¹⁷Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 76 L. ed. 772, 52 S. Ct. 358; Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, 45 L. ed. 914, 21 S. Ct. 644; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625.

¹⁸French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625.

²⁰Re Rahrer (Wilkerson v. Rahrer) 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 S. Ct. 865.

¹Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 71 L. ed. 270, 47 S. Ct. 103, 48 A.L.R. 1102.

²New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 S. Ct. 437; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616.

³State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118, 86 A.L.R. 1523.

⁷Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. ed. 793, 14 S. Ct. 968; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588. See also supra, § 470, as to the equal protection clause.

⁸United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 235, 4 L. ed. 559; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E.

tive.¹³ It does not have regard merely to enforcement of the law, but searches

also the authority for making the law.¹⁴ It is not merely a political right, but

process guaranty as it relates to these particular subjects will be left for those

whether there is a conflict with any of its provisions;¹⁸ and (2) if the act com-

854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus,

¹³³Ind. 513, 33 N. E. 421, 18 L.R.A. 729; State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, 18 A. 878,

⁵L.R.A. 709; Valentine v. Englewood, 76 N. J. L. 509, 71 A. 344, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 262,

¹⁶Ann. Cas. 731; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 40 N. D. 69, 168 N. W. 684, 12 A.L.R. 744, writ of error dismissed in 254 U. S. 370, 65 L. ed. 310, 41 S. Ct. 140; Paulsen v. Portland, 16 Or. 450, 19 P. 450, 1 L.R.A. 673; McCandless v. Richmond & D. R. Co.

⁹Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 40 N. D. 69,

¹⁶⁸N. W. 684, 12 A.L.R. 744, writ of error dismissed in 254 U. S. 370, 65 L. ed. 310, 41 S. Ct. 140.

¹¹Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383; Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212, 52 Am. Rep. 751.

¹²Re Rahrer (Wilkerson v. Rahrer) 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 S. Ct. 865; Robin- son v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18.

¹⁶As to the validity of particular stat- utes, see ARBITRATION AND AWARD, Vol. 3, p. 836, § 6; BANKRUPTCY, Vol. 6, p. 517, §§ 2 et seq.; p. 850, § 561; BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 30, § 9 et seq.; DIVORCE AND SEPARATION [Also

¹⁰R. C. L. p. 1]; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 459]; INCOME TAXES; INHERITANCE, ESTATE, SUCCESSION, AND GIFT TAXES; INSOLVENCY [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 823]; 626]; INSURANCE [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 821]; INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 239]; LABOR [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 410]; LI- CENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 470]; MECHAN- ICS' LIENS [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 868]; MINES AND MINERALS [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 1087]; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 678]; MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 1175]; PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 350]; PUBLIC OFFICERS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 362]; RAILROADS [Also

²²R. C. L. p. 730]; SCHOOLS [Also 24 R. C. L. p. 553]; SECURITIES ACTS; SOCIAL SECU- RITY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, AND RE- TIREMENT FUNDS; SPECIAL OR LOCAL ASSESS- MENTS [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 76]; TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 1]; TRADEMARKS, TRADE- NAMES, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 826]; WITNESSES [Also 28 R. C. L. p. 411]; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS [Also 28 R. C. L. p. 709]; ZONING.

¹⁸¹U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616.

¹⁸New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Lou- isiana, 185 U. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 S. Ct. 691; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.

§ 568. Origin of Guaranty.—

¹⁹Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97,

²⁹S. Ct. 14; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936,

²²S. Ct. 691; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372; Re Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31 A. 522, 28 L.R.A. 242.

⁵³L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Tracy v. Ginz- berg, 205 U. S. 170, 51 L. ed. 755, 27 S. Ct. 461; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, 41 L. ed. 78, 16 S. Ct. 1031; State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650, 91 N. W. 935, 59 L.R.A. 437, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323.

³Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 113, 24 L. ed. 616; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Moses v. United States,

¹⁶App. D. C. 428, 50 L.R.A. 532; Poulsen v. Portland, 16 Or. 450, 19 P. 450, 1 L.R.A. 673.

⁴Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Moses v. United States, 16 App. D. C. 428, 50 L.R.A. 532.

⁷Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; State v. Rose, 33 Del. 168, 132 A. 864, 45 A.L.R. 85; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789.

⁸Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; First Nat. Bank v. Bovey, 49 N. D. 450, 191 N. W. 765, citing R. C. L.

²⁴L. ed. 618; Moses v. United States, 16 App. D. C. 428, 50 L.R.A. 532; State v. Cut- shall, 110 N. C. 538, 15 S. E. 261, 16 L.R.A. 130; Poulsen v. Portland, 16 Or. 450, 19 P. 450, 1 L.R.A. 673.

§ 569. General Nature of Guaranty.—

the amendments;¹² indeed, it has been said that without it the right of private

liberty and justice which lie at the basis of all our civil and political institu-

anty have received a very broad and liberal interpretation,¹⁷ and it has been

against arbitrary interference with his rights.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the courts have

¹¹Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 S. Ct. 1, affirming 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955, 56 L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682; State v. Stimpson, 78 Vt. 124, 62 A. 14, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1153, 6 Ann. Cas. 639.

¹³Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. S. 139, 57 L. ed. 1427, 33 S. Ct. 1033.

¹⁴Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 79 L. ed. 791, 55 S. Ct. 340, 98 A.L.R. 406, re- hearing denied in 294 U. S. 732, 79 L. ed. 1261, 55 S. Ct. 511; Hebert v. Louisiana,

²⁷²U. S. 312, 71 L. ed. 270, 47 S. Ct. 103, 48 A.L.R. 1102; Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581, 74 A.L.R. 241 (Ethridge, J.).

¹⁵Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 60 L. ed. 672, 36 S. Ct. 258; Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581, 74 A.L.R. 241; Sinque- feld v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81,

¹⁷State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650, 91 N. W. 935, 59 L.R.A. 437, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323; People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 18 N. E. 245,

²⁰Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed. 153, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527.

²Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. S. 139, 57 L. ed. 1427, 33 S. Ct. 1033. And see infra, § 573.

³Burdick v. People, 149 Ill. 600, 36 N. E. 948, 24 L.R.A. 152, 41 Am. St. Rep. 329; Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140 N. W. 615, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699; Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450.

cannot convert the process used into due process of law, if the necessary result

§ 570. Difficulty of Definition.—

⁵Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 59 L. ed. 969, 35 S. Ct. 582; Western L. Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 261, 59 L. ed. 220,

³⁵S. Ct. 37; Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 56 L. ed. 429, 32 S. Ct. 303; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 48 L. ed. 623, 24 S. Ct. 390; Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell, 193 U. S. 30, 48 L. ed. 604, 24 S. Ct. 319; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 S. Ct. 836; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chi- cago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Maxwell v. Page, 23 N. M. 356, 168 P. 492, 5 A.L.R. 155; Bowers v. Smith, 14 Pa. D. & C. 220, citing R. C. L. Merely giving a name to an action, as concerning the thing rather than personal rights in it, cannot justify the procedure if in fact the property owner is deprived of his estate without due process of law. Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 48 L. ed. 623,

⁶Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863, 32 S. Ct. 535; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534, 58 S. W. 934, 54 L.R.A. 492.

⁷Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 72 L. ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 878, 40 S. Ct. 499; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. ed. 461, 27 S. Ct. 261; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405,

³³L. ed. 193, 9 S. Ct. 763; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862, 59 L.R.A. 190; Bardwell v. Collins (Bardwell v. An- derson) 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152, 20 Am. St. Rep. 547; Alderman v. Wells, 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 864, 21 Ann. Cas. 193; State v. Spon- augle, 45 W. Va. 415, 32 S. E. 283, 43 L.R.A. 727. Annotation: 20 Am. St. Rep. 554.

⁸Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 33 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171; Chauvin v. Valiton,

³Mont. 451, 20 P. 658, 3 L.R.A. 194; Salt Creek Valley Turnp. Co. v. Parks, 50 Ohio St. 568, 35 N. E. 304, 28 L.R.A. 769; Ex parte Tindall, 102 Okla. 192, 229 P. 125, citing R. C. L.; Anderson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 90, 126 P. 840, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 314; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1216, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 917. To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power would be to sub- ject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our gov- ernment and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct. 581.

³²L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N. W. 624,

⁴¹L.R.A. 481, 53 Am. St. Rep. 557; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289.

¹⁰Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 410, 29 S. Ct. 235; State v. Sponaugle,

¹²Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 S. Ct. 57; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Ft. Smith v. Dodson,

⁴⁶Ark. 296, 55 Am. Rep. 589; Wulzen v. San Francisco, 101 Cal. 15, 35 P. 353, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17; Chauvin v. Valiton, 3 Mont. 451, 20 P. 658, 3 L.R.A. 194; Alderman v. Wells, 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 864, 21 Ann. Cas. 193; State v. Spon- augle, 45 W. Va. 415, 32 S. E. 283, 43 L.R.A. 727. Annotation: 5 L.R.A. 359. See EMINENT DOMAIN [Also 10 R. C. L. p. 1]; SPECIAL OR LOCAL ASSESSMENTS [Also

As in the case of the police power,¹⁶ the courts usually have contented them-

§ 571. Attempted Definitions.—

¹⁴Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 33 L. ed. 193, 9 S. Ct. 763; Lacey v. Lemmens,

¹⁷Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 878, 40 S. Ct. 499; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Scott v. Toledo (C. C.) 36 F. 385, 1 L.R.A. 688; Farmers Independent Ditch Co. v. Agricultural Ditch Co. 22 Colo. 513, 45 P. 444, 55 Am. St. Rep. 149; Ferry v. Camp- bell, 110 Iowa, 290, 81 N. W. 604, 50 L.R.A. 92; Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Serv. Commission, 88 Mont. 180, 293 P. 294, citing R. C. L.; Chauvin v. Valiton, 8 Mont. 451, 20 P. 658, 3 L.R.A. 194; Stuart v. Palm- er, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289; Alder- man v. Wells, 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 864, 21 Ann. Cas. 193; Har- bison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421,

⁴⁴L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 40 L. ed. 467, 16 S. Ct. 344; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314,

¹³⁹U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 S. Ct. 577; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 34 L. ed. 816, 11 S. Ct. 224; Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa, 208, 79 Am. Dec. 529; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171; Re Thompson, 116 Me. 473, 102 A. 303, citing R. C. L.; Rosenbush v. Bern- heimer, 211 Mass. 146, 97 N. E. 984, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1317; Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63, 97 Am. Dec. 248; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; People v. Dunn, 157 N. Y. 528, 52 N. E. 572, 43 L.R.A. 247; Church v. South Kingstown,

¹Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Smith, 266 U. S. 291, 69 L. ed. 293, 45 S. Ct. 63; Tur- pin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 47 L. ed. 70, 23 S. Ct. 20; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34,

³⁸L. ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Kennard v. Louis- iana, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. ed. 478; State Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 P. 755, L.R.A.1915E, 675, affirmed in

²³⁸U. S. 611, 59 L. ed. 1488, 35 S. Ct. 792; Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N. E. 113, 89 A.L.R. 1398; Union Drainage Dist. v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 292; Burdick v. People, 149 Ill. 600,

³⁶N. E. 948, 24 L.R.A. 152, 41 Am. St. Rep. 329; Re Thompson, 116 Me. 473, 102 A. 303, citing R. C. L.; People v. Dickerson,

¹⁶⁴Mich. 148, 129 N. W. 199, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 917, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 688; Ivie v. Bailey, 319 Mo. 474, 5 S. W. (2d) 50, 57 A.L.R. 881; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N. W. 624, 41 L.R.A. 481, 53 Am. St. Rep. 557, affirmed in 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 S. Ct. 513; Re Davies,

¹⁶⁸N. Y. 89, 61 N. E. 118, 56 L.R.A. 855; Ward v. Boyce, 152 N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. 180,

³⁶L.R.A. 549; Anderson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 90, 126 P. 840, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 314; Church v. South Kingstown, 22 R. I. 381, 48 A. 3, 53 L.R.A. 739; Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S. E. 3, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1073; Prescott v. State,

⁵⁶Okla. Crim. Rep. 259, 37 P. (2d) 830, citing Com. v. Gryctko, 22 Pa. D. & C. 462, citing R. C. L. Annotation: 2 L.R.A. 655; 11 L.R.A. 224;

¹³L.R.A. 304; 41 Am. St. Rep. 338. Due process of law, in each particular case, means such an exercise of the pow-

person of life, liberty, or property; it includes all the forms and acts essential

§ 572. Definition of "Law of the Land."—

ers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction and under such safeguards for the protection of in- dividual rights as those maxims prescribe for the classes of cases to which the one in question belongs. State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602,

²Minder v. Georgia, 183 U. S. 559, 46 L. ed. 328, 22 S. Ct. 224; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 S. Ct. 577; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Re Thomp- son, 116 Me. 473, 102 A. 303, citing R. C. L.; St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 8, 77 S. W. 876,

⁶³L.R.A. 778; Ives v. South B. R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Harbison v. Knox- ville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955,

⁵⁶L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682; State v. Stimpson, 78 Vt. 124, 62 A. 14, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1153, 6 Ann. Cas. 639; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 559. Legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law, if it is general in its opera- tion upon the subjects to which it relates and is enforceable by usual methods adapt- ed to the nature of the case. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231.

³Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Wilmot v. Chicago,

³²⁸Ill. 552, 160 N. E. 206, 62 A.L.R. 394; State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650, 91 N. W. 935,

⁵⁹L.R.A. 437, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323; Re Thompson, 116 Me. 473, 102 A. 303, citing R. C. L.; Ives v. South B. R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Carr v. Brown, 20 R. I. 555, 38 A. 9, 38 L.R.A. 294, 78 Am. St. Rep.

⁴Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Harding v. People,

¹⁶⁰Ill. 459, 43 N. E. 624, 32 L.R.A. 445, 52 Am. St. Rep. 344; Re Thompson, 116 Me. 473, 102 A. 303, citing R. C. L.; State v. Moore, 104 N. C. 714, 10 S. E. 143, 17 Am. St. Rep. 696. Annotation: 24 L. ed. 436.

⁶Com. v. Gryctko, 22 Pa. D. & C. 462, citing R. C. L.; Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 Utah, 245, 30 P. 760, 16 L.R.A. 689. See infra, § 573.

¹⁰²N. E. 193, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 532, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1221; Belleville v. St. Clair County Turnp. Co. 234 Ill. 428, 84 N. E. 1049, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1071; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A.L.R. 65; State v. Loomis,

¹¹⁵Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789; Gunn v. Union R. Co. 27 R. I. 320, 62 A. 118, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 362; Harbison v. Knox- ville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955,

⁵⁶L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 632, affirmed in 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 S. Ct. 1; Knoxville & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 S. W. 115, 53 L.R.A. 921; Ex parte Sizemore, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 232, 8 S. W. (2d) 134, 59 A.L.R. 430; State v. Bates, 14 Utah, 293, 47 P. 78, 43 L.R.A. 33.

¹⁸¹U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,

²⁴L. ed. 616; Waller v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 679; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372; Jacobsen v. Superior Ct. 192 Cal. 319, 219 P. 986, 29 A.L.R. 1399; Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388, 19 Am. Rep.

It is a general public law of the land.¹⁰ It may be broadly stated that the words "per legem terre," as expressed in Magna Charta, are the equivalent of such expressions as "according to the law of the land," "by due process of law," or "by due course of law," which are contained in the several Constitutions of the American states.¹¹ Due process of law means something more, however, than the actual existing law of the land. If it were otherwise, it is obvious that a guaranty as to due process of law would be no restraint upon legislative power.¹² Therefore, not everything which may pass under the form of statutory enactment can be considered the law of the land.¹³ Nor does the phrase "law of the land" mean the general body of the law, common and statute, which was in existence at the time the Constitution took effect, for that would deny to the legislature the power to change or amend the law in any particular.¹⁴ The law of the land means the law of the state in which the proceeding is brought; the prohibition of the Federal Constitution does not mean that a state must observe the due process of law of some other jurisdiction over which it has no control. For example, it has been decided that the

656; Water Comrs. v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 84 A. 727, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1024; Re Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31 A. 522, 28 L.R.A. 242; Klafter v. State Examiners, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N. E. 193, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 532, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1221; Off v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184, 14 Ann. Cas. 434; Union Drainage Dist. v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292; Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 43, 57 N. E. 798, 50 L.R.A. 78; Am. St. Rep. 229, affirmed in 184 U. S. 425, 46 L. ed. 623, 22 S. Ct. 425; Eder v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E. 1108, 32 L.R.A. 659, 52 Am. St. Rep. 365; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454, 29 L.R.A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 7 N. E. 631, 57 Am. Rep. 869; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; Wichita Council, S. B. A. v. Security Ben. Asso. 138 Kan. 841, 28 P. (2d) 976, 94 A.L.R. 629; Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A.L.R. 65; Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 56 Am. Dec. 723; University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789; Lowry v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152, 35 Am. Rep. 420; Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63, 97 Am. Dec. 248; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 421, 91 N. W. 421, 58 L.R.A. 825; People v. Dunn, 157 N. Y. 528, 52 N. E. 572, 43 L.R.A. 247; State v. Cutshall, 110 N. C. 538, 15 S. E. 261, 16 L.R.A. 130; Ex parte Sullivan, 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 138 P. 815, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 719; Anderson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 90, 126 P. 840, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 314; Paulson v. Portland, 16 Or. 450, 19 P. 450, 1 L.R.A. 673; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399, 3 Am. Rep. 636; Church v. South Kingstown, 22 R. I. 381, 48 A. 3, 53 L.R.A. 739; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955, 56 L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682, affirmed in 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 S. Ct. 1; Ex parte Sizemore, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 232, 8 S. W. (2d) 134, 59 A.L.R. 430; State v. Bates, 14 Utah, 293, 47 P. 78, 43 L.R.A. 33, overruled on another point in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 42 L. ed. 1061, 18 S. Ct. 620; Jensen v. Union P. R. Co. 5 Utah, 253, 21 P. 994, 4 L.R.A. 724; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1216, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 917; Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 796; Bowen v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 559. Annotation: 24 L. ed. 437; 5 L.R.A. 359; 122 Am. St. Rep. 905. The words "law of the land" as used in Magna Charta implied a conformity with the ancient and customary laws of the English people or laws enacted by Parliament. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616.

¹⁰Off v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184; Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 57 N. E. 798, 50 L.R.A. 762, 78 Am. St. Rep. 229, affirmed in 184 U. S. 425, 46 L. ed. 623, 22 S. Ct. 425.

¹¹Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; State v. Rose, 33 Del. 163, 132 A. 864, 45 A.L.R. 85; State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756. The phrase "conformably to the laws," in a constitutional provision that every person is entitled to a certain remedy for wrongs conformably to the laws, relates to a recognized long-established system of laws existing in states adopting Constitutions as well as in the prior organizations from which the states were organized. McCoy v. Kenosha County, 195 Wis. 273, 218 N. W. 348, 57 A.L.R. 412.

¹²Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372; Re Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31 A. 522, 28 L.R.A. 242; Union Drainage Dist. v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292; Salt Creek Valley Turnp. Co. v. Parks, 50 Ohio St. 568, 35 N. E. 304, 28 L.R.A. 769; Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308, 50 L.R.A. 577, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41.

¹³Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53, 24 Am. Rep. 661; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789.

¹⁴Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152, 20 Am. St. Rep. 547.

guaranty of due process of law does not, of itself, require a trial by jury in states where the usage and statutes are otherwise.¹⁵

§ 573. Essential Elements.—

The essential elements of due process of law are notice16 and an opportunity to be heard17 and to defend18 in an orderly

¹⁶United States.—Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 78 L. ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. ed. 231, 53 S. Ct. 98, 86 A.L.R. 298; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 76 L. ed. 375, 52 S. Ct. 252; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 234 U. S. 369, 58 L. ed. 1356, 34 S. Ct. 810; Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936; Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 56 L. ed. 429, 32 S. Ct. 303; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. ed. 461, 27 S. Ct. 261; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 S. Ct. 836; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 S. Ct. 383; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 40 L. ed. 467, 16 S. Ct. 344; Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372, 39 L. ed. 737, 15 S. Ct. 635; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 38 L. ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 17 L. ed. 531. **Alabama.** — Fowler v. Fowler, 219 Ala. 453, 122 So. 440, citing R. C. L. **California.**—Pierce v. Superior Ct. 1 Cal. (2d) 759, 37 P. (2d) 453, 460, 96 A.L.R. 1020; Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 265 P. 246, citing R. C. L. Re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851, 55 L.R.A. 856, 86 Am. St. Rep. 296 (insanity inquisition). **Colorado.**—Great West Min. Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Min. Co. 12 Colo. 46, 20 P. 771, 13 Am. St. Rep. 204. **Delaware.**—State v. Rose, 33 Del. 168, 132 A. 864, 45 A.L.R. 85 (forfeiture of property used unlawfully). **Florida.**—Coral Gables v. Certain Lands, 110 Fla. 189, 149 So. 36, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Woods-Young Co. v. Tedder, 103 Fla. 1083, 138 So. 643 (writ of certiorari denied in 285 U. S. 557, 76 L. ed. 946, 52 S. Ct. 458) citing R. C. L.; Fiehe v. R. E. Householder Co. 98 Fla. 627, 125 So. 2, citing R. C. L.; Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679, citing R. C. L.; McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731. **Georgia.**—Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 83 S. E. 645, L.R.A.1915D, 817, writ of error denied in 235 U. S. 694, 59 L. ed. 429, 35 S. Ct. 208. **Idaho.**—Anderson v. Great Northern R. Co. 25 Idaho, 433, 138 P. 127, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 191. **Illinois.**—Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118, 55 A.L.R. 196; Rabbitt v. Weber, 297 Ill. 491, 130 N. E. 737, citing R. C. L.; Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co. 256 Ill. 196, 99 N. E. 920, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 793, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 276. **Indiana.**—Harmon v. Bolley, 187 Ind. 511, 120 N. E. 33, 2 A.L.R. 609; Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862, 59 L.R.A. 190. **Iowa.**—Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. 214 Iowa, 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A.L.R. **Kansas.**—Wichita Council, S. B. A. v. Security Ben. Asso. 138 Kan. 841, 28 P. (2d) 976, 94 A.L.R. 629. **Kentucky.** — Levee Comrs. v. Johnson, 178 Ky. 287, 199 S. W. 8, L.R.A.1918E, 202. **Maine.**—Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A.L.R. 65. **Michigan.**—Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 50 N. W. 661, 14 L.R.A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276. **Minnesota.**—Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152, 20 Am. St. Rep. 547. **Mississippi.**—Dunn v. Love, 172 Miss. 342, 155 So. 331, 92 A.L.R. 1323, affirmed in Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64, 79 L. ed. 1303, 55 S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438; Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81, 76 A.L.R. 238. **Missouri.**—Re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S. W. (2d) 410, 91 A.L.R. 74; State ex rel. Love v. Becker, 226 Mo. 1193, 34 S. W. (2d) 27, citing R. C. L.; Stone v. Jefferson, 317 Mo. 1, 293 S. W. 730, 52 A.L.R. 879. **New Jersey.**—State v. Zied, 116 N. J. L. 234, 183 A. 210, citing R. C. L. **New Mexico.**—Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. 34 N. M. 346, 282 P. 1, 70 A.L.R. 1261, writ of certiorari denied in 280 U. S. 610, 74 L. ed. 653, 50 S. Ct. 158; Lacey v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 54, 159 P. 949, L.R.A.1917A, 1185. **North Carolina.**—Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 186, 167 S. E. 638, 87 A.L.R. 237; Parish v. East Coast Cedar Co. 133 N. C. 478, 45 S. E. 768, 98 Am. St. Rep. 718; Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N. C. 700, 24 S. E. 527, 715, 36 L.R.A. 402. **Oklahoma.** — Muskogee Iron Works v. Bason, 176 Okla. 298, 55 P. 68, citing R. C. L. **Oregon.**—Cordrey v. The Bee, 102 Or. 636, 201 P. 202, 20 A.L.R. 1079. **Pennsylvania.**—Com. v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 148 A. 73, citing R. C. L.; Com. v. Gryctko, 22 Pa. D. & C. 462, citing R. C. L.; Bowers v. Smith, 14 Pa. D. & C. 220, citing R. C. L. **South Carolina.**—Koester v. Citizens' Pub. Co. 154 S. C. 154, 151 S. E. 452, citing R. C. L. **Texas.**—Ex parte Renfro, 115 Tex. 82, 273 S. W. 813, 40 A.L.R. 900. **Utah.**—Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah, 316, 279 P. 612, citing R. C. L. **Virginia.**—Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584; Com. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 106 Va. 61, 55 S. E. 572, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1086, 117 Am. St. Rep. 983, 9 Ann. Cas. 1124. **Wisconsin.**—Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N. W. 613, 24 A.L.R. 403. **Wyoming.**—Sterritt v. Young, 14 Wyo. 146, 82 P. 946, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 169, 116 Am. St. Rep. 994. Annotation: 42 L. ed. 865; 2 L.R.A. 657; 11 L.R.A. 225; 20 Am. St. Rep. 554.

¹⁷Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 76 L. ed. 375, 52 S. Ct. 252; Baker v. Baker, E. & Co. 242 U. S. 394, 61 L. ed. 386, 37 S. Ct.

proceeding adapted to the nature of the case19 before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.²⁰ One of the most famous and perhaps the most often quoted definition of due process of law is that of Daniel Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College Case,¹ in which he declared that by due process of law is meant "a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."² Somewhat similar is the

152; Riverside & D. River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 59 L. ed. 910, 35 S. Ct. 579; Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 56 L. ed. 429, 32 S. Ct. 303; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Iowa C. R. Co. v. Ct. 344; Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372, 39 L. ed. 737, 15 S. Ct. 635; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663; Fowler v. Nash, 225 Ala. 613, 144 So. 831, citing R. L.; Fowler v. Fowler, 219 Ala. 453, 122 So. 440, citing R. C. L.; Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 265 P. 246, citing R. C. L.; San Christina Invest. Co. v. San Francisco, 167 Cal. 762, 141 P. 384, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 676; Re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851, 55 L.R.A. 856, 86 Am. St. Rep. 296 (insanity inquisition); State v. Rose, 33 Del. 168, 132 A. 864, 45 A.L.R. 85 (forfeiture of property used unlawfully); Coral Gables v. Certain Lands, 110 Fla. 189, 149 So. 36, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Woods-Young Co. v. Tedder, 103 Fla. 1083, 138 So. 643 (writ of certiorari denied in 285 U. S. 557, 76 L. ed. 946, 52 S. Ct. 458) citing R. C. L.; Flehe v. R. E. Householder Co. 98 Fla. 627, 125 So. 2, citing R. C. L.; Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679, citing R. C. L.; McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731; Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 83 S. E. 645, L.R.A.1915D, 817, writ of error denied in 235 U. S. 694, 59 L. ed. 429, 35 S. Ct. 208; Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118, 55 A.L.R. 196; Rabbitt v. Weber, 297 Ill. 491, 130 N. E. 787, citing R. C. L.; Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co. 256 Ill. 196, 99 N. E. 920, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 793, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 276; Harmon v. Bolley, 187 Ind. 511, 120 N. E. 33, 2 A.L.R. 609; Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. 214 Iowa, 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308; Wichita Council, S. B. A. v. Security Ben. Asso. 138 Kan. 841, 28 P. (2d) 976, 94 A.L.R. 629; Levee Comrs. v. Johnson, 178 Ky. 287, 199 S. W. 8, L.R.A.1918E, 202; Jones v. Caldwell, 176 Ky. 15, 195 S. W. 122, L.R.A.1918B, 50; Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A.L.R. 65; Dunn v. Love, 172 Miss. 342, 155 So. 331, 92 A.L.R. 1323, affirmed in Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64, 79 L. ed. 1303, 55 S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438; Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81, 76 A.L.R. 238; State ex rel. Love v. Becker, 326 Mo. 1193, 34 S. W. (2d) 27, citing R. C. L.; State v. Zied, 116 N. J. L. 234, 183 A. 210, citing R. C. L.; Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. 34 N. M. 346, 282 P. 1, 70 A.L.R. 1261, writ of certiorari denied in 280 U. S. 610, 74 L. ed. 653, 50 S. Ct. 158; Lacey v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 54, 159 P. 949, L.R.A.1917A, 1185; Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 186, 167 S. E. 638, 87 A.L.R. 237; State v. Cutshall, 110 N. C. 538, 15 S. E. 261, 16 L.R.A. 130; State ex rel. Lofthus v. Langer, 46 N. D. 462, 177 N. W. 408, citing R. C. L.; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 126 Or. 519, 270 P. 484, 62 A.L.R. 660; Com. v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 148 A. 73, citing R. C. L.; Bowers v. Smith, 14 Pa. D. & C. 220, citing R. C. L.; Ex parte Hardcastle, 84 Tex. Crim. Rep. 463, 208 S. W. 531, 2 A.L.R. 1539; Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah, 316, 279 P. 612, citing R. C. L.; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584; Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N. W. 613, 24 A.L.R. 403. Annotation: 42 L. ed. 865; 2 L.R.A. 657; 11 L.R.A. 225.

¹⁸George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 77 L. ed. 1265, 53 S. Ct. 620; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. ed. 231, 53 S. Ct. 98, 86 A.L.R. 298; Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 56 L. ed. 429, 32 S. Ct. 303; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Turner v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 47 L. ed. 70, 23 S. Ct. 20; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 S. Ct. 836.

¹⁹Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118, 55 A.L.R. 196; Parish v. East Coast Cedar Co. 133 N. C. 478, 45 S. E. 768, 98 Am. St. Rep. 718. Annotation: 98 Am. St. Rep. 724.

²Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. ed. 552, 2 S. Ct. 569; McClatchy v. Superior Ct. 119 Cal. 413, 51 P. 696, 39 L.R.A. 691; Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388, 19 Am. Rep. 656; Jenks v. Stump, 41 Colo. 281, 93 P. 17, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 554, 124 Am. St. Rep. 137, 14 Ann. Cas. 914; Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118, 55 A.L.R. 196; People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148, 129 N. W. 199, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 917, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 688; Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152, 20 Am. St. Rep. 547; Holmes v. Murray, 207 Mo. 413, 105 S. W. 1085, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 431, 123 Am. St. Rep. 386, 13 Ann. Cas. 845; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Clapp v. Hong, 12 N. D. 600, 98 N. W. 710, 65 L.R.A. 757, 102 Am. St. Rep. 589; Anderson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 90, 126 P. 840; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 314; Bowers v. Smith, 14 Pa. D. & C. 220, citing R. C. L.; Koester v. Citizens' Pub. Co. 154 S. C. 154, 151 S. E. 452, citing R. C. L.; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955, 56 L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682, affirmed in 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 S. Ct. 1; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis (Tex.) 18 S. W. 723, 17 L.R.A. 286, affirmed in 87 Tex. 19, 26 S. W. 985, which was reversed on other points in 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255; State v. Stimpson, 78 Vt. Cas. 62 A. 14, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1153, 6 Ann. Cas. 639; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1216, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 917; Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 52 P. 333, 40 L.R.A. 302; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 559.

statement that it is a rule as old as the law that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court, by which is meant until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression and can never be upheld where justice is fairly administered.³

Due process of law generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings.⁴ Expressed in other language, the words "law of the land" or "due process of law," when used in considering the property rights of individuals, mean summons or notice, such as is ordinarily given upon the institution of a suit, due appearance of the parties in interest, pleading of the facts in issue, and a determination thereof by a jury or by a court in accordance with settled practice.⁵ In any proceedings where notice is essential, the view has been taken that the law authorizing such proceedings must require notice; otherwise, it will be unconstitutional. It is not enough that a person may by chance have notice or that he may, as a matter of favor or courtesy, have a hearing.⁶ A contrary view has been taken on this question to the effect that a statute is not invalid merely by reason of the fact that it does not expressly provide for notice and hearing; it may be implied by the courts, unless the language of the statute excludes the theory that notice and hearing are necessary.⁷ Where a statute does not expressly provide for notice

³Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 78 L. ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 76 L. ed. 375, 52 S. Ct. 252; Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 74 L. ed. 1107, 50 S. Ct. 451; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 59 L. ed. 969, 35 S. Ct. 582; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 58 L. ed. 1363, 34 S. Ct. 779; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 234 U. S. 369, 58 L. ed. 1356, 34 S. Ct. 810; Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 S. Ct. 836; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 S. Ct. 825; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 350, 21 L. ed. 959; Pierce v. Superior Ct. 1 Cal. (2d) 759, 37 P. (2d) 453, 460, 96 A.L.R. 1020; Bicknell v. Herbert, 20 Haw. 132, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1186; Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118, 55 A.L.R. 196; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa, 290, 81 N. W. 604, 50 L.R.A. 92; Wichita Council, S. B. A. v. Security Ben. Asso. 138 Kan. 841, 28 P. (2d) 976, 94 A.L.R. 629; Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 72 A. 97, 8 A.L.R. 65; Ulman v. Baltimore, 224 Md. 587, 20 A. 141, 21 A. 709, 11 L.R.A. 224; People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170, 64 A.L.R. 1024; Dunn v. Love, 172 Miss. 342, 155 So. 331, 92 A.L.R. 1323, affirmed in 55 S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438; Lacey v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 54, 159 P. 949, L.R.A.1917A, 1185; Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 186, 167 S. E. 638, 87 A.L.R. 237; Gallagher v. National Nonpartisan League, 53 N. D. 238, 205 N. W. 674, citing R. C. L.; Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 P. 527, 24 L.R.A. 355; State v. Sullivan, 127 S. C. 136, 121 S. E. 47, citing R. C. L.; Ex parte Renfro, 115 Tex. 82, 273 S. W. 813, 40 A.L.R. 900; Dillon v. Whitley (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 229, citing R. C. L.; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584; Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N. W. 613, 24 A.L.R. 403.

⁴King v. Panther Lumber Co. 171 U. S. 437, 43 L. ed. 227, 18 S. Ct. 573; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404, 43 L. ed. 214, 18 S. Ct. 925; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372. Annotation: 13 L.R.A. 305. The words "law of the land" or "due process of law," when used in considering the property rights of individuals, mean summons or notice, such as is ordinarily given upon the institution of a suit, due appearance of the parties in interest, pleading of the facts in issue, and a determination thereof by a jury. State v. Rose, 33 Del. 168, 132 A. 864, 45 A.L.R. 85. "Remedy by due course of law," as used in the Kansas Bill of Rights, § 18, means the reparation for injury ordered by a tribunal having jurisdiction in due course of procedure after a fair hearing. Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041, 64 L.R.A. 790, 104 Am. St. Rep. 422.

⁷Tatlow v. Bacon, 101 Kan. 26, 165 P. 835, 14 A.L.R. 269, writ of error dismissed in 251 U. S. 537, 64 L. ed. 402, 40 S. Ct. 68.

§ 574. Requirement of Equality of Operation.—

stances,¹⁰ and not a partial or private law affecting the rights of a particular

of the class or of the community at large, unless the imposition or restraint is

privileges, and has no relation to the community in general is rather a sentence

it may safely be stated as a general rule that whatever, in the matter of classi-

⁹Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Hirth- Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 708; University of Mary- land v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72; Atty. Gen. v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L.R.A. 699, 41 Am. St. Rep. 606; J. O. Plott Co. v. H. K. Ferguson Co. 202 N. C. 446, 163 S. E. 688, citing R. C. L.; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1216, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 917; Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S. E. 274, 50 L.R.A. 279.

¹⁰Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282, affirming

¹¹Utah, 200, 39 P. 825, 29 L.R.A. 97; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721; Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 83 S. E. 645, L.R.A.1915D, 817, writ of error denied in 235 U. S. 694, 59 L. ed. 429, 35 S. Ct. 208; Off v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184, 14 Ann. Cas. 434; Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E. 1108, 32 L.R.A. 659, 52 Am. St. Rep. 365; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459,

⁴³N. E. 624, 32 L.R.A. 445, 52 Am. St. Rep. 344; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62, 22 L.R.A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 33 N. E. 421, 18 L.R.A. 729; Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212, 52 Am. Rep. 751; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789; State v. Creamer,

⁸⁵Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 394; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co.

⁷⁶Am. St. Rep. 682; Henley v. State, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S. W. 352, 1104, 39 L.R.A. 126; Stratton v. Morris, 89 Tenn. 497, 15 S. W. 87, 12 L.R.A. 70; Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 59, 30 Am. Dec. 430; State Bank v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 599, 24 Am. Dec. 517; Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 554, 24 Am. Dec. 511; Ex parte Sizemore,

¹¹Off v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184, 14 Ann. Cas. 434; Bailey v. People, 190 Ill. 28, 60 N. E. 98, 54 L.R.A. 838, 83 Am. St. Rep. 116; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62, 22 L.R.A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206.

¹²Atty. Gen. v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L.R.A. 699, 41 Am. St. Rep. 606.

¹³Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955, 56 L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682. As to the relationship between due proc- ess of law and equal protection of the laws, see supra, § 472.

¹⁴State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627, 48 L.R.A. 265, 77 Am. St. Rep. 765; Anderson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 90, 126 P. 840, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 314.

§ 575. Protection from Arbitrary Action.—

whether relating to his life, his liberty, or his property.¹⁸ It is a limitation

lished principles of private rights and distributive justice.²⁰ Substantially the

affecting the rights of the citizen.¹ Accordingly, in general terms it has been

¹⁸Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 38 L. ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes,

¹¹⁵U. S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 S. Ct. 110; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Bank of Columbia v. Okely,

⁴Wheat. (U. S.) 235, 4 L. ed. 559; Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho, 427, 262 P. 881, 56 A.L.R. 317; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223; Ashland Trans- fer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691, 87 A.L.R. 534; Leav- itt v. Canadian P. R. Co. 90 Me. 153, 37 A. 886, 38 L.R.A. 152; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 1058,

¹⁰⁰Am. St. Rep. 610; State v. Cudahy Packing Co. 33 Mont. 179, 82 P. 833, 114 Am. St. Rep. 804, 8 Ann. Cas. 717; State v. Moore, 104 N. C. 714, 10 S. E. 143, 17 Am. St. Rep. 696; First Nat. Bank v. Bovey, Shute & Jackson, 49 N. D. 450, 191 N. W. 765, citing R. C. L.; Ex parte Sizemore (Tex. Crim. Rep.) 8 S. W. (2d) 134, 59 A.L.R. 430; State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 A. 1081,

⁶³L.R.A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825; State v. Wetzel, 208 Wis. 603, 243 N. W. 768, 86 A.L.R. 274; Uram v. Roach, 47 Wyo. 335,

¹⁹Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469; Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 76 L. ed. 772, 52 S. Ct. 358; Davis v. Florida Power Co. 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon,

¹⁶Ann. Cas. 1234; Mt. Carmel Public Util- ity & Serv. Co. v. Public Utilities Commis- sion, 297 Ill. 303, 130 N. E. 693, 21 A.L.R. 571; Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 20 A. 141, 21 A. 709, 11 L.R.A. 224; Thurman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 254 Mass. 569,

¹⁵¹Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 60 A.L.R. 1325; First Nat. Bank v. Bovey, Shute & Jackson,

⁴⁹N. D. 450, 191 N. W. 765, citing R. C. L.; Sandel v. State, 115 S. C. 168, 104 S. E. 567,

²⁰Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; Minder v. Georgia,

¹⁸³U. S. 559, 46 L. ed. 328, 22 S. Ct. 224; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597,

²⁰S. Ct. 448, 494; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282, affirming 11 Utah, 200, 39 P. 825, 29 L.R.A. 97; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462,

³⁵L. ed. 225, 11 S. Ct. 577; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 235, 4 L. ed. 559; McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 126, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234; Blackman Health Resort v. Atlanta,

¹⁵¹Ga. 507, 107 S. E. 525, 17 A.L.R. 516 (police power); People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223; Klafter v. State Examiners, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N. E. 193,

⁴⁶L.R.A.(N.S.) 532, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1221; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L.R.A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus,

¹³³Ind. 513, 33 N. E. 421, 18 L.R.A. 729; State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650, 91 N. W. 935, 59 L.R.A. 437, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323; Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212, 52 Am. Rep. 751; Com. v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 175 N. E. 718, 79 A.L.R. 1380; Rosenbush v. Bern- heimer, 211 Mass. 146, 97 N. E. 984, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1317; Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140 N. W. 615, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789; First Nat. Bank v. Bovey, Shute & Jackson, 49 N. D. 450, 191 N. W. 765, citing R. C. L.; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955, 56 L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis (Tex.) 18 S. W. 723, 17 L.R.A. 236; Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308, 50 L.R.A. 577, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41. Annotation: 122 Am. St. Rep. 905.

¹Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 P. 1040, 70 P. 1083, 59 L.R.A. 581, 92 Am. St. Rep. 188; Parks v. State,

¹⁵⁹Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862, 59 L.R.A. 190; Scholle v. State, 90 Md. 729, 46 A. 326, 50 L.R.A. 411.

trary.⁵ The fact that a rule of law may, in certain instances, work a hardship

§ 576. Vesting Discretion as Arbitrary Denial.—

an arbitrary power and discretion over matters protected by the Constitution.⁸

cretion it sees fit to do so, and this has been held to be the effect of a statute

fer realty without the joinder of her husband who has vested interest therein.¹⁰

an animal is neglected, abandoned, or ill-treated, so as to justify its seizure,

has been considered to fall outside the pale of legitimate legislative action.¹¹

due process of law is absent.¹² Where a reasonable discretion has been vested,

⁶⁰So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 965. Orders of the President under authority of Congress fixing the price of coal as a war measure, the effect of which is merely to prevent the owner from obtaining more than the coal is worth, are not so clearly unreasonable and arbitrary as to render them repugnant to the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co. 279 U. S. 253,

³Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 77 L. ed. 1439, 53 S. Ct. 761. The cost of complying with state laws enacted to promote safety is an element properly to be taken into account in de- termining whether such laws are arbitrary and repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249, 75 L. ed. 1010, 51 S. Ct. 458.

⁶People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolver- ine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170, 69 A.L.R. 1024.

¹⁰Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 58 A. 969, 107 Am. St. Rep. 749, 67 L.R.A. 969, 2 Ann. Cas. 315. Annotation: 2 Ann. Cas. 317.

¹¹Jenks v. Stump, 41 Colo. 281, 93 P. 17, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 554, 124 Am. St. Rep. 137, 14 Ann. Cas. 914. Annotation: 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 554.

⁶⁸L. ed. 623, 44 S. Ct. 280; Winter v. Bar- rett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N. E. 113, 89 A.L.R. 1398; Turner v. Children's Home Soc. 158 Va. 406, 163 S. E. 399, 80 A.L.R. 1125. Merely prohibiting actions for damages for the sale of deficient fertilizer except aft- er chemical analysis, showing the deficien- cy, does not substitute the determination of the official for a trial in court, so as to constitute a deprivation of due process of law. Jones v. Union Guano Co. 264 U. S. 171, 68 L. ed. 623, 44 S. Ct. 280.

ed, the fees of the officer depending on the number of inspections.¹⁴ The com-

discretion of the jury does not make the statute violative of the constitutional

appellate review as may be provided.¹⁶ It has been authoritatively stated that

§ 577. Effect of Party Being Unsuccessful before Tribunal; Errors of Tri-

volving life, liberty, or property does not show that there has been a violation

of the due process of law guaranty.¹⁸ The reversal of a former decision to the

prejudice of one of the parties19 or a departure by the courts of the state from

necessary violation of the guaranty.¹ The highest court of a state, in overrul-

clared by it shall operate prospectively only or apply also to past transactions,

¹³Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. ed. 725, 20 S. Ct. 633; State v. Sherow,

⁸⁷Kan. 235, 123 P. 866, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1050; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com. 106 Ky. 633, 51 S. W. 164, 1012, 90 Am. St. Rep. 236, affirmed in 183 U. S. 503, 46 L. ed. 298,

¹⁷Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 44 L. ed. 520, 20 S. Ct. 410; Com. v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 148 A. 73, citing R. C. L.

¹⁸Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536, 70 L. ed. 1074, 46 S. Ct. 613; Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 63 L. ed. 108, 39 S. Ct. 16; Tracy v. Ginzberg, 205 U. S. 170, 51 L. ed. 755, 27 S. Ct. 461 (denying claim to ownership of property); Re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N. W. 534, 205 N. W. 613, 49 A.L.R. 320, error dismissed in Breen v. Hull, 275 U. S. 491,

⁷²L. ed. 390, 48 S. Ct. 33. Persons suing a state for damages are not deprived of their property without com- pensation, in violation of the Fifth Amend- ment of the Federal Constitution, by a de- cision of the court that the state had not consented to be sued. Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 63 L. ed. 108, 39 S. Ct. 16. Legitimate judicial discretion is due proc- ess of law. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 58 A. 969, 67 L.R.A. 969, 107 Am. St. Rep. 749, 2 Ann. Cas. 315. No denial of the due process of law guar- anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is involved in refusing to permit one sued on a judgment to set up, as a defense thereto, want of jurisdiction of his person, on which ground he had unsuccessfully sought dis- missal of the action in which judgment was rendered, as the doctrine of due process does not involve the right to litigate the same question twice. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso. 283 U. S. 522,

¹Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536, 70 L. ed. 1074, 46 S. Ct. 613; Holmes v. Conway, 241 U. S. 624, 60 L. ed. 1211, 36 S. Ct. 681.

²Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. 287 U. S. 358, 77 L. ed. 360, 53 S. Ct. 145, 85 A.L.R. 254. Annotation: 85 A.L.R. 262. [12 Am. Jur.]—18 273

The same rule applies to the errors of other tribunals or officers.⁵ So far as

fact that it is contrary to previous decisions has been said to be immaterial.⁶

close to the boundary of arbitrary action, there may be a violation of the guar-

man, not a denial of constitutional rights.⁸ It seems clear that a violation of

³Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. 287 U. S. 358, 77 L. ed. 360, 53 S. Ct. 145, 85 A.L.R. 254.

⁴American R. Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U. S. 269, 71 L. ed. 639, 47 S. Ct. 353; Corri- gan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 70 L. ed. 969,

⁴⁶S. Ct. 521; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 100, 64 L. ed. 476, 40 S. Ct. 306, 10 A.L.R. 892; Mc- Donald v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 233 U. S. 665, 58 L. ed. 1145, 34 S. Ct. 772; Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936; Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U. S. 86, 53 L. ed. 709, 29 S. Ct. 483; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164, 50 L. ed. 421, 26 S. Ct. 189; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 48 L. ed. 965,

²⁴S. Ct. 650; Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 44 L. ed. 1187, 20 S. Ct. 890, 1009; Cen- tral Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103,

⁴⁰L. ed. 91, 16 S. Ct. 80; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 S. Ct. 191; Ar- rowsmith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194, 30 L. ed. 243, 6 S. Ct. 1023; Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co. 256 Ill. 196,

⁹⁹N. E. 920, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 793, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 276; Cramer v. Farmers State Bank,

⁹⁸Kan. 641, 158 P. 1111, citing R. C. L.; Griggs v. Hanson, 86 Kan. 632, 121 P. 1094,

⁵²L.R.A.(N.S.) 1161, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 242; Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co. 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W. 760, 52 A.L.R. 723; State v. Orfanakis, 22 N. M. 107, 159 P. 674, citing R. C. L.; Apex Transp. Co. v. Garbade, 32 Or. 582, 52 P. 573, 54 P. 367, 882, 62 L.R.A. 513; Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172; Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902. A state cannot be deemed guilty of vio- lating the constitutional provision against depriving a person of liberty "without due process of law" because of a decision, even if erroneous, of its highest court while act- ing within its jurisdiction, as, for example, in a conviction and judgment for embezzle- ment. Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 S. Ct. 191. The rendition of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action upon a judgment of a court of another state over the defend- ants' objection that the judgment sued up- on was void for lack of valid service of process does not take the property of the defendants without due process of law where the second judgment rests upon the view, right or wrong, that as the issue of jurisdiction over the parties was raised and adjudicated after full hearing in the former case, it could not be reopened in the pres- ent suit. Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 61 L. ed. 966, 37 S. Ct. 492.

⁶Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 51 L. ed. 879, 27 S. Ct. 556, 10 Ann. Cas. 689.

⁷Roberts v. New York, 295 U. S. 264, 79 L. ed. 1429, 55 S. Ct. 689. In condemnation proceedings, as in law- suits generally, the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guaranty that a trial shall be free from error. To constitute a taking of prop- erty without due process of law by force of a judgment in such proceedings, such error must be gross and obvious, coming close to the boundary of arbitrary action. Ibid.

⁸Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 74 L. ed. 1107, 50 S. Ct. 451; Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 61 L. ed. 966, 37 S. Ct. 492.

⁹American R. Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U. S. 269, 71 L. ed. 639, 47 S. Ct. 353; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 70 L. ed. 969, 46 S. Ct. 521; West v. Louisiana,

¹⁹⁴U. S. 258, 48 L. ed. 965, 24 S. Ct. 650; Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699,

inal case,¹⁰ to an erroneous judgment as to what costs the law allows in a suit

punishment for contempt,¹² to an erroneous decision that the issue of jurisdic-

hearing,¹⁴ to a mistake as to the law of another state,¹⁵ to errors of a state

court in interpreting and applying the laws of that state,¹⁶ to errors in the

matter or of the parties,¹⁷ to an error of judgment on the part of the liquidated

agency of a closed bank in the compromise of liabilities,¹⁸ and to an error in

§ 578. Military Law as Due Process.—

United States the military law is due process.²⁰ The decision, therefore, of a

§ 579. Police Regulation.—

¹²Rothschild v. Steger, 256 Ill. 196, 99 N. E. 920, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 793, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 276.

¹⁴Jones v. Buffalo Creek Coal & Coke Co. 245 U. S. 328, 62 L. ed. 325, 38 S. Ct. 121.

¹⁵Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 61 L. ed. 966, 37 S. Ct. 492; Pennsyl- vania F. Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. 243 U. S. 93, 61 L. ed. 610, 37 S. Ct. 344; Porter v. Wilson, 239 U. S. 170, 60 L. ed. 204, 36 S. Ct. 91; Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co. 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W. 760, 52 A.L.R. 723. Since a mere mistake as to the law of an- other state is a question of fact, it is not a denial of due process of law. Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 61 L. ed. 966, 37 S. Ct. 492.

¹⁷Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 S. Ct. 825; Griggs v. Hanson, 86 Kan. 632,

²⁵⁹U. S. 326, 66 L. ed. 965, 42 S. Ct. 505; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 65 L. ed. 469,

⁴¹S. Ct. 224; Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U. S. 296, 55 L. ed. 225, 31 S. Ct. 230.

¹Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109, 39 L. ed. 914, 15 S. Ct. 773. See MILITARY [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 1010].

police power of the various states.⁴ This is true of the Fourteenth Amendment,⁵ including the guaranty of due process.⁶ The state is not deprived of the power to enact regulations.⁷ The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare, but merely require that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process.⁸ Even the fact that police regulations may prevent the enjoyment of rights in property without providing compensation does not necessarily render them violative of the due process clause.⁹ Regulation under a proper exercise of the police power is due process, even though a property in whole or in part is taken or destroyed.¹⁰

There are, however, some limitations upon the exercise of the police power. An arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of police power is not justified.¹¹ The

⁶Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465, 71 L. ed. 354, 47 S. Ct. 133, 47 A.L.R. 1044; Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U. S. 303, 57 L. ed. 520, 33 S. Ct. 290; Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 53 L. ed. 295, 29 S. Ct. 174; Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 S. Ct. 384 (imposition of liability upon place of amusement for wrongfully excluding patron); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Bd. of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 46 L. ed. 1209, 22 S. Ct. 811 (health regulation); New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. v. Louisiana, 180 U. S. 320, 45 L. ed. 550, 21 S. Ct. 378; Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U. S. 262, 42 L. ed. 461, 18 S. Ct. 80; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 S. Ct. 499; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721; Re Rahrer (Wilkerson v. Rahrer) 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 S. Ct. 865; Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A.L.R. 51; Blackman Health Resort v. Atlanta, 151 Ga. 507, 107 S. E. 525, 17 A.L.R. 516 (building regulation); Durand v. Dyson, 271 Ill. 382, 111 N. E. 143, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 84; White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409, 53 A.L.R. 1215. See Vol. 11, p. 998, § 262. An ordinance adopted under legislative authority by an inland town containing less than 6,000 inhabitants by which the owners of property abutting upon any street along which sewer mains had been laid were required to install waterclosets in their houses and connect the same with the main sewer pipe within thirty days from the passage of the ordinance, under penalty of fine and imprisonment for noncompliance, is a valid exercise of the police power and does not, though affording no notice or opportunity to be heard, deny either due process of law or the equal protection of the laws. Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U. S. 303, 57 L. ed. 520, 33 S. Ct. 290. A decree adjudging the charter of an alleged corporation to be null and void and enjoining the officers and stockholders from acting as a corporation on the ground that the purpose for which it was formed is illegal does not take away the property of the individual corporators without due process of law, or deny to them the equal protection of the laws. New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. v. Louisiana, 180 U. S. 320, 45 L. ed. 550, 21 S. Ct. 378. As to regulations generally, see infra, §§ 684 et seq.

⁷Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Bd. of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 46 L. ed. 1209, 22 S. Ct. 811 (quarantine). See infra, §§ 684 et seq.

⁸Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469.

⁹See Vol. 11, p. 1003, § 266. The enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a legitimate regulation established under the police power is not a taking of property without compensation or without due process of law in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 59 L. ed. 1204, 35 S. Ct. 678.

¹¹Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 156, 33 S. Ct. 76, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192; Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 53 L. ed. 295, 29 S. Ct. 174; Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U. S. 262, 42 L. ed. 461, 18 S. Ct. 80; Blackman Health Resort v. Atlanta, 151 Ga. 507, 107 S. E. 525, 17 A.L.R. 516; State v. Wetzel, 208 Wis. 603, 243 N. W. 768, 86 A.L.R. 274; Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N. W. 159, 34 A.L.R. 32. A city ordinance prohibiting colored persons from occupying as residences any house in any block in which the majority of residences are occupied by white people, thereby preventing white persons in such blocks from selling property to colored people for residence purposes, violates the constitutional prohibition against interference with property rights except by due process of law and cannot be sustained on the ground that it will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts or that the acquisition of property in such blocks by colored persons for residence purposes will cause the depreciation in value of property in the neighborhood owned by white persons. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149, 38 S. Ct. 16, L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201. An unconstitutional infringement of the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment which cannot be upheld as an exercise of the police power resulted from a municipal ordinance passed under the authority of Virginia Laws 1908, p. 623, which required the committee on streets, upon request of the owners of two thirds of the abutting property, to establish a building line on the side of the square on which such property abutted not less than 5 feet or more than 30 feet from the street line. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 156, 33 S. Ct.

state is bound to recognize, even in the exercise of its police power, the right of all persons to the security afforded by due process of law.¹² A law which assumes to be a police regulation, but deprives the citizen of the use of his property under the pretense of preserving the public health, safety, comfort, or welfare when it is manifest that such is not the real object and purpose of the regulation will be set aside as a clear and direct invasion of the right of property without any compensating advantages.¹³ The right of the state to make an unreasonable regulation restricting the right to use business property for business purposes14 has been denied. The courts will, however, be slow to strike down as unconstitutional legislation of the states enacted under the police power.¹⁵

B. MODIFICATION OF COMMON-LAW RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

§ 580. Generally.—

The fact that one of the tests of due process is the common law as it existed at the time of the establishment of our civil and political institutions16 does not prevent a change in the law as it then existed.17 There is no constitutional right to have all general propositions of law once adopted remain unchanged.18 It is not to be inferred that all modes of procedure which do not have the sanction of this early law are to be condemned.19 Nor can it be said that every form of procedure settled in English law at the time of the emigration to America and brought to this country and practiced by the early colonists is an essential element of due process of law. It has been pertinently remarked that if this were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon American jurisprudence like a strait jacket, only to be unloosened by constitutional amendment, and that it would be to deny every quality of the law but its age and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.20 The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.1

While change is thus permissible, neither Congress2 nor the states3 have power to make any process "due process of law" by their mere will. It has been said not to be within the power of Congress to withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which from its nature is the subject of a suit at the common law, in equity, or in admiralty.⁴ Nor can Congress bring under the

76, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192. See particularly Vol. 11, p. 994, § 260.

¹⁵Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah, 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259.

¹⁷Railroad Commission v. Louisville, etc. R. Co. 140 Ga. 817, 80 S. E. 327, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1018, L.R.A.1915E, 902; Nance v. O. K. Houck Piano Co. 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S. W. 1172, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 834. The phrase "law of the land" as used in a state Constitution merely refers to the common and statutory law then existing, but does not prohibit a change of the common law. Nance v. O. K. Houck Piano Co. 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S. W. 1172, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 834.

¹⁸Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 51 L. ed. 879, 27 S. Ct. 556, 10 Ann. Cas. 689.

¹⁹Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

¹Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469; State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) 204, 90 A.L.R. 805.

²Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308, 50 L.R.A. 577, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41.

⁴Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 S. Ct. 1016; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

§ 581. By States.—

gencies of their social life.⁶ It was not designed to interfere with the power

of the state to protect the lives, liberty, and property of its citizens or with

left with a wide range of legislative discretion, notwithstanding the provisions

it chooses to declare such.¹³ In other words, legislative fiat may not take the

⁵Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 S. Ct. 1016; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

⁶O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U. S. 244, 60 L. ed. 249, 36 S. Ct. 54 (irrigation); Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 56 L. ed. 215, 32 S. Ct. 92, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1349; Bolin v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 44 L. ed. 382, 20 S. Ct. 287; Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179,

⁹³So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359, writ of cer- tiorari denied in 260 U. S. 736, 67 L. ed. 488, 43 S. Ct. 96; Cordrey v. The Bee, 102 Or. 636, 201 P. 202, 20 A.L.R. 1079; Nance v. O. K. Houck Piano Co. 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S. W. 1172, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 834.

⁸Arizona Employers' Liability Cases (Ar- izona Copper Co. v. Hammer) 250 U. S. 400, 63 L. ed. 1058, 39 S. Ct. 553, 6 A.L.R. 1537.

⁹Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469.

¹⁰Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194, 30 L. ed. 243, 6 S. Ct. 1023; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678. Annotation: 2 L.R.A. 655.

¹¹People's Wayne County Bank v. Wol- verine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170,

¹²Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 71 L. ed. 270, 47 S. Ct. 103, 48 A.L.R. 1102.

³⁶N. E. 948, 24 L.R.A. 152, 41 Am. St. Rep. 329. Annotation: 41 Am. St. Rep. 338.

¹⁵Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375.

limitation upon the power of the states to prescribe penalties for violations of

their laws, it is always placed with the express or tacit qualification that the

§ 582. Remedies and Procedure.—

of law is not denied by the legislative change.²⁰ A procedure is not shown to

¹⁹Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214; Evans-Snyder-Buel Co. v. McFadden (C. C. A. 5th) 105 F. 293,

⁵³L.R.A. 900, affirmed in 185 U. S. 505, 46 L. ed. 1012, 22 S. Ct. 758; Billmyer Lumber Co. v. Merchants' Coal Co. 66 W. Va. 696,

²⁰Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 78 L. ed. 342, 54 S. Ct. 140; Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214. The cutting down of the remedy of an abutting owner, dissatisfied with an award for the damages caused by the construction of an elevated viaduct changing the street grade, from a general review in a state court of general jurisdiction of the proceed- ings of the board confirming the award, to a review limited to questions of jurisdic- tion, fraud, and wilful misconduct on the part of the officials composing the board, does not take the property of such owner without due process of law. Crane v. Hah- lo, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. ed. 514, 42 S. Ct. 214.

¹⁷⁵Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, 51 L.R.A. 433, writ of error dismissed in 179 U. S. 405,

²Montane Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. 152 U. S. 160, 38 L. ed. 398, 14 S. Ct. 506.

⁴Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co. 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227, 38 A.L.R. 1263.

⁷Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed. 1593, 55 S. Ct. 854, 97 A.L.R. 1106, rehearing denied in 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82.

therein, if the statutory provisions are consonant with a fair, reasonable, and equitable distribution of those assets.⁸

§ 583. —

Powers of States.—The procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control.9 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not control mere forms of procedure in state courts or regulate practice therein;10 nor is it designed to reach errors in the administration of the laws not involving jurisdiction of the subject or of the parties.11 The due process clause does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular form or method of state procedure. A state may regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless it offends some principle of justice ranked as fundamental,12 such as the requirements of hearing and notice,13 or unless it is unreasonable or arbitrary.14 There is nothing in the Federal Constitution or its amendments that requires a state to maintain the familiar line between the functions of the jury and those of the court.15

When a regular course of justice by an efficacious remedy is secured by the law of the state, the constitutional requirement contained in the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied.¹⁶ It has sometimes been broadly stated that the adjudication of a person's claims by the courts of his own state is due process of law,¹⁷ that what is due process of law in a state is regulated by the law of the state,¹⁸ that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment are satisfied if trial is had according to the settled course of judicial procedure obtaining in the particular state and the laws operate on all persons alike and do not sub-

⁹Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 80 L. ed. 682, 56 S. Ct. 461; Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Bank v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359, writ of certiorari denied in 260 U. S. 736, 67 L. ed. 488, 43 S. Ct. 96; Jardine v. Superior Ct. 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756, 79 A.L.R. 291, appeal dismissed in 284 U. S. 592, 76 L. ed. 510, 52 S. Ct. 197; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Taber, 98 Ky. 503, 32 S. W. 168, 36 S. W. 18, 34 L.R.A. 685; Cordrey v. The Bee, 102 Or. 636, 201 P. 202, 20 A.L.R. 1079.

¹⁰Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Holmes v. Conway, 241 U. S. 624, 60 L. ed. 1211, 36 S. Ct. 681; McDonald v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 233 U. S. 665, 58 L. ed. 1145, 34 S. Ct. 772; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 31 S. Ct. 625; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 S. Ct. 620; Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 40 L. ed. 467, 16 S. Ct. 344; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678. See supra, §§ 569 et seq.

¹²Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 78 L. ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575 (criminal procedure); Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 59 L. ed. 969, 35 S. Ct. 582; Tyson v. Washington County, 78 Neb. 211, 110 N. W. 634, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 350; State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) 204, 90 A.L.R. 805; Cordrey v. The Bee, 102 Or. 636, 201 P. 202, 20 A.L.R. 1079; Apex Transp. Co. v. Garbade, 32 Or. 582, 52 P. 573, 54 P. 367, 882, 62 L.R.A. 513; Bettman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 P. 53, 40 L.R.A. 815. Annotation: 2 L.R.A. 655; 11 L.R.A. 224.

¹³Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 314, 47 L. ed. 487, 23 S. Ct. 395, 63 L.R.A. 471.

¹⁴Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 S. Ct. 200; Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359, writ of certiorari denied in 260 U. S. 736, 67 L. ed. 488, 43 S. Ct. 96; Cordrey v. The Bee, 102 Or. 636, 201 P. 202, 20 A.L.R. 1079.

¹⁵Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54, 64 L. ed. 133, 40 S. Ct. 68.

¹⁶New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41 L. ed. 853, 17 S. Ct. 418; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 S. Ct. 577; Schuster v. Weiss, 114 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 438, 19 L.R.A. 182.

¹⁷Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 36 L. ed. 986, 13 S. Ct. 105; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54.

¹⁸Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W. 508, L.R.A.1918A, 339.

ject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,¹⁹ or that the law of the state is the law of the land.²⁰ If the state courts have acted in consonance with the constitutional laws of the state and its own procedure, it is only in very exceptional cases that a Federal court will interfere on the ground that there has been a failure of due process.¹ The proceedings in a state court need not be by any particular mode if they constitute a regular course of proceedings in which notice is given of the claim asserted and an opportunity afforded to defend against it.²

The procedure of a state does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem fairer or wiser or give a surer promise of protection to a prisoner.³

There is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent a state from providing such a system of courts as it chooses.⁴ A state has the right to determine for itself the courts in which crime may be prosecuted and the appellate tribunal, if any, to which such causes may be carried for review.⁵

The Fourteenth Amendment did not impair the authority of the states by their judicial tribunals and according to their settled usages and established modes of procedure to determine finally for the parties before them controverted questions as to the ownership or property, which did not involve any rights secured by the Federal Constitution, by any valid act of Congress, or by any treaty.⁶

A state may, consistent with due process of law, abolish the defense of contributory negligence7 or require that the defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall in all cases be left to the jury.⁸ The legislature has power to provide what portion of the property of a quasi-public corporation necessary for corporate purposes shall be subject to sale and when and how it shall be sold for the payment of its debts.⁹

It is nevertheless necessary for the state laws to adhere to certain fundamental rules.¹⁰ While a state has full power over remedies and procedure in

¹⁹Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; Minder v. Georgia, 183 U. S. 559, 46 L. ed. 328, 22 S. Ct. 224; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 43 L. ed. 91, 18 S. Ct. 805; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282; Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 101, 41 L. ed. 87, 16 S. Ct. 990; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, 41 L. ed. 78, 16 S. Ct. 1031; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 38 L. ed. 485, 14 S. Ct. 570; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 S. Ct. 437 (cost of grade crossing elimination); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 S. Ct. 721; Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U. S. 452, 36 L. ed. 224, 12 S. Ct. 528 (refusal to amend record in derogation of judgment); Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 S. Ct. 577; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 34 L. ed. 816, 11 S. Ct. 224; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 S. Ct. 191; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 127; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109, 8 S. Ct. 1176; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 S. Ct. 1161; Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A.L.R. 51.

¹Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 56 L. ed. 1038, 32 S. Ct. 651; Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586, 42 L. ed. 865, 18 S. Ct. 435; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138, 41 L. ed. 949, 17 S. Ct. 525.

²Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 50 L. ed. 256, 26 S. Ct. 87 (criminal prosecution); Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 314, 47 L. ed. 487, 23 S. Ct. 395, 63 L.R.A. 471; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 S. Ct. 836.

³Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 78 L. ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575.

⁴Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 71 L. ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243; State ex rel. McCaffery v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 466, 54 S. W. 494, 47 L.R.A. 393.

⁷Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54, 64 L. ed. 133, 40 S. Ct. 68.

⁸Herron v. Southern P. Co. 283 U. S. 91, 75 L. ed. 857, 51 S. Ct. 383; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54, 64 L. ed. 133, 40 S. Ct. 68 (provision was in state Constitution).

⁹Bass v. Roanoke Nav. & Water Power Co. 111 N. C. 439, 16 S. E. 402, 19 L.R.A. 247.

¹⁰West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 48 L. ed. 965, 24 S. Ct. 650; Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co. 256 Ill. 196,

its own courts and can make any order it pleases in respect of these, the substance of right must be secured and preserved to parties and litigants without unreasonable burdens.¹¹

It is not within the power of the state to take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right.¹²

§ 584. —

Conditions upon Exercise.—While conditions may be imposed on the exercise of a remedy, especially one created by the state and not one of common or natural right,13 a different remedy which is unreasonable and imposes conditions so onerous and impracticable as to give substantially no remedy is unconstitutional.14

§ 585. Definiteness of Statutes and Orders.—

It is a general principle of statutory law that a statute must be definite to be valid.15 A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.16 On the other hand, where the words assailed, taken in connection with the context, are commonly understood, their use does not render a statute invalid.17 The same is true as to an order of court.18

A great many statutes have been sustained against the contention that they were so uncertain or indefinite that the enforcement thereof did not constitute due process of law. Thus, statutes defining rent as "unjust and unreasonable,"¹⁹ a statute prohibiting the "unreasonable waste" of natural gas,²⁰ and a provision in a statute penalizing misstatement, in the required marking on a package containing an article of food, of the quantity of its contents that "reasonable variation shall be permitted and tolerances and also exemptions as to small packages shall be established by rules and regulations by

⁹⁹N. E. 920, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 793, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 276; Byers v. Meridian Printing Co. 84 Ohio St. 408, 95 N. E. 917, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 913. As to these fundamental rules, see supra, §§ 569 et seq.

¹²Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 S. Ct. 903, 962; Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 40 N. E. 1025, 31 L.R.A. 70, 46 Am. St. Rep. 348. **The right to a remedy by due course of law** is not satisfied by the requirement contained in a statute to make specific reparation for the injury done, which reparation is the same in all cases, bears no relation to the injury suffered, and has not been decreed by a tribunal after ascertainment of the extent of such injury. Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041, 64 L.R.A. 790, 104 Am. St. Rep. 422; Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N. Y. 190, 28 N. E. 1040, 13 L.R.A. 304, 26 Am. St. Rep. 464.

¹³Gano v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 114 Iowa, 713, 87 N. W. 714, 55 L.R.A. 263, 89 Am. St. Rep. 393, affirmed in 190 U. S. 557, 47 L. ed. 1183, 23 S. Ct. 854.

¹⁴Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; White v. Ward, 157 Ala. 345, 47 So. 166, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 568; Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 486, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061. **The court cannot enter judgment in favor** of the plaintiff in an action for the recovery of real estate of which the defendant is in possession, because of the defendant's noncompliance with a rule of court requiring him to deposit one half the reporter's per diem before proceeding to trial, since it deprives him of his property without due process of law. Meacham v. Bear Valley Irrig. Co. 145 Cal. 606, 79 P. 281, 68 L.R.A. 600.

¹⁵As to the definiteness of statutes generally, see STATUTES [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 750]. As to the definiteness of statutes relating to workmen's compensation laws, see WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS [Also 28 R. C. L. p. 709].

¹⁶Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500, 70 L. ed. 1059, 46 S. Ct. 619; Connally v. General Constr. Co. 269 U. S. 385, 70 L. ed. 322, 46 S. Ct. 126; Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435; Vallat v. Radium Dial Co. 360 Ill. 407, 196 N. E. 485, 99 A.L.R. 607.

¹⁷Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d) 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435.

¹⁸McCreery v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co. 363 Ill. 321, 2 N. E. (2d) 290, 105 A.L.R. 75.

¹⁹Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 66 L. ed. 595, 42 S. Ct. 289.

²⁰Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct. 284 U. S. 8, 76 L. ed. 136, 52 S. Ct. 103, 78 A.L.R. 826.

administrative officers"¹ have been held not so indefinite as to violate the due process guaranty clause. On the other hand, statutes using the terms "reasonable," "approved," etc., in defining the measure of duty, have been disapproved.² A statute which permits the state board of dental examiners to revoke the license of any dentist for gross violation of professional duties or for incompetency is not so indefinite as to violate the due process clause.³

The absence of any definite rules as to what is a "long and short haul" in the clause in a Federal statute relating to the Interstate Commerce Commission,⁴ the failure to describe an "isolated sale" of a security in a securities act,⁵ a provision in a statute for the fixing of a barrier pillar between adjoining coal properties that it shall be determined "by the engineers of the adjoining property owners, together with the inspector of the district in which the mine is situated,"⁶ and a provision in a statute relating to innkeepers that in case of fire they shall "do all in their power" to save guests and inmates have been held not to be so indefinite as to violate the guaranty clause.⁷ A provision for a license or excise tax upon the gross income of the business in a stated city of a telephone company which does both an interstate and an intrastate business and carries on its operations within and outside the city cannot be held invalid on the ground of indefiniteness before administrative action by the officer whose duty it is to interpret the ordinance, since before such action the ordinance cannot be said to fall short of the requirements of due process.⁸

An executive order must, in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process, show the existence of the particular circumstances and conditions under which the making of such an order has been authorized by Congress.⁹

C. PERSONS AFFECTED BY GUARANTY

§ 586. Generally.—

The requirements of due process of law extend to every case of the exercise of governmental power.10 The limitations inherent in the requirements as to due process of law are binding equally on the United States11 and on the several states.12

¹United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co. 287 U. S. 77, 77 L. ed. 175, 53 S. Ct. 42.

²Vallat v. Radium Dial Co. 360 Ill. 407, 196 N. E. 485, 99 A.L.R. 607. Annotation: 99 A.L.R. 613.

³State Dental Examiners v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P. (2d) 693, 82 A.L.R. 1176, appeal dismissed in 287 U. S. 562, 77 L. ed. 496, 53 S. Ct. 5.

⁴Intermountain Rate Cases (United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.) 234 U. S. 476, 58 L. ed. 1408, 34 S. Ct. 986; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 234 U. S. 495, 58 L. ed. 1426, 34 S. Ct. 995.

⁶Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 58 L. ed. 713, 34 S. Ct. 359.

⁸Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 638, 78 L. ed. 1037, 54 S. Ct. 550; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 78 L. ed. 1025, 54 S. Ct. 542, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 603, 78 L. ed. 1466, 54 S. Ct. 712.

¹⁰Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 S. Ct. 367; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 S. Ct. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 126, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234.

¹¹Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. ed. 496; Hines v. Dahn (C. C. A. 8th) 267 F. 105, affirmed in 258 U. S. 421, 66 L. ed. 696, 42 S. Ct. 320; Vaughn v. State, 17 Ala. App. 35, 81 So. 417 (writ of certiorari denied in 203 Ala. 700, 82 So. 894) citing R. C. L.

disregard the constitutional prohibition.¹³ The inhibition includes all functionaries of state government, judicial as well as political.¹⁴

It is recognized that the United States cannot interfere with private rights, except for legitimate governmental purposes. Nor can the Federal Government15 or any agencies set up by Congress for the government of its territory16 violate the guaranty of due process. The great substantive powers of Congress are all subject in their operation to the guaranties of due process contained in the Fifth Amendment.¹⁷ The amendment has been applied to restrict the powers of Congress within the limitations of due process in the exercise of the war power,¹⁸ the taxing power,¹⁹ the bankruptcy power,²⁰ the power to regulate commerce,¹ and the power to exclude aliens.² The Supreme Court has held, however, that although rights in contracts are property within the purview of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, of which parties cannot be despoiled by congressional action, contracts involving payment in gold include a congenital infirmity when they are made in that they affect a matter over which congressional control may be exercised at any time in the future, and, therefore, an act of Congress which has the effect of nullifying contractual provisions as to payment in gold, passed by Congress under its constitutional power to regulate money, does not violate the Fifth Amendment.³

Where rights are acquired by a citizen under the existing law, there is no power in any branch of the government to take them away except by due process of law.⁴ The purpose of this clause is to exclude arbitrary power from every branch of the government.⁵ So far, at least, as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, it is a restraint on the legislative,⁶ executive,⁷ and judicial

¹³Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 74 L. ed. 1107, 50 S. Ct. 451; Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 281 U. S. 505, 74 L. ed. 999, 50 S. Ct. 369; Phillip Wagner v. Leser, 239 U. S. 207, 60 L. ed. 230, 36 S. Ct. 66; Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 57 L. ed. 510, 33 S. Ct. 312; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Abbott v. National Bank, 175 U. S. 409, 44 L. ed. 217, 20 S. Ct. 153; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 37 L. ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18; Cincinnati v. Vester (C. C. A. 6th) 33 F. (2d) 242, 68 A.L.R. 831, affirmed in 281 U. S. 439, 74 L. ed. 950, 50 S. Ct. 360; Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 20 A. 141, 21 A. 709, 11 L.R.A. 224; Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 P. 527, 24 L.R.A. 355; Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308, 50 L.R.A. 577, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41. Annotation: 98 A.L.R. 411.

¹⁷Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed. 1593, 55 S. Ct. 854, 97 A.L.R. 1106, rehearing denied in 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82.

¹⁸Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. 251 U. S. 146, 64 L. ed. 194, 40 S. Ct. 106; Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. S. 139, 57 L. ed. 1427, 33 S. Ct. 1033; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 2, 18 L. ed. 281.

¹⁹Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 76 L. ed. 772, 52 S. Ct. 358; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 72 L. ed. 206, 48 S. Ct. 105; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 71 L. ed. 1184, 47 S. Ct. 710, 52 A.L.R. 1081; Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 69 L. ed. 703, 45 S. Ct. 135, 348; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 S. Ct. 524; United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 17 Wall. (U. S.) 322, 21 L. ed. 597.

²⁰Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed. 1593, 55 S. Ct. 854, 97 A.L.R. 1106, rehearing denied in 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82.

¹United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 61 L. ed. 746, 37 S. Ct. 380; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539, 23 S. Ct. 349; Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 199 U. S. 401, 50 L. ed. 246, 26 S. Ct. 66; United States v. Joint Traffic Asso. 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. ed. 259, 19 S. Ct. 25; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 S. Ct. 622.

³Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352.

⁵State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399, 3 Am. Rep. 636; Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 171, 40 Am. Dec. 493. The denial of rights given by the Fourteenth Amendment need not be by legislation. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317, 61 L. ed. 1163, 37 S. Ct. 638.

⁶Ex parte Rhodes, 202 Ala. 68, 79 So. 462, 1 A.L.R. 568; State v. Rose, 33 Del. 168, 132 A. 864, 45 A.L.R. 85; State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A.

departments8 of the state. It seems undoubted that the people of a sovereign state in drafting and adopting a state Constitution are bound to respect these limitations equally with the legislative and other departments of government acting under such Constitution.⁹

The object of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law is to preserve personal and property rights against the arbitrary action of public officials.¹⁰ Hence, it is recognized that administrative officers when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons have no right to disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in due process of law.¹¹ The action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the state may constitute state action within the purview of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹² The guaranty may be violated by unfairness or corruption of officers.¹³ The guaranty is violated whenever any person, by virtue of public position under the Federal or state government, deprives another of any right protected by that amendment.¹⁴ It has been asserted that the guaranty should be enforced even against persons assuming to act under the authority of the government.¹⁵ The act of the public official of a state is the act of the state in depriving an individual of property, life, or liberty without due process of law.¹⁶

The acts of a municipal corporation cannot be said to be wanting in the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, if such acts, when done or ratified by the state, would not be inconsistent with that amendment.¹⁷

§ 587. Private Persons.—

The provisions of the due process clause in a state Constitution and in the Federal Constitution are inhibitions upon the power of government and its agencies, not upon freedom of action of private persons in respect of disposition of their own property; and hence do not preclude a testator from providing that any contestant of his will shall be deprived of any share in his estate.18

§ 588. Generally.—

It is obvious that the guaranty of due process of law inures to the benefit of persons who are citizens of the United States or of the state in which the question arises. It is not, however, limited to such citizens.

519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756; Ladner v. Siegel Co. 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172; Simmons v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 63 S. C. 425, 41 S. E. 521, 57 L.R.A. 607.

⁸Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 74 L. ed. 1107, 50 S. Ct. 451; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223; Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 20 A. 141, 21 A. 709, 11 L.R.A. 224; State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756; Ladner v. Siegel Co. 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172.

⁹State ex rel. Wausau Street R. Co. v. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 526. Annotation: 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 258.

¹¹Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher) 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 S. Ct. 611; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223.

¹²Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 79 L. ed. 791, 55 S. Ct. 340, 98 A.L.R. 406, rehearing denied in 294 U. S. 732, 79 L. ed. 1261, 55 S. Ct. 511. Annotation: 98 A.L.R. 411.

¹⁴Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Indiana Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. State, 158 Ind. 516, 63 N. E. 220, 57 L.R.A. 761.

¹⁷Owensboro Waterworks Co. v. Owensboro, 200 U. S. 38, 50 L. ed. 361, 26 S. Ct. 249.

¹⁸Re Chambers, 322 Mo. 1086, 18 S. W. (2d) 30, 67 A.L.R. 41. Annotation: 67 A.L.R. 52.

The guaranty is universal in its application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality.¹⁹ Persons yet unascertained and unborn are not deprived of their rights without due process of law by making them defendants in a bill to remove a cloud upon title and having them represented by a guardian ad litem.²⁰

The guaranty does not extend to persons in governmental capacity who are claiming injury only in such capacity.¹

§ 589. Aliens.—

It has been broadly stated that aliens within the United States are within the protection of the due process guaranty.3 At least, an alien lawfully within the United States is entitled to the benefits of the guaranties of life, liberty, and property secured by the Constitution to all persons. His personal rights when he is in this country and such of his property as is here during his absence are protected as fully as those of a citizen.4 The alien has been held entitled to the protection of the guaranty although he is alleged to be here illegally.5

When an alien is beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, he can enter only on compliance with the statutory requirements, and Congress may lawfully provide that the question of his right to admission shall be finally determined by administrative officers.⁶

§ 590. Corporations.—

In so far as property of corporations is concerned, corporations are protected by the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.7 Whether a foreign corporation is doing business within a state, so as to give the courts jurisdiction over it, has been stated to raise a question of due process of law under the Federal Constitution.8 The liberty guaranteed is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.9

§ 591. Insane Persons.10—

It is generally recognized that it is within the duties and powers of the state to provide for the care and treatment of its insane, with such confinement and restraint of their liberty as may be necessary for that purpose. The courts, however, have not undertaken precisely to define the limitations of the power which the state possesses in this respect, except by the announcement of general principles essential to their welfare and

¹⁹Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 S. Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283.

²⁰Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 49 N. E. 652, 40 L.R.A. 127, 64 Am. St. Rep. 301.

³Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 74 L. ed. 926, 50 S. Ct. 338, 74 A.L.R. 701; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 41 L. ed. 140, 16 S. Ct. 977 (criminal proceeding); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407. Annotation: 68 L. ed. 255. Alien inhabitants of a state may invoke the protection of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15. See ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 467, § 9.

⁴Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21 S. Ct. 770; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 39 L. ed. 1082, 15 S. Ct. 967; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064. Annotation: 68 L. ed. 255. See ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 467, § 9.

⁵Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher) 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 S. Ct. 611.

⁶United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 49 L. ed. 1040, 25 S. Ct. 644; United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 48 L. ed. 917, 24 S. Ct. 621. See also ALIENS, Vol. 2, p. 465, §§ 7 et seq., where the power of Congress and the nature of its enactments are considered at length.

¹⁰As to insane person accused of crime, see CRIMINAL LAW; INSANE AND OTHER INCOMPETENT PERSONS.

the protection of the public.¹¹ Some of the requirements imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment are of sufficient importance to warrant mention in the present connection. A person even if insane cannot be deprived of his liberty without due process of law, which includes notice and an opportunity of being heard. While a state may provide for the temporary confinement of a person alleged to be insane, on a sufficient showing, pending proceedings for the determination of his sanity,¹² a person cannot be permanently deprived of his liberty on the ground of insanity without such notice and hearing,¹³ as by indefinite confinement upon a mere certificate of practicing physicians,¹⁴ although the certificate of physicians may be made prima facie evidence, subject to be overcome by countervailing evidence.¹⁵ It is no answer to say that the person is insane and consequently notice to him will be useless, for that is assuming as a fact the very thing in question, which is presumed to be otherwise until proved.¹⁶ Where the person alleged to be insane has been given notice but is not produced at the trial because, on examination by a physician, his presence is deemed to be inconsistent with his health or safety, the requirements as to due process of law are met,¹⁷ especially where any relative or any citizen of the county may appear and resist the application.¹⁸ On somewhat the same principles as are applicable in the case of insane persons, due process of law has been held not to be denied by a statute providing for the commitment of inebriates, without their consent, to a public hospital conducted by the state for the treatment of inebriates.¹⁹

§ 592. Children.20—

It is well recognized that the state, as parens patriæ, may take into its custody a wayward child without being required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hands upon the child to lead it into one of its courts.21 Many statutes provide for notice and hearing. Such notice and hearing are held to constitute due process.1 Due process of law has been considered not to be denied by a statute authorizing the grand jury, where an infant under the age of sixteen years is charged with crime and the charge appears to be supported by evidence sufficient to put the accused upon trial, instead of finding an indictment, to return to the court that the accused is a suitable person to be committed to a house of refuge and directing the court

¹¹Re Boyett, 136 N. C. 415, 48 S. E. 789, 67 L.R.A. 972, 103 Am. St. Rep. 944, 1 Ann. Cas. 729; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. Annotation: 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. See generally, INSANE AND OTHER INCOMPETENT PERSONS [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 546].

¹²Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A. 169, 39 L.R.A. 353. The right to restrain an insane person is not governed by the general law which provides that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa, 7, 177 N. W. 541, 10 A.L.R. 482.

¹³State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206, 794, 43 Am. St. Rep. 525; Re Boyett, 136 N. C. 415, 48 S. E. 789, 67 L.R.A. 972, 103 Am. St. Rep. 944, 1 Ann. Cas. 729.

¹⁴Re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851, 55 L.R.A. 856, 86 Am. St. Rep. 296; Re Gannon, 16 R. I. 537, 18 A. 159, 5 L.R.A. 359, 27 Am. St. Rep. 759; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. Annotation: 5 L.R.A. 359.

¹⁶State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206, 794, 43 Am. St. Rep. 525; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. Annotation: 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232; 43 Am. St. Rep. 531.

¹⁹Leavitt v. Morris, 105 Minn. 170, 117 N. W. 393, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 984, 15 Ann. Cas. 961. Annotation: 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 984.

²⁰As to right of parent to notice and hearing before being deprived of custody of child, see annotation: 76 A.L.R. 242. See PARENT AND CHILD [Also 20 R. C. L. p. 597, §§ 13 et seq.]. As to juvenile proceedings, see JUVENILE COURTS AND OFFENDERS.

²¹Re Sharp, 15 Idaho, 120, 96 P. 563, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 886; Com. v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, 5 Ann. Cas. 92. See INFANTS [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 213].

thereupon to order its commitment without trial by jury.² In general, it may be stated that a state may provide for the commitment of minors to industrial schools and houses of refuge under appropriate circumstances without providing for a jury trial.³

**§ ⁵⁹³. Public Bodies.**—So far as the state and its instrumentalities are concerned, there is no scope for invoking the due process guaranty as against the action of the state itself. The state may authorize a suit against itself.⁴ A governmental agency which is not authorized to hold property in a private sense is not deprived of property without due process of law by a statute providing for the extinguishment of its title to land.⁵

In the application of this rule to municipalities the question depends upon the view taken in the particular jurisdiction as to the rights of a municipal government. In a majority of states the right of the people of a municipality to control its affairs is not considered as an inherent right residing in the people, but as dependent for its existence on the legislative will.⁶ In such jurisdictions the state has a power over the rights and properties of cities which is unrestricted by the due process guaranty.⁷ The state may, without violating the guaranty, interfere with the right of a municipality to take water from a public stream although such municipality acquired the right from a private grantee of the state.⁸ The state may impose a license fee or charge for the diversion of water from the stream.⁹ It may abrogate a right of setoff previously given to a municipal corporation,¹⁰ charge a municipal corporation with public obligations,¹¹ or make a municipality liable for damages by a mob or riot.¹² Similarly, the state is held to have power over a school district, so that its action in creating a new district to which is given property within its limits which had belonged to the district from which it was created cannot be attacked on the ground of violation of due process of law.¹³ A school corporation may be charged with special assessments.¹⁴ The same rule applies to townships15 and to counties,¹⁶ although there has been some variance in this

³Re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 42 Am. Rep. 10; Re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 680, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 317; Milwaukee Industrial School v. Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 22 Am. Rep. 702.

⁴Sandel v. State, 115 S. C. 168, 104 S. E. 567, 13 A.L.R. 1268, holding that a statute authorizing suit against the state for death of a child killed by impure vaccine furnished by the state does not violate the constitutional provision against depriving one of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

⁵Essex Public Road Bd. v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. ed. 446, 11 S. Ct. 790. New Jersey Law March 31, 1882, providing a mode by which an assessment may be compromised and discharged where the real estate has been sold to the public road board, which is an involuntary quasi corporation created to construct a public work, does not impair a contract or deprive the board of property without due process of law. Such a public agency cannot own property in a proprietary or private sense. Ibid.

⁷Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 S. Ct. 534, 29 A.L.R. 1471.

¹⁰New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142.

¹¹State ex rel. Bulkeley v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 A. 24, 421, 48 L.R.A. 465, affirmed in 120 U. S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 S. Ct. 617.

¹²Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 56 L. ed. 215, 32 S. Ct. 92, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1349.

¹³Atty. Gen. ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233, 50 L. ed. 167, 26 S. Ct. 27; Pass School Dist. v. Hollywood City School Dist. 156 Cal. 416, 105 P. 122, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 485, 20 Ann. Cas. 87.

¹⁴Windfall City v. Somerville, 181 Ind. 463, 104 N. E. 859, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 661.

¹⁵Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U. S. 522, 56 L. ed. 294, 32 S. Ct. 103. A state law directing that five towns shall maintain a bridge and highway, each bearing a share in the expense thereof, and creating them a body corporate under a particular name for the care and maintenance of the bridge and highway does not deprive of property without due process of law. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 S. Ct. 617.

respect.¹⁷ It has been held that the state cannot, in view of the constitutional provisions that no one shall be deprived of his property except by the law of the land, require a county to give bond for payment of interest on money loaned a township for improving a highway of an exclusively local nature.¹⁸

The state may compel a township, as one of its political subdivisions, to levy and collect taxes for the purpose of paying the amount assessed against such township for the public benefits accruing from the construction of a drain19 or determine what duties may be performed by local officers and whether they shall be appointed or elected by the people.²⁰ It may impose upon a county the cost of maintaining its harmless insane when the insane persons themselves or their relatives are not able to do so, even though the county is not made party to the proceedings in which the necessary facts are determined.

In other jurisdictions the right to local self-government is treated as inherent in cities and towns and, if not surrendered on the adoption of the state Constitution, cannot be taken away by the legislature.¹ In these jurisdictions the due process guaranty applies to municipal corporations,² at least as to its proprietary functions.³

The right of home rule by cities has been established in a number of states by constitutional provision.⁴ A home-rule city is protected by the due process guaranty.⁵ The constitutional protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against state action does not extend to the mere interest of an official, as such, who has not been deprived of his property without due process of law or denied the equal protection of the laws.⁶

D. NOTICE

**§ ⁵⁹⁴. Generally.**—As stated in an earlier section, one of the essentials of due process is notice.⁷ This is especially true in proceedings of a judicial nature affecting the property rights of citizens.⁸ The notice essential to due process of law in such proceedings is original notice whereby the court acquires original jurisdiction, and not notice of the time when jurisdiction already completely vested will be exercised.⁹

²People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716, 52 L.R.A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605.

³State ex rel. Kern v. Arnold, 100 Mont. 346, 49 P. (2d) 976, 100 A.L.R. 1071, holding that an act of the legislature requiring a city which is empowered, but not compelled, to maintain a paid fire department to set up a 3-platoon system and to pay a stated minimum salary to firemen is unconstitutional as depriving the city of its property without due process of law.

⁵State ex rel. Missoula v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 47 P. (2d) 624, 100 A.L.R. 581, holding that a statute making it compulsory upon cities and towns to insure their public buildings and property in a state insurance fund violates the due process and home-rule provisions of the state Constitution. Annotation: 100 A.L.R. 600.

⁸Loesch v. Koehler, 144 Ind. 278, 41 N. E. 326, 43 N. E. 129, 35 L.R.A. 682; Levee Comrs. v. Johnson, 178 Ky. 287, 199 S. W. 8, L.R.A.1918E, 202; Baker v. Baker, E. & Co. 162 Ky. 683, 173 S. W. 109, L.R.A.1917C, 171, affirmed in 242 U. S. 394, 61 L. ed. 386, 31 S. Ct. 152; Riley v. Pearson, 120 Minn. 210, 139 N. W. 361, L.R.A.1916D, 7; Davis v. St. Louis County, 65 Minn. 310, 67 N. W. 997, 33 L.R.A. 432, 60 Am. St. Rep. 475; State ex rel. Ferrocarriles Nacionales v. Rutledge, 331 Mo. 1015, 56 S. W. (2d) 28, 85 A.L.R. 1378; Jones v. Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 426; Davies v. Thompson, 61 Okla. 21, 160 P. 75, L.R.A.1917B, 395; Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308, 50 L.R.A. 577, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41.

⁹As to process generally, see PROCESS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 1279, §§ 23 et seq.]. [12 Am. Jur.]—19 289

erty conformably to state legislation to satisfy an alleged debt or obligation was without the notice essential under the due process clause, because in his particular case due process of law would lead to the same result because he had no adequate defense on the merits.¹⁰

A guaranty that notice shall be actually received is not, it seems, involved in due process if provision is made for notice.¹¹

In the determination of what is due process of law as to notice within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a distinction is to be observed between actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem.¹²

§ 595. Actions in Personam.—

When the action is purely in personam and a personal judgment is sought, there must, subject to limitations subsequently mentioned, be personal service within the jurisdiction. A judgment in personam against a nonresident cannot be rendered unless he enters his appearance or consents to a substituted service; such a judgment is devoid of validity within as well as outside the state in which it is rendered.13 Judgment cannot be rendered against a nonresident joint debtor.14 A statute permitting the substitution of a nonresident executor or administrator upon the death of a nonresident defendant in an action in personam is unconstitutional as depriving him of due process of law where there are no assets in the state.15 Personal service on the defendant outside the jurisdiction of the court will not suffice for this purpose.16

¹⁰Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 59 L. ed. 1027, 35 S. Ct. 625.

¹¹Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236, 58 L. ed. 584, 34 S. Ct. 309. Upholding a sale under a decree for the foreclosure of a mortgage against an attack based on the ground that the owner was not served with process in the foreclosure proceedings does not deprive him of his property without due process of law where the state had made provision for the service of process and the original party in the foreclosure proceeding did all that the law required in the issuance of, and attempt to serve, process and the sheriff made a return to the court, contrary to fact, that the service had been duly made, although, under the circumstances, the recovery upon the sheriff's bond authorized by the state law may not have been an adequate remedy. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236, 58 L. ed. 584, 34 S. Ct. 309.

¹³Minnesota Commercial Men's Asso. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140, 67 L. ed. 573, 43 S. Ct. 293; Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U. S. 269, 61 L. ed. 713, 37 S. Ct. 282, L.R.A. 1917F, 1159; McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. ed. 608, 37 S. Ct. 343, L.R.A. 1917F, 458; Baker v. Baker, E. & Co. 242 U. S. 394, 61 L. ed. 386, 37 S. Ct. 152; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 43 L. ed. 665, 19 S. Ct. 379; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger (C. C. A. 8th) 147 F. 419, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 537; Ex parte Cullinan, 224 Ala. 263, 139 So. 255, 81 A.L.R. 160; Bicknell v. Herbert, 20 Haw. 132, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1186, affirmed in 233 U. S. 70, 58 L. ed. 854, 34 S. Ct. 562; Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461, 59 L.R.A. 735, 94 Am. St. Rep. 722; Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152, 20 Am. St. Rep. 547; Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N. J. L. 379, 79 A. 347, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 312; Foster v. Allison Corp. 191 N. C. 166, 131 S. E. 648, 44 A.L.R. 610. Annotation: 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 537; 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 312. It has been held, however, that there is no infirmity in a personal judgment for a devastavit, rendered by the probate court conformably to the local practice, in favor of an administrator de bonis non against the executor, who, having removed to another jurisdiction and having been adjudged incompetent there, can only be served constructively, where the steps taken were concurred in by both the court that controlled the cause and the court that controlled his person. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346, 57 L. ed. 867, 33 S. Ct. 550.

¹⁵McMaster v. Gould, 239 N. Y. 606, 147 N. E. 214, 40 A.L.R. 792. Annotation: 40 A.L.R. 796.

¹⁶Riverside & D. River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 59 L. ed. 910, 35 S. Ct. 579; Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 S. Ct. 236; Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa, 511, 129 N. W. 494, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 680. Annotation: 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292; Ann. Cas. 1912D, 633. Due process of law is denied by the action of a state court in according full faith and credit to a judgment in personam rendered by a court of a sister state against a nonresident who was not personally served with process within the state and who made no appearance in the action. Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 S. Ct. 236.

than upon nonresidents.¹⁷ It is generally held to be due process of law sufficient to sustain a personal judgment against a resident of a state if the service is made by leaving a copy of the process at his residence.¹⁸ Personal service within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is brought is the ordinary form of service and must be made in all actions where practicable, even in actions to quiet title or settle private adverse rights to property, where the jurisdiction rests upon the process, and not upon a seizure of property.¹⁹ Where actual service is impracticable in such cases, nothing more is essential to the due process of law than that the service provided for be such as in the exercise of legislative discretion shall have been found most suitable to accomplish the purpose of actual service.²⁰

In some cases a personal judgment may be rendered against a resident upon constructive service.¹ The validity of such a judgment against a resident of the state of the forum who is absent therefrom at the time of the service raises some questions that are not uniformly answered.² An individual transacting business within a state through agents has been held amenable to process by service upon an agent; such notice does not deprive the individual of property without due process of law.³ On the other hand, a personal judgment against nonresidents doing business within the state as partners cannot, it has been held, be based upon service of process upon a resident agent.⁴

A state may authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a nonresident which would be binding within the state, even though made without service of process or personal notice to the nonresident.⁵

§ 596. —

Automobile Accident Litigation.—There are in many states statutes providing for constructive or substituted service of process on a nonresident motorist in an action growing out of an automobile accident in which such motorist was involved while operating his automobile within the state. These statutes usually designate a state official as the proper person to receive service of process. Such statutes are constitutional, provided they contain provisions which make it reasonably probable that notice will be communicated to the person to be served as by requiring the mailing of a copy of the summons and complaint to his last-known address.6 Service of process on the state official and the mailing of a copy to the nonresident at his place of resi-

¹⁷As to process, see PROCESS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 1279, §§ 23 et seq.]. See also infra, § 604.

¹⁸Biesenthall v. Williams, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 329, 85 Am. Dec. 629. Annotation: 58 L. ed. 854.

¹⁹State ex rel. Monnett v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756; Bear Lake County v. Budge, 9 Idaho, 703, 75 P. 614, 108 Am. St. Rep. 179.

²⁰State ex rel. Monnett v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756; Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah, 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (quiet title proceeding). Mailing to a resident of the state, as well as publishing, a notice of a proceeding in scire facias to revive a judgment, as provided in 2 Starr & C. Stat. (Ill.) p. 1789, where his residence is stated in the affidavit, which shows that he has gone out of the state or is concealed within it so that process cannot be served on him, is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process of law. Bickerdike v. Allen, 157 Ill. 95, 41 N. E. 740, 29 L.R.A. 782.

¹See PROCESS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 1292, § 35]. A personal judgment for money against a person who has left the state not intending to return may not, however, consistent with due process of law, be rendered upon service by publication in a local newspaper, and such judgment is not merely voidable, but absolutely void. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. ed. 608, 37 S. Ct. 343, L.R.A.1917F, 458.

³Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. 214 Iowa, 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A.L.R. 1308. Annotation: 91 A.L.R. 1327.

⁴Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 63 L. ed. 250, 39 S. Ct. 97. Annotation: 91 A.L.R. 1327.

§ 597. Actions in Rem.—

against nonresidents who cannot be found within the state.¹⁰ At least this is

true of proceedings strictly in rem.¹¹ Notice necessary for due process of law

sufficient.¹⁶ The efficacy, as due process, of constructive service rests upon

⁷Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 71 L. ed. 1091, 47 S. Ct. 632; Pawloski v. Hess,

²⁵⁰Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760, 35 A.L.R. 945; State ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916, 214 N. W. 460, 57 A.L.R. 1218. Annotation: 35 A.L.R. 951; 57 A.L.R. 1239; 99 A.L.R. 131.

⁸State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Ct. 289 U. S. 361, 77 L. ed. 1256,

⁵³S. Ct. 624, 89 A.L.R. 653 (obiter); Wuch- ter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 72 L. ed. 446,

⁹Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 72 L. ed. 446, 48 S. Ct. 259, 57 A.L.R. 1230.

¹⁰Herbert v. Bicknell, 233 U. S. 70, 58 L. ed. 854, 34 S. Ct. 562, affirming 20 Haw. 132, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1186; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 P. 356, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 682, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199; Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E. 182, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 647, 127 Am. St. Rep. 220; Tyler v. Judges of Ct. of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812,

¹⁷⁹U. S. 405, 45 L. ed. 252, 21 S. Ct. 206; Foster v. Allison Corp. 191 N. C. 166, 131 S. E. 648, 44 A.L.R. 610; Straub v. Lyman Land & Invest. Co. 30 S. D. 310, 31 S. D. 571,

¹³⁸N. W. 957, 141 N. W. 979, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 941. The principal defendant in a garnishment suit in a territorial court having jurisdic- tion over small debts only is not deprived of his property without due process of law because judgment was taken by default, appropriating property within the jurisdic- tion to the payment of the defendant's debt, with no other service of process upon him than that provided for in Hawaii Rev. Laws, § 2114, by leaving a copy of the sum- mons at his last and usual place of abode, where he had actual knowledge of the suit before the time for suing out a writ of error had expired and when it might still have been possible to set aside the judg- ment and retry the case. Herbert v. Bick- nell, 233 U. S. 70, 58 L. ed. 854, 34 S. Ct. 562. As to the sufficiency of substituted serv- ice against residents, see supra, § 595.

¹¹Combs v. Combs, 249 Ky. 155, 60 S. W. (2d) 368, 89 A.L.R. 1095; Re Apostolopoulos,

¹²Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 40 L. ed. 691, 16 S. Ct. 585. Annotation: 40 L. ed. 691.

¹⁴Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U. S. 269, 61 L. ed. 713, 37 S. Ct. 282, L.R.A. 1917F, 1159.

¹⁵Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 43 L. ed. 665, 19 S. Ct. 379; Pennoyer v. Neff,

¹⁶Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 33 L. ed. 918, 10 S. Ct. 557. It is competent for the legislature, by reasonable regulations, to authorize the issuance of substituted process upon alle-

the person to be notified.¹⁷ At least, a statute providing for substituted serv-

amenable to action therein is consistent with due process only if it incorporates

reasonable provisions for giving the defendant notice of the initiation of liti-

state of the forum,¹⁹ to quiet title proceedings,²⁰ to partition proceedings,¹ to

escheat proceedings,² to administration proceedings on absentees' estates,³ and

§ 598. Character.5—

acter of the rights which may be affected by it.⁶ It must give sufficient notice

the acquisition of jurisdiction and which affect all persons alike whose proper-

ty or rights come within the lawful scope of the proceedings are prosecuted with

gations which follow the wording of the statute, unsupported by other allegations which show that personal service is im- possible or impracticable. Such a proce- dure is constitutionally valid. McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731.

¹⁹Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 44 L. ed. 520, 20 S. Ct. 410. Service by publication and mailing of a summons in a partition suit conformably to the local law with respect to construc- tive service of nonresidents, naming as party defendant and addressee, "Albert Guilfuss, assignee," and "Albert B. Guil- fuss," has been held to satisfy the require- ment of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution conferring jurisdiction, notwithstanding the misnomer, to render a judgment binding upon "Albert B. Geil- fuss, assignee," with respect to his lien upon, or interest in, the land, he not having appeared. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385,

²⁰Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 56 L. ed. 429, 32 S. Ct. 303; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 S. Ct. 200; McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731; State ex rel. Mon- nett v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756.

²Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 40 L. ed. 691, 16 S. Ct. 585; Com. v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 A. 569, 1 A.L.R. 1048; Re Apostolopoulos, 68 Utah, 344, 250 P. 469, 253 P. 1117, 48 A.L.R. 1322. Annotation: 48 A.L.R. 1342; 40 L. ed. 691. As to escheat of deposit, see BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 290, § 415.

³Cunnius v. Reading School Dist. 198 U. S. 458, 49 L. ed. 1125, 25 S. Ct. 721. As to the conclusiveness of the determi- nation in such cases, see EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 1].

⁴Farm Invest. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258, 50 L.R.A. 747, 87 Am. St. Rep. 918 (notice by registered mail in addi- tion to publication).

⁵As to notice in guardianship proceed- ings, see GUARDIAN AND WARD [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 1114, § 15]. As to notice of demurrage charges, see CARRIERS, Vol. 9, p. 789, § 617.

⁶Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Mis- souri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 70 L. ed. 818, 46 S. Ct. 384; Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 44 L. ed. 520,

²⁰S. Ct. 410; McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731; Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. 34 N. M. 346, 282 P. 1, 70 A.L.R. 1261, writ of certiorari denied in 280 U. S. 610, 74 L. ed. 653, 50 S. Ct. 158.

⁷Straub v. Lyman Land & Invest. Co. 30 S. D. 310, 31 S. D. 571, 138 N. W. 957, 141 N. W. 979, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 941.

⁸Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312, 48 N. W. 98, 12 L.R.A. 436, 31 Am. St. Rep. 477.

⁹Re Clark, 148 Cal. 108, 82 P. 760, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 996, 113 Am. St. Rep. 197, 7 Ann. Cas. 306.

shall be given to parties whose rights are to be affected by judicial proceedings, subject to the condition that the notice prescribed shall afford an opportunity to be heard.¹⁰ The criterion is not whether any injury to an individual is possible, but whether the requirement as to notice and opportunity to protect property rights affected is just and reasonable.¹¹ Extraofficial or casual notice is not sufficient.¹²

If the form sanctioned by the state law gives notice and affords an opportunity to be heard, the mere question whether it is by a motion or ordinary action is not material.¹³ Accordingly, a rule upon the incumbent of a public office to show cause why he refuses to surrender his office, providing for service of the rule upon him, issued in pursuance of a state statute, may be a full compliance with the requirements as to due process of law.¹⁴

The due process of law clause does not impose an unattainable standard of accuracy. If a defendant within the jurisdiction is served personally with process in which his name is misspelled, he cannot safely ignore it on account of the misnomer.¹⁵

Actual personal notice is not necessary in all proceedings. There may be, and must be, some form of constructive service,¹⁶ especially when actual service is impracticable.¹⁷ In cases where the statute authorizes the court to determine the question of title and decree it to the rightful owner, and where personal service cannot be effected after due diligence, the decree is valid and binding without personal service or appearance, if the statute has provided a reasonable method of imparting notice to the defendant and that method has been strictly followed.¹⁸ A statute authorizing a ministerial officer to issue orders of publication against defendants who cannot, after due diligence, be personally served with process is usually held valid.¹⁹ It is competent for the legislature to authorize the issuance of substituted process upon allegations which follow the wording of the statute, unsupported by other allegations which show that personal service is impossible or impractical. Such a procedure is constitutionally valid.²⁰

An order adjudging a person incompetent and appointing a committee of his person and estate is not wanting in due process of law where, at each stage in the proceedings leading up to such order, the alleged incompetent, then under commitment to a private hospital, was personally served with notice and was given an opportunity to be heard.²

¹⁰Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. 34 N. M. 346, 282 P. 1, 70 A.L.R. 1261, writ of certiorari denied in 280 U. S. 610, 74 L. ed. 653, 50 S. Ct. 158.

¹²Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 59 L. ed. 1027, 35 S. Ct. 625. See also supra, § 573.

¹⁵Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 58 L. ed. 1363, 34 S. Ct. 779. A person is not deprived of his property without due process of law where a judgment in a previous suit against the person to whose interest he succeeded, based upon constructive service, in which such person, whose true name is "Albert B. Geilfuss, assignee," was named as "Albert Guilfuss, assignee," is sustained as valid against a collateral attack. Ordean v. Grannis, 118 Minn. 117, 136 N. W. 575, 1026, L.R.A.1915B, 1149, affirmed in 234 U. S. 385, 58 L. ed. 1363, 34 S. Ct. 779.

¹⁶Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 56 L. ed. 429, 32 S. Ct. 303; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. ed. 461, 27 S. Ct. 261.

¹⁷State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L.R.A. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756. See also supra, §§ 595, 596, 597.

¹Cordrey v. The Bee, 102 Or. 636, 201 P. 202, 20 A.L.R. 1079. See ADMIRALTY, Vol. 1, p. 592, §§ 81 et seq.

That notice to the claimants of a dormant bank deposit, which the state is seeking to compel the bank to turn over to it, is required to be made in the county containing the state capitol rather than in that wherein the bank is located is not so unreasonable that it will fail to constitute due process of law, where the bank has been required to publish in the local paper a statement of the facts relating to the account each year for nine years prior to the time fixed for state proceedings.³

Notice by publication where the only statutory provision is for summons or other personal service does not give jurisdiction.⁴

§ 599. To Foreign Corporations.5—

The state may impose any reasonable requirements upon a foreign corporation coming into the state to transact business. Requiring it to appoint a resident agent upon whom process may be served and, in the event of its failure so to appoint an agent, making a state official such agent constitute due process, although there is no requirement that the agent give the corporation notice.6 The rule here is not the same as in cases involving substituted service upon individuals.7 The state may provide for service of process upon the agent of a foreign corporation doing business within the state.8

It is not necessary for a state, in making provision for service of process upon foreign corporations in the state, to make the jurisdiction over the foreign corporation wide enough to include the adjudication of transitory actions not arising in the state; causes of action not arising in the business done by the foreign corporation in the state may be excluded from the operation of the statute.⁹ The due process clause, however, is not violated by a state statute permitting service of summons on a local agent of a foreign corporation having property and transacting business within the state through local agents, in an action by a nonresident on a transitory cause of action arising outside the state and not connected with any corporate action in the state.¹⁰

Where the corporation is not doing business in the state, then to authorize or sustain process upon it does not constitute due process.¹¹ The enforcement by the courts of the state of the residence of an insurance company of

³Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 68 L. ed. 301, 44 S. Ct. 108, 31 A.L.R. 391.

⁴Pierce v. Superior Ct. 1 Cal. (2d) 759, 37 P. (2d) 460, 96 A.L.R. 1020 (cancelation of fraudulent election registrations). Annotation: 96 A.L.R. 1041. For a general question of purging voters' registration lists, see ELECTIONS [Also 9 R. C. L. p. 972].

⁵As to service of process upon corporations, domestic and foreign, see PROCESS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 1279, §§ 23 et seq.].

⁶Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Ct. 289 U. S. 361, 77 L. ed. 1256, 53 S. Ct. 624, 89 A.L.R. 653. A foreign corporation owning land within the state is not deprived of its property without due process of law by a statute permitting its property to be sold under a judgment obtained upon service of process of which it had no actual notice, although it is guilty of no laches or negligence in failing to file an answer. Foster v. Allison Corp. 191 N. C. 166, 131 S. E. 648, 44 A.L.R. 610.

⁸Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 99 Tenn. 322, 42 S. W. 145, 44 L.R.A. 442, affirmed in 172 U. S. 602, 43 L. ed. 569, 19 S. Ct. 308.

⁹Missouri P. R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co. 257 U. S. 533, 66 L. ed. 354, 42 S. Ct. 210.

¹⁰Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. 243 U. S. 93, 61 L. ed. 610, 37 S. Ct. 344; Steele v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583, 96 A.L.R. 361.

¹¹Minnesota Commercial Men's Asso. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140, 67 L. ed. 573, 43 S. Ct. 293; Riverside & D. River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 59 L. ed. 910, 35 S. Ct. 579; Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger (C. C. A. 8th) 147 F. 419, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 537; Gloeser v. Dollar S. S. Lines, 192 Minn. 376, 256 N. W. 666, 95 A.L.R. 1470; State ex rel. Ferrocarriles Nacionales v. Rutledge, 331 Mo. 1015, 56 S. W. (2d) 28, 85 A.L.R. 1378, writ of certiorari denied in 289 U. S. 746, 77 L. ed. 1492, 53 S. Ct. 689. Annotation: 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 538. See PROCESS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 1339, §§ 96 et seq.].

a judgment secured against the company in another state, where it is not doing business, by service of process on the secretary of state, will deprive the company of its property without due process of law, contrary to the Federal Constitution.¹²

§ 600. Time.—

Ordinarily, the notice must be given a sufficient length of time before the hearing to afford opportunity to be present.13 A notice which fails to give such a length of time is invalid, notwithstanding, by the local practice, there will be several days' additional time before the case can be called for trial or default taken or the court in its discretion will probably set aside a default judgment and permit a defense.14 While the authority of the legislature to prescribe the length of notice is not absolute and beyond review, it is certain that only in a clear case will a notice authorized by the legislature be set aside as wholly ineffectual on account of the shortness of the time.15

The time required in order to validate a notice varies with the circumstances. Service of process made upon a defendant residing in Virginia, requiring him to appear and answer a suit in Texas within five days, was not a reasonable notice, and therefore not due process of law.¹⁶ Notice to the attorney for those whose names were duly entered as freedmen by blood on the rolls made and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, given a few hours before the hearing of a motion to strike their names from the roll on the ground that their enrolment had been secured by perjury, was not such notice as afforded due process of law.¹⁷ Due process is not denied by a state statute providing for the giving of notice by publication to nonresident owners of the institution of condemnation proceedings, where, as construed by the state courts, service was complete upon its first publication, eighteen days before return day.¹⁸ Twenty days' written notice of a proceeding to revoke the license of a physician is reasonable within the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.¹⁹

In certain proceedings notice need not be given at the very initiation of the proceeding. The failure of the Bankruptcy Act to provide for notice to creditors of the filing of a petition in voluntary proceedings does not deprive such creditors of their property without due process of law, in view of the provisions of the act for ten days' notice of the first meeting of creditors, and of each of the subsequent steps in administration, and of the various provisions relative to the granting of a discharge and for revocation of the same when procured by fraud or not warranted by the facts.²⁰ A preliminary order of a bankruptcy court assuming jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of a valid judgment against the property of a debtor pend-

¹²Minnesota Commercial Men's Asso. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140, 67 L. ed. 573, 43 S. Ct. 293.

¹³Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 44 L. ed. 520, 20 S. Ct. 410; McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731; Straub v. Lyman Land & Invest. Co. 30 S. D. 310, 31 S. D. 571, 138 N. W. 957, 141 N. W. 979, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 941. Five days' notice to a nonresident in another state of a suit to foreclose a lien on land, where it would require four days of constant traveling to reach the court, giving but one day, and that a Sunday, to make preparations for the trip, without any allowance for accidental delays, is insufficient to constitute reasonable notice or due process of law. Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 44 L. ed. 520, 20 S. Ct. 410.

¹⁷United States ex rel. Turner v. Fisher, 222 U. S. 204, 56 L. ed. 165, 32 S. Ct. 37.

¹⁹Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 70 L. ed. 818, 46 S. Ct. 384.

ing disposition of the debtor's petition for an order of the bankruptcy court effecting a composition or extending time for payment does not effect a taking against which the due process clause may be invoked.¹ A decree of a bankruptcy court enjoining, pending disposition of a petition seeking composition with creditors or an extension of time, a sale under execution of the property of the petitioner is not invalid as wanting in due process because made without actual notice to the execution creditor, he being entitled to move to set the order aside.² A statutory provision that any vehicle used in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law, and thereby causing damage to any public highway, shall be subject to a lien for the full amount of all damages is not lacking in due process in that it does not provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to the owner of such vehicle, since the foreclosure of such lien, not being provided for therein, must be by a bill in equity, of which the owner will have notice.³

§ 601. Persons Entitled.4—

Persons entitled to notice are, speaking generally, those who are to be affected by a judgment or order. Due process of law in proceedings for the adoption of a child requires, as to the parent, some notice and opportunity to be heard.5 Notice is required to a mental defective before he can be sterilized under a statute providing for such sterilization upon the petition of the next of kin or legal guardian if approved by certain state officers.6 Notice to a person of proceedings to have him declared insane is essential to due process of law.7 It has, however, been held that adjudging a person insane without notice to him, when the commissioners think it would be injurious to him to hold the examination in his presence, does not deprive him of his liberty without due process of law, where a regular practicing physician visits and personally examines him, and any relative or any citizen of the county may appear and resist the application, and the parties may appear by counsel if they like.8

Before the right of suffrage may be denied to an individual, he must have notice and an opportunity to be heard in the manner provided by law.⁹

The notice need not be given to every party for every new step or in every supplementary proceeding in litigation.¹⁰ Accordingly, the giving of proper notice for the appointment of an administrator has been deemed to bring into court all persons having an interest in the estate, for all purposes necessary for the settlement of the estate, including its distribution among

¹Collins v. Welsh (C. C. A. 9th) 75 F. (2d) 894, 99 A.L.R. 1319, writ of certiorari denied in 295 U. S. 762, 79 L. ed. 1704, 55 S. Ct. 921.

³Mammina v. Alexander Auto Serv. Co. 333 Ill. 158, 164 N. E. 173, 61 A.L.R. 649. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 655.

⁴As to notice upon appointment of guardian for infant, see GUARDIAN AND WARD [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 1101]. As to notice upon appointment of guardian ad litem for infants, see INFANTS [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 213].

⁵Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N. W. 194, 21 L.R.A. 483, 39 Am. St. Rep. 873. See ADOPTION OF CHILDREN, Vol. 1, p. 644, § 44.

⁶Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge (Smith v. Command) 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140, 40 A.L.R. 515; Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 186, 167 S. E. 638, 87 A.L.R. 237. Annotation: 40 A.L.R. 535, s. 51 A.L.R. 862 and 87 A.L.R. 242. As to constitutionality generally of these laws, see CRIMINAL LAW [Also 8 R. C. L. p. 38]; INSANE AND OTHER INCOMPETENT PERSONS [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 546].

⁷Re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851, 55 L.R.A. 856, 86 Am. St. Rep. 296; Re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S. W. (2d) 410, 91 A.L.R. 74; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. Annotation: 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. See INSANE AND OTHER INCOMPETENT PERSONS [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 546].

⁹Pierce v. Superior Ct. 1 Cal. (2d) 759, 37 P. (2d) 460, 96 A.L.R. 1020. See ELECTIONS [Also 9 R. C. L. p. 972].

the heirs of the decedent.¹¹ Construing a statute to mean that the heirs are not necessary parties to a suit against the administratrix to foreclose a mortgage executed by the decedent does not deprive such heirs, without due process of law, of the title which is cast upon them upon the death of their ancestor.¹²

§ 602. Of Subsequent Steps.—

After a person has been brought into a proceeding by notice, due process does not require notice of all subsequent steps in the proceeding.13 After a hearing before judgment, with full opportunity to present all evidence and arguments, no further notice and hearing need be given after a decision in order to constitute due process of law.14 A statute providing for constructive notice only of the institution and pendency of a writ of error proceeding, by making a record in the minute book of the court a substitute for personal service, does not violate the constitutional provision against deprivation of property without due process of law.15 It has been suggested, however, that entry of judgment without notice may be a denial of due process, even where there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter.16

A judgment debtor is not entitled, under the constitutional guaranty of due process of law, to notice before the issuance of execution.¹⁷ Creditors of a bankrupt are not deprived of their property without due process of law because the Bankruptcy Act does not require personal service of notice of the application for the discharge in voluntary proceedings.¹⁸ After a judgment of dismissal of the action has been rendered, however, the action cannot, without motion or proceedings to vacate the judgment and without notice, be reinstated after the term or the rule day which under the local practice is equivalent to the end of the term, and a personal judgment rendered.¹⁹

If, in the course of a proceeding, amendments are made which materially enlarge or change the action, an additional notice is necessary, although the defendant can, of course, waive the notice by appearance.²⁰

§ 603. As Dependent on Pleading.—

In civil suits the pleading should contain a prayer for judgment so as to show that the judicial power of the court is invoked, but the prayer does not constitute a part of the notice guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and while the judgment must not go beyond that to which the

¹¹Ro Bards v. Lamb, 127 U. S. 58, 32 L. ed. 60, 8 S. Ct. 1031; Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah, 574, 106 P. 522, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 368. See also infra, § 602.

¹²McCaughey v. Lyall, 224 U. S. 558, 56 L. ed. 883, 32 S. Ct. 602. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 1].

¹³Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, — Iowa, —, 271 N. W. 204, 110 A.L.R. 1415 (administrative board); Griggs v. Hanson, 86 Kan. 632, 121 P. 1094, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1161, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 242. Annotation: 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1161.

¹⁴Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 S. Ct. 1114.

¹⁶American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. ed. 231, 53 S. Ct. 98, 86 A.L.R. 298.

¹⁷Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U. S. 285, 69 L. ed. 288, 45 S. Ct. 61; Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Smith, 266 U. S. 291, 69 L. ed. 293, 45 S. Ct. 63.

²⁰Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531, 40 L. ed. 525, 16 S. Ct. 366. An opportunity to be heard, sufficient to prevent the claim of a denial of due process of law in a decree rendered upon a supplemental bill personally served outside the state, appears where the defendant had been served under the original bill within the jurisdiction and after a default as to the supplemental bill appeared by counsel and procured a modification of the decree. Ibid.

plaintiff is entitled on proof of the allegations made, the court may grant other and different relief than that for which he prays.²¹ Entry of a judgment of ouster and the imposition of a substantial fine in quo warranto proceedings, conformably to the local practice, afford sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard to satisfy the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although the information contains only general allegations of misuser, with only a prayer for ouster.¹ There is no want of due process of law in a judgment of the highest court of a state, imposing a substantial fine in quo warranto proceedings, conformably to the local practice, upon a foreign corporation found to have misused its license to do business in the state, although there is no statute fixing a maximum penalty, no rule for measuring damages, and no hearing on that subject.²

§ 604. When Not Required.—

In certain cases, notice is not necessary. Some cases have sustained a seizure of property without notice of any kind where the procedure in question is an ancient one.3 A resident is charged with knowledge that under the supervision of the law, his property will be applied, without notice, according to statute, to the discharge of his duty to support his wife and child if he absconds leaving them destitute behind him.4 Due process of law does not require that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before a court may accept the resignation of a committee of an adjudged incompetent and appoint another person as his successor.5 In certain instances of seizure of property, used in violation of law, notice is not necessary. Notice to the owner is not necessary to render valid a seizure and sale of stock found running at large in violation of law.6

In certain cases of attachment of property in which a redelivery bond is given, the statutes provide for judgment against the principal and sureties on the bond in the event judgment goes in favor of the plaintiff. Such a proceeding without notice to the surety has been sustained.⁷ On the other hand, statutes of this kind have been construed as not authorizing summary judgment on the theory that to do so would violate due process.⁸ Again, a judgment against sureties in a summary proceeding for the amount of a judgment recovered against the principal in an action to which they were not made parties is without due process of law, when there has been no suit brought against them on the undertaking or any opportunity given them to plead or defend according to the usual course of legal proceedings.

There may be cases where persons to be affected by proceedings will not be entitled to notice and a hearing under the due process of law clause, be-

²¹Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936. See JUDGMENTS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 554].

¹Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936.

³Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler, 280 U. S. 218, 74 L. ed. 378, 50 S. Ct. 94, affirming 250 N. Y. 136, 164 N. E. 882, 65 A.L.R. 879, holding that a statute authorizing the impounding of property of an absconding husband or father, a resident of the state, and its application to the maintenance of a wife or children likely to become charges on the public, without providing for notice, either actual or constructive, to the absconder, of a proceeding to seize property, cannot be said to deny due process of law, where the challenged procedure is an ancient one. Annotation: 65 A.L.R. 886.

⁴Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N. Y. 136, 164 N. E. 882, 65 A.L.R. 879, affirmed in 280 U. S. 218, 74 L. ed. 378, 50 S. Ct. 94.

⁶Howell v. Daughet, 148 Ark. 450, 230 S. W. 559, 18 A.L.R. 63. See also infra, §§ 677 et seq. See ANIMALS, Vol. 2, p. 797, § 143.

⁷Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 447, 7 S. Ct. 254. Annotation: 24 L. ed. 436. On appeal or supersedeas bonds, see APPEAL AND ERROR, Vol. 3, p. 776, § 1303.

⁸Sandusky Second Nat. Bank v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N. E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860. For a full discussion, see SURETYSHIP [Also PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, 21 R. C. L. p. 940].

cause of a waiver thereof by accepting a statutory privilege or making an application which the proceedings may follow as a consequence. For example, there is authority to the effect that a license for the sale of liquors may be revoked before the expiration of the time for which it was granted, by the granting power, without notice to the licensee, if statutory authority and conditions are pursued, without violating any of the constitutional rights of the licensee.⁹ On the ground that the proceedings are administrative, have their origin in necessity, and have the sanction of usage, the removal of a person in destitute circumstances, who applies for public support in a county where he is temporarily remaining, to a county in which he has a legal settlement, by the county commissioners or their chairman, without judicial proceedings or notice to him of the contemplated removal and without opportunity to be heard in respect thereto, does not violate the constitutional provision as to due process of law.¹⁰ The cases in which such notice may be dispensed with are, however, few, and as a general rule proceedings not founded on notice to the person affected are void. Thus, a statute authorizing a commission finally and conclusively to fix the rates of charges for the transportation of property, without an opportunity for judicial inquiry as to the reasonableness of such rates, cannot be sustained.¹¹ Permitting an administrative board which acts only by consent of the parties interested to take testimony without notice to either party and to give notices by mail does not deprive the parties of due process of law.¹²

§ 605. Representative Actions.—

In certain cases, notice to one party may by reason of representation be notice to another, at least so far as the representative relation is concerned.13 Due process of law is not denied a stockholder in a domestic corporation by a state statute enacted to make more effectual the constitutional liability of stockholders for the debts of the corporation, because stockholders need not be served with process in the action in which the assessment is made,14 or because under such statute they may be assessed for the corporate debts antedating the transfer, in proceedings in which they are represented by the corporation and of which they are notified only by publication and mailing of notice.15

A statute which provides that jurisdiction to render judgment against an association which will bind the joint property of the associates may be acquired by service on one or more of its members is consistent with due process.¹⁶ It has been asserted that so far as constitutionality is concerned, there is no distinction between such a statute applied to partnerships and one applied to other unincorporated associations.¹⁷ When, however, it comes to actually reaching individual property of a person, such as a stockholder in a corporation or a person in an association, notice is required.¹⁸ Due

⁹Wallace v. Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 P. 528, 63 L.R.A. 337, 103 Am. St. Rep. 747. See INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 239].

¹⁵Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U. S. 652, 58 L. ed. 1518, 34 S. Ct. 926, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 104.

¹⁶Jardine v. Superior Ct. 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756, 79 A.L.R. 291, appeal dismissed in 284 U. S. 592, 76 L. ed. 510, 52 S. Ct. 197. Annotation: 79 A.L.R. 305. See PROCESS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 1279, §§ 23 et seq.].

¹⁷Jardine v. Superior Ct. 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756, 79 A.L.R. 291, appeal dismissed in 284 U. S. 592, 76 L. ed. 510, 52 S. Ct. 197.

¹⁸Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 59 L. ed. 1027, 35 S. Ct. 625, holding that the failure to afford notice, hearing, or opportunity to be heard renders invalid a statute under which, upon the return nulla bona of an execution against a corporation, an execution may issue against

process requires notice to nonassenting bondholders of an application to the court, in pursuance of statute, by a bondholders' committee, for leave to the mortgage trustee to bid in the mortgaged property for the benefit of all bondholders, administer it as an express trust, and dispose of it as soon as may be done without sacrifice of its fair and reasonable value, either for cash or for bonds, notes, debentures, stocks, or other securities.¹⁹

§ 606. Appearance as Dispensing with Notice.—

Notice is for the purpose of affording the party an opportunity of being heard upon the claim or the charges made; it is a summons to him to appear and declare, if he has anything to say, why the judgment sought should not be rendered.20 If he actually appears in the proceeding, the notice becomes unimportant.1 One who actually appears and makes a defense in an action to which he was not technically a party cannot contend that when he was brought in by rule to show cause after the judgment was rendered and was condemned to pay it, he was denied due process of law because all right to defend had been cut off by the previous judgment, if he offered no defense which the court did not entertain.2

A state, without violence to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may declare that one who voluntarily enters one of its courts to contest any question in an action there pending shall be deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court for all purposes of the action, and may attach consequences of this character even to a special appearance entered for the purpose of objecting that the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.³

E. HEARING

§ 607. Generally.—

An opportunity for hearing is one of the essential elements of due process,4 at least whenever it is necessary for the protection of the parties.5 It was a maxim of the common law that "no man should be punished without an opportunity of being heard."6 Hence, no one may be legally divested of his property unless he is allowed a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where he may contest the claim set up against him, and be allowed to meet it on the law and facts7 and show if he can that it is unfound-

a stockholder for the amount of the unpaid subscription to the stock he holds, without notice to him or other preliminary steps, he having the right, in case he is not in fact the holder of stock upon which there is an unpaid subscription, or in case the amount of the execution is in excess of the unpaid subscription, to appropriate relief, by testing the legality of the execution after issuance, and the execution, in the absence of such objections, being enforceable, although there may have been only a formal levy, without even such notice as might be implied from a forcible seizure or interference with the possession.

¹⁹Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co. 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227, 88 A.L.R. 1263.

²⁰Ex parte Sullivan, 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 138 P. 815, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 719.

¹Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64, 79 L. ed. 1303, 55 S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438 (opening of closed bank); Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171, 61 L. ed. 229, 37 S. Ct. 34; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 S. Ct. 617; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 S. Ct. 513.

²Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 S. Ct. 620.

⁶Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; Terrell v. Allison, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 289, 22 L. ed. 634; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232.

⁷Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co. 197 U. S. 463, 49 L. ed. 836, 25 S. Ct. 474; Ames v. Port Huron Log Driving & Boom Co. 11 Mich. 139, 83 Am. Dec. 731; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289.

ed.⁸ A person is not precluded from complaining that the taking of his property conformably to state legislation, to satisfy an alleged debt or obligation, was without the hearing essential under the due process guaranty, because, in his particular case, due process of law would lead to the same result, because he had no adequate defense on the merits.⁹

The required hearing is a matter of right; a hearing granted as a matter of favor or discretion in proceedings for the taking of one's property to satisfy his alleged debt or obligation is not a substantial substitute for due process of law.¹⁰

The general rule that due process of law implies a hearing before condemnation or the reaching of a judgment through what is ordinarily understood to be judicial process is subject to an exception only in extreme cases or emergencies, as where the preservation and repose of society or the protection of the property rights of a large class of the community absolutely require a departure from the usual course of procedure.¹¹

If opportunity for hearing is afforded a person sought to be affected by a proceeding, then he has had due process.¹² The fact that external circumstances may prevent a defendant from availing himself of the opportunity to defend does not render a summary judgment law unconstitutional as denying due process.¹³ Nor does the fact that opportunity for a hearing was lost because misapprehension as to the appropriate remedy was not removed by judicial decision until it was too late to rectify the error furnish the basis for a claim that due process of law has been denied.¹⁴

Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of judicial inquiry into liability is not a denial of due process if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate.¹⁵

When the right to a hearing is denied, the mere giving of a notice is ineffectual for any purpose within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty. The denial to a party in such a case of the right to appear is in legal effect the recall of the citation to him.¹⁶ For example, ordering one to pay alimony without having had his day in court and without a hearing on the question of the marriage, when that is denied, amounts to a taking of his property without due process of law.¹⁷ Again, a forfeiture without notice to the owner of property and without opportunity of being heard on the question of his culpability has also been held to amount to the denial of due process of law.¹⁸ There are, however, some instances where a hearing is not required, as will presently be seen.¹⁹

⁸Ray v. Norseworthy, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 128, 23 L. ed. 116; Lowry v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152, 35 Am. Rep. 420.

⁹Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 59 L. ed. 1027, 35 S. Ct. 625.

¹⁰Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 59 L. ed. 1027, 35 S. Ct. 625. See also supra, § 573.

¹¹The Apollon, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 362, 6 L. ed. 111; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club (C. C. A. 6th) 148 F. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997; Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86, 39 Am. Rep. 208; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331, 79 Am. Dec. 656; Lovell v. Seeback, 45 Minn. 465, 48 N. W. 23, 11 L.R.A. 667; Neer v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd. 40 N. D. 340, 168 N. W. 601, citing R. C. L.; Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 Utah, 245, 30 P. 760, 16 L.R.A. 689.

¹²Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183, 45 L. ed. 810, 21 S. Ct. 555; People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170, 69 A.L.R. 1024.

¹³People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170, 69 A.L.R. 1024.

¹⁴American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. ed. 231, 53 S. Ct. 98, 86 A.L.R. 298.

¹⁵Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 75 L. ed. 1289, 51 S. Ct. 608.

**§ ⁶⁰⁸. Sufficiency.**—The proceeding or hearing requisite to due process must be appropriate ²⁰ and such as is practicable and reasonable in the particular case.¹ It must be an orderly proceeding, in which one sought to be affected has an opportunity to be heard and to defend, enforce, and protect his rights.²

A full hearing is one in which ample opportunity is afforded to all parties to make, by evidence and argument, a showing fairly adequate to establish the propriety or impropriety, from the standpoint of justice and law, of the step asked to be taken.³

There is no hearing when the party does not know what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an opportunity to test, explain, or refute.⁴

No fixed procedure is demanded.⁵ The requirement of due process is met if the trial is had according to the settled course of judicial proceedings6

²⁰Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher) 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 S. Ct. 611; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. ed. 552, 2 S. Ct. 569; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Ray v. Norseworthy, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 128, 23 L. ed. 116; Hite v. Hite, 124 Cal. 389, 57 P. 227, 45 L.R.A. 793, 71 Am. St. Rep. 82; Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 P. 527, 24 L.R.A. 355; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L.R.A. 385; Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308, 50 L.R.A. 577, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41. Annotation: 20 Am. St. Rep. 554. See TRIAL [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 1008].

¹Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Hite v. Hite, 124 Cal. 389, 57 P. 227, 45 L.R.A. 793, 71 Am. St. Rep. 82; Redman v. Kyle, 76 Fla. 79, 80 So. 300, citing R. C. L.

²George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 77 L. ed. 1265, 53 S. Ct. 620; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. ed. 231, 53 S. Ct. 98, 86 A.L.R. 298; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464, 62 L. ed. 1215, 38 S. Ct. 566; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 57 L. ed. 431, 33 S. Ct. 185; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 23 L. ed. 914; McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 259, 20 L. ed. 80; Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 265 P. 246, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Woods-Young Co. v. Tedder, 103 Fla. 1083, 138 So. 643 (writ of certiorari denied in 285 U. S. 557, 76 L. ed. 946, 52 S. Ct. 458) citing R. C. L.; Tibbetts v. Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679, citing R. C. L.; Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118, 55 A.L.R. 196; Taylorville v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. 301 Ill. 157, 133 N. E. 720, citing R. C. L.; Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 40 N. E. 1025, 31 L.R.A. 70, 46 Am. St. Rep. 348; Kwiatkowski v. Putzhaven, 189 Ind. 119, 126 N. E. 3, citing R. C. L.; Saco v. Wentworth, 37 Me. 165, 58 Am. Dec. 786; People's Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170, 69 A.L.R. 1024; State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 286, 794, 43 Am. St. Rep. 524; citing v. Zied, 116 N. J. L. 234, 183 A. 210, noting R. C. L.; Doyle's Petition (Re Gannon) 16 R. I. 537, 18 A. 159, 5 L.R.A. 359, 27 Am. St. Rep. 759; Koester v. Citizens' Pub. Co. 154 S. C. 154, 151 S. E. 452, citing R. C. L.; Violett v. Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 23 S. E. 909, 31 L.R.A. 382, 53 Am. St. Rep. 825. **Opportunity to be heard**, if it is necessary for a town before a burden is cast upon it by the legislature, is furnished when the town has a representative who takes part in the proceedings. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 S. Ct. 617.

³New England Division Case (Akron, C. & Y. R. Co. v. United States) 261 U. S. 184, 67 L. ed. 605, 43 S. Ct. 270; Smith v. McCann, 24 How. (U. S.) 398, 16 L. ed. 714.

⁴Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 57 L. ed. 431, 33 S. Ct. 185.

⁶Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher) 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 S. Ct. 611; Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 334, 46 L. ed. 573, 22 S. Ct. 391; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 853, 18 S. Ct. 445; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 S. Ct. 825; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 708, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. ed. 552, 2 S. Ct. 569; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372; Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa, 208, 79 Am. Dec. 529; Com. v. Farmers & M. Bank, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 542, 32 Am. Dec. 290; Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113, 83 Am. Dec. 728; Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. 77 Miss. 194, 24 So. 200, 317, 28 So. 956, 60 L.R.A. 33; Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511, 53 Am. Dec. 325; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86, 47 Am. Dec. 431; Ex parte Renfro, 115 Tex. 82, 273 S. W. 813, 40 A.L.R. 900; Pinney v. Providence Loan &

by a court of justice having jurisdiction.⁷ Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves the principles of liberty and justice, is regarded as due process of law.⁸ The cases proceed upon the theory that given a court of justice which has jurisdiction and acts not arbitrarily but in conformity with a general law, upon evidence, and after inquiry made with notice to the parties affected and opportunity to be heard, then all the requirements of due process, so far as it relates to procedure in court and methods of trial and character and effect of evidence, are complied with.⁹

A court may exercise jurisdiction to inquire into the conduct of members of the bar without compliance with the requirements of formal procedure which must be observed in ordinary litigation; and it is enough if in some proper way the attorney is reasonably and definitely informed of the matters alleged against him and given an opportunity of being heard in answer.¹⁰ A summary proceeding to disbar an attorney, in cases within the jurisdiction of the court, is due process of law.¹¹

Exclusion of claims of ultimate right from possessory actions does not violate the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.¹² Quo warranto proceedings may constitute due process.¹³ A forfeiture of the charter of a corporation for maintaining illegal rates made after full hearing by all parties in a proceeding by quo warranto does not deprive the corporation of its property without due process of law because mandamus is prescribed as the remedy for illegal rates.¹⁴

The denial of a right to be heard before judgment on the single question as to the sufficiency of the service does not amount to a denial of due process of law. Hence, it is clear that laws simply forbidding the defendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service upon him in a personal action, without surrendering himself to the jurisdiction of the court, do not con-

Invest. Co. 106 Wis. 396, 82 N. W. 308, 50 L.R.A. 577, 80 Am. St. Rep. 41. The demands of justice are satisfied if a party has an opportunity for the trial of all parts of his case. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 321, 1 L. ed. 619. See also supra, §§ 569 et seq.

⁸Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 853, 18 S. Ct. 445; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 708, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292; Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co. 256 Ill. 196, 99 N. E. 920, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 793, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 276; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 167, 2 Ann. Cas. 171; Conover v. West Jersey Mortg. Co. 37 N. J. Eq. 16, 99 A. 604, citing R. C. L.; Anderson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 90, 126 P. 840, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 314; Dillon v. Whitley (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 329, citing R. C. L.

⁹Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 56 L. ed. 1038, 32 S. Ct. 651; Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 S. Ct. 14; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 S. Ct. 577; Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N. W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152, 20 Am. St. Rep. 547; People v. Havnor, 149 N. Y. 195, 43 N. E. 541, 31 L.R.A. 689, 52 Am. St. Rep. 707; Carr v. Brown, 20 R. I. 215, 38 A. 9, 38 L.R.A. 294, 78 Am. St. Rep. 855. A decree pro confesso entered after striking the defendant's answer from the files because of his contempt in refusing to obey an order of the court is void for want of due process of law. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 S. Ct. 841.

¹³Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. ed. 478. A national bank is not denied due process of law by the issuance against it of a writ of quo warranto at the suit of state officials, to oust it from the maintenance of a branch. First Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 68 L. ed. 486, 44 S. Ct. 213.

¹⁴New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 46 L. ed. 936, 22 S. Ct. 691.

flict with the constitutional requirement.¹⁵ One who actually appears and makes a defense in an action to which he is not technically a party cannot when he is brought in by rule to show cause after judgment rendered, and condemned to pay it, contend that he is denied due process of law because all right to defend had been cut off by the previous judgment, if he offered no defense which the court did not entertain.¹⁶

§ 609. Raising Issues.—

Due process requires that a party sought to be affected by a proceeding shall have the right to raise such issues or set up any defense18 which he may have in the cause. He is not entitled to set up a defense which has been previously adjudicated against him, since the right to due process does not involve the right to litigate the same question twice.19 Refusal to allow the filing of amended answers which are based upon facts concluded by a former decision does not violate due process.20 Even if he has no defense to the action, the fundamental law of the land secures to him the right to be heard in his defense.1

§ 610. Time.—

Due process of law does not necessarily imply delay. Certain causes may be brought to a hearing by being given priority over others without violating the right of parties thus required to come to trial earlier than would otherwise be required.2

§ 611. Time in Relation to Judgment or Order.—

Although it is the general rule that everyone is entitled to a hearing as an essential part of due process of law, a statute is not unconstitutional merely because it authorizes a ministerial act by which possession of property is taken before the right to it has been judicially determined. This is done in cases of attachment and

¹⁵Kauffman v. Wooters, 138 U. S. 285, 34 L. ed. 962, 11 S. Ct. 298; York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 34 L. ed. 604, 11 S. Ct. 9.

¹⁶Louisville N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 S. Ct. 620.

¹⁷No Federal constitutional right is violated because of the refusal to transfer a cause from the decision of the highest court of the state which heard it to the court in banc. Goldsmith v. George G. Prendergast Constr. Co. 252 U. S. 12, 64 L. ed. 427, 40 S. Ct. 273. Due process is not denied by the issuance of a writ of mandamus to restore conditions existing at the time of the bringing of a suit to determine the rights of the parties, where the grant of the mandamus is conditioned on the giving of a bond of indemnity. Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Michigan R. Commission, 240 U. S. 564, 60 L. ed. 802, 36 S. Ct. 424. There is no denial of due process of law in permitting an amendment of pleadings and requiring the parties to proceed with the trial, where the party adversely affected declines to plead surprise. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Koennecke, 239 U. S. 352, 60 L. ed. 324, 36 S. Ct. 126. The mere fact that a proceeding to hold a party, who appeared and defended, liable to a judgment was by rule to show cause does not conflict with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, since forms of procedure in the state courts are not controlled by that amendment, provided the fundamental rights secured by the amendment are not denied. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 S. Ct. 620.

¹⁸Rouse, H. & Co. v. Donovan, 104 Mich. 234, 62 N. W. 359, 27 L.R.A. 577, 53 Am. St. Rep. 457; State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206, 794, 43 Am. St. Rep. 524; Larson v. Dickey, 39 Neb. 463, 58 N. W. 167, 42 Am. St. Rep. 595; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1216, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 917; Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N. W. 194, 21 L.R.A. 483, 39 Am. St. Rep. 873. The striking of so much of the defense in an action for divorce and alimony as states a defense to the application for divorce, for failure to obey an order for the payment of temporary alimony, and the refusal to permit the defendant to defend except as to the amount of alimony violate his constitutional right to due process of law, especially where he shows by affidavit that he was unable to comply with the order for temporary alimony. McNamara v. McNamara, 86 Neb. 631, 126 N. W. 94, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1062, 21 Ann. Cas. 451.

¹⁹Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso. 283 U. S. 522, 75 L. ed. 1244, 51 S. Ct. 517.

²⁰Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Higdon, 234 U. S. 592, 58 L. ed. 1484, 34 S. Ct. 948; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 589, 58 L. ed. 1484, 34 S. Ct. 947.

¹Western Pattern & Mfg. Co. v. American Metal Shoe Co. 175 Wis. 493, 185 N. W. 535, 20 A.L.R. 264.

replevin, without objection, and is a matter in the discretion of the legislative power in creating remedies. But it is error for the court, on application of the plaintiff and before trial on the merits, to order the seizure and sale of property by provisional orders, where such seizure and sale would render ineffectual a judgment thereafter obtained after trial.³

A party must not be deprived of his property without a judicial hearing, but the stage of proceedings at which that hearing shall take place and the manner in which the cause of a party shall be brought before the judicial tribunal, provided it is not an unreasonably inconvenient and embarrassing one, are with the legislative power.⁴

Due process of law is afforded litigants if they have an opportunity to be heard at any time before final judgment is entered.⁵ It has been announced that the hearing or opportunity to be heard must be prior to judgment.⁶ On the other hand, the view is taken that due process does not require an opportunity to present defenses before the entry of judgment; that it is sufficient if an appeal is provided or another method of review available.⁷ This view has been taken in special proceedings, such as entry of judgment on a supersedeas bond,⁸ and in tax matters.⁹

Within these principles due process of law is not denied by an ordinance which provides that the failure to remove weeds after notice to do so shall render the owner of premises guilty of a misdemeanor, where he can be punished only after a trial has been had, at which he is given an opportunity to defend.¹⁰ On like principles a statute requiring corporations to produce books and papers before a court or grand jury upon notice does not deny due process of law where a hearing is given before any proceeding to enforce the production of papers is concluded, and in case a production before the grand jury is required, any objection made before that body must be reported to the court for its action.¹¹ The ex parte appointment of a receiver to take possession of the property of an insolvent corporation upon the petition of a creditor is due process.¹² The fact that the commissioner conducting an investigation preliminary to the institution of a disbarment proceeding made findings of fact without affording the person investigated an opportunity to be heard does not amount to a denial of due process, where the charges against him were thereafter fully and fairly tried upon issues of which he was well informed, and full opportunity was given him to present his defense.¹³

Any right to a hearing may be lost by delay. There is no denial of due process in a provision that if the person affected takes no steps to assert

³Columbus Packing Co. v. State, 106 Ohio St. 469, 140 N. E. 376, 37 A.L.R. 1525.

⁴Fleming v. McFerson, 94 Colo. 1, 28 P. (2d) 1013, citing R. C. L.; Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 79 Am. Dec. 468; McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (affirmed in 279 U. S. 820, 73 L. ed. 975, 49 S. Ct. 344) citing R. C. L.; Shealy v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 131 S. C. 144, 126 S. E. 622, citing R. C. L.

⁵Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 46 L. ed. 612, 22 S. Ct. 384; Shipp v. Lexington, 212 Ky. 702, 279 S. W. 1094, citing R. C. L.; Shealy v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 131 S. C. 144, 126 S. E. 622, citing R. C. L.

⁶Fleming v. McFerson, 94 Colo. 1, 28 P. (2d) 1013, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206, 794, 43 Am. St. Rep. 524. Annotation: 43 Am. St. Rep. 531.

⁷George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 77 L. ed. 1265, 53 S. Ct. 620; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. ed. 231, 53 S. Ct. 98, 86 A.L.R. 298.

⁸American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 77 L. ed. 231, 53 S. Ct. 98, 86 A.L.R. 298; Beall v. New Mexico, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 21 L. ed. 292. Annotation: 86 A.L.R. 319.

⁹George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 77 L. ed. 1265, 53 S. Ct. 620.

¹¹Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 52 L. ed. 327, 28 S. Ct. 178, 12 Ann. Cas. 658.

his rights within four years after the judicial assertion of an adverse title, he shall lose those rights.¹⁴

The opportunity of landowners within a proposed road district to be heard upon the question whether their lands will be benefited by its creation may be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process of law although the particular road to be improved has not been selected at the time of such hearing.¹⁵

§ 612. —

Before Commissions, Boards, etc.—The rule that a hearing before judgment or order is not necessary to due process is especially applicable to proceedings before commissioners and boards, such as public utility commissioners, banking superintendents, etc. There is no violation of due process if provision is made for a trial de novo before a court of the issues passed upon by such a commission,16 for a judicial review of the order,17 even a review by mandamus,18 provision for suspending or setting aside the order,19 for a hearing before the order is put into effect,20 or for a rehearing upon application.1 A bank may be declared insolvent and assessments laid upon stockholders without a hearing; the stockholders' remedy by injunction to enjoin further proceedings 2 or their right to raise the question upon an affidavit of illegality where every possible defense may be made 3 meets the due process requirements.

It has been made a condition in such cases that there be a stay until final decision; due process is not afforded where a supersedeas or stay cannot be had until final action of the reviewing court.⁴

An appeal in such cases may be conditioned upon certain action being taken by the person affected, as, for example, an appeal to the commissioner of internal revenue after payment of taxes and his refusal to refund prerequisites to a suit to recover taxes.⁵

Confining the scope of the judicial review to the testimony which has been submitted to the commission does not take the property of carriers without due process of law, where the statute provides for a "full hearing" before the commission, at which such carriers may show that the order asked for, if granted, will be unreasonable.⁶

§ 613. Presence of Person.—

A person has the right to be present at the hearing in person and represented by counsel.7 The right to a hearing in-

¹⁴O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrig. Co. 242 U. S. 20, 61 L. ed. 123, 37 S. Ct. 7.

¹⁵Embree v. Kansas City & L. Boulevard Road Dist. 240 U. S. 242, 60 L. ed. 624, 36 S. Ct. 317. For sufficiency of hearings in assessment proceedings, see SPECIAL OR LOCAL ASSESSMENTS [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 76].

¹⁶Alabama, Pub. Serv. Commission v. Mobile Gas Co. 213 Ala. 50, 104 So. 538, 41 A.L.R. 872.

¹⁷Bourjois v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 1027, 57 S. Ct. 691; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U. S. 24, 73 L. ed. 161, 49 S. Ct. 69, 62 A.L.R. 805; Wadley S. R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 59 L. ed. 405, 35 S. Ct. 214; Alabama Pub. Serv. Commission v. Mobile Gas Co. 213 Ala. 50, 104 So. 538, 41 A.L.R. 872.

¹⁹Vandalia R. Co. v. Public Serv. Commission, 242 U. S. 255, 61 L. ed. 276, 37 S. Ct. 93; Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, 59 L. ed. 607, 35 S. Ct. 359.

²⁰United States v. Illinois C. R. Co. 291 U. S. 457, 78 L. ed. 909, 54 S. Ct. 471.

⁴Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 76 L. ed. 1226, 52 S. Ct. 617, affirmed on rehearing in 287 U. S. 346, 77 L. ed. 354, 53 S. Ct. 132.

⁶Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863, 32 S. Ct. 535.

⁷State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206, 794, 43 Am. St. Rep. 524; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N. W. 194, 21 L.R.A. 483, 39 Am. St. Rep. 873.

§ 614. Conditions and Restrictions.—

⁵⁶L. ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734. Proceedings resulting in the deportation of an alien found as an inmate of a house of prostitution within three years subse- quent to her entry into the United States are not wanting in due process of law be- cause she had no counsel when first under examination, where such an examination is within statutory authority and at subse- quent stages in the proceeding, and be- fore the hearing was closed or the orders for deportation made, she had the assist- ance and advice of counsel. Ibid.

¹¹Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 S. Ct. 836; Re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S. W. (2d) 410, 91 A.L.R. 74. A person was not deprived of liberty without due process of law by being ad- judged a lunatic in his absence, under Ala- bama Civ. Code 1886, § 2398, providing that the sheriff may take possession of the per- son "and, if consistent with his health or safety, have him present at the place of trial," where such person was duly served with process, but was not produced by the sheriff at the trial because, on examination by a physician, it was deemed to be incon- sistent with his health or safety, and was not in fact prevented from attending the hearing, or refused opportunity to be rep- resented there by counsel. Simon v. Craft,

¹³Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873 (holding that a statute which affords a nonresident individual defendant in a suit begun by foreign attachment an opportunity to ap- pear and defend only in case he gives bail or security for the discharge of the prop- erty seized to the value of such property and costs does not deny due process of law, even though the defendant may have no resources or credit aside from the prop- erty attached); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 58, 62 L. ed. 574, 38 S. Ct. 236; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkan- sas, 240 U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. 776, 36 S. Ct. 443; Kauffman v. Wooters, 138 U. S. 285, 34 L. ed. 962, 11 S. Ct. 298; York v. Texas,

¹³⁷U. S. 15, 34 L. ed. 604, 11 S. Ct. 9 (sus- taining state legislation which simply for- bids the defendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service upon him in a personal action, without surrendering himself to the jurisdiction of the court, but which does not attempt to restrain him from fully protecting his person, his prop- erty, and his rights against any attempt to enforce a judgment rendered without due service of process).

¹⁴Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873.

²⁵¹U. S. 63, 64 L. ed. 139, 40 S. Ct. 71; Wad- ley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651,

⁵⁹L. ed. 405, 35 S. Ct. 214; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 57 L. ed. 1507,

⁴⁷So. 166, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 568 (holding that an attorney cannot constitutionally be compelled to pay into court money alleged to have been collected for his client, and not paid over, as a condition to the right to defend on the merits a summary pro- ceeding to compel its payment, since he would thereby be deprived of due process of law); State ex rel. Dushek v. Watland,

⁵¹N. D. 710, 201 N. W. 680, 39 A.L.R. 1169; State v. Crawford, 74 Wash. 248, 133 P. 590,

¹³⁶Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 486, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 1181.

¹⁶State ex rel. Dushek v. Watland, 51 N. D. 710, 201 N. W. 680, 39 A.L.R. 1169. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 1181.

§ 615. Requiring Certain Pleadings.—

§ 616. Rulings of Trial Court.—

trary action.¹⁸ Arbitrary action by the tribunal in the hearing of a cause or

§ 617. Imposition of Severe Penalties.—

to be valid,⁶ or if the penalized acts had the supposed sanction of the law.⁷

¹⁷People's Wayne County Bank v. Wol- verine Box Co. 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170,

¹⁹Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863,

²⁰Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527. Annotation: 84 A.L.R. 544.

²Parker, Peebles & Knox v. El Saieh, 107 Conn. 545, 141 A. 884, 59 A.L.R. 1424.

³Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902.

⁵Life & C. Ins. Co. v. Barefield, 291 U. S. 576, 78 L. ed. 999, 54 S. Ct. 486; Life & C. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566, 78 L. ed. 987, 54 S. Ct. 482, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 600, 78 L. ed. 1464, 54 S. Ct. 627; Okla- homa Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331,

⁶⁴L. ed. 596, 40 S. Ct. 338; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63, 64 L. ed. 139, 40 S. Ct. 71; Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482, 59 L. ed. 1419, 35 S. Ct. 886; Ex parte Young,

²⁰⁹U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Beckler Produce Co. v. American R. Exp. Co. 156 Ark. 296, 245 S. W. 1, 26 A.L.R. 1197; Supe- rior Laundry Co. v. Rose, 193 Ind. 138, 137 N. E. 761, 139 N. E. 142, 26 A.L.R. 1392; State v. Crawford, 74 Wash. 248, 133 P. 590,

⁴⁶L.R.A.(N.S.) 1039; Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 486,

A reasonable penalty will be sustained.⁸ A state, however, has power to impose a punishment heavy enough to secure obedience to administrative orders of a state commission after they have been found to be lawful and to impose a penalty for acts of disobedience committed after ample opportunity to test the validity of such orders and failure to do so.⁹

§ 618. Proceedings in Which Hearing Not Required.—

The constitutional right to a hearing as part of due process of law does not exist in all possible cases where rights of liberty or property are affected or interfered with by official action and procedure. It is well settled that as related to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, all questions which are political in their nature and lie within the legislative province may be determined without notice to the owner of the property affected, and the question whether a particular work or improvement shall be made or particular property taken, being one of that character, the owner is not entitled to a hearing upon it as a matter of right.10 Making the ruling of county authorities conclusive evidence of the necessity of taking land for a public highway does not violate the provision of the Federal Constitution against taking property without due process of law.11 The taxing power12 and many acts of government13 are validly exercised without hearing, especially if the matter is subject to revision in the courts.14

The doctrine is established, although after some diversity of opinion, that previous notice and an opportunity to be heard by persons thereby affected are not indispensable to a valid exercise of the police power. It is enough that such persons are enabled, in maintaining their rights, to invoke the equal protection of the law, by any appropriate proceeding.¹⁵ On this ground, a railroad company is not entitled to a hearing upon the question of the pas-

Danaher, 238 U. S. 482, 59 L. ed. 1419, 35 S. Ct. 886, L.R.A.1916A, 1208. Annotation: L.R.A.1916A, 1211.

⁸United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Wickline, 103 Neb. 21, 170 N. W. 193, 6 A.L.R. 1267.

¹⁰Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 68 L. ed. 796, 44 S. Ct. 369; Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 64 L. ed. 135, 40 S. Ct. 62; Water Comrs. v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 84 A. 727, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1024. See EMINENT DOMAIN [Also 10 R. C. L. p. 11]. A railway company cannot complain of not having a hearing on the right of a telegraph company to condemn an easement along the railway right of way for a pole line merely because it is referred for that hearing to a separate suit in equity, the eminent domain proceedings being limited in their effect to determining the amount of the damages. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 250 U. S. 363, 63 L. ed. 1032, 39 S. Ct. 513. Conferring authority upon the Public Service Commission to hear upon notice an application for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, determine the facts of necessity and due compensation, and render judgment, which, subject to appeal, shall be final, does not deprive the owner of his property without due process of law. George v. Consolidated Lighting Co. 87 Vt. 411, 89 A. 635, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 850, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 416.

¹¹Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700, 67 L. ed. 1186, 43 S. Ct. 689.

¹³Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 78 L. ed. 1141, 54 S. Ct. 575 (revocation of motor vehicle fuel distributors license); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092, 24 S. Ct. 789 (seizure of mail in certain case); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390; McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd. 97 Fla. 750, 122 So. 239, 65 A.L.R. 508 (act to eradicate cattle fever tick, see ANIMALS, Vol. 2, p. 806, §§ 156 et seq.). Due process of law requires no special provision for granting a hearing to applicants for registration by the board of registration in medicine created by Michigan Pub. Acts 1899, Act No. 237, where such act provides for semiannual meetings of the board at specified times at the state capitol. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390. That the act of public authorities in forbidding the casting of sawdust from a particular mill into a particular stream is not a general regulation does not make it a judicial act, which will entitle the mill owner to a hearing. Com. v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 752, 109 Am. St. Rep. 630.

¹⁴Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092, 24 S. Ct. 789.

¹⁵Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N. W. 624, 41 L.R.A. 481, 53 Am. St. Rep. 557; Lacey v. Lemons, 22 N. M. 54, L.R.A.1917A, 1185, 159 P. 949.

sage of an ordinance requiring it to light its street crossings ¹⁶ or requiring it to repair a viaduct; notice afterward, with an opportunity on the part of the railroad company to contest the validity of the ordinance, is sufficient.¹⁷ Again, an importer of teas is not entitled to a hearing with reference to the establishing of government standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption or on the question whether his tea should be rejected as not entitled to admission into the United States because inferior to the standards.¹⁸ An express company undertaking to do business on railroads the classification of which has already been fixed by the legislature cannot question the validity of a privilege tax graded with respect to the classification of the various railroads, on the ground that it was not accorded a hearing as to such classification.¹⁹

Contraband property may be seized and destroyed without a hearing.²⁰ The right to a hearing also has been denied in the case of the rearrest and confinement of a convict who has violated the conditions of a parole or pardon granted him,¹ although there is authority to the effect that the convict cannot be denied a hearing in such a case.²

The suspension by the governor of a railroad commissioner under a statute which operates only until the general assembly determines the question is not wanting in due process of law because the governor refuses to produce to the officer the evidence against him or give him an opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses.³ A citizen cannot be deprived of his right to be heard in the court established by law for the purpose of hearing his cause, except under very exceptional circumstances.⁴ It is doubted whether the hearing can be dispensed with even in proceedings for the seizure of the property of alien enemies.⁵

§ 619. Necessity of Jury Trial.6—

The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that in suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed $20 the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, relates only to trials in the courts of the United States. The states, so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own courts in their own way. The due process clause does not imply that all trials in the state courts affecting the personal or property rights must be by jury.7 Under

¹⁶Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hartford City, 170 Ind. 674, 82 N. E. 787, 85 N. E. 362, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 461.

¹⁷Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 S. Ct. 513.

¹⁹Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Miller, 264 U. S. 535, 68 L. ed. 836, 44 S. Ct. 421.

²⁰Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188, 69 L. ed. 568, 45 S. Ct. 264, 37 A.L.R. 1378. For limitations upon this rule, see infra, § 677.

¹Re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 146 P. 1009, L.R.A.1915F, 541; Re Ridley, 3 Okla. Crim. Rep. 350, 106 P. 549, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 110, holding, however, that after recommitment he might have the facts considered on habeas corpus. Annotation: L.R.A.1915F, 541.

²State v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N. W. 1068, 19 L.R.A. 783, 39 Am. St. Rep. 582. See PARDON, REPRIEVE, AND AMNESTY [Also 20 R. C. L. p. 513].

³Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586, 42 L. ed. 865, 18 S. Ct. 435. Annotation: 42 L. ed. 865.

⁴Illinois C. R. Co. v. Baker, 155 Ky. 512, 159 S. W. 1169, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 496.

⁵The constitutionality of a Federal statute authorizing the seizure by a named officer of the property of enemy aliens, providing no adequate remedy to secure to a nonenemy owner either the return of his property seized or compensation for it and affording such owner no remedy where the officer no longer has possession of the property or its proceeds, has been doubted. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U. S. 74, 80 L. ed. 54, 56 S. Ct. 15.

⁷Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U. S. 226, 67 L. ed. 961, 43 S. Ct. 589; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. ed. 678, 37 S. Ct. 255, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637; New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. ed. 667, 37 S. Ct. 247, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309,

constitutional provisions the right of trial by jury is preserved inviolate only

practice of purely equity courts, in which no right to jury trial exists, except

of an attorney at law,¹² contempt proceedings,¹³ proceedings for the removal

of an officer,¹⁴ election contests,¹⁵ juvenile commitment proceedings,¹⁶ depor-

either directly or by conferring jurisdiction on a court of equity to try cases,

¹⁹⁹U. S. 212, 50 L. ed. 157, 26 S. Ct. 31; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 S. Ct. 625; Max- well v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494; Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. 152 U. S. 160, 38 L. ed. 398,

¹⁴S. Ct. 506; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 36 L. ed. 986, 13 S. Ct. 105; Re Delgado,

¹⁴⁰U. S. 586, 35 L. ed. 578, 11 S. Ct. 874 (mandamus); Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265,

²⁷L. ed. 552, 2 S. Ct. 569; Walker v. Sauvi- net, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; State ex rel. Cartmel v. Ætna Casualty & S. Co. 84 Fla. 123, 92 So. 871, 24 A.L.R. 1262; Atty. Gen. v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L.R.A. 699, 41 Am. St. Rep. 606; Lommen v. Min- neapolis Gaslight Co. 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. 53, 33 L.R.A. 437, 60 Am. St. Rep. 450; Re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S. W. (2d) 410, 91 A.L.R. 74; State ex rel. Rhodes v. Saunders, 66 N. H. 39, 25 A. 588, 18 L.R.A. 646; Salt Creek Valley Turnp. Co. v. Parks,

⁵⁰Ohio St. 568, 35 N. E. 304, 28 L.R.A. 769; Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S. E. 274, 50 L.R.A. 279; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A.L.R. 1121. Annotation: 24 L. ed. 436; 11 L.R.A. 224;

⁸Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171, 78 S. W. 770, 65 L.R.A. 76, 105 Am. St. Rep. 25, 2 Ann. Cas. 242; Frost v. People, 193 Ill. 635,

⁶¹N. E. 1054, 86 Am. St. Rep. 352; State ex rel. Wilcox v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953, 5 A.L.R. 1449; State ex rel. Payne v. District Ct. 53 Mont. 350, 165 P. 294, cit- ing R. C. L.; Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100,

¹⁶⁹S. W. 558, L.R.A.1915F, 531; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351,

¹⁰⁵S. E. 141, 12 A.L.R. 1121; Reliance Auto Repair Co. v. Nugent, 159 Wis. 488, 149 N. W. 377, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 307.

¹⁰Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171, 78 S. W. 770, 65 L.R.A. 76, 105 Am. St. Rep. 25, 2 Ann. Cas. 242; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A.L.R. 1121. See NUISANCES [Also 20 R. C. L. p. 376].

¹¹Pompano Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801, 52 A.L.R. 51 (abatement of nuisance); Loeb v. Jennings, 133 Ga. 796, 67 S. E. 101, 18 Ann. Cas. 376; State v. Loden,

¹²Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 42 L. ed. 1002, 18 S. Ct. 573; Ex parte Robin- son, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 505, 22 L. ed. 205. See ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Vol. 5, p. 441, § 297.

⁵⁷L. ed. 309, 33 S. Ct. 158; Tinsley v. An- derson, 171 U. S. 101, 43 L. ed. 91, 18 S. Ct. 805; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. ed. 1047, 14 S. Ct. 1125; Eilenbecker v. District Ct. 134 U. S. 31, 33 L. ed. 801, 10 S. Ct. 424.

¹⁵Ashley v. Three Justices (Ashley v. Wait) 228 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A.L.R. 1472, writ of error dismissed in 250 U. S. 652, 63 L. ed. 1190, 40 S. Ct. 53.

¹⁷United States ex rel. Turner v. Wil- liams, 194 U. S. 279, 48 L. ed. 979, 24 S. Ct. 719.

¹⁸Re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N. E. 1033, 61 Am. St. Rep. 290; Re Moynihan,

³³²Mo. 1022, 62 S. W. (2d) 410, 91 A.L.R. 74; White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W. 508, L.R.A.1918A, 339. Annotation: 91 A.L.R. 88. See INSANE AND OTHER INCOMPETENT PER- SONS.

lature in reference to the regulation of litigation and the procedure in courts,

§ 620. Generally.—

the party defaults, proof is not necessary.⁸ If the allegations of the bill are

§ 621. Right to Introduce Evidence.—

³Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 S. Ct. 77; Parker v. People,

¹³Colo. 155, 21 P. 1120, 4 L.R.A. 803; State v. Bates, 14 Utah, 293, 47 P. 78, 43 L.R.A.

³³(overruled as to the particular regula- tion in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343,

⁸Stephenson v. Kirtley, 269 U. S. 163, 70 L. ed. 213, 46 S. Ct. 50. Where a court has acquired jurisdiction of a suit to set aside a deed as in fraud of creditors by the levying of an attachment and a decree nisi has been entered upon the order of publication, a failure to hear proof before adjudging the deed void will not deprive the court of jurisdiction or con- stitute a denial of due process of law. Ste- phenson v. Kirtley, 269 U. S. 163, 70 L. ed. 213, 46 S. Ct. 50 (admission through de- fault sufficient proof).

⁹McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731. 10⁻13 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 79 L. ed. 791, 55 S. Ct. 340, 98 A.L.R. 406, re- hearing denied in 294 U. S. 732, 79 L. ed. 1261, 55 S. Ct. 511. Annotation: 98 A.L.R. 411.

²⁹⁸U. S. 349, 80 L. ed. 1209, 56 S. Ct. 797; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 59 L. ed. 379, 35 S. Ct. 146; Washing- ton ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fair- child, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863, 32 S. Ct. 535; Re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851,

⁵⁵L.R.A. 856, 85 Am. St. Rep. 296 (insanity inquisition); Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co.

²⁰¹N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Taylor v. Ander- son, 40 Okla. 316, 137 P. 1183, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 731; Ex parte Hardcastle, 84 Tex. Crim. Rep. 463, 208 S. W. 531, 2 A.L.R. 1539 (habeas corpus); Jensen v. Union P. R. Co.

⁶Utah, 253, 21 P. 994, 4 L.R.A. 724; Schlitz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N. W. 194, 21 L.R.A. 483, 39 Am. St. Rep. 873. Refusal of a state court to receive or con- sider evidence of lack of benefits to a street railway company which is required by a municipal ordinance to pay the cost of street paving, on the ground that such evidence is immaterial, amounts to a de- nial of a hearing on that issue, in viola- tion of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution, where the statute authorizing and the ordinance directing the assessment for the cost of such improvements, as con- strued by the state courts, require, as the basis of their operation, the existence of benefits. Georgia R. & Electric Co. v. Deca-

§ 622. Right to Prove and Recover Damages.—

tur, 295 U. S. 165, 79 L. ed. 1365, 55 S. Ct. 701. In view of the rule that a statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts up- on that score, a provision of a statute look- ing to the licensing of real-estate brokers that the commission is authorized to "re- quire and procure" satisfactory proof as to the qualifications of applicants will not be held to be unconstitutional, as giving the applicant no opportunity to meet evidence procured by the commission as to his qual- ifications, through notice and opportunity to be heard. Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110, 67 L. ed. 157, 43 S. Ct. 43.

¹⁶Rouse, H. & Co. v. Donovan, 104 Mich. 234, 62 N. W. 359, 27 L.R.A. 577, 53 Am. St. Rep. 457; Larson v. Dickey, 39 Neb. 463, 58 N. W. 167, 42 Am. St. Rep. 595; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; State v. Cutshall, 110 N. C. 538, 15 S. E. 261, 16 L.R.A. 130.

¹⁸State ex rel. School Dist. v. Cary, 166 Wis. 103, 163 N. W. 645, 1 A.L.R. 1554.

¹⁹Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 70 L. ed. 818, 46 S. Ct. 384.

²⁰Seward v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 17 N. M. 557, 131 P. 980, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 242.

¹De La Rama v. De La Rama, 241 U. S. 154, 60 L. ed. 932, 36 S. Ct. 518, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 411.

§ 623. Changes in Rules of Evidence.—

to submit to the jury in his defense all the facts bearing upon the issue, there

his rights, since this would substantially deprive him of due process of law.⁷

³Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041, 64 L.R.A. 790, 104 Am. St. Rep. 422; Park v. Detroit Free Press Co. 72 Mich. 560,

⁴⁰N. W. 731, 1 L.R.A. 599, 16 Am. St. Rep. 544; Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811, 66 L.R.A. 648. But see to the con- trary Allen v. Pioneer Press Co. 40 Minn. 117, 41 N. W. 936, 3 L.R.A. 532, 12 Am. St. Rep. 707.

⁴Byers v. Meridian Printing Co. 84 Ohio St. 408, 95 N. E. 917, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 913. See generally LIBEL AND SLANDER [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 254].

²⁸⁴U. S. 8, 76 L. ed. 136, 52 S. Ct. 103, 78 A.L.R. 826; Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. ed. 575, 24 S. Ct. 372; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 S. Ct. 1016; Morris v. Pacific Electric R. Co. 2 Cal. (2d) 764, 43 P. (2d) 276, citing R. C. L.; Re Patterson, 155 Cal. 626, 102 P. 941, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 654, 132 Am. St. Rep. 116, 18 Ann. Cas. 625; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S. E. 74, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007; Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56,

⁴⁵N. E. 991, 35 L.R.A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447; Powers v. State, 204 Ind. 472, 184 N. E. 549, 86 A.L.R. 166; Green v. State, 204 Ind. 349, 184 N. E. 183, 87 A.L.R. 1251; Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505, 23 Am. Rep. 381; Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co. 136 Mo. 382,

³⁸S. W. 85, 35 L.R.A. 227, 58 Am. St. Rep. 638, affirmed in 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552,

¹⁹S. Ct. 281; People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102, 4 A.L.R. 463; State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 506, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 626; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1074, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574; Penn- sylvania Co. v. McCann, 54 Ohio St. 10, 42 N. E. 768, 31 L.R.A. 651, 56 Am. St. Rep. 695; Taylor v. Anderson, 40 Okla. 316, 137 P. 1193, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 731; State v. Ran- dolph, 85 Or. 172, 166 P. 555, citing R. C. L.: State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 546, 32 S. W. 481, 34 L.R.A. 656; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. Annotation: 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007. The legislature may, in the absence of constitutional provision to the contrary, authorize a state through its judges and attorney general to take testimony in order to enforce its own laws, and the exercise of such power is not a violation of the pro- vision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Re Davies, 168 N. Y. 89,

⁶¹N. E. 118, 56 L.R.A. 855. The provision of Ohio Rev. Stat. § 4427-6, that the character of an alleged trust or combination may be established by proof of its general reputation as such is uncon- stitutional and void in that it prescribes a rule of evidence which is violative of the guaranty contained in U. S. Const. Art. 15, § 1, that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property" without due process of law. Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N. E. 416, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 906, 125 Am. St. Rep. 634, 14 Ann. Cas. 732. For a detailed discussion of this question, see EVIDENCE [Also 10 R. C. L. p. 847].

²¹⁹U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463; State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1011, 113 Am. St. Rep. 17, 6 Ann. Cas. 744; Pilcher v. Tanner Motor Livery, 138 Cal. App. 558, 33 P. (2d) 58, cit- ing R. C. L.; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25, 62 N. E. 488, 56 L.R.A. 468, 92 Am. St. Rep. 293; State v. Beach,

²²⁰U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 St. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 31

§ 624. Creation of Presumptions.—

A certain fact or facts may be made prima facie evidence of other facts if there is a rational connection between what is proof and what is to be inferred and if the rule is not arbitrary.8

S. Ct. 136, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463; State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1011, 113 Am. St. Rep. 17, 6 Ann. Cas. 744; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S. E. 74, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, 46 N. E. 145, 36 L.R.A. 179; Odell v. Green, 72 Ind. App. 65, 122 N. E. 791, citing R. C. L.; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Simonson, 64 Kan. 802, 68 P. 653, 57 L.R.A. 765, 91 Am. St. Rep. 248; Larson v. Dickey, 39 Neb. 463, 58 N. W. 167, 42 Am. St. Rep. 595; Board of Excise v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143, 8 N. E. 484, 57 Am. Rep. 705; Taylor v. Anderson, 40 Okla. 316, 137 P. 1183, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 731; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 72 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232.

⁸Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502, 77 L. ed. 457, 53 S. Ct. 249; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct. 284 U. S. 8, 76 L. ed. 136, 52 S. Ct. 103, 78 A.L.R. 826 (holding that a statute prohibiting the unreasonable waste of natural gas is not inconsistent with due process by reason of a provision therein that the release or escape of natural gas into the air shall be prima facie evidence of unreasonable waste); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502, 77 L. ed. 457, 53 S. Ct. 249 (failure to give signals at railroad crossing); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct. 284 U. S. 8, 76 L. ed. 136, 52 S. Ct. 103, 78 A.L.R. 826 (release or escape of natural gas as prima facie evidence of unreasonable waste); Western & A. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 73 L. ed. 884, 49 S. Ct. 445; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1, 73 L. ed. 575, 49 S. Ct. 215; United States v. Los Angeles & Salt L. R. Co. 273 U. S. 299, 71 L. ed. 651, 47 S. Ct. 413 (valuation of railroads by Interstate Commerce Commission evidence of property in certain judicial proceedings); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 69 L. ed. 904, 45 S. Ct. 470; United States ex rel. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 264 U. S. 64, 68 L. ed. 565, 44 S. Ct. 294; Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. 1, 66 L. ed. 431, 42 S. Ct. 204; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. ed. 678, 37 S. Ct. 255, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637; McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 241 U. S. 79, 60 L. ed. 899, 36 S. Ct. 498; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 236 U. S. 412, 59 L. ed. 644, 35 S. Ct. 328, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 691 (presumption that in actions to recover from a carrier the damages alleged to have been sustained by a shipper and awarded by the Interstate Commerce Commission by reason of the carrier's violation of the provisions of those statutes, "the findings and order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated"); Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 58 L. ed. 101, 34 S. Ct. 10 (making the taking up of a permanent residence in a foreign country within five years after the issuance of a certificate of citizenship prima facie evidence of the lack of intention to become a permanent citizen of the United States at the time of the application for citizenship, which, in the absence of countervailing evidence, shall be sufficient to warrant the cancellation of the certificate as fraudulent); Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437, 56 L. ed. 497, 32 S. Ct. 248 (making the entry upon the official record of the forfeiture of school land for default in payment of the purchase price prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence that all the preliminary steps essential to a valid forfeiture were properly taken); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160 (making the engaging in pumping mineral waters from wells bored or drilled into the rock for the purpose of collecting and vending as a separate commodity the carbonic acid gas contained therein prima facie evidence of the common underground source of supply and of injury to other proprietors); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. ed. 191, 31 S. Ct. 145; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463; Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. ed. 575, 24 S. Ct. 372; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 47 L. ed. 70, 23 S. Ct. 20; State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1011, 113 Am. St. Rep. 17, 6 Ann. Cas. 744; Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L.R.A. 1915C, 716, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 80; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S. E. 74, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007; Shellabarger Elevator Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 278 Ill. 333, 116 N. E. 170, L.R.A. 1917E, 1011; Waugh v. Glos, 246 Ill. 604, 92 N. E. 974, 138 Am. St. Rep. 259; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Green v. State, 204 Ind. 349, 184 N. E. 183, 87 A.L.R. 1251; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, 46 N. E. 145, 36 L.R.A. 179; Ramsey-Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 119 Kan. 844, 241 P. 433, citing R. C. L.; Duggan v. Bay Street R. Co. 230 Mass. 370, 119 N. E. 757, L.R.A.1918E, 680; People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102, 4 A.L.R. 463; Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, 54 Ohio St. 10, 42 N. E. 768, 31 L.R.A. 651, 56 Am. St. Rep. 695; Taylor v. Anderson, 40 Okla. 316, 137 P. 1183, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 731; Hall v. Johnson, 87 Or. 21, 169 P. 515, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 49. Annotation: 51 A.L.R. 1141, s. 86 A.L.R. 180; 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226; L.R.A.1915C, 717; Ann. Cas. 1916B, 699. The "first-in, first-out," regulation of the United States Treasury Department relative to computing capital gains and losses for income tax purposes, and declaring that when shares of corporate stock are sold from lots purchased at different dates and at different prices and the identity of the lots cannot be determined, the stock sold shall be charged against the earliest purchases of such stock, is not invalid under the Fifth Amendment on the ground that it creates a conclusive presumption as applied to marginal transactions where stock is purchased at different times by a broker for a customer and is not earmarked or allocated in any way to the customer, but is carried in the name of the broker or in "street names" and the certificates are commingled with like certificates held by the broker for other customers, the regulation at most affecting only the burden of proof of identifying stock sold. Helvering

Various cases sustain the constitutionality of statutes making failure of a bank under certain conditions prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the banker that the institution was insolvent at the time of the receipt of deposits or evidence of an intent to defraud.⁹

If the statute is arbitrary, it violates the due process guaranty.¹⁰ A constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment.¹¹ An order of a court, like a statute, is not unconstitutional because it endows an official act or finding with a presumption of regularity or of verity.¹²

§ 625. —

v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123, 79 L. ed. 1343, 55 S. Ct. 732. Statutory provisions for a commitment of an alleged insane person on the certificate of physicians and an inquisition as to whether or not he is a public charge make the certificate merely prima facie evidence of insanity, subject to be overthrown by countervailing evidence, and the statute does not, therefore, deprive the alleged insane person of his liberty without due process of law. Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232. A statute prescribing the circumstances that shall constitute prima facie evidence of a fact in issue on trial in the courts of the state is within the authority of the legislature and may be made applicable to a cause of action which arose outside the state. Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, 54 Ohio St. 10, 42 N. E. 768, 31 L.R.A. 651, 56 Am. St. Rep. 695. The provision of a statute making the commissioners' schedule prima facie evidence that the rates fixed thereby are reasonable is not an infringement of the constitutional guaranties of the right to trial by jury and against deprivation of property without due process of law. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dey (C. C.) 35 F. 866, 1 L.R.A. 744. A statute providing that neglect to give the required signals at a crossing, contributing to injury to person or property by collision, shall render the railroad company liable for all resulting damages cannot be regarded as contravening the due process clause on the ground that the presumption it raises that failure to give the prescribed signals is the proximate cause of the collision does not vanish upon the introduction of opposing evidence, but remains to be considered by the jury as evidence, where the court, by overruling the railroad company's motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that the statute violates the due process clause and by instructing the jury that while the failure to give the required signals raises a presumption that it was the proximate cause of the injury, such presumption may be rebutted by the defendant's evidence and that all the evidence must be considered in determining the question of proximate cause, treated the statute as creating a temporary inference that vanished upon the introduction of opposing evidence. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502, 77 L. ed. 457, 53 S. Ct. 249. See EVIDENCE [Also 10 R. C. L. p. 847]. 183Annotation: 51 A.L.R. 1154, s. 86 A.L.R. See BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 271, § 380; p. 275, § 335.

¹⁰Hall v. Johnson, 87 Or. 21, 169 P. 515, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 49, holding that a municipal ordinance declaring that the loitering or parading in the vicinity or in front of any store, factory, or place of business shall be prima facie evidence of a conspiracy to injure the trade, business, or commerce of the proprietor of the store thus patrolled is invalid, since the acts have no tendency to prove a conspiracy to injure the commerce or trade of such person. In McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 241 U. S. 79, 60 L. ed. 899, 36 S. Ct. 498, it was held that a state cannot create a presumption of participation in a forbidden monopoly or combination from the systematic payment in one state by a person engaged in sugar refining within that state of a less price for sugar than he pays in any other state or a presumption that the closing or keeping idle of a sugar refinery for more than one year was for the purpose of violating that statute or the laws against monopolies.

¹³Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1, 73 L. ed. 575, 49 S. Ct. 215; Shellabarger Elevator Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 278 Ill. 333, 116 N. E. 170, L.R.A.1917E, 1011; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25, 62 N. E. 488, 56 L.R.A. 468, 92 Am. St. Rep. 293; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, 46 N. E. 145, 36 L.R.A. 179; Ramsey Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 119 Kan. 844, 241 P. 433; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Simonson, 64 Kan. 802, 68 P. 653, 57 L.R.A. 765, 91 Am. St. Rep. 248; Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513, 1 L.R.A. 777, 12 Am. St. Rep. 663; Eastland v. Sneed, 134 Tenn. 599, 185 S. W. 717. Annotation: 51 A.L.R. 1149, s. 86 A.L.R. 182. A statute making a judicial determination of title to land forever binding and conclusive upon all persons after the lapse of two years may be given effect against parties to the proceeding and persons who must bring legal proceedings to establish their rights, although it would be void in favor of persons in possession of all they claim, yet who were not parties to the proceeding. People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 910, 44 L.R.A. 801, 68 Am. St. Rep. 175.

§ 626. —

sustained.⁶ On the other hand, in some states the courts have declined to give

¹⁴Clem v. Evans (Tex. Com. App.) 291 S. W. 871, 51 A.L.R. 1135. Annotation: 51 A.L.R. 1157, s. 86 A.L.R. 184. A statutory provision that when a prom- ise to do a future act induces one to enter into a contract which he otherwise would not have entered into, and said promise has not been complied with in a reasonable time, a presumption arises that it was falsely and fraudulently made, and the bur- den of proof that it was made in good faith, but that performance by the prom- isor was prevented by an act of God, the public enemy, or by some equitable reason, rests upon said promisor, unconstituion- ally deprives him of due process of law. Clem v. Evans (Tex. Com. App.) 291 S. W. 871, 51 A.L.R. 1135.

¹⁵Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho, 427, 262 P. 881, 56 A.L.R. 317 (presumption of neg- ligence from driving an automobile when intoxicated). Annotation: 56 A.L.R. 327.

¹Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 S. Ct. 1016; People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102, 4 A.L.R. 463. Annotation: 4 A.L.R. 471.

²¹⁹U. S. 35, 55 L. ed. 78, 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463, af- firming 91 Miss. 273, 46 So. 360, 124 Am. St. Rep. 679. Annotation: 51 A.L.R. 1172, s. 86 A.L.R. 187; 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 226. See NEGLIGENCE [Also 20 R. C. L. p. 184, §§ 155 et seq.].

⁴See FENCES [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 890, §§ 24 et seq.]; RAILROADS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 730].

⁵Western & A. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 73 L. ed. 884, 49 S. Ct. 445, hold- ing that permitting the presumption of negligence created by statute to be given the effect of evidence, to be weighed against opposing testimony, and to prevail unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate is violative of the due proc- ess clause. As to carriers, see CARRIERS, Vol. 9, p. 813, § 661.

⁶Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L. ed. 677, 17 S. Ct. 282, affirming 11 Utah, 200, 39 P. 825, 29 L.R.A. 97.

panies to fence their tracks at reasonable places, all the authorities hold that

§ 627. —

created.¹⁰ In some jurisdictions the courts have upheld as constitutional stat-

stitutionality of statutes declaring in effect that sales of a stock of goods in

⁷Bielenberg v. Montana U. R. Co. 8 Mont. 271, 20 P. 314, 2 L.R.A. 813. See RAILROADS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 730].

⁸Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Smalley, 1 Wash. 206, 23 P. 1008, 22 Am. St. Rep. 143.

²¹²U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 S. Ct. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645 (bad faith or untruth of answer presumed from suppression or fail- ure of proof); People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102, 4 A.L.R. 463; Re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 100 P. 743,

²¹L.R.A.(N.S.) 259, 132 Am. St. Rep. 968 (departing from an hotel or boarding house or removing, or surreptitiously attempting to remove, baggage therefrom).

¹¹James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L. ed. 569, 47 S. Ct. 308 (presumption of fraud and falsity from failure to comply with a promise); State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1011, 113 Am. St. Rep. 17, 6 Ann. Cas. 744; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15,

⁵²S. E. 74, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007; Clem v. Evans (Tex. Com. App.) 291 S. W. 871, 51 A.L.R. 1135 (holding that a prima facie presumption of falsity from failure to per- form promise is valid). Annotation: 4 A.L.R. 471; 51 A.L.R. 1157, s. 86 A.L.R. 184. See FRAUD AND DECEIT [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 222].

¹²Annotation: 51 A.L.R. 1176, s. 86 A.L.R. 189. See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 459].

¹³Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L.R.A.1915C, 716, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 80. Annotation: L.R.A.1915C, 717.

¹⁴Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1, 73 L. ed. 575, 49 S. Ct. 215 (holding that a statute declaring that every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent and subject the directors to imprisonment unless they repel the presumption of fraud by showing that the affairs of the bank have been fairly and legally administered and generally with the same care and diligence that agents receiving a commission for their services are required and bound by law to observe, and declaring that a bank shall be deemed to be insolvent when it cannot meet its liabilities as they become due in the regular course of business, when the actual market value of its assets is insuffi- cient to pay its liabilities, and when its reserve shall fall below the amount re- quired and is not made good within thirty days, is unreasonable and arbitrary and violates the constitutional requirement of due process of law); State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, 46 N. E. 145, 36 L.R.A. 179. See BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 271, § 380; p. 275, § 385.

§ 628. —

for a confiscation of property.¹⁹ A legislative provision that a tax sale shall

§ 629. —

¹⁵Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991, 35 L.R.A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447.

¹⁶Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513, 1 L.R.A. 777, 12 Am. St. Rep. 663. See MECHANICS' LIENS [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 868].

¹⁸Larson v. Dickey, 39 Neb. 463, 58 N. W. 167, 42 Am. St. Rep. 595. Annotation: 76 Am. Dec. 532.

¹⁹McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356, 4 Am. Rep. 214; Maguiar v. Henry, 84 Ky. 1,

¹McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356, 4 Am. Rep. 214; Larson v. Dickey, 39 Neb. 463,

²Maxwell v. Page, 23 N. M. 356, 168 P. 492, 5 A.L.R. 155. Annotation: 5 A.L.R. 164.

⁶Handy v. Delaware Trust Co. 285 U. S. 352, 76 L. ed. 793, 52 S. Ct. 371; Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 76 L. ed. 772, 52 S. Ct. 358 (conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years prior to the donor's death were made in contemplation of death).

certain acts prima facie proof of guilt or of some element of guilt.⁷ Likewise,

that certain facts shall be conclusive proof of guilt,¹¹ especially where this

⁷²L. ed. 632, 48 S. Ct. 373 (making the possession of a narcotic drug which does not bear the required stamps prima facie evidence of its purchase from other than the original stamped packages, contrary to the provisions of the statute); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 69 L. ed. 904, 45 S. Ct. 470 (presumption of unlawful im- portation of opium); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. 1, 66 L. ed. 431, 42 S. Ct. 204 (pre- sumption of guilty knowledge by the actual occupant of a farm from a finding upon the premises of apparatus for distilling pro- hibited intoxicating liquors, although, un- der the local law, a defendant in a crimi- nal case may not testify as a witness and husband and wife are not competent or compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other); State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1011, 113 Am. St. Rep. 17, 6 Ann. Cas. 744; Wooten v. State, 24 Fla. 335, 5 So. 39,

¹L.R.A. 819; Griffin v. State, 142 Ga. 636, 83 S. E. 540, L.R.A.1915C, 716, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 89; Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991, 35 L.R.A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447; State v. Nossaman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 P. 347, 20 A.L.R. 921, writ of error dismissed in 258 U. S. 633, 66 L. ed. 802, 42 S. Ct. 314 (holding that a statutory provision making the possession of cigarettes and cigarette papers prima facie evidence of the selling and keeping for sale of the prohibited ar- ticles is not a denial of due process of law); State ex rel. Robertson v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co. (State ex rel. Rob- ertson v. Lane) 126 Minn. 78, 147 N. W. 951, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, Ann. Cas. 1915D,

⁵⁴⁹(holding that the legislature may pro- vide that the reputation of a building as a house of ill fame shall be prima facie evi- dence as to its character and may create a presumption of knowledge on the part of all persons having property interest in the property in or about such house); People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102, 4 A.L.R. 463. Annotation: 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 626; L.R.A. 1915C, 719. The possession of more than one quart of liquor may be made prima facie evi- dence of intent to violate the statute against illegal sales. State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 506, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 626.

⁸Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. ed. 575, 24 S. Ct. 372, affirming 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636, 63 L.R.A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675. See GAMING [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 704].

¹⁰Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N. E. 416, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 906, 125 Am. St. Rep. 684, 14 Ann. Cas. 732.

²L.R.A.(N.S.) 1011, 113 Am. St. Rep. 17, 6 Ann. Cas. 744; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15,

⁵²S. E. 74, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007; State v. Grimmett, 33 Idaho, 203, 193 P. 380, citing R. C. L.; Powers v. State, 204 Ind. 472, 184 N. E. 549, 86 A.L.R. 166; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25, 62 N. E. 488,

⁵⁶L.R.A. 468, 92 Am. St. Rep. 293; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, 46 N. E. 145, 36 L.R.A. 179; Hollins v. State, 128 Miss. 119, 90 So. 630, citing R. C. L.; Taylor v. Anderson, 40 Okla. 316, 137 P. 1183, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 731. Annotation: 51 A.L.R. 1156. See CRIMINAL LAW [Also 8 R. C. L. p. 38].

¹²Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N. E. 416, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 906, 125 Am. St. Rep. 684, 14 Ann. Cas. 732. [12 Am. Jur.]—21 321

defense and to submit all the facts to a jury, to be weighed by them, on evidence legitimately bearing on them, the constitutionality of the laws will be

not be necessary to prove actual sale; but a notorious character of the premises or notoriously bad or intemperate character of those frequenting them

fraud by showing a fair and legal administration of the bank's affairs is unreasonable and arbitrary and violates the constitutional requirement of due

§ 630. —

been held to be unconstitutional.¹⁶ It is said that such laws amount to an arbitrary exercise of power and an attempt to deprive a person of his day in

court, thereby denying to him due process of law.¹⁷ Where, however, the fixing of the amount of the weight or value of articles depends on elements of

estoppel, it seems that statutes may constitutionally create conclusive rules of

law limiting the right of parties to prove that such amounts were incorrect.¹⁸

For example, the courts have upheld statutes compelling fire insurance companies, in case of total loss, to pay the amount for which the property was insured, less depreciation between the time of issuing the policy and the time of

loss, holding that such a statute does not deprive the insurer of property without due process of law, because it leaves the parties to fix the valuation of the

voluntarily enter into it. The theory of this is that the insurers are left to fix

similar grounds the courts have sustained the constitutional validity of statutes making the acknowledgment of the receipt of property for transportation

⁵²S. E. 74, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1007; State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, 46 N. E. 145, 36 L.R.A. 179; Re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 232.

¹⁴State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 211, 43 Am. Rep. 26. Annotation: 43 Am. Rep. 29. See INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 239].

¹⁵Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1, 73 L. ed. 575, 49 S. Ct. 215; People v. Mancuso, 255 N. Y. 463, 175 N. E. 177, 76 A.L.R. 514. Annotation: 76 A.L.R. 530.

¹⁶Shellabarger Elevator Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 278 Ill. 333, 116 N. E. 170, L.R.A.1917E, 1011; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Simonson,

⁶⁴Kan. 802, 68 P. 653, 57 L.R.A. 765, 91 Am. St. Rep. 248; Taylor v. Anderson, 40 Okla. 316, 137 P. 1183, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 731. Annotation: 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 731; L.R.A. 1917E, 1022.

¹⁷Vega S. S. Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co. 75 Minn. 308, 77 N. W. 973, 43 L.R.A. 843, 74 Am. St. Rep. 484. Annotation: 74 Am. St. Rep. 488.

⁴³L. ed. 552, 19 S. Ct. 281; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Bent, 94 Miss. 681, 47 So. 805, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821.

contained in a bill of lading conclusive evidence of the fact so stated in favor

§ 631. Compulsory Process upon Witnesses.—

process, a statute which fails to provide for such process may be sustained.²²

§ 632. Fixing Burden of Proof.—

The burden of proof may be shifted, provided the statute is reasonable.1 The burden may be cast upon those seeking

a reversal of the order of a commission of showing the order to be unreasonable or unlawful.² The burden of proving citizenship may be cast upon one

burden of excuse or explanation,⁵ at least where, on a balancing of convenience

accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.⁶ The burden of showing, in a proceeding to compel a railroad company to provide a

station at a village on its line, that the establishment of a station there is unreasonable and unnecessary may be cast upon the railroad company by a statute without violating the due process of law guaranty.⁷ The burden of proving facts peculiarly within the knowledge of an accused and hidden from

discovery by the government violates no constitutional rights.⁸ No constitutional right of the defendant is infringed by requiring him to prove contribu-

²⁰Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Bent, 94 Miss. 681, 47 So. 805, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821. Annotation: 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821.

²¹Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 56 L. ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734. The immigration officer's lack of power to issue process to compel the attendance of witnesses does not render invalid, as denying due process of law, the proceedings had conformably to the Act of February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. at L. 898, Chap. 1134), as amended by the Act of March 26, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 263, Chap. 128), resulting in the deportation of an alien found as an inmate of a house of prostitution within three years subsequent to her entry into the United States. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 56 L. ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734.

²²Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 59 L. ed. 379, 35 S. Ct. 146. As to criminal proceedings, see CRIMINAL LAW.

¹Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. ed. 678, 37 S. Ct. 255, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 47 L. ed. 70, 23 S. Ct. 20; Shellabarger Elevator Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 278 Ill. 333, 116 N. E. 170, L.R.A.1917E, 1011; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Duggan v. Bay Street R. Co. 230 Mass. 370,

¹¹⁹N. E. 757, L.R.A.1918E, 680. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1917E, 839. The attempt by the legislature to require a person libeled to prove malice in order to secure substantial damages, if he demands and secures a retraction, unconstitutionally abridges his privileges and immunities and takes away his constitutional remedy for injury to reputation. Byers v. Meridian Printing Co. 84 Ohio St. 408, 95 N. E. 917, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 913.

²United States v. Illinois C. R. Co. 291 U. S. 457, 78 L. ed. 909, 54 S. Ct. 471 (reconsideration of Interstate Commerce Commission ruling); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Nebraska State R. Commission, 85 Neb. 818,

⁵People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636, 63 L.R.A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675, affirmed in 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. ed. 575, 24 S. Ct. 372.

⁶Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82, 78 L. ed. 664, 54 S. Ct. 281 (California alien land law).

⁷Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53, 48 L. ed. 614, 24 S. Ct. 396.

⁸Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413, 72 L. ed. 632, 48 S. Ct. 373. Making possession of a narcotic drug which does not bear the required stamps prima facie evidence of its purchase from other than the original stamped packages, contrary to the provisions of the statute, violates no constitutional right of one accused of violating the statute. Ibid.

§ 633. Generally.—

law previously established.¹² The courts of one state cannot, without a viola-

tion of the due process clause, extend their authority beyond their jurisdiction

his property is within the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment.¹³

§ 634. Necessity of Judicial Tribunal.—

ings are not an indispensable requisite in all cases.¹⁴ It is accordingly said

⁹Duggan v. Bay State Street R. Co. 230 Mass. 370, 119 N. E. 757, L.R.A.1918E, 680.

¹⁰Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527; Wash- ington ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863, 32 S. Ct. 535; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34,

³⁸L. ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, 51 A.L.R. 731; Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 83 S. E. 645, L.R.A.1915D, 817, writ of error denied in 235 U. S. 694, 59 L. ed. 429, 35 S. Ct. 208; Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118,

⁵⁵A.L.R. 196; Thurman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 63, 46 A.L.R. 563; McMaster v. Gould, 239 N. Y. 606, 147 N. E. 214, 40 A.L.R. 792; Muskogee Iron Works v. Bason, 176 Okla. 298, 55 P. (2d) 68, citing R. C. L.; J. B. Barnes Drill- ing Co. v. Phillips, 166 Okla. 154, 26 P. (2d) 766, citing R. C. L.; Hauschildt v. Collins,

¹⁵²Okla. 193, 4 P. (2d) 99, citing R. C. L.; Oklahoma Gas & E. Co. v. Wilson & Co. 146 Okla. 272, 288 P. 316, citing R. C. L.; Satcher v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743, L.R.A. 1917C, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 217, affirmed in

²⁴³U. S. 629, 61 L. ed. 937, 37 S. Ct. 475; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584.

¹¹Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. 152 U. S. 160, 38 L. ed. 398, 14 S. Ct. 506; Eikenbery v. Edwards, 67 Iowa, 619,

²⁵N. W. 832, 56 Am. Rep. 360; Salt Creek Valley Turnp. Co. v. Parks, 50 Ohio St. 568,

¹²The fact that the deputy commissioner is not bound by technical rules of proce- dure does not invalidate a proceeding to obtain an award of compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, provided substantial rights of the parties are not infringed. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 76 L. ed. 598, 52 S. Ct. 285; Kil- bourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377.

¹³Riverside & D. River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 59 L. ed. 910, 35 S. Ct. 579.

¹⁴Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. ed. 461, 27 S. Ct. 261; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092, 24 S. Ct. 789; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505,

⁴⁷L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390; Palmer v. McMa- hon, 133 U. S. 660, 33 L. ed. 772, 10 S. Ct. 324; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,

²⁴L. ed. 616; Den ex dem. Murray v. Ho- boken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372; State Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 P. 755, L.R.A.1915E, 675, affirmed in 238 U. S. 611,

⁵⁹L. ed. 1488, 35 S. Ct. 792; Water Comrs. v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 84 A. 727, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1024; Klafter v. State Ex- aminers, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N. E. 193, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 532, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1221; Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A.L.R. 65; Atty. Gen. v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L.R.A. 699, 41 Am. St. Rep. 606; Lovell v. Seeback, 45 Minn. 465,

³¹⁶Mo. 770, 293 S. W. 362, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607,

²⁶⁴S. W. 678 (affirmed in 271 U. S. 40, 70 L. ed. 818, 46 S. Ct. 384); Colvill v. Fox, 51 Mont. 72, 149 P. 496, L.R.A.1915F, 894; Chauvin v. Valiton, 8 Mont. 451, 20 P. 658,

³L.R.A. 194; Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Ct. 42 Nev. 1, 171 P. 166, citing R. C. L.; Lacey v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 54, 159 P. 949, L.R.A.1917A, 1185; Neer v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd. 40 N. D. 340, 168 N. W. 601, citing R. C. L.; Bowman v. Vir- ginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A.L.R. 1121; Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S. E. 3, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1073; State v. Sponaugle,

⁴⁵W. Va. 415, 32 S. E. 283, 43 L.R.A. 727; Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va. 347, 13 S. E. 1012, 14 L.R.A. 337; Ekern v. McGovern,

¹⁵⁴Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 796. Annotation: 2 L.R.A. 655; 11 L.R.A. 224. Although the phrase "due process of law" does not necessarily mean a judicial pro- ceeding, neither does it necessarily mean a special tribunal for the express purpose of hearing the merits of a particular contro- versy, and where ample notice is provided, giving an owner opportunity to have a hearing in a court of competent jurisdic- tion before his property is affected, he is afforded due process of law. Balch v. Glenn, 85 Kan. 735, 119 P. 67, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1080, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 406.

the class of cases to which the one in question belongs.¹⁵ Questions may arise

sale.¹⁶ A hearing of a judicial nature is not essential where the state is en-

or eminent domain.¹⁹ Judicial proceedings are not necessary to the revocation

as a drainage board,³ a board of park commissioners,⁴ a board of tax appeals,⁵

Labor,¹⁰ the Federal Secretary of Agriculture,¹¹ a notary public,¹² or an ad-

¹⁵State Sav. & Commercial Bank v. An- derson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 P. 755, L.R.A. 1915E, 675, affirmed in 238 U. S. 611,

⁵⁹L. ed. 1488, 35 S. Ct. 792; Wulzen v. San Francisco, 101 Cal. 15, 35 P. 353, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17; Water Comrs. v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151, 84 A. 727, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1024; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N. W. 624, 41 L.R.A. 481, 53 Am. St. Rep. 557; State v. Cream- er, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 694; Byers v. Meridian Printing Co.

⁸⁴Ohio St. 408, 95 N. E. 917, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 913; Anderson v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 90, 126 P. 840, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 314; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis (Tex.) 18 S. W. 723, 17 L.R.A. 286; State v. Stimpson, 78 Vt. 124, 62 A. 14, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1153, 6 Ann. Cas. 639.

¹²L.R.A.(N.S.) 869; Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 164, 30 A. 648, 26 L.R.A. 541, 45 Am. St. Rep. 339; People v. Vandecarr, 175 N. Y. 440, 67 N. E. 913, 108 Am. St. Rep. 781, affirmed in 199 U. S. 552, 50 L. ed. 305, 26 S. Ct. 144. See HEALTH [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 1263].

¹⁸Lacey v. Lemmons, 22 N. M. 54, 159 P. 949, L.R.A.1917A, 1185. See infra, §§ 640 et seq. See generally TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 1].

¹State Medical Bd. v. McCrary, 95 Ark. 511, 130 S. W. 544, 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 783, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 631.

⁴Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropoli- tan Park Dist. 281 U. S. 74, 74 L. ed. 710, 50 S. Ct. 228, 66 A.L.R. 1460.

⁵Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 70 L. ed. 494, 46 S. Ct. 215.

⁶State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705, 95 A.L.R. 1416.

⁷Title Guaranty & S. Co. v. Idaho, 240 U. S. 136, 60 L. ed. 566, 36 S. Ct. 345.

⁸Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 65 L. ed. 549, 44 S. Ct. 283; United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 48 L. ed. 979, 24 S. Ct. 719; Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher) 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 S. Ct. 611; Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U. S. 168, 46 L. ed. 1108, 22 S. Ct. 795; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905.

¹⁰Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 77 L. ed. 341, 53 S. Ct. 167.

¹¹P. F. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U. S. 570, 78 L. ed. 505, 54 S. Ct. 277, 90 A.L.R. 1285.

¹³National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352 (National Labor Relations Board); Flory v. Smith,

¹⁴Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092, 24 S. Ct. 789; Wulzen v. San Francisco, 101 Cal. 15, 35 P. 353, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17; Atty. Gen. v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L.R.A. 699, 41 Am. St. Rep. 606; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955, 56 L.R.A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682.

¹⁵Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, — Iowa, —, 271 N. W. 204, 110 A.L.R. 1415,

tions do not actually exist.¹⁶ It is clear that administrative officers, when

process of law and the law of the land.¹⁸ For a reason analogous to that which

tarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of such bodies.²⁰ The enforcement

§ 635. Requirement of Impartiality.—

bunal of which his adversary is a member does not afford due process of law.²³

minimus non curat lex."²⁵ The possibility of a mayor receiving $¹² as costs

salary, is not an interest so minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant that his

¹⁷Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher) 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 S. Ct. 611; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223.

⁶⁴Kan. 802, 68 P. 653, 57 L.R.A. 765, 91 Am. St. Rep. 248. Annotation: 91 Am. St. Rep. 254.

²⁰Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433, 49 Am. Rep. 239. See ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS, Vol. 4, p. 455; MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 1175].

²⁹³U. S. 245, 79 L. ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197, re- hearing denied in 293 U. S. 633, 79 L. ed. 717,

²²Federal Constr. Co. v. Curd, 179 Cal. 489, 177 P. 469, 2 A.L.R. 1202; Stahl v. Ring- gold County, 187 Iowa, 1342, 175 N. W. 772,

¹¹A.L.R. 185; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855, affirmed in 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. ed. 1000, 47 S. Ct. 584.

²³Union Drainage Dist. v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292.

²⁴Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 71 L. ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243. Annotation: 50 A.L.R. 1256.

²⁵Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 71 L. ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243.

sitting as judge in the case will not deprive the accused of due process of law.¹

§ 636. Generally.—

§ 637. Rehearings.—

Rehearings or new trials are not essential to due process of law, either in judi-

§ 638. Appeal or Review.—

³Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 48 L. ed. 195, 24 S. Ct. 88; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 S. Ct. 825; Federal Constr. Co. v. Curd, 179 Cal. 489, 177 P. 469,

⁴Union Drainage Dist. v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292. Annotation: 2 A.L.R. 1208.

⁵Union Drainage Dist. v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292. Annotation: 2 A.L.R. 1208.

⁶McCoy v. Handlin, 35 S. D. 487, 153 N. W. 361, L.R.A.1915E, 858, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1046.

²³⁵U. S. 261, 59 L. ed. 220, 35 S. Ct. 37. No infringement of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution results from the ruling of a state court that the de- fendant, by permitting a judgment in his favor to be reviewed on the merits at the instance of the plaintiff in the action with- out interposing a cross appeal to call in question the decision of the trial court overruling a motion to quash the return upon the summons, waived its objection to the jurisdiction of the court over it and could not have any benefit of that objection upon a second appeal by it from a judg- ment for the plaintiff. Ibid. See supra, §§ 607 et seq.

¹⁰Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Higdon, 234 U. S. 592, 58 L. ed. 1484, 34 S. Ct. 948; United States v. Heinze, 218 U. S. 532, 54 L. ed. 1139, 31 S. Ct. 98, 21 Ann. Cas. 884; James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129, 48 L. ed. 377,

²⁴S. Ct. 222; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Brad- ley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 S. Ct. 56; Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus,

¹⁵⁴U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 S. Ct. 1114; The Francis Wright (Duncan v. The Fran- cis Wright) 105 U. S. 381, 26 L. ed. 1100; Saylor v. Duel, 236 Ill. 429, 86 N. E. 119, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 377; Dillon v. Whitley (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 329, citing R. C. L.; Putnam v. Ford, 155 Va. 625, 155 S. E. 823,

of first instance.¹¹ Nor is appeal necessary for the purpose of securing a second trial upon the merits.¹² An appeal is not necessary in a juvenile commitment proceeding,¹³ or even in a criminal case,¹⁴ however grave may be the nature of the case.¹⁵ The judgment of an appellate court below the court of last resort may be made final.¹⁶

Limitations of the matters that may be considered in review proceedings17 or upon the right to reverse18 do not violate the guaranty even in a criminal case.¹⁹ Limitations as to appeals may be imposed with respect to the time within which they may be perfected20 and with respect to the amount involved.¹ Various other limitations upon the appellate procedure have been held not to violate the guaranty of due process. For example, a state constitutional provision that no law shall be held unconstitutional by the state supreme court without a concurrence of at least all except one of the judges does not violate the due process guaranty.² The state may prescribe rules as to appellate procedure.³

The rules governing appeals must operate uniformly. A party otherwise entitled to appeal who, by the construction of a statute, is prevented from doing so when such right is given to all others in similar cases is thus deprived of the right of due process of law.⁴

¹¹District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 81 L. ed. 843, 57 S. Ct. 660; Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso. 283 U. S. 522, 75 L. ed. 1244, 51 S. Ct. 517; Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist. 281 U. S. 74, 74 L. ed. 710, 50 S. Ct. 228, 66 A.L.R. 1460; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 533, 71 L. ed. 394, 47 S. Ct. 186; Lott v. Pittman, 243 U. S. 588, 61 L. ed. 915, 37 S. Ct. 473; Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 56 L. ed. 760, 32 S. Ct. 406, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 936; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 S. Ct. 57; Beck v. Missouri Valley Drainage Dist. (C. C. A. 8th) 46 F. (2d) 632, 84 A.L.R. 1039, writ of certiorari denied in 284 U. S. 618, 76 L. ed. 527, 52 S. Ct. 7; Re Sharp, 15 Idaho, 120, 96 P. 563, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 886; Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 158 N. E. 118, 55 A.L.R. 196; Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa, 813, 229 N. W. 205, 67 A.L.R. 1075; Ross v. Wright County, 128 Iowa, 427, 104 N. W. 506, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 431; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Schall, 96 Md. 225, 53 A. 925, 61 L.R.A. 300; Re Third Street, 177 Minn. 146, 225 N. W. 86, 74 A.L.R. 561; Wilson v. Kryger, 26 N. D. 77, 143 N. W. 764, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 760; Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Or. 133, 117 P. 814, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1257; Putnam v. Ford, 155 Va. 625, 155 S. E. 823, 71 A.L.R. 1217. Annotation: 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 377. A statute denying an appeal in proceedings to contest a local option election does not unconstitutionally deprive contestants of property without due process of law. Saylor v. Duel, 236 Ill. 429, 86 N. E. 119, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 377.

¹³Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 52, 87 A.L.R. 1407.

¹⁴Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272, 39 L. ed. 422, 15 S. Ct. 389; McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 38 L. ed. 867, 14 S. Ct. 913. Whether an appeal in a criminal case should be allowed and, if so, under what circumstances or on what conditions are matters for each state to determine for itself. McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 38 L. ed. 867, 14 S. Ct. 913.

¹⁵Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390; Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U. S. 155, 44 L. ed. 711, 20 S. Ct. 639; McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 38 L. ed. 867, 14 S. Ct. 913.

¹⁶Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 59, 38 N. E. 773, 30 L.R.A. 33.

¹⁷Re Francis Wright (Duncan v. The Francis Wright) 105 U. S. 381, 26 L. ed. 1100; Beck v. Missouri Valley Drainage Dist. (C. C. A. 8th) 46 F. (2d) 632, 84 A.L.R. 1039, writ of certiorari denied in 284 U. S. 618, 76 L. ed. 527, 52 S. Ct. 7; Re Third Street, 177 Minn. 146, 225 N. W. 86, 74 A.L.R. 561; State ex rel. Baltzell v. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 43 N. W. 947, 6 L.R.A. 394.

¹⁹Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 40 L. ed. 432, 16 S. Ct. 304; Ryan v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. Rep. 632, 198 S. W. 582, citing R. C. L.

²⁰Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 249, 23 S. Ct. 234.

¹Duncan v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 68 W. Va. 293, 69 S. E. 1004, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 272. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1912B, 275.

²Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist. 281 U. S. 74, 74 L. ed. 710, 50 S. Ct. 228, 66 A.L.R. 1460; Lott v. Pittman, 243 U. S. 588, 61 L. ed. 915, 37 S. Ct. 473.

³State ex rel. Cartmel v. Ætna Casualty & Surety Co. 84 Fla. 123, 92 So. 871, 24 A.L.R. 1262.

⁴State ex rel. J. Hahn Bakery Co. v. Anderson, 269 Mo. 381, 190 S. W. 857, L.R.A. 1917C, 130.

where a state court dismisses a writ of error taken in a criminal case because of the escape of the accused and the fact that he is at large.⁵

Appeals may be granted without violating the due process guaranty. No constitutional provision is infringed by a statute giving a further appeal from a judgment in a given tribunal which would otherwise be final.⁶ An appeal may, of course, be waived.⁷

**§ ⁶³⁹. Judgments and Orders of Administrative Boards or Commissions.—** The legislature may, consistently with due process, provide that a hearing before an administrative tribunal shall be final and conclusive.⁸

Judicial review of the issues before the Federal Secretary of Labor in determining whether a fine should be imposed for violating the immigration laws is not essential to due process.⁹ There must, however, be a fair and impartial tribunal.¹⁰ When review is granted, the scope may be limited,¹¹ although there is some dispute as to this.¹²

It should be borne in mind that due process of law involves in many instances the right to have a matter in dispute passed upon by a judicial tribunal. Hence, an appeal to a court from the action of a nonjudicial body may be implied in the requirements as to due process of law. A statute providing for the calling in and payment of state bonds and authorizing the state treasurer to pay valid bonds only, thereby imposing upon him the duty of ascertaining the validity of all bonds presented for payment, is not unconstitutional as depriving a bondholder of his property without due process of law where provision is made for an appeal to the courts from the adverse decision of the state treasurer.¹³ Furthermore, where a right to a jury trial exists, the guaranty may include the right to an appeal to a court of record conducting such trials from the judgment of a magistrate's court entered without any jury trial.¹⁴ Where the right to appeal in such case exists, an act imposing a double penalty upon one who appeals to a court in order to enjoy his right to a jury trial in case of a conviction on appeal cannot be given effect.¹⁵ The fact that the provision for court review of an administrative order is by certiorari within the discretion of the court does not infringe the constitutional rights to have a judicial review of the order.¹⁶

⁶Essex Public Road Bd. v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. ed. 446, 11 S. Ct. 790.

⁸Beck v. Missouri Valley Drainage Dist. (C. C. A. 8th) 46 F. (2d) 632, 84 A.L.R. 1039, writ of certiorari denied in 284 U. S. 618, 76 L. ed. 527, 52 S. Ct. 7; Ross v. Wright County, 128 Iowa, 427, 104 N. W. 506, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 431; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743, L.R.A.1917C, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 217, affirmed in 243 U. S. 629, 61 L. ed. 937, 37 S. Ct. 475.

⁹Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 77 L. ed. 341, 53 S. Ct. 167.

¹⁰Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 58 L. ed. 229, 34 S. Ct. 48. The failure of the Kentucky Act of March 10, 1900, to provide for an appeal to any court from the final order of the state railroad commission fixing maximum freight rates under the authority of that statute or for a judicial review of the reasonableness of the prescribed rates before they become effective does not invalidate such statute as operating to deprive the carrier of its property without due process of law or to deny to it the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution where the statute does not, except by its separable penal provisions, deny the carrier the right of access to the courts for the purpose of determining any matter which would be the appropriate subject of judicial inquiry. Ibid.

¹¹Nega v. Chicago R. Co. 317 Ill. 482, 148 N. E. 250, 39 A.L.R. 1057. Annotation: 39 A.L.R. 1064.

¹³Tipton v. Smyth, 78 Ark. 392, 94 S. W. 678, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 714, 115 Am. St. Rep. 44, 8 Ann. Cas. 521.

¹⁴Brown v. Epps, 91 Va. 726, 21 S. E. 119, 27 L.R.A. 676. See generally JURY [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 209, § 26].

¹⁶Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public Utility Comrs. 278 U. S. 24, 73 L. ed. 161, 49 S. Ct. 59, 62 A.L.R. 805.

§ 640. Generally.—

A discussion of the notice and hearing required by due process in order to give a proper perspective of the demands included in the constitutional provisions entails some treatment of the procedure involved in tax cases necessary to fulfil the requirements of the Constitution. The questions involved are primarily questions of taxation and therefore are appropriately discussed in detail elsewhere in this work.17 In the present discussion it is proposed to sketch out only the broad essentials and distinctive features of notice and hearing as they relate to tax matters, so that the reader may contemplate a more or less complete picture of this question.

In an early case the United States Supreme Court pointed out the distinction between ordinary hearings involving life, liberty, or property and matters relating to the enforcement of the taxing measures of a state. The court stated that where life and liberty, or even the title or possession of property, are involved, due process requires that there be a regular course of judicial proceeding, which implies that the party to be affected shall have notice and an opportunity to be heard. Where the taking of the property is in the enforcement of a tax, however, the proceeding is necessarily less formal, and whether notice to the property-owner taxpayer is at all necessary may depend upon the character of the tax and the manner in which its amount is determinable.¹⁸ Due process of law in tax proceedings is afforded litigants if they have an opportunity to question the validity or the amount of an assessment or charge before the amount is determined or to enforce its collection at any subsequent proceedings or at any time before final judgment is entered.¹⁹ It has been stated generally that the general system of procedure for the levy and collection of taxes which is established in this country is, within the meaning of the Constitution, due process of law.²⁰

The constitutional guaranty against the taking of property without due process of law has to do, in taxation proceedings, with the essentials of taxation only.¹ The legislature may provide by law what shall be essential and what not essential in taxation proceedings, subject only to the fundamental principles that the taxpayer must have an opportunity to be heard as to the amount of the charge laid upon his property,² as to whether the purpose of the tax is a permissible one, and as to the lawfulness and proper apportionment of the tax against his property.³ Generally speaking, all other matters may be regulated according to the legislative will.⁴

It has been stated by the United States Supreme Court that the right to notice and hearing does not extend to taxes of every description, but only to such as involve the exercise of quasi-judicial power in the determination of amount.⁵ This amounts to the same thing as saying that notice and an oppor-

¹⁹Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300, 46 L. ed. 207, 22 S. Ct. 162. **Under the Georgia Tax Laws**, due process of law requires that after such notice as may be appropriate, the taxpayer have an opportunity to be heard as to the validity of the tax and the amount thereof by giving him the right to appear for that purpose at some stage of the proceedings. Turner v. Wade, 254 U. S. 64, 65 L. ed. 134, 41 S. Ct. 27.

³Garden of Eden Drainage Dist. v. Bartlett Trust Co. 330 Mo. 554, 50 S. W. (2d) 627, 84 A.L.R. 1078.

⁵Carson v. Brockland Sewerage Comrs. 182 U. S. 398, 45 L. ed. 1151, 21 S. Ct. 860.

tunity to be heard are necessary to due process of law under statutes imposing a tax in cases other than those in which the tax may be computed by a simple mechanical calculation.⁶ Therefore, in the case of an excise not dependent upon the valuation of property and in which there is no discretion as to the amount, no notice of the assessment or levy of the tax is necessary.⁷ The same is true of poll taxes and other specific taxes on persons and things.⁸ Where, however, a tax is levied on property not specifically, but according to its value, to be ascertained by assessors appointed for that purpose upon such evidence as they may obtain, a different principle is involved and a hearing at some stage of the proceedings is essential.⁹

With regard to the notice to be employed in tax proceedings, it is settled that the process of taxation does not require the same kind of notice as is required in a suit at law. Such notice involves no violation of due process of law when it is executed according to customary forms and established usages.¹⁰ In cases of this type due process of law does not imply or require the right to such notice as is considered essential to the validity of the proceedings and judgments of judicial tribunals11 or to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, it generally being regarded as sufficient if the taxpayer has an opportunity to contest the validity of the assessment or amount of the tax in proceedings for its collection.¹² Not only is notice of each step in the tax proceedings not necessary,¹³ but opportunity to question the validity or amount of a tax either before the amount is determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection is deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of due process of law.¹⁴ Putting the rule in other words, the owner, if he has notice and opportunity to be heard either before or after the tax lien is fixed upon his property, has due process of law.¹⁵

A state statute which authorizes the assessment and collection of a tax and provides for due notice to all persons interested and a proper mode of contesting the tax in a court does not deprive persons of property without due process of law.¹⁶ Whenever, by the laws of a state or by state authority, a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether for the whole state or for some more limited portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed in the ordinary course of justice, with such notice to the person or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, due process of law is afforded.¹⁷ The rules have been carried to a point whereby it is held that if a taxpayer is given an opportunity to test the validity of a tax at any time before it is made final, whether

⁷Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U. S. 276, 49 L. ed. 477, 25 S. Ct. 237, affirming 121 Iowa, 482, 96 N. W. 968, 67 L.R.A. 624, 104 Am. St. Rep. 304; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 S. Ct. 825; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663.

⁸Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 418, 11 S. Ct. 825; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663.

¹⁰Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 S. Ct. 533; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78, 26 L. ed. 658.

¹¹Kentucky R. Tax Cases (Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky) 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 S. Ct. 57.

¹²State v. Clement Nat. Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 A. 944, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 22, affirmed in 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 S. Ct. 31.

¹⁴Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526, 40 L. ed. 247, 16 S. Ct. 83.

¹⁷Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 S. Ct. 56; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616.

character or before a tribunal provided by the state for the purpose of determining such questions, due process of law is not denied.¹⁸

**§ ⁶⁴¹. Levy according to Value.**—In cases in which a tax is levied on property, not specifically, but according to its value, to be ascertained by assessors

at designated periods provided by law to hear complaints respecting the justice of the assessments. The law in prescribing the time when such complaints

a sale of the delinquent's property, is due process of law.¹⁹ In some states,

taken when the attempt is made to enforce it. In such cases all the opportunity is given to the taxpayer to be heard respecting the assessment which

and hearing before his property is originally assessed.¹ Notice of the assessment and opportunity to contest it therefore need not be given in advance of

is to be made is all that "due process" requires.⁴ The notice is sufficient where

if it defines the time when the assessment shall be made by an officer and specifically directs him to hear any stockholder who may desire to be heard.⁶

Notice by publication is likewise sufficient to constitute due process of law in

which the various steps for collection shall be taken, in which there is opportunity to appear and defend.⁷

¹⁹Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 S. Ct. 31; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 S. Ct. 663. The lack of any assessment other than that made by the statute itself or of any other notice to the depositor than that thus given by law does not invalidate, as denying due process of law, a semiannual tax laid at a specified rate upon interest-bearing deposits in national banks, where the tax is recoverable by suit in which the depositor will have full opportunity to resist any illegal demand.

⁴Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 S. Ct. 829.

⁵Pittsburgh, J. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 S. Ct. 1114.

⁶Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 S. Ct. 829.

as the circumstances of the case require,⁸ such proceedings should be construed

the proceedings, it is only necessary that such notice shall be given as is suitable in a given case, and it is only where the proceedings are arbitrary, oppressive, or unjust that they are declared to be not due process of law.⁹ The requirement of due process is that after notice as may be appropriate the taxpayer have opportunity to be heard as to the amount of the tax by giving him

the tax becomes irrevocably fixed.¹⁰ It is sufficient if the party assessed has

of assessment at some stage of the proceedings.¹¹ If available defenses may be

A statute which provides for an assessment, which assessment can be enforced only by suits in which notice is given to the taxpayer and an opportunity afforded him to be heard respecting the assessment, in which he may

set forth by way of defense all his grievances, satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.¹³ There is no want of due process of law in a tax assessment where the

have their validity judicially determined is due process of law, notwithstanding security is required, as in other injunction cases.¹⁵

right to appear and be heard upon the question of valuation before arbitrators, whose decision shall be final, is not deprived of his property without due

process of law through enforcement of a tax.¹⁶ Similarly, when the law provides for a mode of confirming or contesting assessment of taxes by a board of

the state tax law, increased the valuation of his property as returned for taxation without notice or hearing other than notice given after the assessment

was made and a hearing in the arbitration provided for in case of the taxpayer's dissatisfaction, and such arbitration failed because the arbitrators

⁸Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 52 L. ed. 134, 28 S. Ct. 47, 12 Ann. Cas. 463.

¹¹Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S. 32, 43 L. ed. 354, 19 S. Ct. 90.

statute after the time provided by law for the making of a general assessment, does not deprive the taxpayer of his property without due process of law, provided the state court had afforded him full opportunity to be heard on the question of the validity and the amount of the tax.¹⁹ In assessing taxes upon omitted property, however, somewhere during the course of the process of assessment the taxpayer must have an opportunity to be heard.²⁰ Hence, due process of law is not afforded by the scheme of a taxation statute which provides that if property is withheld from return, the state comptroller without notice or opportunity for hearing must proceed to value the property and, furthermore, states such valuation is final and conclusive, against which no relief in the courts can be secured either upon proceedings brought to collect the taxes or by bill to enjoin their collection, unless the taxpayer can show that the taxing officer has acted in bad faith in making the assessment.¹

The revenue laws of a state may be in harmony with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, although they do not provide for the presence of a person when a tax is assessed against him.² Lack of provision for notice to a nonresident stockholder in a domestic corporation of the assessment of taxes on his stock or for opportunity for contest by him as to the correctness of the valuation does not render invalid, as denying due process of law, so much of a statute as imposes upon him, as a condition of such ownership, a personal liability for the taxes upon his stock, to be enforced by a personal action brought against him by the corporation to recover the amount of the tax which it is compelled to pay on his behalf, since that statute is construed by the state courts as constituting the corporation in legal effect the agent of the stockholders, to receive notice and to represent them in proceedings for the correction of the assessment.³

A state in the exercise of its taxing power may direct that the property subject to that power shall be assessed without any reference whatever to the name of the owner by any such description or method which is legally adequate to convey either actual or constructive notice to the owner.⁴ The use of an initial instead of the first name of a person in an assessment roll does not make the assessment void for want of due process of law, where the law provides for describing the property as well as naming the owner on the roll and also fixes a time for examination and correction, of which notice is given by a general publication calling upon all persons having property subject to taxation to come forward and ask for such corrections as they desire to have made.⁵

Where ample opportunity is given railroads to be heard before the final assessment of their properties, they cannot complain because an additional hearing is given ordinary taxpayers.⁶

§ 642. Changes in Valuation; Reassessment.—

It is a general rule that "due process" requires that after an assessment has been made by an assessor, it cannot be increased by a reviewing board without notice to the taxpayer or oppor-

¹⁹Security Trust & S. V. Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 204, 27 S. Ct. 87.

²⁰Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 52 L. ed. 134, 28 S. Ct. 47, 12 Ann. Cas. 463; Security Trust & S. V. Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 204, 27 S. Ct. 87.

¹Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 52 L. ed. 134, 28 S. Ct. 47, 12 Ann. Cas. 463.

tunity to be heard.⁷ Hence, a statute giving a reviewing board power to increase individual assessments without notice to the taxpayer or provision for review is unconstitutional as denying due process.⁸ The law authorizing such proceedings must require notice or it will be unconstitutional. It is not enough that a person may by chance have notice or that he may as a matter of favor or courtesy have a hearing.⁹ A statute giving to a tax commission power to increase individual assessments, without providing for notice to the taxpayer other than is given by the fact that the time of the meeting of the commission is fixed by law, does not afford the notice necessary to due process; though the rule may be otherwise in the case of a horizontal increase of all property, or of all property of a certain class, in the taxing district.¹⁰ Some cases, however, because of the necessities of government in matters of taxation, extend the general rule so that wherever actual notice is impracticable, the requirement of due process is satisfied by substituted or constructive notice, to a point where the only constructive notice is that contained in the statutes fixing the time of meeting of the board.¹¹ Thus, an order of a tax commission and state board of equalization requiring the local taxing officer to make a ⁴⁰ per cent increase in the assessed valuation of all taxable property in a particular city and county is not wanting in due process of law because no opportunity to be heard is given to the individual taxpayers or to any city or county official other than such as they may have had by reason of the fact that the time of meeting of the boards is fixed by law.¹² Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption.¹³

A reassessment of grossly undervalued property, so as to make the property bear the same burden it would have borne if the true assessment had been made in the first instance, does not violate the constitutional provision for due process of law on the ground that the former assessments constituted judicial judgments which could be set aside only after notice and opportunity to be heard.¹⁴ The failure to provide a hearing before the governor in proceedings for the revaluation of undervalued property, pursuant to statute, does not make the proceeding void for want of due process of law, since the governor only starts the inquiry upon which reassessment may be based, and opportunity to be heard is offered in the course of the subsequent proceedings.¹⁵

§ 643. Collection.—

The power to collect and disburse revenue and to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into effect includes all known and appropriate means of effectually collecting and disbursing that revenue, unless some such means should be forbidden in some part of the Constitution.16 Taxes have not, as a general rule, in this country since its independence or in England before that time, been collected by regular judicial proceedings. The necessity of government, the nature of the duty to be performed, and the customary usages of the people have established a different procedure which, in regard to that matter, is and always has been

⁷Beveridge v. Baer, 59 S. D. 563, 241 N. W. 727, 84 A.L.R. 189. Annotation: 24 A.L.R. 331, s. 84 A.L.R. 197.

¹²Bi-Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 60 L. ed. 372, 36 S. Ct. 141.

¹⁶Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

due process of law.¹⁷ The collection of a tax is an administrative matter, and,

collect the levee taxes assessed upon their lands.²⁰ Four weeks' notice given

enforce the collection of levee taxes, is adequate to afford due process of law.¹

§ 644. Forfeiture or Sale.—

sion shall, by operation of the Constitution itself, forfeit the title to the state,

vested with the title to land worth $⁵⁰⁰ by the lapse of five years, with no

offer to redeem following a sale to the state for the unpaid tax, sells the land

for $¹⁶⁶, all of which goes to the state to satisfy a tax which, with penalties

and costs, amounts to only $¹⁶.¹⁹, the owner having been afforded an oppor-

tunity to be heard as to the fairness of the original assessment and given notice

whether to be found within the jurisdiction or not, is due process of law within

¹⁸Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

⁵⁹L. ed. 874, 35 S. Ct. 518; King v. Panther Lumber Co. 171 U. S. 437, 43 L. ed. 227, 18 S. Ct. 573; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404, 43 L. ed. 214, 18 S. Ct. 925.

does not destroy the efficacy of the advertisement so that it is insufficient for

§ 645. Imposition of Lien.—

the tax and, in case of a denial of the petition, to appeal to the District Court

§ 646. Proceedings against Collectors.—

A distress warrant issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury under the Act of May 15, 1820, against a delinquent collector, is not in conflict with the Constitution and is "due process of law."14 It is not invalid, within the Constitution, because issued without oath or affirmation. The adjustment of balances due from accounting offices is not necessarily a judicial controversy.15

§ 647. Generally.—

The proceedings by which special assessments are levied vary greatly in form. The necessity of notice and hearing sufficient to constitute due process depends to a certain extent upon the form the proceeding takes. This matter is discussed in detail in another title.16

F. PROTECTION OF LIBERTY

§ 648. Generally.17—

The guaranty of due process protects the liberty of the individual. The cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of personal liberty ultimately rest is that a government should be one of law.18

The due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not a guaranty of untrammeled freedom of action and of contract.¹⁹ The guaranty is only of freedom from arbitrary restraint, not of immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.²⁰ The Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty, the liberty safeguarded being liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.¹

The liberty which is within the protection of the guaranty cannot be defined in any general way. It has been said to be the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.² So far as persons are concerned, it has been said to be not natural, but civil, liberty of which a person may not be deprived without due process of law.³ It embraces the right of a person to be free not only from physical restraint, but also in the enjoyment of all his faculties.⁴ The liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded.⁵ The protection extends to the right to entertain the belief and to teach the doctrine that war, training for war, and military training are immoral, wrong, and contrary to the precepts of Christianity.⁶ The view has been taken that personal liberty is invaded without due process by a statute making it a criminal offense against the United States for an agent or officer of an inter-

¹⁴Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

¹⁸Jones v. Securities & Exch. Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 80 L. ed. 1015, 56 S. Ct. 654.

¹⁹Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, R. E. D. 300 U. S. 515, 81 L. ed. 789, 57 S. Ct. 592.

²⁰Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151, 76 L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 60 A.L.R. 1325. See supra, § 575.

¹West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330.

⁵Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 75 L. ed. 1357, 51 S. Ct. 625; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 75 L. ed. 1117, 51 S. Ct. 532, 73 A.L.R. 1484.

⁶Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 79 L. ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197, rehearing denied in 293 U. S. 633, 79 L. ed. 717, 55 S. Ct. 345.

state carrier having full authority in the premises from his principal to discharge an employee from service to such carrier because of his membership in a labor organization.⁷

The liberty to conduct a business so as to injure the public at large or any substantial group is not protected.⁸ The guaranty is not infringed by the provisions of a statute making it a misdemeanor to use representations of the national flag upon articles of merchandise for advertising purposes.⁹ One is not unconstitutionally deprived of liberty by being prohibited, under penalty, from becoming a member of a secret, oath-bound association which has not filed a copy of its constitution, bylaws, rules, regulations, oath of membership, and the roster of its membership.¹⁰

State legislation applying alike and equally to all aliens, withholding from them the right to own land, does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or transgress the due process of law clause of the Federal Constitution.¹¹ The enforcement of an order of the board of regents of a state university prescribing instruction in military science and tactics as a required course does not unconstitutionally deprive any person of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.¹² Commitment for contempt in refusing to make a disclosure as required by law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.¹³

An ordinance authorizing officers of the city police department to direct all traffic in accordance with the provisions of the traffic ordinance, except in times of an emergency, at which times such officers shall direct the traffic as public safety or public convenience may require, is valid and constitutional, and is not open to the objection that it deprives motorists and drivers of other vehicles of their liberty without due process of law.¹⁴ An arrest cannot be authorized upon a mere verbal charge by a citizen, of trespass to a police officer.¹⁵

G. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

§ 649. Generally.—

The guaranty of due process protects property rights. As it is commonly stated, an owner of property cannot be deprived thereof without due process.16 Property cannot be taken for a debt unless the debt

⁷Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 436, 28 S. Ct. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764. But see National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & L. Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352. See infra, § 670.

⁸Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469.

⁹Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419, 10 Ann. Cas. 525.

¹⁰New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785.

¹²Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 79 L. ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197, rehearing denied in 293 U. S. 633, 79 L. ed. 717, 55 S. Ct. 345.

¹⁴Chicago v. Marriotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N. E. 369, 60 A.L.R. 501. Annotation: 60 A.L.R. 504.

¹⁵Ex parte Rhodes, 202 Ala. 68, 79 So. 462, 1 A.L.R. 568. Annotation: 1 A.L.R. 585.

¹⁶Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149, 38 S. Ct. 16, L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201; Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. S. 139, 57 L. ed. 1427, 33 S. Ct. 1033; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369, 24 L. ed. 1047; Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108, 23 L. ed. 822; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 107, 22 L. ed. 72; Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L.R.A. 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850; Ives v. Edison, 124 Mich. 402, 83 N. W. 120, 50 L.R.A. 134, 83 Am. St. Rep. 329; Hill v. Woodward, 100 Miss. 879, 57 So. 294, 39 L.R.A.(N.S.) 538, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 390; Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N. Y. 232, 29 N. E. 139, 14 L.R.A. 243; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 126 Or. 519, 270 P. 484, 62 A.L.R. 660 (divorce suit); McClain v. Williams, 11 S. D. 227, 76 N. W. 930, 49 L.R.A. 610.

study of the specific article within which his question falls.¹⁹ In some juris-

§ 650. What Is Property.—

¹⁷Anderson v. Great Northern R. Co. 25 Idaho, 433, 138 P. 127, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 191.

¹⁸Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 48 L. ed. 623, 24 S. Ct. 390. As to fundamental principles of due process, see supra, §§ 567 et seq.

¹⁹See HEALTH [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 1263]; LANDLORD AND TENANT [Also 16 R. C. L. p. 509]; PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES; SPE- CIAL OR LOCAL ASSESSMENTS [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 76]; TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 1]. ZONING.

²A.L.R. 331. A reservation of "wharves and wharfing privileges" in a dedication of land for an addition to a city does not include the right to appropriate for wharfage purposes a street or an extension thereof which can- not be taken away or destroyed without compensation without denying the due process of law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Mead v. Portland, 200 U. S. 148, 50 L. ed. 413, 26 S. Ct. 171. Since no rights, property or otherwise, are fixed or established by a verdict of a coroner's jury, under the Illinois Coroner's Act, § 14, that section is not void as depriv- ing persons of property without due proc- ess of law. Devine v. Brunswick-Balke- Collender Co. 270 Ill. 504, 110 N. E. 780, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 887.

³United States ex rel. Levey v. Stock- slager, 129 U. S. 470, 32 L. ed. 785, 9 S. Ct. 382.

⁴New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co. 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 S. Ct. 142.

interest of their own to protect in exercising their voting power for the benefit

ferring the right to vote for the trustees from the members to the board itself.⁹

edness given in lieu of such liability, to the extent that the deposits represent

the law of the land.¹¹ Pursuant to this principle the legislature may authorize

it an offense to have possession of prohibited articles, such, for example, as a

⁶Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. 252 U. S. 388, 64 L. ed. 626, 40 S. Ct. 404.

¹⁰Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Finance v. Haw- kins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271. Annotation: 38 A.L.R. 1512, s. 96 A.L.R. 295. See generally PUBLIC FUNDS [Also 22 R. C. L. p. 222.]

⁷⁰N. J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 197, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, 10 Ann. Cas. 116.

¹²Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 37 A. 172, 41 L.R.A. 551, 60 Am. St. Rep. 337. As to the destruction of property incapa- ble of legal use, see infra, §§ 676 et seq.

¹³District of Columbia v. R. P. Andrews Paper Co. 256 U. S. 582, 65 L. ed. 1103, 41 S. Ct. 545 (permits for construction of vaults under sidewalks); Tracy v. Ginz- berg, 205 U. S. 170, 51 L. ed. 755, 27 S. Ct. 461.

¹⁴State v. Durein, 70 Kan. 1, 78 P. 152, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 908, affirmed in 208 U. S. 613,

department of which the applicant cannot be deprived, except upon proceedings directly therefor, and of which he has notice.¹⁹ Enrolment for the purposes of Indian allotments of land concerns property rights and cannot be taken away without notice and an opportunity to be heard.²⁰ A fund arising from royalties under an oil and gas lease of lands of an Indian allottee is his individual property and as such within the protective guaranties of the Constitution.¹ The same general principle applies with reference to certain specific and statutory rights. Accordingly, the right to transmit property at death, free from a succession tax, has been held not to be within the constitutional guaranty as to property;² and, further illustrating the rule, it has been held that the holder of a patent has no exclusive right of property in his invention, except under and by virtue of the statutes securing it to him, and that a modification of the regulations and restrictions of such statutes is therefore not necessarily an impairment of his rights.³

**§ ⁶⁵¹. What Is a Taking.**—What amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law is often difficult to determine, especially where the question relates to the property of a quasi-public corporation and the extent to which it may be subjected to public control.⁴ All property is held subject to reasonable regulation by the state.⁵ In consequence, the question as to whether property is taken without due process of law largely depends upon the nature of the particular case.⁶ Declaring a common-law trust or business trust to be a corporation does not deprive anyone of property without due process.⁷

As a general rule, there is a taking of property within the meaning of the constitutional provision, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," where the act involves an actual interference with, or disturbance of, property rights, as distinguished from injuries which are merely consequential or incidental8 and as distinguished further from trivial or insignificant takings or interferences.⁹ It is not necessary, in order

¹⁹Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. 147 U. S. 165, 37 L. ed. 123, 13 S. Ct. 271; Love v. Flahive, 205 U. S. 195, 51 L. ed. 768, 27 S. Ct. 486.

²⁰Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 308, 62 L. ed. 309, 38 S. Ct. 99; United States ex rel. Turner v. Fisher, 222 U. S. 204, 56 L. ed. 165, 32 S. Ct. 37.

²State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, 30 A. 76, 25 L.R.A. 632, 41 Am. St. Rep. 569. Annotation: 41 Am. St. Rep. 580.

⁶Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 48 L. ed. 623, 24 S. Ct. 390. The removal by the South Carolina Dispensary Commission, under the authority of South Carolina Act of February 23, 1910, of funds in the hands of county dispensaries, due to a corporation which the commission has found to be indebted to the state, does not deprive the corporation of its property without due process of law or impair any contract obligations, the state not having consented to be sued. Carolina Glass Co. v. South Carolina, 240 U. S. 305, 60 L. ed. 658, 36 S. Ct. 293.

⁷State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243 P. 2, 247 P. 476, 46 A.L.R. 165.

⁸Andrews v. Heiney, 178 Ind. 1, 98 N. E. 628, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1023, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1136. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1139. A decision, after a full and fair trial, that an abutting owner cannot recover for mere consequential injuries caused by the lawful operation of a railroad under a constitutional provision for compensation to those whose property is taken, injured, or destroyed by the "construction or enlargement of" works for public use, does not deprive him of property without due process of law. Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 S. Ct. 894.

⁹Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 31 S. Ct. 186, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487; Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U. S. 325, 50 L. ed. 212, 26 S. Ct. 106; Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. 152 U. S. 160, 38 L. ed. 398, 14 S. Ct. 506; State v. Dupaquier, 46 La. Ann. 577, 15 So. 502, 26 L.R.A. 162, 49 Am. St. Rep. 334; Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. 464, 89 S. W. 611, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 918, 109 Am. St. Rep. 774, 4 Ann. Cas. 112; Seneca v. Cochran, 84 S. C. 279, 66 S. E. 238, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 124; Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 486, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061. Annotation: 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 918; 4 Ann. Cas. 115.

to render a statute vulnerable from a constitutional viewpoint, that it in terms or in effect authorize an actual physical taking of the property or the thing itself, so long as it affects its free use and enjoyment or the power of disposition at the will of the owner.¹⁰

An owner cannot be deprived of any of the essential attributes which belong to the right of property,¹¹ such as use, enjoyment, purchase, mortgage, and sale; in fact, any contracts in relation thereto.¹² He cannot be deprived of the increment of property or the increment of proceeds into which property has been converted.¹³ The right protected is an attribute of property existing through the application of common-law principles.¹⁴ Wherever the operation and effect of any general regulation is to extinguish or destroy that which by the law of the land is the property of any person, so far as it has that effect, it is unconstitutional and void.¹⁵ Burdens and expenses may within reasonable and constitutional limits be imposed on property.¹⁶ Denial by a state of permission to a riparian owner owning the bed of a navigable stream to erect a dam therein for development of power does not deprive him of his property without due process of law in violation of the provisions of the Federal Constitution.¹⁷ Temporary and emergency invasions or limitations of the use of property have been sustained.¹⁸

An act in order to violate the guaranty of due process must have some actual operation. A provision of a state Constitution which is only declaratory of what is in fact the law cannot unlawfully deprive a person of his property.¹⁹ The mere entry of a judgment for money, which is void for want of proper service, does not deprive the defendant of liberty or property.²⁰ The garnishment of assets of a defendant in the hands of a third party does not of itself operate to deprive the defendant of his property. There must be an adjudication of the rights of the parties before the property can be subjected to the plaintiff's claim.¹ A nonresident enemy legatee under a will is not deprived of his property without due process of law because the court orders its distribution on service of notice to him by publication, since

¹⁰Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577, 32 N. E. 976, 18 L.R.A. 543; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 18 N. E. 692, 2 L.R.A. 255, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684. Annotation: 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 115. As to tax matters, see TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 1].

¹¹Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 P. 848, 66 L.R.A. 185, 1 Ann. Cas. 936; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285, 6 L.R.A. 621.

¹²Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 80, 76 L. ed. 177, 52 S. Ct. 87; Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 73 L. ed. 210, 49 S. Ct. 50, 86 A.L.R. 654; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149, 38 S. Ct. 16, L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201; Pacific Palisades Asso. v. Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 P. 538, 40 A.L.R. 782; Re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 796, 109 Am. St. Rep. 178; Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 338, 3 Ann. Cas. 263; Taylor v. Lexington Water Power Co. 165 S. C. 120, 163 S. E. 137, citing R. C. L.; State v. Del Rio Turnp. Co. 131 Tenn. 600, 172 S. W. 1143, citing R. C. L.; Third Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery Co. 97 Tenn. 603, 37 S. W. 390, 34 L.R.A. 445; Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah, 107, 292 P. 194, 72 A.L.R. 657; Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah, 387, 76 P. 22, 65 L.R.A. 308, 101 Am. St. Rep. 971, 1 Ann. Cas. 550; Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N. W. 159, 34 A.L.R. 32. A municipal ordinance arbitrarily declaring a nuisance that which is not a nuisance per se takes and destroys property without due process of law and is unconstitutional. Denver v. Rogers, 46 Colo. 479, 104 P. 1042, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 247.

¹³Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U. S. 298, 70 L. ed. 953, 46 S. Ct. 524, 51 A.L.R. 229.

¹⁷Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission, 274 U. S. 651, 71 L. ed. 1279, 47 S. Ct. 669.

¹⁸Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. ed. 865, 41 S. Ct. 458, 16 A.L.R. 165; Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. 152 U. S. 160, 38 L. ed. 398, 14 S. Ct. 506.

his right is merely changed from one against the trustee to one against the distributee.²

§ 652. Relation to Police Power.—

It must be remembered that the enjoyment of property is subject to the exercise by the state of the police power.3 There is, therefore, in addition to the question of whether what has been done amounts to a taking of property the question whether such taking is a valid exercise of the police power. Constitutional limitations as to due process of law may be violated by enactments, in the exercise of the police power, which impose unreasonable restraints and burdens on property and the enjoyment of property rights 4 or which work a practical confiscation of property or of its beneficial use.5 An unreasonable police regulation restricting the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property for a public use without compensation, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.6 If the nature and conditions of a restriction on the use or disposition of property are such that a state can, under the police power, impose it consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution without making compensation, then the United States may, for a permitted purpose, impose a like restriction consistently with the Fifth Amendment without making compensation.7 The regulations which may be made under the police power are discussed in a subsequent subdivision.

§ 653. Generally.—

In the following sections an illustrative group of decisions dealing with various topics has been given. These are only illustrative. The reader investigating any particular subject should supplement the study here with a study of the title dealing with such particular subject.

§ 654. Attachment and Garnishment.—

There is a great diversity of holdings as to the attachment or garnishment of a debt due a nonresident.8 The general rule is that a debt owing a nonresident may be reached in an action against such nonresident by garnishment process served personally upon his debtor within the state of the forum.9 Such attachment does not deprive the nonresident creditor of property without due process of law.10

§ 655. Business.—

A business is a property right entitled to protection against state legislation in contravention of the Federal Constitution.11 The right to engage in a business is protected.12 The right to operate a cotton

²Chapman v. Northern Trust Co. 296 Ill. 353, 129 N. E. 836, 13 A.L.R. 568. See Process [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 1258].

⁴Schiller Piano Co. v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co. 288 Ill. 580, 123 N. E. 631, 11 A.L.R. 454; Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. v. Minneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 83 N. W. 527, 86 N. W. 69, 53 L.R.A. 175; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 68 Minn. 381, 71 N. W. 400, 38 L.R.A. 672, 64 Am. St. Rep. 482; Eiermann v. Milwaukee, 142 Wis. 606, 126 N. W. 53, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1085.

⁵Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N. W. 624, 41 L.R.A. 481, 53 Am. St. Rep. 557. Annotation: 53 Am. St. Rep. 572.

⁷Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. 251 U. S. 146, 64 L. ed. 194, 40 S. Ct. 106.

¹⁰Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 334, 46 L. ed. 573, 22 S. Ct. 391; King v. Cross, 175 U. S. 396, 44 L. ed. 211, 20 S. Ct. 131. See also ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT, Vol. 4, p. 589, § 66. For other phases of due process as related to attachment and garnishment, see ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT, Vol. 5, p. 13, § 656; p. 141, § 903; p. 175, § 959.

¹¹Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 73 L. ed. 204, 49 S. Ct. 57.

¹²New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 76 L. ed. 747, 52 S. Ct. 371. Unreasonable or arbitrary interference

gin and collect tolls therefor under a statute declaring such business to be a public utility, to be permitted only in case of public necessity, is not a mere license, but is a franchise granted in consideration of the performance of public service and constitutes property within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.¹³

The Constitution, however, affords no protection from the consequences of competition.¹⁴ A state may, in the public interest, constitutionally engage in a business commonly carried on by private enterprise, levy a tax to support it, and compete with private interests engaged in a like activity,¹⁵ at least where there is no contract to the contrary.¹⁶ Subjecting a water company, the franchise of which has expired, to the alternative of accepting an inadequate price for its plant or of having its value ruinously impaired by the construction and operation of a municipal plant does not take property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, where the municipality not only is under no legal obligation either to renew the franchise or to purchase the plant, but is free to construct and operate its own plant.¹⁷ So far as the due process requirement is concerned, a state is free to adopt and enforce whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, whether by promoting free competition by laws aimed at monopolies or by curbing harmful competition by fixing minimum prices.¹⁸

§ 656. Rights in Children.—

Persons in whose home a children's welfare society has placed a child committed to its care have no property or natural right entitling them to attack the validity of a statute giving the society discretionary power to require the return of the child, as depriving them of property without due process.19

§ 657. Contracts.20—

The right to enter into a contract, with some exceptions, is a liberty which falls within the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Valid contracts are property and as such are protected from being taken without just compensation, whether the obligor is a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.2 The denial of a vested right under a contract, by a state Constitution subsequently adopted, is a deprivation of property without due process of law.3 The

with, or restrictions on, the common right to engage in a lawful private business, such as the manufacture and sale of ice, cannot be saved from the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment by calling them experimental. Ibid.

¹³Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515, 73 L. ed. 483, 49 S. Ct. 235.

¹⁴Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 79 L. ed. 259, 55 S. Ct. 7; Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 638, 78 L. ed. 1037, 54 S. Ct. 550; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 78 L. ed. 1025, 54 S. Ct. 542, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 603, 78 L. ed. 1466, 54 S. Ct. 712.

¹⁵Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 638, 78 L. ed. 1037, 54 S. Ct. 550; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 78 L. ed. 1025, 54 S. Ct. 542, rehearing denied in 292 U. S. 603, 78 L. ed. 1466, 54 S. Ct. 712; Boston v. Jackson, 260 U. S. 309, 67 L. ed. 274, 43 S. Ct. 129.

¹⁸Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469. Annotation: 96 A.L.R. 313.

¹⁹Turner v. Children's Home Soc. 158 Va. 406, 163 S. E. 399, 80 A.L.R. 1125. Annotation. 80 A.L.R. 1129.

¹Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513; Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U. S. 283, 77 L. ed. 306, 53 S. Ct. 133, 87 A.L.R. 285; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 S. Ct. 516, 27 A.L.R. 27; Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81, 76 A.L.R. 238.

³Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 243, 42 L. ed. 1023, 18 S. Ct. 610.

legal tender and as a medium of exchange.⁵ "Gold clauses" of private obligations for the payment of money, whether construable as requiring the payment of gold coin or as intended to set up a standard of value if gold coin

§ 658. Taking under Eminent Domain.9—

prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation. Although this provision is omitted from the Fourteenth Amendment, which operates upon the states, still property cannot be taken by the

a violation of the due process clause contained therein.¹⁰ The provision that

private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation has been regarded in certain instances as an additional guaranty to the

provision that a citizen shall not be deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law. It prevents the property of the citizen from being

⁴Shawnee Sewerage & Drainage Co. v. Stearns, 220 U. S. 462, 55 L. ed. 544, 31 S. Ct. 452.

⁵Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352. Annotation: 92 A.L.R. 1525, s. 95 A.L.R. 1383, and 101 A.L.R. 1318.

⁶Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co. 300 U. S. 324, 81 L. ed. 678, 57 S. Ct. 485; Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 294 U. S. 240, 79 L. ed. 885, 55 S. Ct. 407, 95 A.L.R. 1352, affirming 265 N. Y. 37, 191 N. E. 726, 92 A.L.R. 1523. Annotation: 92 A.L.R. 1525, s. 95 A.L.R. 1383, and 101 A.L.R. 1318.

⁷Catholic Order of Foresters v. State, — N. D. —, 271 N. W. 670, 109 A.L.R. 379. Annotation: 109 A.L.R. 996.

⁸Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518.

¹⁰Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Commission, 294 U. S. 613,

⁷⁹L. ed. 1090, 55 S. Ct. 563, rehearing denied in 295 U. S. 768, 79 L. ed. 1709, 55 S. Ct. 652; Consolidated Turnp. Co. v. Norfolk & O. V. R. Co. 228 U. S. 326, 57 L. ed. 857,

³³S. Ct. 510; Appleby v. Buffalo, 221 U. S. 524, 55 L. ed. 838, 31 S. Ct. 699; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 S. Ct. 56; Goldman v. Crowther,

¹⁴⁷Md. 282, 128 A. 50, 38 A.L.R. 1455; State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451, 33 A.L.R. 269.

¹¹Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co. 196 U. S. 239, 49 L. ed. 462,

²⁵S. Ct. 251; Hopper v. Britt, 203 N. Y. 144, 96 N. E. 371, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 825, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 172; Ex parte Smythe, 56 Tex. Crim. Rep. 375, 120 S. W. 200; Violett (N.S.) 854, 133 Am. St. Rep. 976; Violett v. Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 23 S. E. 909, 31 L.R.A. 382, 53 Am. St. Rep. 825.

market value of the property.¹⁶ The constitutional requirement of just compensation may not be evaded or impaired by any form of legislation.¹⁷ The

by the statute under which the condemnation is sought amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law.¹⁸

Judicial authorization of the entry by a water company upon land in private ownership to test by borings and wells its availability for the purposes

of the corporation, without making compensation to the owner, unconstitutionally deprives the owner of his property without due process of law.¹⁹

§ 659. Franchises.—

²⁹⁵U. S. 662, 79 L. ed. 1640, 55 S. Ct. 894, rehearing denied in 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82; McCoy v. Union Elev. R. Co. 247 U. S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1156, 38 S. Ct. 504; Weems v. St. Co. v. People's S. B. Co.

¹⁶Ann. Cas. 1222; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523,

²⁷S. Ct. 367; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 S. Ct. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. 200 U. S. 527, 50 L. ed. 581, 26 S. Ct. 301, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 L. ed. 150, 26 S. Ct. 36, 4 Ann. Cas. 493; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co. 196 U. S. 239,

⁴⁹L. ed. 462, 25 S. Ct. 251; Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 45 L. ed. 862,

²¹S. Ct. 648; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 S. Ct. 187; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 S. Ct. 56; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 40 L. ed. 188, 16 S. Ct. 43; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 S. Ct. 622; Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490, 37 L. ed. 252, 13 S. Ct. 394; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. ed. 80, 8 S. Ct. 21, 22; Kentucky R. Tax Cases (Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky) 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 S. Ct. 57; Scott v. Toledo (C. C.) 36 F. 385, 1 L.R.A. 688; Cumberland Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. United Electric R. Co. 93 Tenn. 492,

¹³Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 434; Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 64 L. ed. 135, 40 S. Ct. 62; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269,

⁴³L. ed. 443, 19 S. Ct. 187; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581.

¹⁸State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252, 48 S. W. (2d) 891, 81 A.L.R. 1066. Annotation: 81 A.L.R. 1071.

¹Missouri P. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 41 L. ed. 489, 17 S. Ct. 130; Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. ed. 455; Fall River Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. 202 Cal. 56, 259 P. 444, 56 A.L.R. 264; Reed v. Seattle, 124 Wash. 185, 213 P. 923, 29 A.L.R. 446; Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 105 N. W. 1031, 1135, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 653, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1023, 7 Ann. Cas. 400; Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improv. Co. 93 Wis. 534, 67 N. W. 918, 33 L.R.A. 645.

²Cincinnati v. Vester (C. C. A. 6th) 33 F. (2d) 242, 68 A.L.R. 831, affirmed in 281 U. S. 439, 74 L. ed. 950, 50 S. Ct. 360; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Wright v. Walcott, 238 Mass. 432, 131 N. E. 291, 18 A.L.R. 1242; State ex rel. Tacoma Industrial Co. v. White River Power Co. 39 Wash. 648, 82 P. 150, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 842, 4 Ann. Cas. 987. The provisions of the Ohio Constitution forbid the laying of an imposition upon the private property of one for the sole benefit of another. Alma Coal Co. v. Cozad, 79 Ohio St. 348, 87 N. E. 172, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1092.

³Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co. 196 U. S. 239, 49 L. ed. 462,

²⁵S. Ct. 251; Wright v. Walcott, 238 Mass. 432, 131 N. E. 291, 18 A.L.R. 1242; Salisbury Land & Improv. Co. v. Com. 215 Mass. 371,

¹⁰²N. E. 619, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1196; Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans, 85 Wis. 26, 54 N. W. 1003, 20 L.R.A. 662, 39 Am. St. Rep. 813.

of compensation.⁴ After the expiration of a franchise in city streets, the holder has no property rights of which its ouster from the use of the streets of the city will deprive it without due process of law.⁵ The right to take possession of the property of a street railway company remaining in the streets at the expiration of its franchise cannot, consistent with due process of law, be conferred by municipal ordinance upon another street railway company.⁶

§ 660. Rights under Judgment.—

Rights acquired by a judgment are property rights which cannot be taken without due process of law.7 Where a judgment creditor has actually received on account of his judgment all that he is entitled to receive, he cannot be said to have been deprived of his property.8 A state limiting the power of a city to raise money by taxation is not unconstitutional because it prevents the collection of a judgment against the city for damages caused by a mob. A party cannot be said to be deprived of his property in a judgment because at the time he is unable to collect.9

§ 661. Jural Rights.—

Property rights may exist in causes of action which cannot be taken without violation of the guaranty against due process. An existing cause of action to recover an amount due,10 to recover tolls unlawfully collected,11 or to recover damages 12 cannot be taken away without violation of the guaranty of due process. A statute depriving a creditor of his vested right of bringing an action in another state is a deprivation of property without due process of law.13 Existing causes of action under a state constitutional provision making directors of a corporation liable to its creditors for money embezzled or misappropriated during their terms by its officers are protected by the contract impairment clause in Article 1, § 10 of the Federal Constitution, from extinguishment upon repeal of such constitutional provision, even though such repeal is regarded as an exercise of the power reserved by the state Constitution over laws concerning corporations.14

Rights acquired by an administrative or judicial proceeding cannot be taken away without notice and opportunity to be heard.¹⁵

Since an injunction decree does not create a right, its modification cannot be considered as an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law.¹⁶

Although a vested cause of action is property, protected from arbitrary interference, all that is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Four-

⁴Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & E. Corp. 251 U. S. 32, 64 L. ed. 121, 40 S. Ct. 76.

⁵State ex rel. McKittrick v. Missouri Utilities Co. 339 Mo. 385, 96 S. E. (2d) 607, 106 A.L.R. 1169.

⁶Cleveland Electric R. Co. v. Cleveland, 204 U. S. 116, 51 L. ed. 399, 27 S. Ct. 202.

⁷Collins v. Welsh (C. C. A. 9th) 75 F. (2d) 894, 99 A.L.R. 1319, writ of certiorari denied in 295 U. S. 762, 79 L. ed. 1704, 55 S. Ct. 921; Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N. Y. 190, 28 N. E. 1040, 13 L.R.A. 304, 26 Am. St. Rep. 464.

⁸Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 S. Ct. 54.

⁹Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 S. Ct. 211; Sherman v. Laughman, 92 Tex. 13, 40 S. W. 140, 42 S. W. 961, 39 L.R.A. 258.

¹¹Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage Dist. 258 U. S. 338, 66 L. ed. 647, 42 S. Ct. 325.

¹²Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 1, 38 L. ed. 55, 14 S. Ct. 240.

teenth Amendment is the preservation of a substantial right to redress by some effective procedure, and there is no property right, in the constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy.¹⁷ A statute authorizing the receiver of an insolvent bank to enforce the constitutional liability of stockholders does not, by denying to creditors the right to maintain individual actions, deprive them of a property right without due process of law.¹⁸ A statute which substitutes, for a taxpayer's existing right of action against a collector of internal revenue for the amounts exacted under an invalid tax law, a remedy against the government is not an invasion of the taxpayer's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.¹⁹ Changing the form of remedy or giving an additional remedy for the collection of the personal liability of a stockholder, which does not impose upon him any greater liability than existed at common law, does not violate the guaranty of due process.²⁰ There is no deprivation of the right to due process of law in declining to entertain an action on the ground that the issues thereunder can be more conveniently litigated in another forum.¹ Awarding a new trial upon the question of damages only, upon reversing a judgment, does not deprive the defendant of his property without due process of law.² Allowing an injunction without a bond to prevent the use of property in violation of a statute does not deprive the owner of his property without due process of law.³

§ 662. —

Imposing Liability.—The rules governing the imposition of liability raise fundamental questions of taking of property rights. The state has the power to impose absolute liability upon one causing loss of property to another by the use of agencies necessarily destructive and in the use of which absolute control is impossible, whether the one using the agency is a private person or a corporation.5 It may make a railroad company absolutely liable for fires set by its locomotives.6 But an absolute liability for injury to stock cannot be imposed 7 except as a penalty for failure to fence.8 A statute imposing double liability upon a railroad company for damages to livestock resulting from its failure to fence does not deprive the company of its property without due process where the company is afforded every facility for presenting its defense.9 A carrier may be made liable for injury to a passenger unless the injury is occasioned by the passenger's criminal negligence or by his violation of some express rule or regulation of the carrier actually brought to his notice.10 A carrier may be made liable for the difference between charges exacted by the carrier in conformity with the tariff schedule approved by the state railroad commission and a less amount thereafter

²⁰Shriver v. Woodbine Sav. Bank, 285 U. S. 467, 76 L. ed. 884, 52 S. Ct. 430.

¹Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407.

²Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491, L.R.A.1915E, 239, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 880.

³State ex rel. Duensing v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168, 41 N. E. 145, 33 L.R.A. 213, 51 Am. St. Rep. 174.

⁴United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370, 51 L. ed. 1098, 27 S. Ct. 742, 11 Ann. Cas. 688 (cause of action for illegal collection of duties). Campbell v. Missouri P. R. Co. 121 Mo. 340, 25 S. W. 936, 25 L.R.A. 175, 42 Am. St. Rep. 530.

¹⁰Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke, 59 Neb. 689, 82 N. W. 26, 55 L.R.A. 610, affirmed in 183 U. S. 582, 46 L. ed. 339, 22 S. Ct. 229. As to liability of carriers, see CARRIERS, Vol. 10, p. 160, § 1240.

he has no control.¹³ Liability may arise, however, where the owner has expressly or impliedly put it within the power of the third person to cause

and as not depriving the owner of his liberty or property without due process.¹⁴ He cannot, however, be made liable where the car is taken without

due process of law, if he is not denied the right to be heard at the trial before the jury upon every question which is to be determined by their verdict.¹⁶

with joint and concurring negligence, on the theory that it was thereby deprived of the right of reimbursement from the servants.¹⁷ Punitive damages

resulting in death, without unconstitutionally depriving the employer of property without due process of law.¹⁹ The mere fact that a railroad was constructed under legislative authority at a time when the Constitution made

the company liable to pay only for property taken in its exercise of the right of

permitting his sheep to graze on the public domain within ² miles of a dwelling house.¹

¹¹Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. 287 U. S. 358, 77 L. ed. 360, 53 S. Ct. 145, 85 A.L.R. 254.

¹²Holmes v. Murray, 207 Mo. 413, 105 S. W. 1085, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 431, 123 Am. St. Rep. 336, 13 Ann. Cas. 845.

¹³Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co. 171 Pa. 193, 33 A. 237, 29 L.R.A. 808, 50 Am. St. Rep. 801.

²⁰Alabama & V. R. Co. v. King, 93 Miss. 379, 47 So. 857, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 603.

§ 663. —

that statutes subjecting counties and cities to liability for damages to property by mobs and riots within such counties and cities are within the general

§ 664. —

a cause of action or limit recovery therein. An injured employee, his personal representative, or next of kin has no vested right to recover damages

employment in or about a railroad by a statute restricting his rights as against

owner of land is not deprived of the inherent right to the means of acquiring and possessing property or of the constitutional guaranty against taking

³James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 71 L. ed. 569, 47 S. Ct. 308.

⁴Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 50 L. ed. 215, 32 S. Ct. 313, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1349; Dawson Soap Co. v. Chicago, 234 Ill. 314, 84 N. E. 920, 14 Ann. Cas. 1131; Chicago v. Manhattan Cement Co. 178 Ill. 372, 53 N. E. 68, 45 L.R.A. 848, 69 Am. St. Rep. 321; Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 248; Champaign County v. Church,

⁶²Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L.R.A. 738, 78 Am. St. Rep. 718; Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397, 35 Am. Rep. 670. Annotation: 24 L.R.A. 600; 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 361; 69 Am. St. Rep. 331; 14 Ann. Cas. 1134; Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1351. See RIOTS AND UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

⁵Iola v. Birnbaum, 71 Kan. 600, 81 P. 198, 6 Ann. Cas. 267. Annotation: 6 Ann. Cas. 274.

⁶Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 50 L. ed. 215, 32 S. Ct. 313, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1349.

⁷Champaign County v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L.R.A. 738, 78 Am. Am. St. Rep. 318.

⁸As to modification of liability of automobile owners to guests, see AUTOMOBILES, Vol. 5, p. 633, § 238.

¹⁰Martin v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co. 203 U. S. 284, 51 L. ed. 184, 27 S. Ct. 100, 8 Ann. Cas. 87.

¹¹Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 273 N. Y. 528, 5 N. E. (2d) 815, 7 N. E. (2d) 677,

¹⁰⁹A.L.R. 1229, appeal dismissed in 301 U. S. 667, 81 L. ed. 1332, 57 S. Ct. 939, and rehearing denied in — U. S. —, 82 L. ed. (Adv. 30), 58 S. Ct. 6. Annotation: 109 A.L.R. 1234.

¹²Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 273 N. Y. 528, 5 N. E. (2d) 815, 7 N. E. (2d) 677,

¹⁰⁹A.L.R. 1229, appeal dismissed in 301 U. S. 667, 81 L. ed. 1332, 57 S. Ct. 933, and rehearing denied in — U. S. —, 82 L. ed. (Adv. 30), 58 S. Ct. 6.

the premises by a lawful fence.¹⁵ The right to abolish a cause of action has been in some cases based upon the fact that the particular cause of action does not exist at common law.¹⁶ Where the legislation relates to rights which had become well established prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the right to abolish the cause of action altogether has been denied. This rule has been applied to a cause of action for negligence.¹⁷ Limitation of liability for negligence has been sustained.¹⁸ It has been stated that not all causes of action which existed at common law are beyond legislative control.¹⁹

§ 665. —

Denying Remedy.—Whether acting through its judiciary or through its legislature, a state may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right which the state has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it.20 A law which operates in effect to make remediless injury to an employer's business by striking employees and others, through concerted action in picketing, displaying banners, advertising the strike, denouncing the employer as unfair to union labor, appealing to customers to withdraw their patronage, and circulating handbills containing abusive and libelous charges against employers, employees, and patrons, and intimations of injury to future patrons, deprives the owner of the business and the premises of his property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 If Congress cannot validate a tax by subsequent legislation, it cannot accomplish the same result by denying to the taxpayers all remedy both as against the United States and as against the tax collector personally.2

A state may prohibit the enjoyment by persons within its borders of rights acquired elsewhere, which violate its laws or public policy, and under some

¹⁶Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 273 N. Y. 528, 5 N. E. (2d) 815, 7 N. E. (2d) 677, 109 A.L.R. 1229, appeal dismissed in 301 U. S. 667, 81 L. ed. 1332, 57 S. Ct. 933, and rehearing denied in — U. S. —, 82 L. ed. (Adv. 30), 58 S. Ct. 6.

¹⁷Stewart v. Houk, 127 Or. 589, 271 P. 998, 272 P. 893, 61 A.L.R. 1236, holding that the right of a guest to recover for a breach, resulting in injury, of the duty to exercise care, owed by one transporting such guest without charge, is protected against legislative abolishment by a constitutional provision giving every man a remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person or property. Annotation: 61 A.L.R. 1255; 111 A.L.R. 1013.

¹⁸Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 186 Wash. 700, 53 P. (2d) 615, 59 P. (2d) 1183, 111 A.L.R. 998. Annotation: 111 A.L.R. 1012.

¹⁹Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 273 N. Y. 528, 5 N. E. (2d) 815, 7 N. E. (2d) 677, 109 A.L.R. 1229, appeal dismissed in 301 U. S. 667, 81 L. ed. 1332, 57 S. Ct. 933, and rehearing denied in — U. S. —, 82 L. ed. (Adv. 30), 58 S. Ct. 6

²⁰Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 74 L. ed. 1107, 50 S. Ct. 451. The constitutionality of a Federal statute authorizing the seizure by a named officer of the property of enemy aliens, providing no adequate remedy to secure to a nonenemy owner either the return of his property seized or compensation for it, and affording such owner no remedy where the officer no longer has possession of the property or its proceeds has been doubted. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U. S. 74, 80 L. ed. 54, 56 S. Ct. 15. Due process of law is denied by a decision of a state court denying an injunction against the collection of a tax based on an alleged discriminatory assessment, on the ground that the plaintiff had a remedy by complaining to the state tax commission before the tax books were delivered to the collector and was guilty of laches in not so doing, where prior to the decision in the instant case an application to the state tax commission would have been unavailing because the highest court of the state had held in a former case that the tax commission was without power to afford relief and at the time of the instant decision that it had such power, the time for filing such complaint had expired. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 74 L. ed. 1107, 50 S. Ct. 451. See generally, supra, §§ 580 et seq.

¹Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A.L.R. 375.

circumstances may refuse to aid in the enforcement of such rights.³ Trustees of a Massachusetts trust are not unconstitutionally deprived of property without due process of law by being denied the right to maintain an action in a state other than that where the trust was organized, with the laws of which it has not complied, upon notes executed to it in such state.⁴

§ 666. —

Imposing Conditions on Suit.—The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state from prescribing a reasonable and appropriate condition to the bringing or defending of a suit of a specified kind or class, so long as the basis of distinction is real and the condition imposed has reasonable relation to a legitimate object.5

§ 667. —

Withdrawal by State of Consent to Be Sued.—The consent of the United States to be sued is a privilege accorded, not the grant of a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment, and may be withdrawn at any time, although given after much deliberation and for a pecuniary consideration.6 Refusal to permit the assertion in a suit brought by the United States to foreclose a mortgage securing a loan made through the Federal Farm Board, of a counterclaim in respect of which the United States has not waived immunity from suit, does not amount to a taking of the defendant's property without due process of law.7

§ 668. —

Limitations on Right of Removal from State to Federal Court.— The privilege of removal from a state to a Federal court is not in any sense a vested right, no matter whether it is based on diversity of citizenship or on a right of action created by Federal law. The power in Congress to grant or withhold the right of removal is involved in the power to prescribe the jurisdiction of courts, and since such power is continuing in its nature, it of necessity includes authority to take away, as well as to bestow, the right to remove causes.8

§ 669. Right to Labor.—

The right to pursue any lawful occupation or calling is generally, if not universally, recognized as property within the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.9 Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor.10 The right to earn wages is just as much property and within the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution as earned wages.11

³Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 74 L. ed. 926, 50 S. Ct. 338, 74 A.L.R. 701.

⁵Jones v. Union Guano Co. 264 U. S. 171, 68 L. ed. 623, 44 S. Ct. 280; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 S. Ct. 433, 17 A.L.R. 873 (requiring security of nonresident defendant in attachment). Annotation: 17 A.L.R. 884; 68 L. ed. 623. Merely prohibiting actions for damages for sale of deficient fertilizer except after chemical analysis, showing the deficiency, does not substitute the determination of the official for a trial in court, so as to constitute a deprivation of due process of law. Jones v. Union Guano Co. 264 U. S. 171, 68 L. ed. 623, 44 S. Ct. 280.

⁶Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U. S. 115, 81 L. ed. 545, 57 S. Ct. 359; Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 78 L. ed. 1434, 54 S. Ct. 840.

⁷North Dakota-Montana Wheat Growers' Asso. v. United States (C. C. A. 8th) 66 F. (2d) 573, 92 A.L.R. 1484, writ of certiorari denied in 291 U. S. 672, 78 L. ed. 1061, 54 S. Ct. 457.

⁸Teel v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 204 F. 918, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 21. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

⁹New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 76 L. ed. 747, 52 S. Ct. 371; State v. Kartus, 230 Ala. 352, 162 So. 533, 101 A.L.R. 1336, followed in appellate court in 26 Ala. App. 446, 162 So. 538; Wight v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 146 Md. 66, 125 A. 881, 37 A.L.R. 864; Singuefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81, 76 A.L.R. 238.

¹¹Wight v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 146 Md. 66, 125 A. 881, 37 A.L.R. 864. [12 Am. Jur.]—23 353

§ 670. Labor Relations.—

Labor relations between employer and employee raise questions of due process.12 An employer is protected by the guaranty of due process in his right to discharge an employee.13 This view has been somewhat modified in that it is now held that due process is not denied by a statute forbidding discrimination against employees because of union activities.14 The legislature cannot prevent the granting of an injunction against the intimidation of a merchant's employees and customers by a labor union for the purpose of compelling him to pay the union's scale of prices to his employees, since it interferes with his constitutional right to acquire, possess, enjoy, and protect property.15

Publicity to labor disputes may be authorized and peaceful picketing and patrolling validated.¹⁶

§ 671. Liens.—

The general rule with reference to priority of liens is that the lien which is first in point of time is first in right.17 As between private parties this priority of liens cannot, as to vested liens, be modified without depriving the prior lien holder of his property without due process.18 When public liens are involved, such as taxes, assessments,19 and even municipal water rents,20 priority may be given to the public charge. In contests between resident and nonresident creditors in insolvency proceedings some shifting of priorities has been sustained.1 Privity of contract between the persons to whom a lien is given and the owner of property is not necessary to constitute due process.2 Liens may be imposed upon property by the implied consent of the owner.3

§ 672. Limitation of Actions.—

Where property rights have been acquired under a statute of limitations, a vested right exists which cannot be taken away without due process.4 There is a difference of opinion as to the right to extend the bar of the statute of limitations after it has once fallen in actions not involving title to real or personal property.5

§ 673. Rights in Property.—

Requiring the use of property for the public may constitute a taking. A corporation cannot be required to use its property for the benefit of the public without receiving just compensation for the services rendered by it.6 A public hack stand cannot be established upon

¹³Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 436, 28 S. Ct. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764.

¹⁴National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & L. Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352.

¹⁵Goldberg, B. & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 P. 806, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 460, 117 Am. St. Rep. 145, 9 Ann. Cas. 1219.

¹⁶Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 81 L. ed. 1229, 57 S. Ct. 857; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172 A. 551, 92 A.L.R. 1450.

¹⁸Fisher v. Wineman, 125 Mich. 642, 84 N. W. 1111, 52 L.R.A. 192; Pacific Spruce Corp. v. Oregon Portland Cement Co. 133 Or. 223, 286 P. 520, 289 P. 489, 72 A.L.R. 1507.

¹⁹Baldwin v. Moroney, 173 Ind. 574, 91 N. E. 3, 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 761. Annotation: 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 761. See SPECIAL OR LOCAL ASSESSMENTS [Also 25 R. C. L. p. 76]; TAXATION [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 1].

²⁰Dunbar v. New York, 251 U. S. 516, 64 L. ed. 384, 40 S. Ct. 250; Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 28 L. ed. 1102, 5 S. Ct. 612.

¹Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 S. Ct. 935. See INSOLVENCY [Also 14 R. C. L. p. 626].

²Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. N. O. Nelson Mfg. Co. 291 U. S. 352, 78 L. ed. 840, 54 S. Ct. 392. See MECHANICS' LIENS [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 868].

⁶Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U. S. 182, 72 L. ed. 523, 48 S. Ct. 276, 56 A.L.R. 756; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 S. Ct. 418; Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission, 176 Cal. 518, 169 P. 62, L.R.A.1918C, 849 (pipe line). Annotation: L.R.A.1918C, 855.

a driveway maintained by a railroad company upon its own property to afford means of ingress and egress to the public to its station, which has not been dedicated as a public highway.⁷ A statute will not be construed as attempting to convert private carriers into public carriers unless such construction is unavoidable.⁸ The substitution of one public use to the exclusion of other public uses is not an invasion of a right of property within the meaning of the Constitution.⁹

Property can be destroyed by legislation limiting or prohibiting its use.¹⁰ It is not, however, every interference with the use of property which amounts to a taking.¹¹

§ 674. —

Real Property.—One of the most common illustrations of the taking of property is an interference with rights in real property.12 The right to devote real estate to any legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution,13 such as the right to use it for advertising purposes.14

A statute forbidding the mining of coal under private dwellings or streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal is reserved in the grant is unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law.¹⁵

A wharf built by riparian owners under the permission and license of the state is property ¹⁶ which cannot be destroyed or its value impaired and the exclusive use of which the owner can only be deprived in accordance with established law.¹⁷

Judicial authorization of the entry by a water company upon land in private ownership to test by borings and wells its availability for the purposes of the corporation, without making compensation to the owner, unconstitutionally deprives the owner of his property without due process of law.¹⁸ A statute declaring waters flowing in a natural channel public and subject to appropriation, so far as they are not being applied to a useful or beneficial purpose, or reasonably needed for such purpose, unconstitutionally deprives riparian owners of their property without due process of law.¹⁹ Although the right of a mortgagee, who has foreclosed his mortgage and purchased at the foreclosure sale, to an unlimited time for obtaining a sheriff's deed cannot be taken away by fixing a limitation,²⁰ such right may be subjected to certain rules and regulations imposed by the public authorities.¹ The state has power to regulate water rights. It may regulate adverse claims

⁷Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U. S. 182, 72 L. ed. 523, 48 S. Ct. 276, 56 A.L.R. 756.

⁸Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. ed. 288, 53 S. Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721.

⁹Park Comrs. v. Diamond Ice Co. 130 Iowa, 603, 105 N. W. 203, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1103, 8 Ann. Cas. 28.

¹³Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 73 L. ed. 210, 49 S. Ct. 50, 86 A.L.R. 654.

¹⁴Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 998. Annotation: 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 998.

¹⁵Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 67 L. ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158, 28 A.L.R. 1321.

¹⁶Lewis v. Portland, 25 Or. 133, 35 P. 256, 22 L.R.A. 736, 42 Am. St. Rep. 772.

¹⁷Weems S. B. Co. v. People's S. B. Co. 214 U. S. 345, 53 L. ed. 1024, 29 S. Ct. 661, 16 Ann. Cas. 1222.

¹⁸Jacobsen v. Superior Ct. 192 Cal. 319, 219 P. 986, 29 A.L.R. 1399. Annotation: 56 A.L.R. 287.

¹⁹Fall River Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. 202 Cal. 56, 259 P. 444, 56 A.L.R. 264. Annotation: 56 A.L.R. 287.

and prescribe limitations.² Curative statutes affecting rights in real property have been sustained.³

§ 675. Statutory Rights.—

Rights acquired under a statute while it is duly adjudged to be constitutional are valid legal rights that are protected by the Constitution, not by judicial decision. But rights acquired under a statute that has not been adjudged valid are subject to be lost if the statute is adjudged invalid, although the statute was considered valid by eminent attorneys, public officers, and others.4 The repeal of a statute5 or change therein is sometimes prevented by the due process clause. Generally, statutes may be repealed or changed at the will of the legislature.6

H. DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

§ 676. Generally.—

The state, in a bona fide exercise of its police power, may interfere with private property and even order its destruction in the public interests.7 All property is held under the implied obligation that the use of it shall not be injurious to the community.8

When necessary to insure the public safety, the legislature may under its police power authorize municipal authorities summarily to destroy property without legal process or previous notice to the owner.⁹ For instance, a dwelling house may be pulled down or blown up by the public authorities if this is necessary in order to avert or stay a general conflagration, and this may be done without recourse against such authorities for the injuries occasioned thereby.¹⁰ Private property may be destroyed even by private individuals

²O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrig. Co. 242 U. S. 20, 61 L. ed. 123, 37 S. Ct. 7. Annotation: 56 A.L.R. 287. See generally, IRRIGATION [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 442]; WATERS [Also 27 R. C. L. p. 1052].

³Downs v. Blount (C. C. A. 5th) 170 F. 15, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1076; writ of certiorari denied in 226 U. S. 609, 57 L. ed. 380, 33 S. Ct. 216; Eckles v. Wood, 143 Ky. 451, 136 S. W. 907, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 832.

⁴State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739, 37 A.L.R. 1298. Bonds sold to bona fide holders, while the statute authorizing the bonds is duly adjudged to be constitutional, are valid, and the purchaser is protected from a subsequent decision of invalidity by the property rights clause of the organic law, because the bonds, being valid when issued, are lawful obligations to pay money, —therefore, property,—and the Constitution secures to the purchaser the "inalienable right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property," and requires the courts to afford a remedy by due course of law for any injury done to property rights. State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739, 37 A.L.R. 1298.

⁵Treigle v. Acme Homestead Asso. 297 U. S. 189, 80 L. ed. 575, 56 S. Ct. 408, 101 A.L.R. 1284, rehearing denied in 297 U. S. 728, 80 L. ed. 1010, 56 S. Ct. 587 (Building and Loan Association Act); Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 78 L. ed. 1434, 54 S. Ct. 840 (War Risk Insurance Act).

⁶Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514, 27 L. ed. 808, 2 S. Ct. 854 (holding that the abolition of existing tacit mortgages as against third persons, unless they shall be recorded within a stated reasonable time, does not deprive a minor owner of such a mortgage of her property without due process of law); Gross v. United States Mortg. Co. 108 U. S. 477, 27 L. ed. 795, 2 S. Ct. 940 (holding that the withdrawing of the inhibition of the local law against the taking of mortgages within the state by a foreign corporation does not, as applied to an existing mortgage, deprive a purchaser of his property without due process of law, where he assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage); Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co. 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. ed. 961; Fox v. Cincinnati, 104 U. S. 783, 26 L. ed. 928 (change in canal law). The repeal of a statute which created a right of action against a county for an injury resulting from a defective bridge or highway does not violate a constitutional provision that every man shall have a remedy by due course of law for injury done him in person, property, or reputation, although the statute was in force at the adoption of the Constitution. Templeton v. Linn County, 22 Or. 313, 29 P. 795, 15 L.R.A. 730.

⁷Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 72 L. ed. 568, 48 S. Ct. 246; Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 S. Ct. 693; Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. R. Co. 167 La. 771, 120 So. 290, 62 A.L.R. 1512.

¹⁰Jenks v. Stump, 41 Colo. 281, 93 P. 17, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 554, 124 Am. St. Rep. 137, 14 Ann. Cas. 914; Durand v. Dyson, 271 Ill. 382, 111 N. E. 143, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 84; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa, 290, 81 N. W. 604, 50 L.R.A. 92; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636.

in the exercise of the common-law right of necessity to prevent the spreading of a conflagration.¹¹ Similarly, the municipal authorities may order the destruction of a house falling into decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by.¹²

When a business is extinguished as noxious under the Constitution, the owners cannot demand compensation from the government.¹³ The police power of the state includes the right to destroy or abate a public nuisance. Property so destroyed is not taken for public use, and therefore there is no obligation to make compensation for such taking.¹⁴ In cases of great emergency engendering overwhelming necessity, property may thus be taken or destroyed without compensation and without what is commonly called "due process of law." ¹⁵ As an additional example it may be mentioned that boards of health exercising the police power may be empowered to employ all necessary means to protect the public health and, when the emergency demands, to destroy private property without preliminary formal legal proceedings. Thus, it has been held that the appearance of a malignant and contagious disease in cattle may be in its nature such a menace to the public health as to bring it clearly within the general rule and so as to permit the destruction of the animals afflicted.¹⁶ It is settled that by due process of law specific forfeitures may be imposed for specific acts, including even total destruction of property per se innocent, when such fairly tends and is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose under the police power.¹⁷ It is not an objection to the validity of a police regulation that it does not provide for a hearing or for notice to the owner before his property is subjected to restraint or destruction. The very purpose to be subserved by such a regulation would be defeated if the officer charged with its administration was required to give notice or conduct a hearing before he could proceed. His action is intended to be prompt and summary.¹⁸ The right, however, of either an individual or the community to destroy private property can as a rule be exercised only in case of extreme, imperative, or overruling necessity; and it has been said that the justification of destruction of private property under plea of necessity is always a question of fact to be tried by a jury and settled by their verdict, unless the sovereign authority has constitutionally provided some other mode.¹⁹ The legislature may fix any time it pleases within which articles seized for a violation of law shall be brought before a court for condemnation, subject to the limitation that the delay is not in itself a deprivation of property without due process of law.²⁰

See BUILDINGS, Vol. 9, p. 197; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Also 19 R. C. L. p. 678].

¹¹Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136, 97 Am. Dec. 82, 1 Am. Rep. 94; American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N. J. L. 590, 57 Am. Dec. 420. Annotation: 57 Am. Dec. 433. See FIRES [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 938]; TORTS [Also 26 R. C. L. p. 755].

¹³New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. New Orleans, 281 U. S. 682, 74 L. ed. 1115, 50 S. Ct. 449; Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. 280 U. S. 384, 74 L. ed. 498, 50 S. Ct. 155; Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. R. Co. 167 La. 771, 120 So. 290, 62 A.L.R. 1512.

¹⁴State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N. W. 770, 58 A.L.R. 607; Colvill v. Fox, 51 Mont. 72, 149 P. 496, L.R.A.1915F, 894.

¹⁵Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 S. Ct. 693; Ross v. Desha Levee Bd. 83 Ark. 176, 103 S. W. 380, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699, 119 Am. St. Rep. 131; McClone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 855; State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 466.

¹⁹Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 714, 47 Am. Dec. 190. Annotation: 47 Am. Dec. 207.

**§ ⁶⁷⁷. Notice and Hearing.**—In certain cases property may be destroyed summarily without any notice or hearing to the owner. This is true in cases of emergency, such as the destruction of buildings to stay a conflagration, or in cases of property seized which has no lawful use, as, for example, burglars' tools.¹ So far as property is dangerous to the safety or health of the community, due process of law may authorize its summary destruction.² But in any case in which the property may have a lawful use or in which a fair question arises as to whether the property is such as should be destroyed, notice and hearing are necessary.³ As otherwise stated, property which is inoffensive and harmless can be condemned or destroyed only by legal proceedings with due notice to the owner.⁴ Notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential to the validity of a statute providing for forfeiture of an automobile used in the transportation of intoxicating liquor.⁵ As to intoxicating liquors, notice and hearing are not necessary to due process in ordering their destruction,⁶ at least, not if the owner can secure a hearing by instituting injunction proceedings to prevent the destruction.⁷ Due process is not denied by a statute providing that a slot machine seized as illegal may be taken before a magistrate who, if he comes to the conclusion that the machine is a gambling device, may order it to be summarily destroyed, even though there is no provision for a hearing or to test the wisdom of the magistrate. Its justification lies in the evil it is aimed at.⁸

The rights of an owner of property who is not made a party to, but whose property is bound by the decree in, a suit for the abatement of a nuisance maintained on the premises by his tenant are preserved by a statutory provision for the giving of a bond by him that he will immediately abate the nuisance that may exist, whereupon the abatement order will be canceled so far as it relates to the property itself.⁹

Courts in determining what is due process of law in the deprivation of a person of his property are bound to consider the nature of the property, the necessity for its sacrifice, and the extent to which it has previously been regarded as within the police power.¹⁰

**§ ⁶⁷⁸. Summary Destruction or Forfeiture of Property Used Illegally.**— With respect to the necessity of affording a notice or hearing before destroying property used for an unlawful purpose, a distinction has been drawn between property which may be innocently used and that which is incapable of any except an illegal use. While in the exercise of the police power the legislature has authority to declare property which may be used only for an unlawful purpose to be a public nuisance and authorize it to be abated summarily, it has been said that if property which is innocent in its ordinary and

²Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 S. Ct. 693; State ex rel. Daniel v. Kizer, 164 S. C. 383, 162 S. E. 444, 81 A.L.R. 722.

³Loesch v. Koehler, 144 Ind. 278, 41 N. E. 326, 43 N. E. 129, 35 L.R.A. 682; State v. Robbins, 124 Ind. 308, 24 N. E. 978, 8 L.R.A. 438; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa, 290, 81 N. W. 604, 50 L.R.A. 92.

⁴Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 S. Ct. 693; State ex rel. Daniel v. Kizer, 164 S. C. 383, 162 S. E. 444, 81 A.L.R. 722.

⁵State v. Rose, 33 Del. 168, 132 A. 864, 45 A.L.R. 85; People v. Marquis, 291 Ill. 121, 125 N. E. 757, 8 A.L.R. 874. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 888, s. 45 A.L.R. 93. See generally INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 239].

⁶Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188, 69 L. ed. 568, 45 S. Ct. 264, 37 A.L.R. 1378; Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561, L.R.A.1917D, 926, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 685. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 888, s. 45 A.L.R. 93.

⁷Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188, 69 L. ed. 568, 45 S. Ct. 264, 37 A.L.R. 1378.

¹⁰Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 S. Ct. 693.

proper use has been used for an unlawful purpose, it is beyond the power of the legislature to order its summary forfeiture to the state as a penalty or punishment for such unlawful use without giving its owner an opportunity for a hearing.¹¹ In accordance with this distinction it has been held that a statute authorizing a game warden to seize and forfeit to the state, without a hearing, all guns, dogs, decoys and fishing tackle used by any person hunting or fishing without a license, when such license is required by law, is unconstitutional and void.¹² The state has an undoubted right, in the exercise of its police power, to seize implements used in taking or catching fish in violation of law, with a view to subjecting them to judicial condemnation and to sale or destruction by process of law.¹³ The proposition has been laid down that the legislature may declare that any net for catching fish in violation of law shall be deemed to be a public nuisance and that the summary destruction thereof may be authorized.¹⁴ The value of the articles has sometimes been considered to have a bearing on the right to destroy them when illegally used, provided they are capable of an innocent use. If of little value, as compared with the expense of proceedings to determine their real character and the lawfulness of their use, and if the owner may, without inconvenience or hardship, avoid drastic proceedings by compliance with the law, it seems that the courts do not hesitate in sustaining the summary power of destruction.¹⁵ In such a case the legislature may declare the property to be a nuisance and subject to summary abatement. While the legislature has no right arbitrarily to declare that to be a nuisance which is clearly not so, a good deal is left to its discretion in this regard.¹⁶ Some authority may be found for the proposition that the confiscation and public sale of valuable nets used in fishing contrary to the provision of a statute may be authorized by the legislature without according the owner a notice or a hearing, since he has a sufficient remedy in an action to recover the property or damages for its wrongful destruction or, by way of injunction, to restrain its sale.¹⁷

Articles such as cards and dice used for gambling purposes, although perfectly harmless in themselves, may become nuisances by being put to an illegal use and in such cases may fall within the ban of the law and be sum-

¹¹State v. Robbins, 124 Ind. 308, 24 N. E. 978, 8 L.R.A. 438; State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103, citing R. C. L.; McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505, 65 L.R.A. 610, 115 Am. St. Rep. 614, 8 Ann. Cas. 898; Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 47 S. E. 275, 65 L.R.A. 616, 104 Am. St. Rep. 1004, 2 Ann. Cas. 933.

¹²McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505, 65 L.R.A. 610, 115 Am. St. Rep. 614, 8 Ann. Cas. 898. State legislation making unlawful the possession of nets, traps, and seines, the use of which in taking fish from the waters of the state is prohibited, is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of the time of acquisition or the protestations of lawful intentions on the part of a particular possessor. Miller v. McLaughlin, 281 U. S. 261, 74 L. ed. 840, 50 S. Ct. 296.

¹⁴State v. French, 71 Ohio St. 186, 73 N. E. 216, 104 Am. St. Rep. 770, 1 Ann. Cas. 948; Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 588, 66 N. W. 805, 32 L.R.A. 380. Annotation: 17 A.L.R. 574, s. 50 A.L.R. 97. The confiscation and sale at auction of nets used in fishery, contrary to the provision of a statute, may be authorized by the legislature without according the owner notice or a hearing; he has a sufficient remedy in an action to recover the property, or damages for its wrongful destruction, or by way of injunction to restrain its sale. Daniels v. Homer, 139 N. C. 219, 51 S. E. 992, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 997. See FISH AND FISHERIES [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 1014]; GAME AND GAME LAWS [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 683].

¹⁵Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 S. Ct. 499; Ross v. Desha Levee Bd. 83 Ark. 176, 103 S. W. 380, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 699; Nelson v. Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N. W. 445, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 260; McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505, 65 L.R.A. 610, 115 Am. St. Rep. 614, 8 Ann. Cas. 898; State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 114 N. W. 137, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 229, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 15 Ann. Cas. 408.

¹⁶Ross v. Desha Levee Bd. 83 Ark. 176, 103 S. W. 380, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699, 119 Am. St. Rep. 131. Annotation: 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699.

¹⁷Daniels v. Homer, 139 N. C. 219, 51 S. E. 992, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 997. Annotation: 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 997.

marily destroyed.¹⁸ There is no constitutional objection to enforcing a penalty by forfeiture of the offending article.¹⁹ Statutory forfeitures of property intrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States do not constitute a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.²⁰ But the forfeiture of property of an innocent third person, used without his knowledge or permission in the illegal transportation of liquor by one in possession of the car, without notice to the owner, unconstitutionally deprives him of his property without due process of law.¹ Some articles may be incapable of any lawful use and the legislature may make the mere possession of them illegal. In this class fall burglars' tools, counterfeiting outfits, obscene pictures or prints, gaming tables and slot machines.² Statutes may authorize their seizure and forfeiture without in any way violating constitutional provisions prohibiting the deprivation of property without due process of law.³ Similarly, it has been held that a statute making it an offense knowingly to have in possession any papers used in playing policy does not deprive anyone of his property without due process of law.⁴ Possession of opium without having a license therefor or without having obtained it on the prescription of a physician or pharmacist for medicinal purposes may likewise be made a criminal offense in the discretion of the legislature, without violating any constitutional right.⁵

The courts are not in agreement as to whether a jury trial is necessary in such cases.⁶

§ 679. Property Constituting Nuisance.7—

It is universally conceded that the police power of the state includes the right to destroy or abate by a summary proceeding whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance.8 This right is

¹⁸Mullen v. Moseley, 13 Idaho, 457, 90 P. 986, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 394, 121 Am. St. Rep. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 450; Daniels v. Homer, 139 N. C. 219, 51 S. E. 992, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 997; State ex rel. Daniel v. Kizer, 164 S. C. 383, 162 S. E. 444, 81 A.L.R. 722. See GAMING [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 704].

¹⁹United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto. 272 U. S. 321, 71 L. ed. 279, 47 S. Ct. 154, 47 A.L.R. 1025.

²⁰Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465, 71 L. ed. 354, 47 S. Ct. 133, 47 A.L.R. 1044; J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 65 L. ed. 376, 41 S. Ct. 189; Com. v. Certain Motor Vehicle, 261 Mass. 504, 159 N. E. 613, 61 A.L.R. 548. Annotation: 47 A.L.R. 1055, s, 61 A.L.R. 553, 73 A.L.R. 1087, and 82 A.L.R. 607; 71 L. ed. 357. See generally INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 239].

²Mullen v. Moseley, 13 Idaho, 457, 90 P. 986, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 394, 121 Am. St. Rep. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 450; State v. Robbins, 124 Ind. 308, 24 N. E. 978, 8 L.R.A. 438; Police Comrs. v. Wagner, 93 Md. 182, 48 A. 455, 52 L.R.A. 775, 86 Am. St. Rep. 423; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 61 S. E. 61, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 299, 14 Ann. Cas. 562. Annotation: 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 394; 13 Ann. Cas. 454.

³Mullen v. Moseley, 13 Idaho, 457, 90 P. 986, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 394, 121 Am. St. Rep. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 450; Frost v. People, 193 Ill. 635, 61 N. E. 1054, 86 Am. St. Rep. 352; Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 47 S. E. 275, 65 L.R.A. 616, 104 Am. St. Rep. 1004, 2 Ann. Cas. 933. Annotation: 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 394; 2 Ann. Cas. 936.

⁴People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636, 63 L.R.A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675, affirmed 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. ed. 575, 24 S. Ct. 372.

⁵Ex parte Mon Luck, 29 Or. 421, 44 P. 693, 32 L.R.A. 738, 54 Am. St. Rep. 804.

⁶See FISH AND FISHERIES [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 1014]; GAME AND GAME LAWS [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 683]; GAMING [Also 12 R. C. L. p. 704]; INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 239]; PROSTITUTION. As to the right to a jury trial in case of seizure of property alleged to be illegally used, see annotation: 17 A.L.R. 568, s, 50 A.L.R. 97.

⁸Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 S. Ct. 273; Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171, 78 S. W. 770, 65 L.R.A. 76, 105 Am. St. Rep. 25, 2 Ann. Cas. 242; People v. Hupp, 53 Colo. 80, 123 P. 651, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 792, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1177; Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801, 52 A.L.R. 51 (gambling house); Blackman Health Resort v. Atlanta, 151 Ga. 507, 107 S. E. 525, 17 A.L.R. 576; Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19, 37 L.R.A. 294, 62 Am. St. Rep. 477; Balch v. Glenn, 85 Kan. 735, 119 P. 67, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1080, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 406; State v. Nejin,

akin to the right of destroying property for the public safety in case of the prevalence of a devastating fire or other controlling exigency,⁹ which has already been considered.¹⁰ Property taken or destroyed for the purpose of abating a nuisance is not taken for public use, and accordingly there is no obligation to make compensation for such taking.¹¹ The state may authorize the removal, destruction, or abatement of nuisances before any judicial decision and leave the party to his right of appeal to the courts, by an action for damages, for a determination of the question whether the thing abated was a nuisance.¹² Where buildings are so used as to be common nuisances, the normal power to abate them exists and such action is not a taking of property without due process of law.¹³ Equity may be invested with jurisdiction to abate a nuisance without violating the due process guaranty,¹⁴ and in proper cases an injunction may be issued for the same purpose without infringing the constitutional guaranty.¹⁵

Summary proceedings may be taken against the maintenance of a bawdyhouse without violating the due process of law. A temporary injunction which does not prevent the owners from using the property in a lawful manner, but only prevents the maintenance of a nuisance thereon, may be authorized without notice to the person guilty of the nuisance.¹⁶ The extent to which such nuisances may be abated without notice and hearing is not answered uniformly. It has been stated generally that a statute conferring power upon a chancery court to abate nuisances must provide for a hearing and an opportunity to defend.¹⁷ Other cases without mentioning any provision as to notice and opportunity have sustained statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the chancery courts.¹⁸ A seizure and a retention of property alleged to be used as a bawdyhouse without notice and without a hearing to determine whether such place is a nuisance in fact constitute a violation of the due process guaranty.¹⁹ The owner of property used as a bawdyhouse is not deprived of his property without due process of law if he is accorded notice and hearing, by selling the personal property at an auction and paying him

¹⁴⁰La. 793, 74 So. 103, citing R. C. L.; State v. Hyman, 98 Md. 596, 57 A. 6, 64 L.R.A. 637, 1 Ann. Cas. 742; State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N. W. 770, 58 A.L.R. 607; Lawton v. Steele, 119 N. Y. 226, 23 N. E. 878, 7 L.R.A. 134, 16 Am. St. Rep. 813, affirmed 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 S. Ct. 499; State v. French, 71 Ohio St. 186, 73 N. E. 216, 104 Am. St. Rep. 770, 1 Ann. Cas. 948; Harrington v. Providence, 20 R. I. 233, 38 A. 1, 38 L.R.A. 305; Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 47 S. E. 275, 65 L.R.A. 616, 104 Am. St. Rep. 1004, 2 Ann. Cas. 933. Annotation: 2 Ann. Cas. 245.

⁹Jenks v. Stump, 41 Colo. 281, 93 P. 17, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 554, 124 Am. St. Rep. 137, 14 Ann. Cas. 914.

¹¹Sweet v. Reckel, 159 U. S. 380, 40 L. ed. 188, 16 S. Ct. 43; Balch v. Glenn, 85 Kan. 735, 119 P. 67, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1080, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 406; State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103, citing R. C. L.; State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N. W. 770, 58 A.L.R. 607. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1913A, 412.

¹²Wheeling & E. G. R. Co. v. Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487, 52 S. E. 499, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 321.

¹³Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N. E. 55, 5 L.R.A. 193, 14 Am. St. Rep. 446.

¹⁴State ex rel. Wilcox v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 146 N. W. 953, 5 A.L.R. 1449; State ex rel. Robertson v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co. (State ex rel. Robertson v. Lane) 126 Minn. 78, 147 N. W. 951, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 549. Annotation: 5 A.L.R. 1483, s, 22 A.L.R. 545, and 75 A.L.R. 1298. As to abatement of nuisances generally, see NUISANCES [Also 20 R. C. L. p. 376]. As to abatement of particular nuisances, see particular titles.

¹⁵Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County Dist. Court, 134 U. S. 31, 33 L. ed. 801, 10 S. Ct. 424; Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N. E. 55, 5 L.R.A. 193, 14 Am. St. Rep. 446; State ex rel. Wilcox v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953, 5 A.L.R. 1449.

¹⁶State ex rel. Herigstad v. McCray, 48 N. D. 625, 186 N. W. 280, 22 A.L.R. 530. Annotation: 5 A.L.R. 1483, s, 22 A.L.R. 545, and 75 A.L.R. 1298.

¹⁹State ex rel. Herigstad v. McCray, 48 N. D. 625, 186 N. W. 280, 22 A.L.R. 530. Annotation: 5 A.L.R. 1483, s, 22 A.L.R. 545, and 75 A.L.R. 1298.

§ 680. Foodstuffs.—

§ 681. Intoxicating Liquors.—

ment as such,⁹ and liquors brought for sale into a district in which such sale

²⁰People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N. E. 31, L.R.A.1917B, 1075.

²Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 57 L. ed. 971, 33 S. Ct. 610, affirming 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1066; North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chi- cago, 211 U. S. 306, 53 L. ed. 195, 29 S. Ct. 101, 15 Ann. Cas. 276. As to fruit, see infra, § 682. See Food [Also 11 R. C. L. p. 1093].

³Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 S. Ct. 693; Ross v. Desha Levee Bd. 83 Ark. 176, 103 S. W. 380, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699, 119 Am. St. Rep. 131; State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 466.

⁴Windsor v. State, 103 Md. 611, 64 A. 288, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 869; Deems v. Balti- more, 80 Md. 164, 30 A. 648, 26 L.R.A. 541,

¹¹²Minn. 16, 127 N. W. 445, 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 260; State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 A. 189,

³⁴L.R.A.(N.S.) 190, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 218. Annotation: 18 A.L.R. 249, s. 42 A.L.R. 556, 58 A.L.R. 672, 80 A.L.R. 1225, 101 A.L.R. 64, and 110 A.L.R. 644; 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 918.

⁵Nelson v. Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N. W. 445, 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 260; Adams v. Milwaukee, 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1066, affirmed in 228 U. S. 572,

⁵⁷L. ed. 971, 33 S. Ct. 610. Annotation: 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 260; 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1066.

⁶In Columbus Packing Co. v. State, 106 Ohio St. 469, 140 N. E. 376, 37 A.L.R. 1525, it was held that under the facts presented, where the action and controversy involved the res, or right of property, it was error for the court, on application of the plaintiff and before trial on the merits, to order the seizure and sale of food, the property of a cold storage company, by provisional or- ders, where such seizure and sale would render ineffectual a judgment thereafter obtained after trial.

⁸Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 S. Ct. 273; State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103, citing R. C. L. See INTOXICATING LIQUORS [Also 15 R. C. L. p. 239].

⁹Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 9 S. Ct. 6; State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793,

¹⁰Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 S. Ct. 693; Ross v. Desha Levee Bd. 83 Ark. 176, 103 S. W. 380, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699, 119 Am. St. Rep. 131; State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103,

ture from forbidding their further use for that purpose,¹³ for the owner cannot

§ 682. Trees.—

are within the police power of the state.¹⁵ Trees infected with noxious plant

destruction of trees as a public nuisance, if there is provision for investigation

citing R. C. L.; State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 466.

¹²Ex parte Campbell, 74 Cal. 20, 15 P. 318, 5 Am. St. Rep. 418; People v. Van de Carr, 178 N. Y. 425, 70 N. E. 965, 66 L.R.A. 189, 102 Am. St. Rep. 516; People v. Orange County Road Constr. Co. 175 N. Y. 84, 67 N. E. 129, 65 L.R.A. 33.

¹³Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 S. Ct. 273; Re Young, 154 Cal. 317, 97 P. 822, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 330; Cureton v. State, 135 Ga. 660, 70 S. E. 332, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 182.

¹⁴Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 56 L. ed. 1229, 32 S. Ct. 697, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 153.

¹⁶Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 72 L. ed. 568, 48 S. Ct. 246; Balch v. Glenn, 85 Kan. 735, 119 P. 67, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1080, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 406; Louisiana State Bd. of Agri. & Immigration v. Tanzmann, 140 La. 756, 73 So. 854, L.R.A.1917C, 894, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 217; Colvill v. Fox, 51 Mont. 72, 149 P. 496, L.R.A.1915F, 894. Annotation: 12 A.L.R. 1136; 67 A.L.R. 214; L.R.A.1915F, 894; 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1080. See also AGRICULTURE, Vol. 2, p. 433, § 39.

¹⁷Chicago, T. H. & S. E. R. Co. v. Ander- son, 182 Ind. 140, 105 N. E. 49, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 182, affirmed in 242 U. S. 283, 61 L. ed. 302, 37 S. Ct. 124; St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 8, 77 S. W. 876, 63 L.R.A. 778; Northern P. R. Co. v. Adams County, 78 Wash. 53,

¹³⁸P. 307, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 274; Wedemeyer v. Crouch, 68 Wash. 14, 122 P. 366, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1090. Annotation: 12 A.L.R. 1143.

¹⁸Miller v. State Entomologist (Miller v. Schoene) 146 Va. 175, 135 S. E. 813, 67 A.L.R. 197, affirmed in 276 U. S. 272, 72 L. ed. 568, 48 S. Ct. 246. Annotation: 67 A.L.R. 215.

¹⁹Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 72 L. ed. 568, 48 S. Ct. 246, affirming 146 Va. 175,

²⁰St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 8, 77 S. W. 876, 63 L.R.A. 778; Stockwell v. State, 110 Tex. 550, 221 S. W. 932, 12 A.L.R. 1116.

¹Miller v. State Entomologist (Miller v. Schoene) 146 Va. 175, 135 S. E. 813, 67 A.L.R. 197, affirmed in 276 U. S. 272, 72 L. ed. 568, 48 S. Ct. 246; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A.L.R. 1121. See also AGRICULTURE, Vol. 2, p. 433, § 39. Due process in a statute authorizing the destruction of noxious weeds upon land of a nonresident at his expense is provided for by requiring that notice of the expense be mailed to him and that if the claim has not been paid within thirty days, it be pre- sented to the county commissioner before whom he might contest its validity before the cost is assessed against him. Wede- meyer v. Crouch, 68 Wash. 14, 122 P. 366,

⁴³L.R.A.(N.S.) 1090. A statute which imposes the cost in- curred by an entomological commission in inspecting and treating trees, shrubs, and plants for insects and plant diseases upon the owner of the property whose premises

determine that insects found upon trees are injurious insect pests or that conditions found there constitute contagious disease and to order destruction of

§ 683. Animals.—

the statutes provide for compensation to the owner for the loss of the stock.⁶

the destruction is based upon the presence of a contagious or infectious disease

and is for the purposes of preventing the spread of the disease and for protecting health, the destruction without a prior hearing has been sustained as

however, has been expressed on this point,¹⁰ at least where the destruction is

running at large in violation of such statutes or ordinances.¹⁶ A statute providing for the destruction of any dog not registered and not wearing a collar

are inspected and gives him twenty days within which to pay such cost and, in the event of his failure, makes it a lien upon the property is not invalid on the ground that it authorizes the cost of the proceeding to be taxed against his property without notice to him or opportunity to question the amount thereof. Balch v. Glenn,

⁸New Orleans v. Charouleau, 121 La. 890, 46 So. 911, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 368, 126 Am. St. Rep. 332, 15 Ann. Cas. 46. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 71.

¹¹Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L.R.A. 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850.

¹²Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N. E. 854, 32 Am. St. Rep. 113. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 73.

¹⁴Loesch v. Koehler, 144 Ind. 278, 41 N. E. 326, 43 N. E. 129, 35 L.R.A. 682; Randall v. Patch, 118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A.L.R. 65. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 67. The constitutional provision against the taking of property without due process of law is violated by a statute which authorizes the seizure and sale of calves under seven months of age if consigned or held under herd unaccompanied by their mothers, without notice, actual or constructive, to the reputed owner. Lacey v. Lemmons,

as required, by any person, does not violate the guaranty.¹⁷ A license statute

for the destruction without notice to the owner.¹⁸ In several cases ordinances

hogs found running at large on or near public levees does not unconstitutionally deprive the owner of his property where prevention of the weakening of

I. REGULATIONS

§ 684. Generally.—

this power. It is obviously true that regulation is not per se a violation of the

capricious and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.⁴

¹⁷Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 Utah, 245, 30 P. 760, 16 L.R.A. 689. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 75. An ordinance providing that a dog seized while running at large shall be killed if not ransomed by payment of $1 before 10 o'clock of the morning after it has been detained twenty-four hours and providing for a notice of the seizure to be given to the owner of any dog having a collar with the owner's name thereon is not unconstitutional or so unreasonable that the court can hold it void. Hagerstown v. Witmer,

¹⁶⁵N. Y. 517, 59 N. E. 353, 51 L.R.A. 681, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767. Annotation: 8 A.L.R. 75.

¹⁰³S. W. 380, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699, 119 Am. St. Rep. 131. Annotation: 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699.

¹Masonic Cemetery Asso. v. Gamage (C. C. A. 9th) 38 F. (2d) 950, 71 A.L.R. 1027, writ of certiorari denied in 282 U. S. 852,

⁷⁵L. ed. 755, 51 S. Ct. 30; State v. Kierman, 116 Conn. 458, 165 A. 601, 88 A.L.R. 962.

¹³⁸Ga. 625, 75 S. E. 1041, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 541, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 609; Balch v. Glenn, 85 Kan. 735, 119 P. 67, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1080, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 406. Annotation: 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1080; Ann. Cas. 1913A, 412.

⁴West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L. ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 505, 89 A.L.R. 1469; Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 77 L. ed. 1439, 53 S. Ct. 761; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 76 L. ed. 1167, 52 S. Ct.

⁵⁸¹(weight of loads on highways); Northern P. R. Co. v. Puget Sound & W. H. R. Co. 250 U. S. 332, 63 L. ed. 1013, 39 S. Ct.

⁴⁷⁴(charges on property); Puget Sound Traction, Light & P. Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574, 61 L. ed. 1325, 37 S. Ct. 705, 5 A.L.R. 1; Mississippi R. Commission v. Mobile & O. R. Co. 244 U. S. 388, 61 L. ed. 1216, 37 S. Ct. 602. A court may not, under the guise of protecting private property, extend its authority to a subject of regulation not within its competency, but is confined to ascertaining whether the particular assertion of the legislative power to regulate has been exercised to so unwarranted a degree as, in substance and effect, to exceed regulation and to be equivalent to a taking of property without due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 S. Ct. 585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 12 S. Ct. 468 (fees chargeable by grain elevators); Durgin v. Minot, 203 Mass. 26, 89 N. E. 144, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 241, 133 Am. St. Rep. 276; People v. Luhrs, 195 N. Y. 377,

⁸⁹N. E. 171, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 473. Compelling expense to improve property by the exercise of police power does not deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, if the exaction is not unreasonable either with reference to the nature or cost. Health Dept. v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 27 L.R.A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579; Etheredge v. Norfolk, 148 Va. 795, 139 S. E. 508, 55 A.L.R.

account of its actual operation.⁵ If a statute in its practical operation becomes

cation, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.⁶

§ 685. Animals.—

jecting them to tests for tuberculosis, etc., has generally been sustained.⁷ The

§ 636. Attorneys' Fees.—

view is that the statute may be made applicable to such contracts;¹¹ the other,

§ 687. Automobiles.—

³⁰⁰U. S. 154, 81 L. ed. 573, 57 S. Ct. 397, re- hearing denied in 300 U. S. 686, 81 L. ed. 888, 57 S. Ct. 504.

⁷⁰L. ed. 176, 46 S. Ct. 64 (limited to a fee of $3 for preparing the papers to secure a claim, under the War Risk Insurance Act); Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U. S. 540, 69 L. ed. 775, 45 S. Ct. 399; Capital Trust Co. v. Cal- houn, 250 U. S. 208, 63 L. ed. 942, 39 S. Ct. 486. Annotation: 69 L. ed. 775. See generally ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Vol. 5, p. 331, § 200.

¹⁰Buckler v. Hilt, 209 Ind. 541, 200 N. E. 219, 103 A.L.R. 901. Annotation: 103 A.L.R. 907.

¹¹Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U. S. 170, 64 L. ed. 843, 40 S. Ct. 474; Newman v. Moyers,

¹³Hartford L. Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U. S. 129, 65 L. ed. 549, 41 S. Ct. 276 (refusal to pay insurance claim); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 57 L. ed. 1507,

¹⁵Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincin- nati, 284 U. S. 335, 76 L. ed. 323, 52 S. Ct. 144.

§ 688. Banks.—

lessly insolvent without violating due process of law.¹⁸ In liquidating a de-

given in the assets of an insolvent bank, within certain limits, without violat-

with commercial depositors in the distribution of all other assets and resources

²⁰Opinion of Justices, 278 Mass. 607, 181 N. E. 833, 82 A.L.R. 1021. Annotation: 82 A.L.R. 1025.

²Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64, 79 L. ed. 1303, 55 S. Ct. 558, 96 A.L.R. 1438. A plan adopted pursuant to state stat- ute for the reopening of a closed bank, pro- posed by at least three fourths of the cred- itors, recommended by the superintendent of banks, and approved after hearing by the court of chancery, whereby part of the stockholders contributed new capital in consideration of their release from further statutory liability on their old shares, the noncontributing stockholders remaining lia- ble on their shares, and 25 per cent of the claims against the old bank was assumed by the reopened bank, and 75 per cent was to be a charge on assets to be placed in a pool to be administered by the bank as a trust for the benefit of creditors, and as- sets having an estimated value exceeding the liabilities assumed were turned over to the reopened bank as the primary source of payment, and whereby no dividends were to be declared upon shares of the re- opened bank until all the assumed liabil- ities had been satisfied, does not annul rights of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con- stitution. Ibid. Error of judgment on the part of the liq- uidating agency of a closed bank in the compromise of liabilities is not a taking of property in violation of the Federal Con- stitution. Ibid.

³Annotation: 31 A.L.R. 790, s. 79 A.L.R. 582, 83 A.L.R. 1080. In Abilene Nat. Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 707, 33 S. Ct. 409, it was held that national banks cannot claim that as to dealings after the Kansas State Depos- itors' Guaranty Law of March 6, 1909, went into effect, the obligation of their contract was impaired and their property taken without due process of law, because as creditors they did not share equally with depositors under that statute in the assets of an insolvent state bank. As to preferences and priorities, see BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 538, §§ 747 et seq.

⁶Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Or. 597, 209 P. 100, 210 P. 706, 25 A.L.R. 919. Annotation: 31 A.L.R. 790, s. 79 A.L.R. 582, 83 A.L.R. 1080.

¹⁰²A. 569, 1 A.L.R. 1048. For a full discussion, see BANKS, Vol. 7, p. 290, § 415.

§ 689. Business and Trade Practices.—

to legitimate channels, the state has a right to throw around it such safeguards

out due process of law, in violation of the Philippine Bill of Rights as enacted

§ 690. Contracts.—

relative to many conditions of time, place, and circumstance.¹⁶ The liberty of

tract can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances.¹⁸ A

⁸Farmers & M. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 67 L. ed. 1157, 43 S. Ct. 651, 30 A.L.R. 635.

³⁰¹U. S. 178, 81 L. ed. 990, 57 S. Ct. 748 (contents of fertilizer); State v. W. S. Buck Mercantile Co. 33 Wyo. 47, 264 P. 1023, 57 A.L.R. 675 (label showing content of virgin wool required on woolen goods). Annotation: 81 L. ed. 1002.

¹³Detweiler v. Welch (C. C. A. 9th) 46 F. (2d) 75, 73 A.L.R. 1440 (potatoes). See MARKETS AND MARKETING STATUTES [Also 18 R. C. L. p. 366].

¹⁶Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. N. O. Nelson Mfg. Co. 291 U. S. 352, 78 L. ed. 840, 54 S. Ct. 392. See also Vol. 11, p. 1153, §§ 339 et seq.

¹⁷Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Stephenson v. Binford,

⁸⁷A.L.R. 721; Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U. S. 151,

⁷⁶L. ed. 214, 52 S. Ct. 69; Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co. 279 U. S. 253, 73 L. ed. 688, 49 S. Ct. 314; Growers Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Co-op Marketing Asso. 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 S. Ct. 516, 27 A.L.R. 27; Crowley v. Chris- tensen, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 S. Ct. 13.

¹⁸Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U. S. 283, 77 L. ed. 306, 53 S. Ct. 133, 87 A.L.R. 285.

tered into within the state is to be performed elsewhere does not put its terms,

laws beyond its borders so as to destroy or impair the right of citizens of other

with every local statutory policy solely upon the ground that one of the parties

is its own citizen.² A state statute prohibiting billboard advertising of tobacco

stitution of the United States by Chapter ¹⁷⁹, Laws 1917 (§§ 5941a1, 5941a2,

disability from the effect of the injuries so received, or if made within thirty

²⁰Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518. A state statute imposing restrictions upon the processing of fish does not de- prive a processor of property without due process of law because it operates indi- rectly as a deterrent on the making of con- tracts for the purchase of fish taken from the high seas and brought into the state. Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513.

¹Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. 292 U. S. 143, 78 L. ed. 1178, 54 S. Ct. 634, 92 A.L.R. 928.

²Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. 292 U. S. 143, 78 L. ed. 1178,

⁵⁴S. Ct. 634, 92 A.L.R. 928. A state statute whereby the bond of a contractor guaranteeing to an owner the faithful performance of a contract for the construction of a building is declared to inure to the protection of materialmen and laborers as if a guaranty that the con- tractor shall pay them had been ex- pressed therein, but which does not re- quire that a bond be given, does not, as applied to a bond which expresses an in- tention to exclude materialmen and labor- ers, constitute an arbitrary interference with liberty of contract, with resulting vio- lation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. N. O. Nel- son Mfg. Co. 291 U. S. 352, 78 L. ed. 840,

³Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 76 L. ed. 643, 52 S. Ct. 273, 79 A.L.R. 546.

⁴Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley To- bacco Growers' Co-op. Marketing Asso. 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291.

⁵Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 80 L. ed. 772, 56 S. Ct. 513.

⁶Peterson v. Panovitz, 62 N. D. 328, 243 N. W. 798, 84 A.L.R. 1290. Annotation: 84 A.L.R. 1297.

⁷Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 44 L. ed. 136, 20 S. Ct. 96; United States v. Joint Traffic Asso.

§ 691. Flag.—

displaying a flag so decorated, which intends to prevent the use of flags already

law.⁹ There has been held to be some limits on legislation of this character.¹⁰

of a red flag in a parade.¹¹ But a state statute penalizing the public display

which the state may not constitutionally prohibit, is invalid as infringing upon

§ 692. Garbage.—

collection of garbage by a licensed collector13 and forbidding its transportation

scientific methods of reduction of fats.¹⁷ It is recognized that the regulations

§ 693. Moratorium.—

⁸Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 51 L. ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419, 10 Ann. Cas. 525, affirming 74 Neb. 757, 105 N. W. 298, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079, 121 Am. St. Rep. 754. Annotation: 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079.

¹⁰Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N. E. 41, 49 L.R.A. 181, 76 Am. St. Rep. 30. Annotation: 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1079.

¹¹Com. v. Karvonen, 219 Mass. 30, 106 N. E. 556, L.R.A.1915B, 706, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 846. Annotation: L.R.A.1915B, 706.

¹⁴Wheeler v. Boston, 233 Mass. 275, 123 N. E. 684, 15 A.L.R. 275; Pantlind v. Grand Rapids, 210 Mich. 18, 177 N. W. 302, 15 A.L.R. 280. Annotation: 15 A.L.R. 287, s. 72 A.L.R. 520.

¹⁸Jansen Farms v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 138, 171 N. E. 199, 72 A.L.R. 514; Pantlind v. Grand Rapids, 210 Mich. 18, 177 N. W. 302, 15 A.L.R. 280.

⁸⁸A.L.R. 1481, affirming 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A.L.R. 1507; Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297.

²⁰Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed. 1593, 55 S. Ct. 854, 97 A.L.R. 1106, rehearing denied in 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82; Home Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481.

§ 694. Occupations.2—

licensed, in a business, trade, or occupation which is subject to legislative con-

of no use does not give any basis to a contention that it has been taken without

§ 695. Privacy.—

purposes without the written consent of such person.¹⁰ Such a statute will be

§ 696. Property.—

property for lawful purposes or restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only

poses, is prejudicial to the interests of the community.¹³ A reasonable regula-

¹Re People (Title & Mortg. Guarantee Co.) 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153, 96 A.L.R. 297.

²As to licensing occupations generally, see LICENSES [Also 17 R. C. L. p. 470]. See ATTORNEYS AT LAW, Vol. 5, p. 270, §§ 14 et seq.; AUCTIONS, Vol. 5, p. 447, §§ 3 et seq.; PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 352, §§ 3 et seq.].

³Clein v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 529, 139 S. E. 46, 53 A.L.R. 933 (auction sales of jewel- ry).

⁴Semler v. Oregon State Dental Ex- aminers, 294 U. S. 608, 79 L. ed. 1086, 55 S. Ct. 570 (dentists); Berk v. State, 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832, 84 A.L.R.

¹¹⁶Conn. 458, 165 A. 601, 88 A.L.R. 962 (junk yard); Tuttle v. Wood (Tex. Civ. App.) 35 S. W. (2d) 1061, citing R. C. L.

²⁶⁹U. S. 269, 70 L. ed. 270, 46 S. Ct. 110, sustaining the imposition of a graduated tax upon the product of fish canners for the purpose of discouraging the canning of the larger amounts.

¹⁰²N. E. 193, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 532, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1221. See ARCHITECTS, Vol. 3, p. 997.

⁷Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 56 L. ed. 439, 32 S. Ct. 286; Reetz v. Michigan,

¹⁸⁸U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 S. Ct. 390; State v. Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289, 62 N. E. 325, 55 L.R.A. 791, 87 Am. St. Rep. 605; State v. Carlisle, 28 S. D. 169, 132 N. W. 686, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 395. Annotation: Ann. Cas. 1914B, 399. See PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS [Also 21 R. C. L. p. 350].

⁸Gregory v. Hecke, 73 Cal. App. 268, 238 P. 787, citing R. C. L.; State v. Havorka,

¹³Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 S. Ct. 273; Richmond, F. O. P.

tion under the police power is not a violation of the due process guaranty,¹⁴

in participating in the general advantage.¹⁸ Likewise, acts done in the proper

constitute a "taking" in a constitutional sense.¹⁹ All such prohibitions as to

⁷³⁴(prohibition of use of engines of rail- road company on a certain street of a mu- nicipality); State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 165 A. 601, 88 A.L.R. 962; Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. 128 Ind. 555,

²⁸N. E. 76, 12 L.R.A. 652; Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills, 141 N. C. 615, 54 S. E. 453, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 321; Bountiful City v. De Lu- ca, 77 Utah, 107, 292 P. 194, 72 A.L.R. 657.

³⁴L. ed. 620, 11 S. Ct. 13; Barbier v. Con- nolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357; Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036 (nui- sance); Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,

⁹⁷U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989 (prohibition of manufacture and sale of intoxicating liq- uors).

¹⁵Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15 (prohibiting lease of lands to aliens); Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 A. 354, 12 A.L.R. 669 (city building plan); Wilmot v. Chicago, 328 Ill. 552, 160 N. E. 206, 62 A.L.R. 394 (prohibi- tion against change of grade in sidewalk); White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409, 53 A.L.R. 1215. Annotation: 12 A.L.R. 679. A statute providing that a railroad com- pany shall not collect fare from a passen- ger when it fails, neglects, or refuses to deliver the passenger a check for his bag- gage is valid and binding on such company as a part of the penalty for its failure and neglect to comply with the statute, and is in no sense a taking of property without due process of law within the inhibition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti- tution of the United States. Tarr v. Ore- gon Short Line R. Co. 14 Idaho, 192, 93 P. 957, 125 Am. St. Rep. 151.

⁴⁰L. ed. 490, 16 S. Ct. 345 (state laws sub- jecting lands on a river bank to ease- ment or servitude for the construction of a levee); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581, 88 A. 775, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 977, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 157.

¹⁸Opinion of Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 A. 627, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 422, 13 Ann. Cas. 745.

¹⁹Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 S. Ct. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Taggart v. Claypole, 145 Ind. 590, 44 N. E. 18, 32 L.R.A. 586; Swift v. Calnan, 102 Iowa, 206, 71 N. W. 233, 37 L.R.A. 462, 63 Am. St. Rep. 443; Callen v. Junction City, 43 Kan. 627, 23 P. 652, 7 L.R.A. 736; Fellows v. Charleston, 62 W. Va. 665, 59 S. E. 623, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 737,

¹²⁵Am. St. Rep. 990, 13 Ann. Cas. 1154. Annotation: 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 737; 4 Ann. Cas. 1185.

²⁰Re Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 796, 109 Am. St. Rep. 178.

²Vreeland v. Forest Park Reservation Commission, 82 N. J. Eq. 349, 87 A. 435, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1153.

§ 697. Public Printing.—

§ 698. Public Utilities.—

protected against confiscation by a constitutional guaranty that the price fixed

similar clauses in the various state Constitutions,⁶ although it is settled that

are businesses affected with a public interest,⁷ it is equally well settled that

tions relating to public utilities as such and, therefore, are discussed in another

reasonableness of the rates fixed for its charges by a rate-fixing commission.⁹

³State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co. 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 953.

⁹Ohio Bell Teleph. Co. v. Public Util- ities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 81 L. ed. 1093, 57 S. Ct. 724; Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 80 L. ed. 1288, 56 S. Ct. 906; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. ed. 1033,

⁵⁶S. Ct. 720; Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co. v. Nebraska State R. Co. 297 U. S. 471, 80 L. ed. 810, 56 S. Ct. 536; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 294 U. S. 63, 79 L. ed. 761, 55 S. Ct. 316; South- ern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 78 L. ed. 260, 54 S. Ct. 148; Los Angeles Gas & E. Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U. S. 287, 77 L. ed. 1180, 53 S. Ct. 637 (recogniz- ing rule); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 57 L. ed. 431, 33 S. Ct. 185; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 10 S. Ct. 462, 702.

sured to every litigant by the Federal Constitution as a minimal requirement.¹⁰

upon review of rates fixed by a public service commission.¹⁶ In all cases where

fiscation of his property will result, the state must provide a fair opportunity

legislative in character, is void because in conflict with the due process of law

party affected by such legislative action is entitled, by the due process clause,

of a right protected by the Constitution.¹⁸ Hence, if a statute provides that

¹⁰Ohio Bell Teleph. Co. v. Public Util- ities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 81 L. ed. 1093, 57 S. Ct. 724; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 294 U. S. 63,

¹¹Ohio Bell Teleph. Co. v. Public Util- ities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 81 L. ed. 1093, 57 S. Ct. 724; Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 80 L. ed. 1288, 56 S. Ct. 906; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. ed. 1033,

⁵⁶S. Ct. 720; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 294 U. S. 63, 79 L. ed. 761, 55 S. Ct. 316; Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 78 L. ed. 260, 54 S. Ct. 148; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 57 L. ed. 431, 33 S. Ct. 185.

¹²Ohio Bell Teleph. Co. v. Public Util- ities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 81 L. ed. 1093, 57 S. Ct. 724; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. ed. 1033, 56 S. Ct. 720.

¹³Ohio Bell Teleph. Co. v. Public Util- ities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 81 L. ed. 1093, 57 S. Ct. 724.

¹⁴Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 78 L. ed. 260, 54 S. Ct. 148; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 10 S. Ct. 462, 702.

¹⁵West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 294 U. S. 63, 79 L. ed. 761, 55 S. Ct. 316.

¹⁶Bluefield Waterworks & Improv. Co. v. Public Serv. Commission, 262 U. S. 679,

⁶⁷L. ed. 1176, 43 S. Ct. 675; Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U. S. 287, 64 L. ed. 908, 40 S. Ct. 527.

with the demands of due process, be deprived of its right to a judicial investi-

cially an order of the commission, alleged to be confiscatory.²⁰ A statute which

to fix the rates for transportation of logs wholly within the state is not in vio-

an inquiry into the confiscatory character of such rates, where the carrier has,

mined in an action against the commission.⁴ Similarly, an act creating a board

not invalid on the theory that by failing to provide an adequate judicial review

¹⁹Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 78 L. ed. 260, 54 S. Ct. 148; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 10 S. Ct. 462, 702.

¹Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 78 L. ed. 260, 54 S. Ct. 148; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 10 S. Ct. 462, 702.

³Southern P. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537, 57 L. ed. 1610, 33 S. Ct. 1027; Portland R. Light & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission,

²²⁹U. S. 414, 57 L. ed. 1259, 33 S. Ct. 827; Portland R. Light & P. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 229 U. S. 397, 57 L. ed. 1248,

⁴Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Fletcher Paper Co. 248 U. S. 30, 63 L. ed. 107, 39 S. Ct. 13.

The time when a judicial inquiry is made into the action of a rate-fixing commission is not of much significance in ascertaining under the due process clause the validity of the procedure afforded, provided at some stage of the proceedings hearing by judicial inquiry is afforded.⁶ Thus, a state may provide that after a judicial inquiry into the character of an order of the state railroad commission fixing rates, such order shall be binding on the parties until changed.⁷ Failure to provide a hearing in advance as to whether the return allowed a railroad company on its investment is fair does not invalidate the statute providing for recapture by the government of the excess profits of a railroad, where there may be resort to the courts to test the question under the general provisions of law.⁸ One not made a party to a proceeding before a public service commission which results in an order affecting his interests is not deprived of his property without due process of law if the statute provides for a rehearing upon his application.⁹

The main essential in rate-fixing cases is that notice and hearing actually be afforded to interested parties. Thus, municipal ordinances fixing telephone rates do not deny due process of law because the section of the municipal charter under the authority of which they are enacted does not expressly provide for notice and hearing, where both notice and an opportunity to be heard are in fact accorded by ordinances providing that the rates be fixed at a meeting of the city council held in a certain month in each year and requiring the telephone company to furnish the city council annually in that month a statement of its receipts, expenditures, and property employed in the business.¹⁰ Similarly, formal notice as to the precise day upon which water rates will be fixed by ordinance need not be given to a company the rates of which are thus fixed, under a state Constitution which gives notice of the fact that ordinances will be passed annually in a certain month to take effect on a particular date, and under statutes requiring the company to make an annual statement of its ratepayers, revenue, and expenditures at least thirty days prior to a date previous to the effective date of such ordinances.¹¹

§ 699. Secret Societies.—

The legislature may regulate secret societies reasonably without depriving the members of their liberty without due process of law.12 A statute requiring oath-bound secret societies having a membership of twenty or more, except labor unions and benevolent orders, to file sworn copies of their constitutions, laws, regulations, and oaths, together with a list of members and officers, may be upheld as not actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.13

§ 700. Time.—

The owner of a clock is not deprived of his property without due process of law by a statute forbidding the display of it in a public place

⁷Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Fletcher Paper Co. 248 U. S. 30, 63 L. ed. 107, 39 S. Ct. 13.

⁸Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 68 L. ed. 388, 44 S. Ct. 169, 33 A.L.R. 472.

¹⁰Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. ed. 176, 29 S. Ct. 50.

¹¹San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 S. Ct. 804.

¹²People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497, 43 A.L.R. 909, affirmed in 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785. Annotation: 43 A.L.R. 914, s. 62 A.L.R. 798.

¹³People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497, 43 A.L.R. 909, affirmed in 278 U. S. 63, 73 L. ed. 184, 49 S. Ct. 61, 62 A.L.R. 785.

to furnish time for the general public when it is set to indicate other than standard time.¹⁴

§ 701. Waste.—

The state may impose reasonable regulations to prevent unnecessary loss, destruction, and waste of natural resources, such as petroleum, natural gas,15 or natural mineral waters,16 without violating the guaranty of due process. A statute in regard thereto must be definite.17 An action of the governor of a state in limiting, by executive order enforced by the military arm of the state, the permissible production of petroleum at a time when and place where the courts are open and functioning is not due process of law.18

§ 702. Generally.—

Modern interpretation of constitutional provisions has seen the gradual growth of an important development affecting the power of states over foreign rights sought to be enforced within their borders. Due to recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the freedom exercised under the ancient doctrine of comity, in the sense in which it prevails in conflict of laws among different nations, has been greatly curtailed as between the various states and territories of the United States. Many of the decisions limiting the ancient theories of comity have arisen under Article 4, § 1, of the Federal Constitution, usually designated as the "full faith and credit clause." Hence, this clause has become of increasing importance in recent developments of the law, and its effect is of extreme significance in ascertaining the extent to which the courts or statutes of a forum may interpose local laws or policies upon foreign rights there asserted.19

Article ⁴, § ¹, of the Constitution of the United States, provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Congress, in the execution of the power conferred upon it by the Constitution, prescribed in the Act of May ²⁰, 1790, the mode of attestation of the records of the courts of one state to entitle them to be proved in the courts of another state and enacted that records so authenticated should have such faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the state from which they are taken. By this act Congress has not only provided for the admission of such records as evidence, but has declared the effect of such evidence when admitted—namely, that if a record is duly authenticated, it shall have such faith and credit as it has in the state court whence it is taken. On March ²⁷, 1804, Congress passed an act extending the provisions of the former statute to the public acts, records, judicial proceedings, etc., of the territories of the United States and countries subject to the jurisdiction thereof. These stat-

¹⁴State v. Bassett, 100 Conn. 430, 123 A. 842, 37 A.L.R. 131. Annotation: 37 A.L.R. 134.

¹⁵Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 77 L. ed. 375, 53 S. Ct. 190; Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 76 L. ed. 1062, 52 S. Ct. 559, 86 A.L.R. 403; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 44 L. ed. 729, 20 S. Ct. 576.

¹⁶Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160.

¹⁷Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 76 L. ed. 1062, 52 S. Ct. 559, 86 A.L.R. 403; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct. 284 U. S. 8, 76 L. ed. 136, 52 S. Ct. 103, 78 A.L.R. 826.

utory enactments subsequently became §§ ⁹⁰⁵ and ⁹⁰⁶ of the Revised Statutes, ²⁸ U. S. C. A. §§ ⁶⁸⁷, ⁶⁸⁸.¹

The effect of the full faith and credit clause upon the force which must be given to judgments of another state has been judicially scrutinized almost since the ratification of the Constitution. It may be added that even at the present time almost all of the cases which involve the effect of this clause of the Constitution relate to such judicial acts of another state. Such matters involving as they do the status and conclusiveness of judgments are properly considered in another title and will not be dealt with herein.² Some of the recent decisions, however, have given the constitutional provision a broader scope. It is no longer limited in its application to judicial proceedings or judgments of another state. Its application to public acts of states is one of the important recent developments in the field of constitutional construction.³

It is now well settled that a statute is a "public act" within the meaning of Article ⁴, § ¹, of the Federal Constitution.⁴ Hence, if a court of one state refuses to enforce the statute of another state in a case in which it ought to do so and in which the statute gives a right, it thereby denies the full faith and credit demanded by the Federal Constitution, because the statute is a public act of another state.⁵ Furthermore, the duty imposed upon the courts to give full faith and credit to the Constitution of a state as a public act of the state is as obligatory as the similar duty with respect to the judicial proceedings of such a state.⁶ The clause has nothing to do, however, with the conduct of individuals or corporations.⁷

§ 703. History.—

After the American Revolution, when independence was declared and the confederation of the former colonies was being formed, it was seen by the wise men of that day that the powers necessary to be given to the Confederation and the rights to be given to the citizens of such states, in all the states, would produce such intimate relations between the states and persons that the former would no longer be foreign to each other in the sense that they had been, as dependent provinces, and that for the prosecution of rights in courts, it was proper to put an end to the uncertainty upon the effect of judgments obtained in the different states. Accordingly, in the Articles of Confederation, there was inserted this clause: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of

⁴John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 81 L. ed. 106, 57 S. Ct. 129; Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133; Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co. 289 U. S. 439, 77 L. ed. 1307, 53 S. Ct. 663; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026, 52 S. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 119 U. S. 615, 30 L. ed. 519, 7 S. Ct. 398. See Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 69 L. ed. 783, 45 S. Ct. 389, 41 A.L.R. 1384 (statute and bylaw of mutual benefit society); Ætna L. Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 69 L. ed. 342, 45 S. Ct. 129 (statute relating to insurance); Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 59 L. ed. 1089, 35 S. Ct. 724, L.R.A.1916A, 771 (statute and charter of mutual benefit society); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 58 L. ed. 1259, 34 S. Ct. 879 (statutes relating to insurance). Annotation: 74 A.L.R. 711, s. 100 A.L.R. 1144.

⁵Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133; Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026, 52 S. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696; Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902.

the courts and magistrates of every other state."⁸ What was meant by this clause inserted in the Articles of Confederation may be considered as conclusively determined, almost by contemporaneous exposition.⁹ When the present Constitution was formed, the same clause was introduced into it, but with a variation, making it more comprehensive, including within the purview of full faith and credit which shall be given in each state to proceedings of other states, public acts, records, and judicial proceedings.¹⁰ The constitutional provision, moreover, added that Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof. This contingency had not been taken care of in the provisions of the Articles of Confederation and the purpose of the additional clause in the Constitution was to take care of the deficiency and permit Congress to enforce the declaration of the provision.¹¹

§ 704. Interpretation.—

The constitutional requirement as to full faith and credit must be interpreted in connection with other provisions of the Constitution.12 For example, no state can obtain in the tribunals of other jurisdictions full faith and credit for its judicial proceedings if such proceedings are themselves wanting in the due process of law demanded by the fundamental law.13

§ 705. Operation and Effect.—

The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state, are to be guided when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as to the faith and credit to be given by the court to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of a state other than that in which the court is sitting.14 Federal courts are bound equally with state courts to observe the command of the full faith and credit clause where it is applicable.15

The constitutional provision as to full faith and credit by its terms excludes from operation among the states a considerable portion of private international law. It gives full faith and credit, not only to the judicial proceedings of every state, but also to its public acts and records. Hence, a law of one state, affecting the rights of persons and property and local in the sense that it differs from the laws of other states, and may be to some extent contrary to their policy—such as would not be recognized and enforced, nor a judgment carrying it into effect recognized, if it were the law of a foreign country—must nevertheless have full faith and credit in all of the states of the Union.¹⁶ The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.¹⁷ The clause does not, however, require a greater effect to be given to a state

¹²Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 S. Ct. 236.

¹³Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 S. Ct. 236; Magdanz v. District Ct. — Iowa —, 269 N. W. 498, 108 A.L.R. 377. See also Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S. 141, 51 L. ed. 745, 27 S. Ct. 434.

¹⁴Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co. 194 U. S. 48, 48 L. ed. 870, 24 S. Ct. 598.

¹⁵Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026, 52 S. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696.

¹⁶Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902.

¹⁷Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co. 296 U. S. 268, 80 L. ed. 220, 56 S. Ct. 229.

statute in other states than is given to it by the courts of the enacting state.¹⁸

state.¹⁹ For example, since one state cannot legislate to affect the transmission

of title to lands located in another state, the courts of a state in which land is

statute of another state which would control the devolution of title to lands of

the forum.²⁰ Likewise, an act of a state exempting its registered public debt

jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be

courts otherwise competent.⁴ Although it is true that a state can legislate only

with reference to its own jurisdiction5 and that the full faith and credit clause

the statutes of another state,⁶ the room left for the play of conflicting policies

¹⁹Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133 (recognizing rule); Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026,

²⁰Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386, 54 L. ed. 530, 30 S. Ct. 292, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1292. Annotation: 74 A.L.R. 715, s. 100 A.L.R. 1147.

²National Mut. Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Bra- han, 193 U. S. 635, 48 L. ed. 823, 24 S. Ct. 532.

³Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133.

⁴Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133. See Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, L. O. M.

⁷Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133. In Cole v. Industrial Commission, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520, 90 A.L.R. 116, it was held that Illinois must give full faith and credit to the Compensation Statute of In- diana, which provides an exclusive rem- edy for injuries occurring either within or without the state, where the contract of employment is made within the state, in respect of compensation for injuries occur- ring in Illinois, to a workman employed un- der a contract made in Indiana, where both the employer and employee were resi- dents of Indiana and subject to the laws thereof.

⁸Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133. In Clark v. Willard, 294 U. S. 211, 79 L. ed. 865, 55 S. Ct. 356, 98 A.L.R. 347, the court held that under the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitu- tion a state in which was located prop- erty of a foreign corporation for which a statutory liquidator had, in the domiciliary state, been appointed for the purpose of liquidating its assets upon dissolution, must recognize such liquidator as the suc- cessor in title to the property of the cor- poration, but that this rule did not pre- vent such state, in effectuating its pol- icy tolerating preferences and a race of diligence among the creditors, from subor- dinating such title to the liens of attach- ment and execution levied upon such prop- erty by the creditors of the corporation subsequent to the appointment of the liq- uidator. In so holding the court expressed the opinion that while full faith and credit must be given to the decree of the Iowa

refusing to permit actions against residents of the state by a nonresident super-

under the statutes of another state violates the full faith and credit clause.⁹

§ 706. —

force and effect to the full faith and credit clause, which act is in accordance

with the very mandates of Article ⁴, § ¹, of the Constitution, the command of

of territories.¹⁰ Therefore, the full faith and credit clause is made applicable

§ 707. Exceptions to Operation.—

permitted to do so, but only because they are deemed not to be within its spirit.

Subject to the restraint and limitations of the Federal Constitution, the states

states are themselves limited to a certain extent—or rather, certain things are

Article ⁴, § ¹, include only such things as it was the plain purpose of the Con-

court and the statute of Iowa, to the ef- fect that the receiver there appointed was entitled to the property not as an ordinary receiver, but as a quasi assignee of the dissolved corporation, and that as such it might defend and sue in Montana, the question whether such a liquidator would prevail in Montana as against creditors of the corporation attaching or levying exe- cution on local property must be determined by principles of interstate comity and not by the constitutional mandate as to full faith and credit, and that, therefore, the foreign liquidator could not prevail over later attaching or execution creditors. A decree refusing to turn over local as- sets of a foreign insurance company hav- ing local creditors to the statutory liqui- dator of the company in its home state does not violate the provisions of the Fed- eral Constitution that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. Davis v. Amra Grotto, M. O. V. P. E. R. 169 Tenn. 564, 170 Tenn. 19, 89 S. W. (2d) 754, 91 S. W. (2d) 294, 106 A.L.R. 1506. For a detailed discussion of the differ- ences and probable grounds of reconcilia- tion of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, see Broderick v. Rosner,

¹⁰⁰A.L.R. 1133, and Clark v. Willard, 294 U. S. 211, 79 L. ed. 865, 55 S. Ct. 356, 98 A.L.R. 347. See annotation: 100 A.L.R. 1145.

⁹Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133. In Broderick v. McGuire, 119 Conn. 83,

¹⁷⁴A. 314, 94 L.R.A. 890, it was held that the superintendent of banks of the state of New York, who, under the statute of New York, was authorized to make assess- ments on stockholders of insolvent banks and enforce their statutory liability, and had at least an equitable title to the prop- erty of such banks, was, under the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution, entitled to sue in Connecticut to enforce assessments made by him under the New York statute on Connecticut stock- holders of an insolvent New York bank. The court was of the opinion that by vir- tue of the statute of New York the plain- tiff became a statutory assignee of the right to enforce the obligation of the stock- holders, as a receiver appointed by a court would be under a like statute; and that since such a receiver would, under the de- cisions of the United States Supreme Court, be entitled to sue in a foreign jurisdiction as a matter of right, under the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Consti- tution, so might the superintendent of banks of New York sue in Connecticut, be- cause in this respect there exists no dis- tinction between an officer with title who derives his authority through court action and one who derives his power directly from a statute, without intermediary court action. For a detailed discussion of the rule stat- ed in the text, see CONFLICT OF LAWS, Vol. 11, p. 304, § 7.

¹⁰Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 53 L. ed. 695,

¹¹Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 53 L. ed. 695,

¹²Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in

²³⁴U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902. As to questions of policy and conflicting interests of states, see infra, § 708.

tainment of uniformity in laws, but rather the right of each state to have local

say for another what should be sufficient to pass title to land or prescribe the

subjected to the satisfaction of debts, or how questions of title should be liti-

policy of a state to outside interference. On the other hand, the full faith and

ticular provision of the Federal Constitution, such as the full faith and credit

clause, may seemingly be applicable, its controlling effect is limited by the es-

adopted.¹⁷ For example, the full faith and credit clause cannot be invoked to

§ 708. Policy of Forum; Conflicting Interests.—

local policy which, if it exists, would seem to be too trivial to merit serious con-

the interest of the state the judgment of which is challenged.¹⁹ Yet even though

the constitutional provision is a narrow one,²⁰ there is room for some play of

¹³Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902.

¹⁵Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902. See also Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386, 54 L. ed. 530, 30 S. Ct. 292, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1292, as to the fact that effect need not be given to a statute of another state affecting an interest in real estate in the forum.

¹⁶Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L.R.A.1915F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1139, writ of error dismissed in 234 U. S. 738, 58 L. ed. 1570, 34 S. Ct. 902.

²⁹⁶U. S. 268, 80 L. ed. 220, 56 S. Ct. 229; Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 79 L. ed. 1100, 55 S. Ct. 589, 100 A.L.R. 1133 (rec- ognizing rule); Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532,

⁷⁹L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Bradford Elec- tric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026, 52 S. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696.

another, the necessity of some accommodation of the conflicting interests of the

conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of an-

a greater effect is thus to be given to a state statute abroad than the clause per-

statute of another state.⁵ One who challenges the prima facie right of a state

ing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of

the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.⁶ It follows that not every

statute of another state will override a conflicting statute of the forum by vir-

and conflicting interests, the rule is fairly well settled that different considera-

tions usually apply where the statute creating a foreign right, which it is claimed

should be given effect, is set up by way of defense to an asserted liability, from

faith and credit clause, one state cannot refuse to give effect to a substantive

defense arising under applicable statutes of another state if failure to sanction

²²⁹(recognizing rule, but holding that a judgment for taxes is entitled to full faith and credit); Alaska Packers Asso. v. In- dustrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532,

³Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518. See also discussion of the cases in Mil- waukee County v. M. E. White Co. 296 U. S. 268, 80 L. ed. 220, 56 S. Ct. 229.

²⁹⁶U. S. 268, 80 L. ed. 220, 56 S. Ct. 229; Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044,

⁵⁵S. Ct. 518. See also Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026, 52 S. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696. The Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter of the question wheth- er a state may have a local policy merit- ing recognition as a permissible limita- tion upon the full faith and credit clause. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.

²⁹⁶U. S. 268, 80 L. ed. 220, 56 S. Ct. 229; Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026, 52 S. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696.

⁶Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518.

⁷Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518. See also Bradford Elec- tric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145,

the defense thus created by the statute of such other state subjects the defendant to irremediable liability.⁸ The Supreme Court has pointed out, however, that the necessity of balancing the interests of the forum and of the foreign state the statute of which is asserted to control is not any the less whether the statute and policy of the forum are set up as a defense to a suit brought under a foreign statute or a foreign statute is set up as a defense to a suit or proceeding under the local statute. In either case the conflict is the same. In each rights claimed under one statute prevail only by denying effect to the other. In both the conflict is to be resolved not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.⁹ As an example of a fact situation which sets up a defense the denial of which would subject the defendant to an irremediable liability and the nature of which swings any conflicting interest of the forum and of the foreign state the statute of which creates the defensive right in favor of such foreign state so that the full faith and credit clause compels the application of its statute, there may be mentioned a statute of a state in which a contract is entered into, which statute, by enacting a rule of substantive law and in effect becoming a term of such contract, determines the substantive rights of the parties thereto just as if a provision to the same effect as the statute had been embodied in writing in the contract.¹⁰

§ 709. Necessity that Validity of Foreign Laws Be Involved.—

In order to create a reviewable Federal question under the constitutional provision as to full faith and credit, the fact that the validity of laws of another state is drawn into question by the courts of a state determining rights arising under such laws of such other state, and not merely the construction of such laws, must be shown.11 If, every time the courts of a state put a construction upon the statutes of another state, the United States Supreme Court should be required to determine whether the construction was or was not correct, upon the ground that if it were concluded that the construction was incorrect, it would follow

⁸John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 81 L. ed. 106, 57 S. Ct. 129; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. ed. 1026, 52 S. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696. Annotation: 100 A.L.R. 1148 et seq.

⁹Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Accl. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 79 L. ed. 1044, 55 S. Ct. 518.

¹⁰John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 81 L. ed. 106, 57 S. Ct. 129 (statute relating to false answers in application for insurance).

¹¹Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. 243 U. S. 93, 61 L. ed. 610, 37 S. Ct. 344; Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 261, 59 L. ed. 220, 35 S. Ct. 37; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 S. Ct. 676, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 84; Allen v. Alleghany Co. 196 U. S. 458, 49 L. ed. 551, 25 S. Ct. 311; Johnson v. New York L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 491, 47 L. ed. 273, 23 S. Ct. 194; Banholzer v. New York L. Ins. Co. 178 U. S. 402, 44 L. ed. 1124, 20 S. Ct. 972; Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 222, 39 L. ed. 128, 15 S. Ct. 70. See also Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335, 47 L. ed. 839, 23 S. Ct. 558. Annotation: 74 A.L.R. 716. In Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360, 37 L. ed. 203, 13 S. Ct. 350, the United States Supreme Court, in denying a writ of error to the supreme court of New York in an action under the Virginia statute to enforce the liability of a party who had never subscribed for stock or been a transferee thereof in fact because of the presence of his name upon the books of the company without his consent, held that the New York court did not deny full faith and credit to the Virginia statute, because it merely construed such statute without questioning its validity. In Allen v. Alleghany Co. 196 U. S. 458, 49 L. ed. 551, 25 S. Ct. 311, an action in New Jersey upon a contract of a corporation doing business in New York and Pennsylvania contrary to statutes of those states, the holding of the New Jersey court, that such contract is not void and is enforceable in New Jersey was held not to deny full faith and credit to the laws of Pennsylvania and New York, the theory being that the validity of the statutes was not questioned by the holding and that the case turned only upon the construction and effect to be given to them in another state.

that the state courts had refused to give full faith and credit to the statutes involved, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be enlarged in a manner not contemplated.¹² Moreover, the full faith and credit clause does not require the courts of one state to follow the construction given by the courts of another state to its statutes.¹³

¹²Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 222, 39 L. ed. 128, 15 S. Ct. 70; Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360, 37 L. ed. 203, 13 S. Ct. 350. In Banholzer v. New York L. Ins. Co. 178 U. S. 402, 44 L. ed. 1124, 20 S. Ct. 972, where it was contended that the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not give full faith and credit to the New York statute as to insurance, the United States Supreme Court held that the court merely construed the New York statute, and, granting that its construction was erroneous, full faith and credit were not thereby denied to the New York statute.

¹³Nesbitt v. Clark, 272 Pa. 161, 116 A. 404, 25 A.L.R. 1406, writ of certiorari denied in 253 U. S. 621, 66 L. ed. 795, 42 S. Ct. 272.